Truth and Meaning Consider Caesar was murdered but it was not necessary that Caesar was murdered Not only is this statement readily intelligible it is true IR p 24 It does not follow from this difference however that there is any equivocationany shift in meaningbetween ID: 277896
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Slide1
Some Additional Thoughts on
‘Truth and Meaning’Slide2
Consider ‘Caesar was murdered, but it was not necessary that Caesar was murdered’. Not only is this statement readily intelligible, it is true. (IR p. 24)Slide3
It does not follow from this difference, however, that there is any equivocation—any shift in meaning—between the two occurrences of ‘was murdered’. Nor does it follow that it is illicit to symbolize our statement in the form
‘
P
∧
¬
P’.
There is, then, no reason to doubt the legitimacy of the repeated variables in Ramsey’s formula
‘
B is a belief that P
∧
P’.
A confirmed extensionalist will not be moved by the parallel, rejecting the logical form assigned the modal formula too.Slide4
Caesar was murdered
¬( is analytic)
Caesar was murderedSlide5
They are not objects because ‘the way things are thought to be when someone thinks that Running Rein was four years old’ is not a genuine singular term or
Eigenname
. (p. 27)Well, it is grammatically. What makes it non-genuine?Slide6
1
(1)
∀
Q
(δ
Q
(Q
¬P
(δ
P
∧
P
))
Premiss
2
(2)
R
δ
R
Assumption, for
reductio
2
(3)
δ
R
2
Instantiation
1
(4)
δ
R
(
R
¬
P
(δ
P
∧
P
))
1
I
1,2
(5)
R
¬
P
(δ
P
∧
P
)
3, 4
modus ponens
6
(6)
R
Assumption
(1,2),6
(7)
¬
P
(δ
P
∧
P
)
5, 6
∧
E and
modus ponens
2,6
(8)
δ
R
∧
R
3, 6
∧
I
2,6
(9)
P
(δ
P
∧
P
)
8
I
((1,2),6)(2,
6
)
(10)
¬
R
7, 9
reductio
, discharging assumption 6
(1,2),(1,2,2,6)
(11)
¬¬
P
(δ
P
∧
P
)
5, 10
∧
-E and
modus tollens
12
(12)
∃
P
(δ
P
∧
P
)
Assumption
12
(13)
δ
S
∧
S
12
Instantiation
12
(14)
δ
S
13
∧
E
1
(15)
δ
S
(
S
¬
P
(δ
P
∧
P
))
1
I
1,12
(16)
S
¬
P
(δ
P
∧
P
)
14, 15
modus ponens
12
(17)
S
13
∧
E
(1,12),12
(18)
¬
P
(δ
P
∧
P
)
16, 17
∧
Eand
modus ponens
12,((1,12),
12
)
(19)
¬
P
(δ
P
∧
P
)
12, 18
reductio
, discharging assumption 12
(1,2),(1,2,
2
,6)
12,(1,12)
(20)
¬
R
δ
R
11, 19
reductio
, discharging assumption 2Slide7
We would also get into trouble if we applied our rules to ‘Everything a Cretan says should be rejected as untrue’. I think we just have to concede that problems would arise if the entire semantic machinery of the present paper were to be projected into the object language: the limitations on such projection mean (as in Kripke’s theory) that ‘the ghost of the Tarski hierarchy is still with us’ (Kripke 1975, p. 714). But the ghost is far less inhibiting than the hierarchy proper: the rules proposed enable us to do a great deal of semantic theorizing within our system.
If the (very substantial) ghost is not to be exorcised, why not just stick with Tarskian hierarchialism? It’s pretty straightforward and one can do a lot of semantic theorising about the object language.
Not about the language of the semantic theory itself it’s true[sic]- but the same is true on the above account.