UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT - PDF document

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. MITCHELL SMALLS, a/k/a Gary Richardson, a/k/a Cebo, a/k/a Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of VirginiaRebecca Beach Smith Argued MOTZ and GREGORYand Ellen L. HOLLANDER, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, by published opinion which Judge Dylan W. Greenwood, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Richard Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:John J. Korzen, Director, FOREST UNIVERSITY ��2 &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, ��3 &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge: &#x/MCI; 1 ;&#x/MCI; 1 ; Mitchell Smalls appeals from the district court’s order the court erred in failing to provide an individualized explanation in support of ptember 1996, of conspiracy to import cocaine. At sentencing, the district court Smalls accountable for quantitiesof cocaine base and powder , producing a guideline range of imprisonment for In February 2008, Smalls filed amotion for reduction of on the 200crack cocaine amendmentsto the Sentencing The district court granted the motion and reduced his guideline range to 262 to 327 months.In the motion, Smalls arguethat the district court should n ��4 &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;included cocaine base when calculating his drug quantities at the initial sentencing and requested a sentence of 210 months. He did not discuss or even mention any other factors that might he district court ordered the Government to file a response whether it opposed agreed that Smalls was eligible for a sentence reduction but Two days later, without waiting for Smalls appeals, arguing that the district court to provide an individualized explanationin support of 5 II. reduce a sentence“in the case of a Sentencing Commission18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Wreduce a sentence and to what extent is a matter within the F.3d 724 (4th Cir. 2000). In exercising this discretion, however, thecourt mustconsiderthe factors s18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to the extent that they are applicable.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)-sentencing conduct. SeeU.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10 cmt. district court's grant or denial of a Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 186 (4th Cir. 2010).Butthe question of motion must provide an individualized explanation is one of law that we held that,absent a contrary indication, presume a district court deciding a motionhas considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factorsand other pertinent matters before it. Iat 728-(internal quotation marks see alsosoA] court need not engage in 6 ritualistic incantation in order to establish its consideration of a legal issue. It is sufficient if . . .the district court rules on issues that have been fully presented for internal quotation marksomitted)) neglectedtoconsider relevantfactors, the court does not err in failing to forits § 3582(c)(2) decision III. that in his case the district court did for its the facts of his case overcome the is no longer good law. We consider A. assertsLegreeaddress question of whethera district court must provide in support of itsdeniala § 3582In fact, however, 7 Legree primarilarguedthatthe district court erred in failing to conduct a two-part analysis of his motion on the record, first stating the sentence it would have imposed had the relevant Guidelines amendment been in place at the original sentencing and, second, addressing the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 728. ButLegreealso contendedthat “the district court erred because it did not state on the record with sufficient specificity its reasons for denying the motion.” Id.at 729 provided no individualized explanation in support of its Thus, B. “contrary indication” sufficient to rebutLegree that the district court considered all relevant factors in that Legree himself had notovercome thfound it significant that the motion failed to offer any ,we 8 concluded that all relevant factors wereadequately presented the same district judge presided over Smalls original sentencing and § 3582(c)(2) proceeding§ 3582(c)(2), like Legree’s,failed to set forth Dillon v. United States § 3582(c)(2) motionproperly declined to address Smalls contends, however, that threecritical factorsdistinguish his case from Legree. First, Smalls district court’s consideration of his most recent § 3582(c)(2) four years Thus, Smalls he lapse of a significant amount of time in some cases cast doubt ��9 &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;on such a presumption. But in this case Smalls filed, and the same district judge addressed, several motions during thyear periodremained though Smalls does not motion set forth any new mitigating factorshe would havesubmittedprevented him from fully presenting his case by deciding (c)(2) motionbefore receiving his replyThe fundamental problem with this contentionis that new arguments Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 571 n. 2004). Thus, in failing to consider a reply brief, to consider a ThirdSmalls suggests that his case resembles not Legree but another casein which the defendant and the refused to adopt that upon reduction or explain its to the extent of thherequested. Rather, the 10 Government requested a reduction only to the top of the amended guideline range, and the district court granted that request. meaningfully distinguishhis case from we reduced Smalls’ sentenceIn 1996, woriginallysentencing sentence at the top of the thenresponsibility for his actionsIn response to Smalls’ 2008 motion for reduction of sentence, the district court reduced sentence to the top of the amended guideline range.The court’s decision, in response to Smalls’ most recent Wthereforeconcludethat the facts of Smalls’ case do not rebut the Legreepresumption that the district court considered any C. Smalls Legreeis no longer good law the Supreme Court’s decisions in v. United States 11 552 U.S. 38 (2007), and undermine its reasoning 1. , the Court clarifiedobligations of sentencingcourt in the wake of be justified by “extraordinary” circumstances,butthe sentencing court must consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and “make an adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair Though Gallmakes clear that a sentencing courtmust says nothing about§ 3582(c)(2), in indicating that sentencing courts must adequately explain their chosen sentences, the Court relied onRita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). SeeGall, 552 U.S. at 50; Rita to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the 12 legal decisionmaking authority.”). AndRitaSupreme Court rooted the requirement that a district court explain itsreasoning in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), a provision that does not apply to proceedings. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356- at the time of sentencing,” to “state in open court the reasons for its on of the particular sentence”(emphasis added)United States v. Evans terms, [§ 3553(c)] applies at the time of sentencing, not at the time of sentence Dillon, which the Court issuedthree years after Gall extends to §proceedings. The question in Dillonwas whether Bookerrendered advisory apolicy statement governing 3582(c)(2) proceedingsprovides that, except in limited defendant’s sentence The Court held that did not render the § 3582(c)(2)proceedings “do not S.Ct. at 2692seeid.at 2687 (noting that Booker“ the Guidelines advisory to remedy the Sixth Amendment problems 13 BookerCourt § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a sentencing or resentencing proceeding,” and emphasized the “limited nature” of proceedings. emphasis o3582(c)(2) proceedingsGall, which makes no mention of § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, implicitly undermines 2. Smallsfurthercontenthat, independent of Gall Dillonestablished a new rule requiring courts to provide did, as Smalls note that at 2692. But, contrary to Smalls’ did not create that requirement. Rather, as we recognized in § 3582(c)(2)itself instructs courts to consider the § 3553(a) factors. See18 U.S.C. he court may reduce the [defendant’s] term of imprisonment, ctors set forth in section 3553(a) to F.3d at 727. doesnot indicate that courts must consider those factors 14 3. Finally, we find unavailing Smalls’ reliance on out-circuit cases. SeeUnited States v. Howard- (6th Cir. 2011)district court mustUnited States v. Burrell, 622 F.3d 961(8th Cir. 2010) (same)United States v. Marion- hose casesdid not come in the wake of circuit precedent like indicate , or any other Supreme Court case subsequent to supportargument that we are no longer bound Dillon constitutes superseding Supreme Court precedent that would permit us to ignore I Because Legreegoverns and the facts of Smalls’case fail a court has considered the relevant factors in deciding a , we hold the district court’s explanation AFFIRMED