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Increasing Anonymity via Dummy Increasing Anonymity via Dummy

Increasing Anonymity via Dummy - PowerPoint Presentation

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Increasing Anonymity via Dummy - PPT Presentation

Increasing Anonymity via Dummy Jondos in a Crowd Author Benjamin Winninger Eavesdropping Attacks Local Eavesdropper An attacker who can view all communication to and from a user If the eavesdropper gets lucky and is listening to the sender then the sender is exposed Otherwise the receive ID: 774153

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Increasing Anonymity via Dummy Jondos in a Crowd Author: Benjamin Winninger

Eavesdropping Attacks Local Eavesdropper: An attacker who can view all communication to and from a user. If the eavesdropper gets lucky and is listening to the sender, then the sender is exposed! Otherwise, the receiver is beyond suspicion. As the size of the crowd increases, the probability of a local eavesdropper getting lucky decreases.

End Server AttacksEnd Server: The web server to which the jondo’s request is sent. Since the server can see traffic to and from itself, receiver anonymity isn’t possible! Also, since any jondo could have forwarded the request, it is equally likely that any jondo did forward the request. As the size of the crowd increases, the probability of determining which jondo forwarded the request decreases.

Collaborating Jondo AttacksCollaborating Jondos: A group of crowd members that can view all communication to and from “collaborating” users and pool this information together to find the sender of a request. If the number of crowd members n >= p f *(c+1)/(p f -(1/2)) (note: c = number of collaborators, p f = probability of forwarding, assumed > (1/2)), then the sender has probable innocence! As the size of the crowd increases, the number of collaborating jondos that it can resist also increases!

TakeawaysIn order for a crowd to provide maximum anonymity, the crowd must have a large number of “users”. In an event where there are few (non-collaborating) users, dummy jondos can help a crowd resist all three attacks discussed. The case of the collaborating jondos is particularly interesting since it poses the greatest (consistent) threat to crowd anonymity, so dummy jondos could prove to be extremely useful in this scenario (i.e. by keeping n above the specified value in the previous slide)

Analysis To Be CompletedWhat is the tradeoff of latency for anonymity? How can dummy jondos be set up and registered properly? Is there a new forwarding algorithm that will help work with dummy jondos? How often should dummy jondos be added/dropped out of the crowd? Etc.

Resourceshttp://www.cise.ufl.edu/~ nemo/anonymity/papers/crowds:tissec.pdf www.cise.ufl.edu/~nemo/.../lect04a Crowds .ppt http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=cs_faculty_pubs http :// freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/taxonomy-dummy.pdf