David Hull Through his own philosophical lens - PowerPoint Presentation

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David Hull Through his own philosophical lens

Naomi Kasturiarachi and Dr. Andrew

Inkpen

Archival Scholars Research AwardDietrich School of Arts and Sciences, University of Pittsburgh

Introduction

SummaryThis project investigates the ways that philosopher David Hull (1935-2010) put his own philosophical approach into practice. Hull famously argued for an evolutionary theory of scientific change, according to which, conceptual and social change in science—like natural selection—requires heritability, variation, and differential fitness. I use this as an interpretive framework to highlight Hull’s own contributions to science and philosophy as demonstrated in the contents of his archival papers.Who was David Hull?Hull split his career between the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (1964-1984) and Northwestern University (1984-2000). He advocated a novel approach, combining historical, philosophical, and social studies of science, and founded the field of modern philosophy of biology.1 He made significant contributions to science. This project will specifically focus on his contributions to scientific change.My Interpretive FrameworkWe can appreciate Hull’s contributions to science and philosophy by using his approach to scientific change as an interpretative framework.2 Hull’s philosophy of scientific change hypothesized that scientific change works in a similar way to evolution by natural selection. He believed that scientific change is a social process in which scientists interact so that a variety of ideas are exchanged and passed on to future generations. For Hull, “science is essentially social”: individuals “can learn about the world in which they live by confronting it directly, but if science is to be cumulative, social transmission is necessary.”3 Scientific change requires heritability, variation, and differential fitness. Below I show how Hull demonstrated these three criteria through archival examples.

Heritability and FitnessHeritability and FitnessIn order for conceptual change to occur, there must be social heritability (i.e., the transmission of concepts from one person to another) and differential fitness (i.e., some concepts must ‘out compete’ others). In order to increase conceptual fitness, scientists must behave in ways that will increase the likelihood of their ideas being inherited. This requires that they balance having good relationships with other scientists, giving credit to the influence of their peers while simultaneously asserting their own ideas. Hull’s own contributions can be understood similarly, as he ensured that his ideas were inherited and increased his own conceptual fitness. Interpreting Hull Through a Hullsian LensTraining students in his own ideasHull increased his conceptual fitness through mentoring students, thereby passing down his ideas. In a letter from philosopher of biology, Dr. John Beatty, dated February 9, 1975, Beatty asks if he would be able to study under Hull during 1975-76. Hull agrees. In the letter, Hull describes how he is teaching a course in which he discusses “the possibility of an evolutionary analysis of science.”4 Hull is teaching his own theory of scientific change to students he himself teaches, therefore increasing his conceptual fitness.Professional committeesHull headed several committees, which also increased his conceptual fitness. He was the president of the Society of Systematic Zoology (1984-1985), the Philosophy of Science Association (1985-1986), and co-founded the International Society for History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology ( President in 1991-1992). Unintentional versus Intentional My analysis of Hull doesn’t commit him to purposefully increasing his own fitness. It was the by-product of being a good philosopher and teacher. As Hull put it, “Flour beetles are unaware that such a thing as genetic inclusive fitness even exists let alone capable of performing the required calculations. Scientists are not appreciably different.”5

The Importance of Conceptual VariationWhat is the role of a philosopher in science?Hull demonstrated how the philosopher can play a normative role in science. A philosopher can do more than simply describe what science is, but instead say how it should be. Hull argued that (just as for natural selection) variation was required for scientific change. Like heritability and fitness, we can use variation as a way to think about Hull’s contributions. There are examples throughout Hull’s archive of his desire to ensure that social and conceptual variation wasn’t suppressed.Variation in CorrespondenceThe topical variation within Hull’s correspondence is astonishingly high. This, in one way, demonstrates his commitment to variability. Figure 1 features a graph illustrating the number of letters in Hull’s archive with a particular theme for five different philosophers. Each philosopher had a unique theme they corresponded about the most with Hull. This illustrates a high amount of variability.Hull as a Normative ScientistHull’s commitment to variation ensured that no one’s ideas were illegitimately suppressed. This included the ideas of gay or lesbian philosophers. During the 1970-1990’s, anti-sodomy laws were present in certain states. In one letter to Jane Maienschein on October 31, 1997, Hull was angry that the History of Science Society was having a conference in Arizona (an anti-sodomy laws state). Maienschein explained to Hull that the city the conference was being held protected gay rights.6 Hull advocated for meetings to not be held in anti-sodomic states in the Philosophy of Science Association, Society of Systematic Zoology, International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology, and History of Science Society. Additionally, Hull also fought against “gay purges”, where gay students and faculty were persecuted at Indiana University and University of Wisconsin Milwaukee.7

Future DirectionsIn the future, letters from a larger sample of philosophers within Hull’s archives will be analyzed and graphed to ensure that the pattern of variability is conserved. Additionally, further evidence for heritability and conceptual inclusive fitness will be searched for. I would like to thank the Special Collections Department at the Hillman Library for making this research possible, especially librarian Lance Lugar from the Archives of Scientific Philosophy.

References1Godfrey-Smith, P. “David Hull (1935-2010).” Biology and Philosophy 25: 749-750.2Hull, D. 1988. Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago.3Hull, D. 1988. “A Mechanism and Its Metaphysics: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science.” Biology and Philosophy 3: 127.4 Letter from John Beatty, Box 6, Folder 2. David L. Hull Papers, 1965-2004, ASP.2005.01, Archives for Scientific Philosophy, Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh.5Hull, D. 1988. “A Mechanism and Its Metaphysics: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science.” Biology and Philosophy 3: 128.6Letter from Jane Maienschein, Box 6, Folder 2. David L. Hull Papers, 1965-2004, ASP.2005.01, Archives for Scientific Philosophy, Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh.7Overmann, R. 2000. “David Hull, Hod Carrier.” Biology and Philosophy 15: 311-20.

Figure 1: A graph representing specific philosophers within the David L. Hull Papers versus the distinct counts of dates (representative of an individual letter within the collection). The different theme of each letter is represented by a different color. This graph shows that each philosopher has a different theme with the highest frequency of dates, therefore indicating different themes of specialization.

Figure 2:

A photograph of David Hull and Michael Ruse. The two were very close friends. As indicated by Figure 1, Hull spoke to Ruse the most about Philosophy of Science in general. They also talked a great deal about personal matters.