Wegratefullyacknowledge133nancialsupportfromtheTorstenandRagnarS ID: 305698
Download Pdf The PPT/PDF document "BillionairesTinoSanandajiyPeterT.Leeson..." is the property of its rightful owner. Permission is granted to download and print the materials on this web site for personal, non-commercial use only, and to display it on your personal computer provided you do not modify the materials and that you retain all copyright notices contained in the materials. By downloading content from our website, you accept the terms of this agreement.
BillionairesTinoSanandajiyPeterT.LeesonzJanuary2,2012AbstractExistingstudiesofentrepreneurshipfocusonentrepreneurswhoseindividualcon-tributiontowealthcreationistypicallytrivial:self-employedpersons.Thispaperin-vestigatesentrepreneurswhoseindividualcontributiontowealthcreationisenormous:billionaires.Weexploretherelationshipbetweeneconomicdevelopment,institutions,andthesecontrastingkindsofentrepreneurs.We ndthattheinstitutionsconsis-tentwithself-employedentrepreneursdi¤ermarkedlyfromtheonesconsistentwithbillionaires.Further,onlythelatterareconsistentwiththeinstitutionsthatunder-lieeconomicprosperity.Wherewell-protectedprivatepropertyrightsandsupporting,market-enhancinginstitutionsourish,sodobillionaires.Butself-employedentrepre-neursdont.Whereprivatepropertyrightsareweaklyprotectedandinterventionistinstitutionsourish,sodoself-employedentrepreneurs.Butbillionairesdont.JELcodes:L26,O17,N2,H2,L53.Keywords:Billionaires;entrepreneurship;self-employment;institutions. Wegratefullyacknowledge nancialsupportfromtheTorstenandRagnarSöderbergFoundation.WealsothankPeteBoettke,ChrisCoyne,andparticipantsoftheJune2011IFN/SwedishEntrepreneurshipForumConferenceEntrepreneurship,IndustrialDevelopmentandGrowthforhelpfulcommentsandsugges-tions.SanandajialsothankstheJanWallanderandTomHedeliusFoundationfor nancialsupport.yEmail:Tino@UChicago.edu.Address:HarrisSchoolofPublicPolicyStudies,UniversityofChicago,1155E.60thSt,Chicago,IL60637,USAandResearchInstituteofIndustrialEconomics,Box55665,SE-10215,Stockholm,Sweden.zEmail:PLeeson@GMU.edu.Address:GeorgeMasonUniversity,DepartmentofEconomics,MS3G4,Fairfax,VA22030,USA.1 1IntroductionAtinynumberoftheworldsentrepreneursproduceanenormousamountoftheworldswealth.Theseentrepreneursarebillionaires:entrepreneurswhomadeabilliondollarsormorefoundingandgrowingnewbusinesses.1Billionairesnetworthreectstheirbusinessespro tsandcapitalgains.Inwell-functioningmarketeconomiesitmeasuresthetotalsocialvaluebillionaireshavecontributedtotheworld.Thatcontributionisastonishing.ConsidertheUnitedStates.In2009therewere234billionairesintheUnitedStatesworth$718billioncollectively.2Americasbillionairescom-prisedlessthan0.00008percentofitspopulation.Buttheycontributedmorethan1.3percentofitswealth.Comparebillionairescontributiontowealthtoself-employedentrepreneurscontribu-tion.In2009Americasself-employedentrepreneurswerecollectivelyworthnearly28timeswhatitsbillionaireswereworth(FederalReserve2011).3Buttheyweremorethan61,000timesasnumerous(Hipple2010).4Themedianself-employedentrepreneurscontributiontowealthwasjustover$365,000(Brickeretal.2011).Themedianbillionaireentrepreneurscontributionwasmorethan4,600timeslarger.Clearlyallentrepreneursarentcreatedequal.Thevastmajoritycontributealmostnoth-ingtoglobalprosperity.Anelite,super-richfewcontributetoglobalprosperityinremarkabledisproportiontotheirnumber.Existingstudiesofentrepreneurshipfocusonentrepreneurswhoseindividualcontributiontowealthcreationistypicallytrivial:self-employmentpersons(see,forinstance,EvansandJovanovic1989;EvansandLeighton1989;BlanchowerandOswald1998;Fairlie1999;GentryandHubbard2000;Hamilton2000;BruceandSchutze2004;Lazear2004;Bitler 1Notallbillionairesmadetheirfortunesthisway.Aswedescribebelow,thispaperconsidersthosewhodid.2Nordhaus(2004)estimatesthatAmericanentrepreneursonlycaptureasmallshareofthesocialvaluetheycreateasprivatewealth.Thissuggeststhatsomebillionairesmayhavecreatedtensorevenhundredsofbillionsdollarsofsocialvaluethroughtheirentrepreneurship.3This gureisbasedonanestimateofhouseholdsnetworthwhoseheadofhouseholdisself-employed.Itprovidesonlyacrudeideaofself-employedentrepreneursnetworth.Estimatingtheearningsandnetworthofself-employedpersonsisnotoriouslydi¢cultduetoincomeunder-reportingandtheproblemofseparatingcapitalearningsfromlaborearnings.See,HenreksonandSanandaji(2011).4This gureisbasedonanestimateofthenumberofincorporatedandunincorporated,non-agriculturalself-employedpersonsintheUnitedStates,whichincludesthepart-timeself-employed.2 etal.2005;Guisoetal.2006;CagettiandDeNardi2009).5Thispaperinvestigatesentrepreneurswhoseindividualcontributiontowealthisenormous:billionaires.Weexploretherelationshipbetweeneconomicdevelopment,institutions,andthesecontrastingkindsofentrepreneurs.Ourpaperisthe rsttostudybillionaireentrepreneurs.However,previousworkattemptstodistinguishhigh-impactentrepreneurshipfromitslow-impact,self-employedcounter-part.Oneapproachconsidersfaster-growing rms(forasurveyofthiswork,seeHenreksonandJohansson2010).AnotherapproachusestheGlobalEntrepreneurshipMonitors(GEM)high-growthentrepreneurshipvariable,whichmeasuresthefrequencyof rmownerswhoemploy20ormorepersons.6Forexample,Autio(2005,2007),BowenandDeClercq(2008),andEstrin,Korosteleva,andMickiewicz(2009)considerhowinstitutionsandpoliciesarerelatedtohigh-growthversuslow-impactentrepreneurialactivity.7Ourapproachprovidesanalternativelookathigh-impactentrepreneurialactivity.WedevelopanewmeasureofthatactivitybasedonForbesMagazineslistofTheWorldsBil-lionaires.Inconsideringbillionaires,ourapproachfocusesontheaspectofentrepreneurshipthatresearchersandpolicymakerspresumablycareaboutmost:wealthcreation.Theresultsofourempiricalanalysisaresimplebutstriking.First,self-employeden-trepreneursareassociatedwithpoverty,notwealth.Incontrast,billionairesareassociatedwithwealthratherthanpoverty.Second,theinstitutionsconsistentwithself-employedentrepreneursdi¤ermarkedlyfromtheonesconsistentwithbillionaires.Wherewell-protectedprivatepropertyrightsandsup-porting,market-enhancinginstitutionsourish,sodobillionaires.Butself-employeden- 5Or,whatssimilar,theyanalyzesmallbusinessownership(see,forinstance,GentryandHubbard2004;HurstandLusardi2004;Djankovetal.2006;Paulson,Townsend,andKaraivanov2006).LookingattheUnitedStates,Holtz-Eakin,Joulfaian,andRosen(1994a,1994b)considerpersonswho lescheduleCswiththeirincometaxreturns.6GEMalsohasavariablecalledhigh-expectationentrepreneurship.Itmeasuresthefrequencyof rmownerswhosaythattheyintendtohire20employeesormoreoverthenext veyears.Otherapproachestocapturinghigh-impactentrepreneurshipinclude,forinstance,distinguishingself-employed rmsandspino¤sfromlargercompanies(AnderssonandKlepper2012)andmeasuringventurecapitalinvestments(LernerandTåg2012).7Ourpaperisalsocloselyconnectedtothelargeliteraturethatconsidersinstitutionaldeterminantsofentrepreneurialactivityacrosscountries.See,forinstance,Fonseca,Lopez-Garcia,andPissarides(2001),OvaskaandSobel(2005),Holtz-EakinandRosen(2005),KanniainenandVesala(2005),GriloandThurik(2005,2008),HallandSobel(2006),Klapper,Laeven,andRajan(2006),Stel,Story,andThurik(2007),Sobel,Clark,andLee(2007),HoandWong(2007),andAidis,Estrin,andMickiewicz(2009).3 trepreneursdont.Whereprivatepropertyrightsareweaklyprotectedandinterventionistinstitutionsourish,sodoself-employedentrepreneurs.Butbillionairesdont.Finally,onlytheinstitutionsthatwe ndareconsistentwithbillionairesarealsoconsis-tentwiththeinstitutionsthatunderlieeconomicprosperity.Theinstitutionsthatwe ndareconsistentwithself-employedentrepreneursaretheonesassociatedwithcomparativeeconomicpoverty.2InstitutionsandEntrepreneurship2.1ProductiveandUnproductiveWilliamBaumol(1990)distinguishestwoformsofentrepreneurship:productiveandun-productive.Productiveentrepreneurialactivityimprovesresourcessocialvaluethroughinnovation.Indoingsoitcreateswealthandcontributestoprosperity.Productiveen-trepreneurswhoseinnovationcreatesenormouswealthgenerateenormouspro ts.Theseentrepreneursarebillionaires.Unproductiveentrepreneurialactivitywastesresourcesthroughrentseeking.Inusingresourcesinwaysthatcreatelesssocialvaluethanalternativeuses,unproductiveentrepre-neurialactivityundermineswealthcreationandcontributestopoverty.Institutionschannelentrepreneurialactivityproductivelyorunproductively.Theydosobydeterminingtherelativepayo¤ofsociallyproductiveinnovationversusrentseeking.Limitedgovernmentswhereinstateauthorityisusedtode neandenforcepropertyrightsbutotherwiseintervenesminimallywiththeoperationofmarketstendtochannelentre-preneurialactivityproductively.Intheseinstitutionalenvironmentsinnovationspayo¤iscomparativelylarge.Rentseekingspayo¤iscomparativelysmall.Unlimitedgovernmentswhereinstateauthorityneglectsprivatepropertyprotectionandisusedtointervenesigni cantlywiththeoperationofmarketstendtochannelentrepre-neurialactivityunproductively.Intheseenvironmentsinnovationspayo¤iscomparativelysmall.Rentseekingspayo¤iscomparativelylarge.Alargeempiricalliteraturecon rmsthattheformerinstitutionalenvironmentspro-4 ducewealth,whilethelatterinstitutionalenvironmentsproducepoverty(see,forinstance,Acemoglu,Johnson,andRobinson2001;AcemogluandJohnson2005;Gwartneyetal.1999;Scully1988).8Baumolsdistinctionsuggestsareadyreasonforthisresultinthelan-guageofentrepreneurship.Institutionsofprivatepropertyprotectionandmoreconstrainedgovernmentwhatwecallidealinstitutionsencourageproductiveentrepreneurshipanddiscourageunproductiveentrepreneurship.Institutionsofweakpropertyprotectionandlessconstrainedgovernmentwhatwecallinferiorinstitutionsdothereverse.2.2EvasiveInstitutionsnotonlychannelentrepreneurialactivity.Theyinuencethesupplyofentre-preneursbyinuencingtherelativepayo¤ofworkingforothersversusself-employment.Individualschooseself-employmentoverworkingforotherswhenself-employmentismorelucrative.Underidealinstitutionsthisiswhenself-employmentcreatesmoresocialvalue.Hereself-employmenttendstoreectproductiveentrepreneurship.Incontrast,underinferiorinstitutionsindividualsmay ndself-employmentmorelucra-tivethanworkingforothersevenwhenself-employmentcreateslesssocialvalue.9Hereself-employmenttendstoreectunproductiveentrepreneurship.Thereasonforthisisstraight-forward.Governmentscanmoreeasilyregulateandexpropriatelarge rmswithmanyemployeesthansmall,self-employed rmswithfewemployees.Thelatter nditeasiertoybelowthestatesradar(deSoto1989).Becauseofthis,politicalrulesthatdirectlyorindirectlytaxlarger rmsandtheiremployeesdriveawedgebetweenindividualspayo¤ofworkingforothersandtheirpayo¤fromself-employment.Thatwedgecanmakeself-employmentmorelucrativethanworkingforothersevenwhenself-employmentcreateslesssocialvalue.Anindividualmayproducelessvalueinself-employment.But(s)hesabletokeepalargershareofwhat(s)heproduces,inducinghim/her 8Foradiscussionofthisliterature,asummaryofitsbasicresults,andthetheorythatunderliesthem,seeLeeson(2008,2010).9Inferiorinstitutionsdescriberealityinmanythirdworldcountries.However,developedcountrieswithgenerallyfavorableinstitutionalclimatesmayalsohaveinferiorinstitutionalelementsofsuchpolicies,suchasexcessivetaxesandregulations.See,forexample,DavisandHenrekson(2010)whohighlighttheeconomicallydeleteriouse¤ectsofpenalizingentrepreneurialwealthcreationinSweden.5 tochooseself-employmentoverworkingforothersnonetheless.Thus,comparedtounderidealinstitutions,underinferiorinstitutionstheresanoversupplyofentrepreneurs.CoyneandLeeson(2004)callentrepreneurialactivitythatmanifestsitselfintheformofself-employmenttocircumventpoliticalrulesthatarti ciallydepressthepayo¤fromemploymentforothersevasiveentrepreneurship.Evasiveentrepreneurialactivityisoftenunproductive.Itoftenusesresourcesinwaysthatcreatelesssocialvaluethanalternativeuses.10Theincentivesdrivingevasiveentrepreneurshaveanimportante¤ectonthefractionofself-employedbusinessownersunderinferiorinstitutionalenvironmentswhowillbecomebillionaires.Evasiveentrepreneursdontenterself-employmenttoinnovateandgrow.Indeedgrowingwouldunderminetheveryreasontheyenterself-employmentinthe rstplace.Thereforefew,ifany,willcreateenormoussocialvalue.Thatinturnmeansthatfew,ifany,willbecomebillionaires.Further,inferiorinstitutionsconstrainentrepreneursabilityandincentivetoinnovateandgrowpastsomepoint,evenforthosewhoseself-employmentisproductiveandthuscapableofcreatinglargesocialvalue.Forexample,withweakprivatepropertyrights,eventhemosttalentedentrepreneurswill ndithard,andoftenunpro table,tocreatelarge rms.Asaresulttherearefewerbillionaires,curtailingentrepreneursandsocietyswealthcomparedtowhattheywouldotherwiseenjoy.2.3TestableImplicationsTheforegoingdiscussionyieldsseveralpredictionsabouttherelationshipsweexpectto ndbetweeneconomicdevelopment,institutions,andentrepreneurship:First,weexpectbillionairestobemoreprevalentincountrieswhoseinstitutionsareclosertotheidealthanincountrieswhoseinstitutionsarefurtherfromitandviceversa.Intheformercountriesalargerproportionofentrepreneurialenergyischannelledproductively. 10Althoughtheresourcesthatevasiveentrepreneurshipusestocircumventpoliticalrulesthatarti ciallydepressthepayo¤fromemploymentforothersarenecessarywastedfromasocialperspective,inthepresenceofinferior,orsecond-best,institutionsthatcreatebarrierstoproductiveentrepreneurialactivity,evasiveentrepreneurshipmaypermitvalue-creatingeconomicactivitytotakeplaceandinthissensebeproductive.See,forinstance,Rodrik(2008)andDouhanandHenrekson(2010).6 Entrepreneurshavestrongerincentivestocreateasmuchsocialvalueastheycan.Andmorepersonswhofoundbusinessesandemploythemselvesaimtodothat.Thusthepotentialforbillionairesishigher.Second,weexpectself-employedentrepreneurstobemoreprevalentincountrieswhoseinstitutionsarefurtherfromtheidealthanincountrieswhoseinstitutionsareclosertoitandviceversa.Intheformercountriesalargerproportionofentrepreneurialenergyischanneledunproductively.Individualshavestrongerincentivestoengageinevasiveentrepreneurship.Thusthepotentialforself-employedentrepreneurshipishigher.Third,weexpectbillionairestobemoreprevalentinrichercountriesthaninpooreronesandviceversa.Billionairescreateimmensewealth.Theymakethecountriestheyarelocatedinricher.Further,followingthelogicabove,billionairesshouldbemoreprominentincountrieswhoseinstitutionalenvironmentsareclosertoideal.Thesearericherones.Finally,weexpectself-employedentrepreneurstobemoreprevalentinpoorercountriesthaninricheronesandviceversa.Evasiveentrepreneursoftenunderminewealthcreationbyallocatinglaborresourcestoself-employedbusinessownershipthatwouldcreatemoresocialvalueinwagelabor.11Further,becauseself-employedentrepreneursareoversuppliedincountrieswhoseinstitutionalenvironmentsarefurtherfromtheideal,self-employeden-trepreneursshouldbemoreprominentinthem.Thesecountriesarepoorerones.3DataToexploretherelationshipsbetweeneconomicdevelopment,institutions,andentrepreneur-shipempiricallyweuseseveraldatasources.Weconstructanewcross-countrydatasetonbillionairesusingForbesMagazineslistofTheWorldsBillionaires.Forbescompilesthislistannually.WeconsiderbillionaireswhoappearonForbeslistatleastoncebetween1996and2010.Forbesidenti eseachbillionairesnetworthandcountryofcitizenship.Between1996and2010thisincludes1,723uniquepersons.Someofthesebillionairesarententrepreneurs. 11Though,asnotedabove,undersecond-bestinstitutions,evasiveentrepreneurshipmaynotmeanwealtherosionifself-employmentpermitsvalue-creatingeconomicactivitythatinstitutionalconstraintswouldoth-erwisepreclude.7 Theydidntproducetheirfortunesbystartingandgrowingcompanies.Sincewereinterestedonlyinthosewhodid,weneedtoidentifythesubsetofthese1,723billionaireswhoacquiredtheirfortunesbyfoundingandgrowingnewbusinesses.Todosowecollectinformationonthesourceofeachbillionaireswealth.Forbesoftenprovidesthisinformation.Whenitdoesnt,weconsultexternalsourcestodeterminehowbillionairesmadetheirfortunes.Mostoftheworldsbillionaires,58percent,acquiredtheirwealthbystartingandgrowingbusinesses.This gureislowerinEurope,whereonly42percentofbillionairesmadetheirmoneythisway,thanintheUnitedStates,where65percentdidso.Amongbillionaireswhodidntacquiretheirwealthentrepreneurially,manyacquiredtheirwealththroughbequestsorareCEOswho,thoughhiredbyentrepreneurialstartups,arentthemselvesentrepreneurs.Othernon-entrepreneurialbillionairesonForbeslistinclude -nancialsectortraders,law rmpartners,entertainers,andwildlysuccessfulauthors.Inrarecaseswhenwecouldnt ndinformationaboutabillionaireswealthsourcewecodedhim/herasanon-entrepreneur.Ourresultsarentsensitivetoincludingtheseambiguouspersonsinoursample.Afterexcludingnon-entrepreneurbillionaireswereleftwithjustunderathousand(996)billionaireentrepreneursfrom51countries.Thesebillionairesincludemanyarchetypicalentrepreneurs,suchasBillGates(Microsoft),SteveJobs(Apple),GordonMoore(Intel),LarryEllison(Oracle),Je¤Bezos(Amazon.com),LarryPage(Google),WarrenBu¤ett(BerkshireHathaway),MichaelDell(DellInc.)andMarkZuckerberg(Facebook).Wedividethenumberofbillionairesineachcountrybythatcountryspopulationinmillionsusingpopulationdatafor2009fromtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).Theresultingvariablemeasurespercapitabillionairesacrosscountries.TheAppendixprovidessummarystatisticsforourbillionairevariable.12Thatvariable,whichaimstomeasuretheprevalenceofproductivebillionaireentrepre-neurs,isunavoidablyimperfect.Althoughourdataexcludenon-entrepreneurialbillionaires,wereunabletosimilarlyexcludeallbillionaireentrepreneurswhoengagedinunproductiveentrepreneurialactivity,suchasrentseeking,toacquiretheirwealth.Wecarefullyinspect 12Alistofthecountriesinourbillionairessampleandtheirratesofbillionairesisavailableonrequest.8 thebillionairesinourdatatogetasenseoftheincidenceofsuspiciousbillionaires:thosewhosewealthmayreectsigni cantunproductiveentrepreneurialactivity.Theirincidenceislow.Inafewinstances,suchasthecaseofbillionairegovernmentrulers,forexam-pleSuharto,Indonesiasformerpresident,wecancon dentlyexcludebillionairesonthesegrounds.Butinmostcaseswecantobservetowhatextent,ifany,thebillionairesinourdatausedthepoliticalprocesstohelpthembecomesuperrich.Whileitsimportanttokeepthislimitationinmindwhenconsideringourresults,becausemostofthebillionairesinourdataarelocatedindevelopedcountrieswhoseinstitutionalenvironmentsdoareasonablejobofchannellingentrepreneurialactivityproductively,wecanbemorecon dentthatourbillionairesvariablemeasuresproductiveentrepreneurshipasopposedtotheunproductivevariety.Further,aswediscussbelow,ourresultsholdwhenwerestrictoursampletoOECDcountrieswhereourcon dencethatourbillionairesvariablemeasuresproductiveentrepreneurialactivityisstrongerstill.Toconstructourself-employedentrepreneurvariablewecollectdatafromtheOECD(2009),whichcomputesthepercentageofeachcountrysnon-agriculturalworkforcethatsself-employed.TheOECDgetsitsdatafromtheInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO).TheILOde nesself-employmentjobsasjobswheretheremunerationisdirectlyde-pendentuponthepro ts(orthepotentialforpro ts)derivedfromthegoodsandservicesproduced(whereownconsumptionisconsideredtobepartofpro ts).Theincumbentsmaketheoperationaldecisionsa¤ectingtheenterprise,ordelegatesuchdecisionswhileretainingresponsibilityforthewelfareoftheenterprisewhereenterpriseincludesone-personop-erations.Formostcountriesweconsiderself-employmentratesfortheyear2000.WhendataforthisyearareunavailableweusedataforthemostrecentavailableyearcollecteddirectlyfromtheILOdatabase.TheAppendixprovidessummarystatisticsforourself-employedentrepreneurvariable.13 13Thelistofthecountriesinourself-employedentrepreneurssampleandtheirratesofself-employedentrepreneurshipisavailableonrequest.9 4EmpiricalRelationshipsOurempiricalanalysisfocusesonidentifyingrelationshipsbetweeneconomicdevelopment,institutions,anddi¤erentkindsofentrepreneurshipacrosscountriesintherawdata.Wemakenoattempttocontrolforotherfactorsthatmayinuencetherelationshipsbetweenthesevariables.14Thenumberofotherfactors,forexample,education,culture,andreligion,islarge.Further,dataavailabilityforthefactorswedoconsidervaries.Thusthecountriesincludedinourdepictionoftherelationshipbetweenregulatoryclimatesandbillionairesprevalencedi¤ersomewhatfromthecountriesincludedinourdepictionoftherelationshipbetweenpropertyrightssecurityandbillionairesprevalence.Finally,thereadershouldkeepinmindthatourapproachprecludesde nitivecausalinference.Despitetheselimitations,therawdataprovideevidenceofcompellingconnectionsbe-tweeneconomicdevelopment,institutions,billionaires,andself-employedentrepreneurscon-sistentwiththeabovereasoningabouthowthesevariablesmayberelated.4.1BillionairesBillionairesaredistributedunevenlythroughouttheworld.Figure1depictsthenumberofbillionairespermillioncitizensforeachcountryinoursample.InHongKong,wherebillionairesaremostprevalent,therearemorethan2.8billionairespermillioncitizens.InNigeria,wherebillionairesareleastprevalentamongcountriesthathaveanybillionairesatall,therearefewerthan0.007billionairespermillioncitizens.Figure2plotsbillionairespermillioncitizensacrosscountriesagainstcountriesaverageincome.OurincomedatameasurecountriesPPP-adjustedpercapitaGDPsin2009.WecollectthesedatafromtheIMF.TherelationshipinFigure2isstrong,positive,andstatis-ticallysigni cant.Richercountrieshavemorebillionaires.Poorercountrieshavefewer.15Economictheorytellsussomethingaboutthesourceofvariationincountrieswealth 14Thisisaslightoverstatement.Aswediscussbelow,inadditiontoconsideringeachofourrelationshipsusingourfullsample,wealsoconsiderthemusingasamplethatconsistsonlyofOECDcountries.Thelatterrelationshipscontrolcrudelyforaverageincome.15Manycountrieshavenobillionaires.Thusinthisandoursubsequent guresthatconsiderbillionairesaclusterofcountriesappearsalongthehorizontalaxis.Ourresultsarerobustto,andinfactgrowstronger,excludingthem.10 andpoverty.Weelaboratedthatsomethingabove:countriesinstitutionaldi¤erences.Thosedi¤erencesinturnchannelentrepreneurialenergydi¤erently.Institutionalenvironmentsthatbetterprotectcitizensprivatepropertyrightsanddolesstointerveneinthemarketplacechannelalargershareoftheircitizensentrepreneurialenergyproductively.Thusthefactthatbillionairesaresigni cantlymoreprevalentinrichcountriesstrengthensourcon dencethatourbillionairevariablecapturesproductiveentrepreneurs.ThereasoningdescribedinSection2suggeststhatbillionairesdistributiondependssigni cantlyonsuperiorinstitutionalenvironmentsdistribution.Toexaminethisconnectionmoredirectly,weconsidertherelationshipbetweencountriesinstitutionalenvironmentsandbillionairesprevalence.TheFraserInstituteproducesanindexofeconomicfreedomthatmeasurestheextenttowhichgovernmentprotectscitizensprivatepropertyrightsandintervenesinthemarketacrosscountries.EconomicfreedomprovidesareasonablewayofmeasuringhowfarvariouscountriesinstitutionalenvironmentsarefromtheidealenvironmentdescribedinSection2.WeusetheFraserInstituteseconomicfreedomscoresfor2008.Thesescoresrangefrom0to10.Countrieswithhigherscoresareclosertotheideal.Countrieswithlowerscoresarefurtherfromit.Figure3plotstherateofbillionairesacrosscountriesagainsttheireconomicfreedomscores.TherelationshipinFigure3ispositiveandstatisticallysigni cant.Thecorrelationbetweencountrieseconomicfreedomandtheprevalenceofbillionairesis0.46.Countrieswhoseinstitutionalenvironmentsaremoreconducivetoproductiveentrepreneurshiphavemorebillionaires.Countrieswhoseinstitutionalenvironmentsarelessconducivetoproduc-tiveentrepreneurshiphavefewer.Economicfreedomisaverybroadwaytomeasuretheextenttowhichcountriesinstitu-tionalenvironmentsdeviatefromtheideal.Itsusefultoexaminetherelationshipbetweenvariationinparticularinstitutionsandvariationinbillionaires.Todothiswe rstconsidercountriesregulatoryclimates.TomeasuretheburdenthoseclimatesimposeonproductiveentrepreneurialactivityweusedatafromtheWorldBanksEaseofDoingBusinessIndex.Thisindexrankscountriesaccordingtohowconducivetheirregulatoryclimateistodo-ingbusinessin2008.Lowernumbersindicatehigherranksandthusmorebusiness-friendly11 regulatoryclimates.Figure4depictstherelationshipbetweencountriesregulatoryclimatesandthepreva-lenceofbillionaires.Therelationshipisnegativeandstatisticallysigni cant.Thecorrelationbetweencountriesregulatoryclimatesandtheprevalenceofbillionairesis-0.45.Countrieswithlessburdensomebusinessregulatoryclimateshavemorebillionaires.Countieswithmoreburdensomebusinessregulatoryclimateshavefewer.Nextweconsidertherelationshipbetweenbillionairesprevalenceacrosscountriesandhowwellcountriesprotectcitizensprivatepropertyrights.TodosoweusedatafromthePropertyRightsAlliancesInternationalPropertyRightsIndex(IPRI).TheIPRIvariablemeasuresthestrengthofcitizensprivatepropertyrightsin2010.Propertyrightsscoresrangefrom0to10wherehigherscoresreectmoresecureprivatepropertyrights.ThereasoninginSection2suggeststhatincountrieswhoseinstitutionalenvironmentsprotectprivatepropertyrightsbetter,citizenswilldevotealargershareoftheirentrepreneur-ialenergytoproductiveactivities.Thus,consistentwiththerelationshipsidenti edabove,weshould ndmorebillionairesincountriesthatscorebetteronIPRIsprivatepropertysecuritymeasureandfewerbillionairesincountriesthatscoreworse.Wedo.Figure5presentstherelationshipbetweencountriesinstitutionalenvironmentsintermsofprivatepropertysecurityandbillionaires.Therelationshipispositiveandstatis-ticallysigni cant.Thecorrelationbetweencountriespropertysecurityandtheprevalenceofbillionairesis0.49.Whereprivatepropertyrightsaremoresecure,therearemorebillion-aires.Wherethoserightsarelesssecure,therearefewer.Finally,weconsidertherelationshipbetweenbillionairesprevalenceacrosscountriesandcountrieslegalorigins.AsGlaeserandShleifer(2002)pointout,countrieswithEnglishlegaloriginshavecommonlawtraditions.Thesecountriestendtohaveinstitutionalenvironmentsthataremoreconducivetoproductiveentrepreneurialactivity.Incommonlawcountriesgovernmentdoesmoretoprotectcitizensprivatepropertyrights;regulatoryrulesaremorebusinessfriendly;andthestatedoeslesstointerveneintheoperationofmarkets.16Countrieswithnon-Englishlegaloriginshavecivillawtraditionsinstead.Inthesecoun-triesthesituationisreversedfromwhatwedescribeabove.Governmentdoeslesstoprotect 16Onthepolitical-economicimplicationsofthecommonlaw,seealsoHayek(1960).12 citizensprivatepropertyrights;regulatoryrulesarelessbusinessfriendly;andthestatein-tervenesmoreintheoperationofmarkets.Heretherelativepayo¤ofevasiveandotherformsofunproductiveentrepreneurshipishigher.Wethereforeexpectto ndmorebillionairesincountrieswithEnglishlegaloriginsthanelsewhere.ToexaminethispossibilityweusedataonlegaloriginsfromLaPortaetal.(1997).ThesedataclassifycountriesaccordingtowhethertheirlegalinstitutionshaveEnglish,German,Scandinavian,orFrenchorigins.LaPortaetal.slegaloriginsvariablecovers47countries.28ofthesecountriesaredeveloped.19arenot.TherearebothdevelopedandundevelopedcountrieswithEnglishandFrenchlegalori-gins.However,allcountrieswithGermanorScandinavianlegaloriginsaredeveloped.Sincebillionairesarestronglycorrelatedwithaverageincome,itssensibletolimitattentiontodevelopedcountriesinordertobetterisolatehowvariationincountrieslegalorigins,ratherthanvariationintheirincome,mayberelatedtovariationinbillionairesprevalence.Theresultswepresentbelowdothis.However,ifweconsiderall47countriesforwhichLaPortaetal.supplydata,our ndingremainsqualitativelyunchanged.Figure6presentstherelationshipbetweenbillionairesandlegalorigins.Asexpected,billionairesaremoreprevalentincommonlawcountriesthanincivillawones.Indeed,theyaremorethantwiceasprevalentincountrieswithEnglishlegaloriginsthantheyareincountrieswithcivillawtraditionswherebillionairesaremostprevalentthosewithGermaniclegalorigins.Billionairesaremorethan vetimesasprevalentincountrieswithEnglishlegaloriginsthantheyareincountrieswithcivillawtraditionswherebillionairesareleastprevalentthosewithFrenchlegalorigins.Toensurethatpoorcountriesarentdrivingtherelationshipswe ndinFigures2-6and,closelyrelated,tominimizethepossibilitythatourbillionairesvariablecontainscasesofunproductiveentrepreneurship,wereconsidereachoftherelationshipsconsideredaboverestrictingourattentiontoOECDcountriesonly.Theresultsaresimilarineachcase:billionairesaremoreprevalentinrichercountriesandcountrieswhoseinstitutionalenviron-mentsbetterprotectcitizenspropertyrightsandintervenelessinmarkets.Theyarelessprevalentinpoorercountriesandcountrieswhoseinstitutionalenvironmentsdoaworsejobofprotectingcitizenspropertyrightsandintervenemoreinmarkets.13 TakentogethertherelationshipsthatFigures2-6identifysuggesttwoimportantconclu-sions.First,ourbillionairesvariableisagoodmeasureofproductiveentrepreneurship.Ininstitutionalenvironmentswhereweexpectproductiveentrepreneurshiptoourish,billion-airesourish.Ininstitutionalenvironmentswhereweexpectunproductive,andinparticularevasive,entrepreneurshiptoourish,billionairesdont.Second,althoughouranalysisprecludesconclusivecausalinterpretations,billionairesgreaterprevalenceincountrieswithsuperiorinstitutionalenvironmentssuggeststhatcross-countryvariationinhowwellgovernmentprotectscitizenspropertyrightsbutotherwiselimitsitsinvolvementinthemarketmaybeanimportantdeterminantofcross-countryvariationinbillionaires.Closelyrelated,billionairesgreaterprevalenceinrichercountriessuggeststhatcross-countryvariationinbillionairesmaybeanimportantdeterminantofcross-countryvariationinwealth.4.2Self-EmployedEntrepreneursToseehoweconomicdevelopmentandinstitutionalenvironmentsmayberelatedtoself-employedentrepreneursprevalence,inthissectionweexaminethesamesetsofrelationshipsweconsideraboveforbillionairesbutforself-employedpersonsinstead.Thedataweuseandtheyearsourdatacoverarethesameonesweusetoexaminebillionaires.Thesetofcountriesdepictedinourself-employment guresdi¤erssomewhatfromthatdepictedinourbillionaires guressinceself-employmentdataanddataforourincomeandinstitutionalvariablesarentalwaysavailableforthesamecountriestheyareavailableforinthecaseofbillionaires.Toanticipatewhatwe ndforself-employedentrepreneurs,considerFigure7.Inthis gurewedepicttherelationshipbetweenbillionairesprevalenceandself-employedentrepre-neursprevalenceacrosscountries.Therelationshipisnegativeandstatisticallysigni cant.Countrieswithmorebillionaireshavefewerself-employedpersonsandviceversa.ThepatterninFigure7suggeststwothings.First,billionairesandself-employmentmeasuretwodi¤erententrepreneurialphenomena.Second,givenwhatweknowfromaboveabouttherelationshipsbetweenbillionaires,percapitaincome,andinstitutionalenviron-ments,thepatterninFigure7suggeststhattherelationshipswewill ndwheninvestigating14 self-employedentrepreneursarelikelytobetheoppositeoftheoneswe ndforbillionaires.Sincebillionairesareassociatedwithrichercountriesandcountrieswithsuperiorinstitu-tionalenvironments,thismeansself-employedentrepreneursarelikelytobeassociatedwithpoorercountriesandcountrieswithinferiorinstitutionalenvironments.Thisispreciselywhatwe nd.Likebillionaires,self-employedentrepreneursaredistributedunevenlythroughouttheworld.ConsiderFigure8.This guredisplayshowvariationincountriesaverageincomeisrelatedtovariationintherateofself-employment.Therelationshipisstrongandstatisticallysigni cant,butnegativetheoppositeofwhatwe ndforbillionaires.Poorercountrieshavemoreself-employedentrepreneurs.Richercountrieshavefewer.17Investigatingtherelationshipbetweenself-employedentrepreneursandcountriesinstitu-tionalenvironmentsalsoyieldsoppositeresultsfromwhatwe ndforbillionaires.ConsiderFigure9.This guredepictstherelationshipbetweencountrieseconomicfreedomandrateofself-employment.Itsstrong,negative,andstatisticallysigni cant.Thecorrelationbetweencountrieseconomicfreedomandrateofself-employmentis-0.60.Nextweexaminetheconnectionbetweencountriesregulatoryclimatesandtheirratesofself-employment.ConsiderFigure10.Thisrelationshipstrongandstatisticallysigni cant.Butitspositivetheoppositeofwhatwe ndwhenconsideringbillionaires.Thecorrelationbetweencountriesregulatoryclimatesandrateofself-employmentis0.61.Countrieswithmoreburdensomeregulatoryclimateshavemoreself-employedentrepreneursandviceversa.Similarly,we ndtheoppositerelationshipbetweenself-employedentrepreneursandthesecurityofcitizenspropertyrightsthatwe ndforbillionaires.ConsiderFigure11. 17Wennekeretal.(2010)suggestthattherelationshipbetweenself-employmentandeconomicdevel-opmentmaybeU-shaped.Thatsuggestionismisleading.Theymeasureself-employmentbybusinessownershipandbusinessentry,orstart-uprates(and ndaU-shapedrelationshiponlyinthecaseofthelatter).Thesevariablesareofcoursedi¤erentfromactualself-employmenttherateofnon-agriculturalself-employmentwhichisthispapersmeasureofself-employment.Forexample,intheU.S.morethanathirdofbusinessownersarentemployedbytheirbusinessesandthusarentcountedasself-employed.Further,someself-employedpersonswithverysmallbusinessesarentcountedasbusinessownersbecausetheirbusinessesaretoosmall.Thesedi¤erencesareimportant.Forinstance,usingbusinessownershiptomeasureself-employment,Wennekeretal.(2010) ndthatself-employmentfortheOECDasawholeincreasedbetween1972and2007.Usingself-employmentratestomeasureself-employment,we ndthatself-employmentfortheOECDasawholedecreasedbetween1972and2007.Althoughsomevariablescommonlyusedtoproxyself-employmentmaydisplayaU-shapedrelationshiptoaverageincome,self-employmentitselfdisplaysanegativerelationship.15 Therelationshipisstrong,negative,andstatisticallysigni cant.Thecorrelationbetweencountriespropertysecurityandrateofself-employmentis-0.58.Wherecitizensprivatepropertyrightsarelesssecure,therearemoreself-employedentrepreneurs.Whereprivatepropertyrightsaremoresecure,therearefewer.Finally,inFigure12weseehowcountrieslegaloriginsarerelatedtotheirratesofself-employment.Weagainlimitourattentiontodevelopedcountries.Andweagain ndnearlytheoppositeofwhatwe ndwhenwelookatbillionaires.WithoneexceptioncountrieswithScandinavianlegaloriginsself-employmentislessprevalentincommonlawcountries,whoseinstitutionalclimatesaremoreconducivetoproductiveentrepreneurship,andmoreprevalentincivillawcountries,whoseinstitutionalclimatesaremoreconducivetoevasiveandotherformsofunproductiveentrepreneurship.18IncountrieswithFrenchlegalorigins,where,recall,billionairesareleastprevalent,self-employedentrepreneursaremostprevalent.Indeed,self-employedentrepreneursare46percentmoreprevalentincountrieswithFrenchlegaloriginsthantheyareincountrieswithEnglishlegalorigins.Aswedoforbillionaires,wereconsidereachoftherelationshipsinFigures8-12restrictingattentiontoOECDcountriesonly.Theresultsareagainsimilar:self-employedentrepreneursaremoreprevalentinpoorercountriesandcountrieswithinstitutionalenvironmentsthatprovideworseprotectionofcitizenspropertyrightsanddomoretointerveneinmarkets.Ourempiricalanalysispreventsusfromdrawingde nitivecausalinferences.Still,takentogether,theresultsinFigures8-12suggestthatmuchself-employedentrepreneurshipmaybeunproductive.AsdiscussedinSection,2muchofthisentrepreneurshipmaybeoftheevasivevariety.Self-employedentrepreneurshipsstrongnegativerelationshipwithaverageincomeandtheextenttowhichinstitutionalenvironmentsprotectcitizensprivatepropertyrightsandleavemarketsalonetooperatefreelythereverseofwhatwe ndforbillionairesaretherelationshipswouldexpectto ndifthiswasthecase. 18Ifweconsiderall47countriesforwhichLaPortaetal.supplydata,countrieswithFrenchlegaloriginscontinuetohavethemostself-employedentrepreneurs.CountrieswithScandinavianlegaloriginscontinuetohavethefewest.However,butthepositionsofcountrieswithEnglishlegaloriginsandthosewithGermaniconesreverse.16 5ConcludingRemarksOuranalysisleadstothreeimplicationsofpotentialimportforpolicymakers.First,self-employmentmaybeanegativeindicatorofwhetheracountrysinstitutionalarrangementsleverageentrepreneurshipforeconomicprogress,notapositiveone.We ndthatself-employedentrepreneursareassociatedwithpoverty,notwealth.Thuspolicymakersthatseektouseself-employedentrepreneursprevalenceasagaugeforinstitutionalreformmaywanttothinktwicebeforeinvokingself-employmentasameasureofsuccess.Reformsthatincreaseself-employmentmaybemovingacountrysinstitutionalenvironmentinthewrongdirectionratherthantherightonefromtheperspectiveofeconomicprogress.Billionairesprevalencemaybeabetterbenchmarkforpolicymakersconsideringreforms.Thisvariableispositivelyassociatedwithwealth.Unsurprisingly,itsalsopositivelyasso-ciatedwiththeinstitutionalenvironmentsknowntoencourageproductiveentrepreneurialactivityandeconomicprosperity:strongprivatepropertyrights,lowregulation,andlight-handedinterventioninmarkets.Thusareformthatleadstoanincreaseintherateofbillionairesoraimstoincreasethatrateismorelikelytobeoneindicativeofmovementintherightdirectionfromtheperspectiveofeconomicprogress.Second,ouranalysissuggeststhatpolicymakersinterestedinpromotingentrepreneur-shipasameansoffosteringeconomicdevelopmentmaydobesttofocustheirattentionontheoverarchinginstitutionsthatpromotethelatterratherthanfocusingonpromotingentrepreneurshipperse.Whengrowth-enhancinginstitutionsareinplace,productiveentre-preneurshiptakescareofitself.AsAdamSmith(1776:xliii)putit,Littleelseisrequisitetocarryastatetothehighestdegreeofopulencefromthelowestbarbarism,butpeace,easytaxes,andatolerableadministrationofjustice;alltherestbeingbroughtaboutbythenaturalcourseofthings.Thekeycomponentofalltherestthatsbroughtaboutthenaturalcourseofthingsisproductiveentrepreneurship.Institutionsestablishtheframeworkforeconomicdevelopment.Productiveentrepre-neurialactivityisthemechanismwherebythatframeworkproducesprosperity.Billionairesgreaterprevalenceincountrieswhoseinstitutionalenvironmentscomportmorecloselywiththeidealandarerichersupportsthisnotion.Theproductiveentrepreneurialmechanismis17 automaticinthepresenceofinstitutionsthatprotectpropertyrightsandallowmarketstooperatefreely.Thisbringsustothe nalpolicyrelevantimplicationofouranalysis.Intheabsenceofwell-protectedpropertyrightsandlight-handedstateinterventioninmarkets,policymakerse¤ortstoencourageentrepreneurialactivity,suchassubsidizingbusinessstartups,businesstraining/education,orsubsidizingsmallbusinessgrowth,maycreateaworsestateofa¤airsfromtheperspectiveofeconomicdevelopmentthandoingnothingatall.Atleastsomesuche¤ortsmayhavetheoppositee¤ectofwhatsneeded.Thesee¤ortsraisetherelativepayo¤ofevasiveentrepreneurship,makingitevenmorelikelythatproducerswhosesocialvalueishigherinwagelaborwillturntoself-employmentwheretheirsocialvalueislower.Equallyimportant,smallbusinesssubsidiesandrelatedattemptstoencourageentrepre-neurshipdirectlycostsomething.Thefundingforthemmustberaisedbytaxingproductiveentrepreneurswhosepropertyrightstoproductivelygeneratedpro tisconcomitantlydi-minished.Totheextentthate¤ortstosparkentrepreneurshipperseincountriesthatlacktheinstitutionalregimesnecessarytochannelpro tseekinginsociallyproductivewaysmayrequireadditionalregulations,forexamplerequirementsthatcompelestablishedbusi-nessownerstopurchaseacertainpercentageoftheirinputsfromstartup rms,targetingentrepreneurshipperseinsuchenvironmentsaddssimilarlytothecostofproductiveentre-preneurialactivity.Byimposingadditionalcostsonproductiveentrepreneurialprojects,thesee¤ortsdis-couragethecreationandgrowthofproductivebusinesses,someofwhichmayhaveproducedbillionaires.Ifevenonebillionaireispreventedfromcomingintoexistenceasaconsequence,thee¤ectonsocialwelfareisenormous.Thecreationofspecialprogramsaimedatboostingentrepreneurshippersemayalsocreateanewsourceofrentsforunproductiveentrepreneurs,sappingsocialvaluethiswayaswell.18 References[1]Acemoglu,D.,Johnson,S.andRobinson,J.A.(2001),TheColonialOriginsofCom-parativeDevelopment:AnEmpiricalInvestigation,AmericanEconomicReview,91,1369-1401.[2]Acemoglu,D.andJohnson,S.(2005),UnbundlingInstitutions,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,113,949-995.[3]Aidis,R.,Estrin,S.andMickiewicz,T.(2009),EntrepreneurialEntry:WhichInstitu-tionsMatter?,IZADPNo.4123.[4]Andersson,M.andKlepper,S.(2012),CharacteristicsandPerformanceofNewFirmsandSpino¤sinSweden,IndustrialandCorporateChange,forthcoming.[5]Autio,E.(2005),GlobalEntrepreneurshipMonitor.2005ReportonHigh-ExpectationEntrepreneurship.LondonBusinessSchool:London.[6]Autio,E.(2007),GlobalEntrepreneurshipMonitor.2007GlobalReportonHigh-GrowthEntrepreneurship.LondonBusinessSchool:London.[7]Baumol,W.J.(1990),Entrepreneurship:Productive,Unproductive,andDestructive,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,98,893-921.[8]Bitler,M.,Moskowitz,T.andVissing-Jørgensen,A.(2005),TestingAgencyTheorywithEntrepreneurialE¤ortandWealth,JournalofFinance,60,539-576.[9]Blanchower,D.G.andOswald,A.J.(1998),WhatMakesanEntrepreneur?,JournalofLaborEconomics,16,26-60.[10]Bowen,H.P.andDeClercq,D.(2008),InstitutionalContextandtheAllocationofEntrepreneurialE¤ort,JournalofInternationalBusinessStudies,39,747-767.[11]Bricker,J.,Bucks,B.,Kennickell,A.,Mach,T.andMoore,K.(2011),SurveyingtheAftermathoftheStorm:ChangesinFamilyFinancesfrom2007to2009,FederalReserveBoardWorkingPapers2011-17.[12]Bruce,D.andSchuetze,H.(2004),TheRelationshipbetweenTaxPolicyandEntre-preneurship,SwedishEconomicPolicyReview,11,233-265.[13]Cagetti,M.andDeNardi,M.(2009),EstateTaxation,Entrepreneurship,andWealth,AmericanEconomicReview,99,85-111.[14]Coyne,C.J.andLeeson,P.T.(2004),ThePlightofUnderdevelopedCountries,CatoJournal,24,235-249.[15]Davis,S.J.andHenrekson,M.(2010),EconomicPerformanceandMarketWorkAc-tivityinSwedenAftertheCrisisoftheEarly1990s,inR.B.Freeman,B.SwedenborgandR.H.Topel(eds.),ReformingtheWelfareState:RecoveryandBeyondinSweden.UniversityofChicagoPress:Chicago.19 [16]Djankov,S.,Qian,Y.,Roland,G.andZhuravskaya,E.(2006),WhoareChinasEn-trepreneurs?,AmericanEconomicReview,96,348-352.[17]Douhan,R.andHenrekson,M.(2010),EntrepreneurshipandSecond-BestInstitutions:GoingBeyondBaumolsTypology,JournalofEvolutionaryEconomics,20,629-643.[18]Estrin,S.,Korosteleva,J.andMickiewicz,T.(2009),BetterMeansMore:PropertyRightsandHigh-GrowthAspirationEntrepreneurship,IZADPNo.4396.[19]Evans,D.andLeighton,L.(1989),SomeEmpiricalAspectsofEntrepreneurship,AmericanEconomicReview,79,519-535.[20]Evans,D.andJovanovic,B.(1989),AnEstimatedModelofEntrepreneurialChoiceunderLiquidityConstraints,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,97,808-827.[21]Fairlie,R.W.(1999),TheAbsenceoftheAfrican-AmericanOwnedBusiness:AnAnalysisoftheDynamicsofSelf-Employment,JournalofLaborEconomics,17,80-108.[22]FederalReserve(2011),FlowofFundsAccountsoftheUnitedStates2005-2010,BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,March.[23]Fonseca,R.,Lopez-Garcia,P.andPissarides,C.A.(2001),Entrepreneurship,Start-UpCostsandEmployment,EuropeanEconomicReview,45,692-705.[24]Gentry,W.M.andHubbard,R.G.(2000),TaxPolicyandEntrepreneurialActivity,AmericanEconomicReview,90,283-287.[25]Gentry,W.M.andHubbard,R.G.(2004),EntrepreneurshipandHouseholdSaving,B.E.JournalofEconomicAnalysisandPolicy,4,Article8.[26]Glaeser,E.L.andShleifer,A.(2002),LegalOrigins,QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,107,1193-1229.[27]Grilo,I.andThurik,R.(2005),LatentandActualEntrepreneurshipinEuropeandtheUS:SomeRecentDevelopments,InternationalEntrepreneurshipandManagementJournal,1,441-459.[28]Grilo,I.andThurik,R.(2008),DeterminantsofEntrepreneurialEngagementLevelsinEuropeandtheUS,IndustrialandCorporateChange,17,1113-1145.[29]Guiso,L.,Sapienza,P.andZingales,L.(2006),DoesCultureA¤ectEconomicOut-comes?,JournalofEconomicPerspectives,20,23-48.[30]Gwartney,J.,Holcombe,R.andLawson,R.(1999),EconomicFreedomandtheEn-vironmentforEconomicGrowth,JournalofInstitutionalandTheoreticalEconomics,155,1-21.[31]Hamilton,B.(2000),DoesEntrepreneurshipPay?AnEmpiricalAnalysisoftheRe-turnstoSelf-Employment,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,108,604-631.20 [32]Hall,J.C.andSobel,R.S.(2006),PublicPolicyandEntrepreneurship,KansasUni-versityCenterforAppliedEconomicsTechnicalReport06-0717.[33]Hayek,F.A.(1960),TheConstitutionofLiberty.UniversityofChicagoPress:Chicago.[34]Henrekson,M.andJohannson,D.(2010),GazellesasJobCreators:ASurveyandIntrepretationoftheEvidence,SmallBusinessEconomics,35,227-244.[35]Henrekson,M.andSanandaji,T.(2011).EntrepreneurshipandtheTheoryofTaxa-tion,SmallBusinessEconomics,37,167-185.[36]Hipple,S.(2010),Self-EmploymentintheUnitedStates,MonthlyLaborReview,September,17-32[37]Ho,Y.-P.andWong,P.K.(2007),Financing,RegulatoryCostsandEntrepreneurialPropensity,SmallBusinessEconomics,28,187-204.[38]Holtz-Eakin,D.,Joulfaian,D.andRosen,H.S.(1994a),StickingitOut:Entrepre-neurialSurvivalandLiquidityConstraints,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,102,53-75.[39]Holtz-Eakin,D.,Joulfaian,D.andRosen,H.S.(1994b),EntrepreneurialDecisionsandLiquidityConstraints,RandJournalofEconomics,25,334-347.[40]Holtz-Eakin,D.andRosen,H.S.(2005),CashConstraintsandStart-Ups:DeutschmarksversusDollars,ContributionstoEconomicAnalysisandPolicy,4,1-26.[41]Hurst,E.andLusardi,A.(2004),LiquidityConstraints,HouseholdWealth,andEn-trepreneurship,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,112,319-347.[42]Kanniainen,V.andVesala,T.(2005),EntrepreneurshipandLaborMarketInstitu-tions,EconomicModelling,22,828-847.[43]Klapper,L.,Laeven,L.andRajan,R.(2006),EntryRegulationasaBarriertoEntre-preneurship,JournalofFinancialEconomics,82,591-629.[44]Lazear,E.(2004),BalancedSkillsandEntrepreneurship,AmericanEconomicReview,94,208-211.[45]LaPorta,R.,Lopez-de-Silanes,F.,Shleifer,A.andVisnhy,R.W.(1997),LegalDe-terminantsofExternalFinance,JournalofFinance,52,1131-1150.[46]Leeson,P.T.(2008),EscapingPoverty:ForeignAid,PrivateProperty,andEconomicDevelopment,JournalofPrivateEnterprise,23,39-64.[47]Leeson,P.T.(2010),TwoCheersforCapitalism?,Society,47,227-233.[48]Lerner,J.andTåg,J.(2012),InstitutionsandVentureCapital,IndustrialandCor-porateChange,forthcoming.21 [49]Nordhaus,W.(2004),SchumpeterianPro tsintheAmericanEconomy:TheoryandMeasurement,NBERWorkingPapersNo.10433.[50]OECD(2009),Overview:DataonInformalEmploymentandSelf-Employment.OECD.[51]Ovaska,T.andSobel,R.S.(2005),EntrepreneurshipinPost-SocialistEconomies,JournalofPrivateEnterprise,21,8-28.[52]Paulson,A.,Townsend,R.andKaraivanov,A.(2006),DistinguishingLimitedLiabilityfromMoralHazardinaModelofEntrepreneurship,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,114,100-144.[53]Quadrini,V.(1999),TheImportanceofEntrepreneurshipforWealthConcentrationandMobility,ReviewofIncomeandWealth,45,1-19.[54]Rodrik,D.(2008),Second-BestInstitutions,AmericanEconomicReview,98,100-104.[55]Scully,G.(1988),TheInstitutionalFrameworkandEconomicDevelopment,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,96,652-662.[56]Smith,A.(1776[1991]),AnInquiryIntotheNatureandCausesoftheWealthofNa-tions.PrometheusBooks:NewYork.[57]Sobel,R.S.,Clark,J.R.andLee,D.R.(2007),Freedom,BarrierstoEntry,Entrepre-neurship,andEconomicProgress,ReviewofAustrianEconomics,20,221-236.[58]Soto,H.de(1989),TheOtherPath:TheEconomicAnswertoTerrorism.BasicBooks:NewYork.[59]Stel,A.van,Story,D.J.andThurik,A.R.(2007),TheE¤ectofBusinessRegulationsonNascentandYoungBusinessEntrepreneurship,SmallBusinessEconomics,28,171-186.[60]U.S.SmallBusinessAdministration(2011),SmallBusinessPro le:UnitedStates,U.S.SmallBusinessAdministration,O¢ceofAdvocacy.[61]Wennekers,A.R.M.,Stel,A.van,Carree,M.A.andThurik,A.R.(2010),TheRe-lationbetweenEntrepreneurshipandEconomicDevelopment:IsitU-Shaped?,Foun-dationsandTrendsinEntrepreneurship,6,167-237.22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Statistics Employment, Billionairesperpeople percentiledeviation