79 2014 pp 143154 1 Introduction When two people disagree we tend to assume that someone is making a mistake But perhaps that is not always the case Perhaps there are cases of disagreement in which nobody is making a mistake The possibility of cases ID: 87770
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Theplanistodiscusstheseissuesonafairlygenerallevel.Whatisatissueiswhetherrelativismprovidestheonlywayofmakingsenseoffaultlessdisagreement,notwhetherithappenstobethecasethatrelativismprovidestherightaccountofcertaincasesoffaultlessdisagreement.ThatmeansthatIamnotgoingtodiscussissuesspecicallyhavingtodowithpredicatesoftasteoranyotherexpressionsthathavebeendiscussedinthedebateaboutrelativism.1Inx2Igiveaninitialcharacterisationoffaultlessdisagreement.Inx3Iintroduceasimplerelativistaccountoffaultlessdisagreement.x4Ipresentanalternativeaccountoffaultlessdisagreementintermsofattitudesotherthanbe-lief.Inx5IarguethatthisalternativeaccountavoidsaproblemthatRosenkranz(2008)hasraisedinconnectionwithrelativistaccountsoffaultlessdisagreement.Inx6IpresentanotherproblemforrelativistaccountsoffaultlessdisagreementduetoRichard(2008)andCappelenandHawthorne(2009).Inx7Iarguethatanaccountoffaultlessdisagreementintermsofattitudesotherthanbeliefalsoavoidsthisproblem.2FaultlessDisagreementInthissection,Iamgoingtogiveaninitialcharacterisationoffaultlessdis-agreement.Acaseoffaultlessdisagreementisacaseofdisagreementinwhichneitherpartyiswrongormakingamistake.2Thisisnotjustamatteroftherebeingsomesenseinwhichthepartiesareepistemicallyblamelessornotratio-nallycriticisable.Thereisanimportantsenseinwhichsomeonewhobelievessomethingthatisnottruealwayscountsasbeingwrongorhavingmadeamis-take.IfIbelievethatMaryisinheroceanditturnsoutthatsheisnotthere,Ihavemadeamistake.Thatistrueevenifmybeliefisbasedonseeminglystrongevidence.PerhapsIamnotepistemicallyblameworthyinsuchacase,butIhavestillmadeamistake.Inordinarycasesofdisagreement,wetendtoassumethatsomeonemustbemakingamistake.Forinstance,letussupposethatMaryandJohnare 1SeeHuvenes(2012)foradiscussionofsomerelatedissuesconcerningdisagreementandpredicatesoftaste.Whiletheideathatdisagreementcaninvolveattitudesotherthanbeliefplaysanimportantroleinthatdiscussion,thediscussionisnotspecicallyconcernedwithfaultlessdisagreement.2Itakethistobeafairlystandardwayofcharacterisingfaultlessdisagreement.Seee.g.Wright(2006)forasimilarcharacterisationoffaultlessness.2 supposethatMarybelievesthepropositionthathaggisistastyandthatJohnbelievesthepropositionthathaggisisnottasty.Butthenitfollowsthatoneofthembelievessomethingthatisnottrue.Afterall,itcannotbethecasethatapropositionanditsnegationarebothtrue.3Butinthatcase,eitherMaryorJohnismakingamistakeandthedisagreementisnotfaultless.Indeed,ifthislineofreasoningiscorrect,itlookslikefaultlessdisagreementisimpossible.3RelativismDespitetheseapparentdiculties,theideaoffaultlessdisagreementhasnotbeenabandoned.RelativistslikeKolbel(2002,2004,2009)andLasersohn(2005,p.662)havearguedthattheyareinapositiontodeliverfaultlessdisagreement.4Inthissection,Iwillpresentasimplerelativistaccountoffaultlessdisagreement.TherelativistviewsthatIamgoingtodiscusstakepropositionaltruthtoberelativeinsomeinterestingsense.Forthepurposeofthefollowingdiscussion,IwillfocusonKolbel's(2002)versionofrelativism.5AccordingtoKolbel,propositionsaretrueorfalserelativetoperspectives.ThisallowsustosaythatthepropositionthathaggisistastyistruerelativetoMary'sperspective,butfalserelativetoJohn'sperspective.Thisissupposedtoexplainhowfaultlessdisagreementispossible.Whatmattersisthatnobodybelievessomethingthatisnottruerelativetotheirperspective.AslongaswhatMarybelievesistruerelativetoherperspectiveandwhatJohnbelievesistruerelativetohisperspectives,neitherofthemhasmadeamistake.Accordingtothiskindofrelativiststory,faultlessdisagreementisstillamatteroftherebeingapropositionsuchthatonepartybelievesthatpropositionandtheotherpartybelievesitsnegation.However,sincetruthisrelativeto 3Iamnotgoingtodiscussthepossibilitythatwecanmakesenseoffaultlessdisagreementifweacceptsomekindofnon-classicallogic.Seee.g.Wright(2006)andBeall(2006)forrelevantdiscussion.4Therearerelativistswhoadoptamorecautiousattitudetowardsfaultlessdisagreement.Forinstance,MacFarlane(2005,2007)doesnotputalotofemphasisonfaultlessdisagreementandRichard(2008,p.132)ndstheideaoffaultlessdisagreementproblematicfromarelativistpointofview.5Itsometimeslookslikethereareasmanyversionsofrelativismastherearerelativists.Seee.g.Richard(2004,2008),Lasersohn(2005),MacFarlane(2005,2007),Egan(2007,2010),andStephenson(2007)forotherwaysinwhichtodeveloprelativism.4 called`disagreementinattitude'.7Acaseofdisagreementinbeliefissimplyacaseofcon ictingbeliefs.Thereisapropositionsuchthatonepartybelievesthatpropositionandanotherpartybelievesitsnegation.Buttherearealsocasesofdisagreementinvolvingattitudessuchasapprovalanddisapproval.Forinstance,itcouldbethatonepartyapprovesofsomethingthattheotherpartydisapprovesof.Inthatcase,wewouldhaveacaseofdisagreementinattitude.However,wedonothavetofollowStevensonindistinguishingbetweentwokindsofdisagreement.Onewayofthinkingabouttheunderlyingpictureisthatdisagreementisamatterofhavingcon ictingattitudes,with`attitudes'beingunderstoodinasuitablybroadsense.Wecanhavecon ictingattitudesinvirtueofhavingcon ictingbeliefs,buttherecanalsobecon ictsinvolvingotherattitudes.Stevenson(1944,p.3)mentionspurposes,aspirations,wants,preferences,anddesires.Otherpotentialexamplesareliking,admiring,hoping,andsoforth.Forinstance,ifyouwantsomethingtobethecaseandIwantitnottobethecase,thereisasenseinwhichwehavecon ictingattitudes.Similarly,wehavecon ictingattitudesifthereissomethingthatyoulikeandIdislike(Weatherson,2009;Huvenes,2012).Inthesecases,itsoundsquitenaturaltosaythatthereisasenseinwhichwedisagree.ThisisobviouslyafairlysketchypictureandIwillnotsaymuchabouthowtodevelopitfurther,excepttopointoutsomesalientoptions.Oneoptionistosaythattwoattitudesareincon ictifandonlyifitisnotpossibleforasingleindividualtorationallyorcoherentlyhavebothattitudes(Dreier,2009).Anotheroptionistosaythattwoattitudesareincon ictifandonlyiftheycannotbothbesatised(Stevenson,1963;Jackson,2008).Alternatively,onemightresistthetemptationtotrytoo eradenitionorreductiveanalysisandattempttomakesenseofcon ictingattitudesinsomeotherway.Thereisalotthattobesaidhere,butamorethoroughdiscussionmustbeleftforanotheroccasion.Whatmattersforourpurposesishowthisrelatestofaultlessdisagree-ment.Theimportantpointisthattherecanbecasesofdisagreementinvolvingattitudesotherthanbelief.Theinitialreasoningwhichledustoquestionthe 7ThiswayofthinkingaboutdisagreementcanalsobefoundintheworksofcontemporaryexpressivistslikeBlackburn(1984,1998)andGibbard(1990,2003).However,thiswayofthinkingaboutdisagreementisalsoavailabletonon-expressivists.Seee.g.JacksonandPettit(1998),Dreier(1999,2009),andHuvenes(2012).NothingthatIsayinthispaperpresupposesexpressivisminanyway,shape,orform.6 pointofview,thisideaisprimafacieabsurd:iftwopropositionsexpressdisagreement,onemustfailtobecorrect.[...]Myownin-clinationistosidewiththetraditionalview,andrejectthenotionoffaultlessdisagreementasabsurd.(Glanzberg,2007,p.16)Itakeitthatthisattitudeisnotuncommon.Intherecentdebateaboutrela-tivism,therehavebeenseveralattemptstodiscredittherelativiststoryaboutfaultlessdisagreement.9However,aswehaveseen,relativismisnotonlythewayofmakingsenseoffaultlessdisagreement.Iamgoingtolookatsomeoftheallegedproblemswithrelativistaccountsoffaultlessdisagreementandarguethattheseproblemsdonotthreatenalternativeaccountsthatmakemakeuseoftheideathatdisagreementcaninvolvenon-doxasticattitudes.IamgoingtostartbylookingatanargumentthathasbeenputforwardbyRosenkranz(2008).HepresentsadilemmaforrelativistslikeKolbelwhowanttomakesenseoffaultlessdisagreement.10Supposethatthereisapropo-sitionpsuchthatyoubelievethatpandIbelievethatnot-p.11Furthermore,letusassumethatpistruerelativetoyourperspective,butfalserelativetomyperspective.Rosenkranzarguesthatifyoumerelypresentpastruerelativetoyourperspective,andImerelypresentnot-pastruerelativetomyperspective,wedonotreallyhaveadisagreement.Ontheotherhand,ifwepresentthepropositionsinquestionastruesimpliciterorrelativetoeveryperspective,wedohaveadisagreement,butitisnotfaultless.Itisamistaketopresentpastruesimpliciterorrelativetoeveryperspectiveifitisonlytruerelativetomyperspective.ThereiscertainlyroomfordebateconcerningtheextenttowhichthisargumentsucceedsinraisingaproblemforKolbel'saccountoffaultlessdis-agreement.AnaturalreactionisthatrelativistsmaynotwanttoacceptthatthereisnodisagreementifImerelypresentpastruerelativetomyperspective,andyoupresentnot-pastruerelativetoyourperspective.Rosenkranzwill 9Severalcommentatorshaveexpresseddoubtsabouttheideathatrelativismcandeliverfaultlessdisagreement.Seee.g.Stojanovic(2007),Moruzzi(2008),Rosenkranz(2008),CappelenandHawthorne(2009),andMoltmann(2010).10Seee.g.Stojanovic(2007,p.696)andMoltmann(2010,p.195)forsimilararguments.11Rosenkranz(2008)runshisargumentintermsofassertionratherthanbelief.SinceIaminclinedtothinkofdisagreementasaphenomenonatthelevelofthought,Iprefertoruntheargumentintermsofbelief.However,Iamassumingthatthisdoesnotmakemuchofadi erence.8 believesthepropositionthathaggisisnottasty.Asbefore,thepropositionthathaggisistastyistruerelativetoMary'sperspective,butfalserelativetoJohn'sperspective.Inthatcase,whenJohnasserts(4),whathesaysistruerelativetohisperspective.(4)Mary'sbeliefthathaggisistastyisfalse.ButthenitishardforhimtodenythatMaryismakingamistake.Thinkabouthowstrangeitwouldbetosaysomethinglike(5).(5)Mary'sbeliefthathaggisistastyisfalse,butsheisn'tmakingamistake.Iftherelativistswanttopreservethestraightforwardconnectionbetweentruthanderror,theyneedtosaythatitistruerelativetoJohn'sperspectivethatMaryismakingamistake.Inotherwords,theyneedtoextendtherelativistaccounttoexpressionslike`wrong'and`mistake'.ThepropositionthatMaryiswrongistruerelativetoJohn'sperspective,butfalserelativetoMary'sperspective.Thispointappliestocasesoffaultlessdisagreementacrosstheboard.Therelevantcasesoffaultlessdisagreementweresupposedtobecasesinwhichthereisapropositionpsuchthatonepartybelievesthatpandtheotherpartybelievesthatnot-p.Iamassumingthatpandnot-pcannotbetruerelativetoasingleperspective.Thatmeansthatitisgoingtobetruerelativetoeveryperspectivethatoneofthepartiesbelievessomethingthatisnottrue.Butthenthereisalotofpressuretoadmitthatitisalsogoingtobetruerelativetoeveryperspectivethatoneofthepartieshasmadeamistake.Thealternativeistolearntolivewiththetruthofsentenceslike(5).12Thisputstherelativistsinanawkwardpositionwhenitcomestomakingsenseoffaultlessdisagreement.Acaseoffaultlessdisagreementisacaseofdisagreementinwhichneitherpartyiswrongormakingamistake.Butitisdicultfortherelativiststosaythatifitistruerelativetoeveryperspectivethatoneofthepartiesmustbemakingamistake.Itlooksliketherelativistshavetofaceanotherdilemma.Iftheydonotwanttoacceptthatsentences 12MacFarlane(forthcoming)suggeststhatwecandistinguishbetweendi erentsensesof`mistake'.Butitisnotclearthatthisreallyaddressestheproblem.Aslongastherearetruereadingsofsentenceslike`Whatyoubelieveisfalse,butyouarenotmakingamistake',theviewisstillmakingseeminglyincorrectpredictions.Attheveryleast,thiskindofresponsewouldhavetobesupplementedwithastoryaboutwhytherelevantreadingof`mistake'isnotavailableintherelevantcases.10 notinvolvebelief.Someonewhoisopposedtotheideaoffaultlessdisagreementmighttrytoarguethatthereisamoregeneralconnectionbetweendisagreementanderror.However,Iamnotsurethattherearegoodreasonstoacceptthatthereissuchaconnection.Thereappearstobesomethingwrongwithasentencelike(5)andthatprovidessomemotivationforpostulatingaconnectionbetweenbelievingsomethingthatisnottrueandmakingamistake.Butitisnotclearthatthereisanythingwrongwithasentencelike(6).(6)Marylikeshaggis.Idisagreewithher,butsheisn'tmakingamistake.Infact,ifwetaketheideaoffaultlessdisagreementseriously,weshouldbeopentothepossibilitythatitcanbeappropriatetosaythingslikethis.Ifcasesoffaultlessdisagreementwerepossible,itwouldbestrangeifthepartieswerepreventedfromdescribingtheirdisagreementasfaultless.MoreneedstobesaidbeforeIamconvincedthatthisisaproblemforanaccountoffaultlessdisagreementintermsofnon-doxasticattitudes.However,weshouldbecarefulnottooverstatethesignicanceofthepointthatIhavemadeinthissection.Evenifweacceptthatanaccountoffaultlessdisagreementintermsofnon-doxasticattitudesavoidssomeoftheproblemswitharelativistaccountoffaultlessdisagreement,thatdoesmeanthattheformerissuperiortothelatter.Morewouldhavetobedoneinordertoshowthattherelativistsdonothaveanadequateresponsetotheseprob-lems.Moreover,anaccountoffaultlessdisagreementintermsofnon-doxasticattitudesmightsu erfromproblemsofitsown.Somephilosophersmightevenbereluctanttoaccepttheideathattherecanbecasesofdisagreementinvolvingnon-doxasticattitudesintherstplace.13Ihavealsonotmadeanyspecicclaimsaboutallegedcasesoffaultlessdisagreement.Forinstance,Ihavenotsaidanythingabouthowweshouldunderstandcasesinvolvingexpressionslike`fun'and`tasty'.Theremightbespecicfeaturesofsuchcasesthatonlyarelativistaccountcanaccommodate.Butitmightalsobethatsuchcasesdonotinvolvefaultlessdisagreementafterall.NothingIhavesaidturnsonwhetherthatisthecase.Ihaveonlyar- 13Itisalsoworthkeepinginmindthattheseaccountsarenotincompatible.Evenifsomecasesoffaultlessdisagreementinvolvenon-doxasticattitudes,theremightbeothercasesthatrequirearelativisttreatment.12 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