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Warrior Cops The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism inAmerican Police Departments by Diane Cecilia Weber Diane Cecilia Weber is a Virginia writer on law enforcement and criminal justice. No. 50 Over the past 20 years Congress has encouraged the U.S. military to supply intelligence,equipment, and training to civilian police. Thatencouragement has spawned a culture of paramilitarism in American law enforcement.The 1980s and 1990s have seen markedchanges in the number of state and local paramilitary units, in their mission and deployment, and in their tactical armament.According to a recent academic survey, nearly90 percent of the police departments surveyedin cities with populations over 50,000 had paramilitary units, as did 70 percent of the departments surveyed in communities with populations under 50,000. The Pentagon has beenequipping those units with M-16s, armoredpersonnel carriers, and grenade launchers. Thepolice paramilitary units also conduct trainingexercises with active duty Army Rangers andNavy SEALs.State and local police departments areincreasingly accepting the military as a modelfor their behavior and outlook. The sharing oftraining and technology is producing a sharedmindset. The problem is that the mindset of thesoldier is simply not appropriate for the civilianpolice officer. Police officers confront not an“enemy” but individuals who are protected bythe Bill of Rights. Confusing the police function with the military function can lead to dangerous and unintended consequences—such asunnecessary shootings and killings. August 26, 1999 Introduction One of the most alarming side effects ofthe federal government’s war on drugs isthe militarization of law enforcement inAmerica. There are two aspects to the militarization phenomenon. First, the Ameri-can tradition of civil-military separation isbreaking down as Congress assigns moreand more law enforcement responsibilitiesto the armed forces. Second, state and localpolice officers are increasingly emulatingthe war-fighting tactics of soldiers. MostAmericans are unaware of the militarization phenomenon simply because it hasbeen creeping along imperceptibly formany years. To get perspective, it will beuseful to consider some recent events: • The U.S. military played a role in theWaco incident. In preparation fortheir disastrous 1993 raid on theBranch Davidian compound, federallaw enforcement agents were trainedby Army Special Forces at Fort Hood,Texas. And Delta Force commanderswould later advise Attorney GeneralJanet Reno to insert gas into the compound to end the 51-day siege. Wacoresulted in the largest number of civilian deaths ever arising from a lawenforcement operation. Between 1995 and 1997 the Departmentof Defense gave police departments 1.2million pieces of military hardware,including 73 grenade launchers and 112armored personnel carriers. The LosAngeles Police Department has acquired600 Army surplus M-16s. Even small-town police departments are getting intothe act. The seven-officer department inJasper, Florida, is now equipped withfully automatic M-16s. In 1996 President Bill Clinton appointeda military commander, Gen. Barry R.McCaffrey, to oversee enforcement of thefederal drug laws as the director of theOffice of National Drug Control Policy. Since the mid-1990s U.S. Special Forceshave been going after drug dealers inforeign countries. According to the U.S.Southern Command, American soldiersoccupy three radar sites in Colombia tohelp monitor drug flights. And NavySEALs have assisted in drug interdiction in the port city of Cap-Haitien, The U.S. Marine Corps is now patrollingthe Mexican border to keep drugs andillegal immigrants out of this country. In1997 a Marine anti-drug patrol shot andkilled 18-year-old Esequiel Hernandez ashe was tending his family’s herd of goatson private property. The JusticeDepartment settled a wrongful deathlawsuit with the Hernandez family for$1.9 million. In 1998 Indiana National Guard Engin-eering Units razed 42 crack houses inand around the city of Gary. TheNational Guard has also been deployedin Washington, D.C., to drive drug dealers out of certain locations. In 1999 the Pentagon asked PresidentClinton to appoint a “military leader”for the continental United States inthe event of a terrorist attack onAmerican soil. The powers that wouldbe wielded by such a military commander were not made clear. What is clear—and disquieting—is thatthe lines that have traditionally separatedthe military mission from the police mission are getting badly blurred.Over the last 20 years Congress hasencouraged the U.S. military to supplyintelligence, equipment, and training tocivilian police. That encouragement hasspawned a culture of paramilitarism inAmerican police departments. By virtue oftheir training and specialized armament,state and local police officers are adoptingthe tactics and mindset of their militarymentors. The problem is that the actionsand values of the police officer are distinctly different from those of the warrior. Thejob of a police officer is to keep the peace,but not by just any means. Police officersare expected to apprehend suspected law The lines thathave traditionally separatedthe militarymission fromthe police mission are gettingbadly blurred. breakers while adhering to constitutionalprocedures. They are expected to use min-mum force and to deliver suspects to a courtof law. The soldier, on the other hand, is aninstrument of war. In boot camp, recruitsare trained to inflict maximum damage onenemy personnel. Confusing the policefunction with the military function canhave dangerous consequences. AsAlbuquerque police chief Jerry Glavin hasnoted, “If [cops] have a mind-set that thegoal is to take out a citizen, it will happen.” Paramilitarism threatens civil liberties, constitutional norms, and the well-being of allcitizens. Thus, the use of paramilitary tactics in everyday police work should alarmpeople of goodwill from across the politicalspectrum. This paper will examine the militarization of law enforcement at the local level,with particular emphasis on SWAT (SpecialWeapons and Tactics) units. The paper willconclude that the special skills of SWATpersonnel and their military armaments arenecessary only in extraordinary circumstances. The deployment of such unitsshould therefore be infrequentMore generally, Congress should recognize that soldiers and police officers perform differentfunctions. Federal lawmakers should discourage the culture of paramilitarism inpolice departments by keeping the militaryout of civilian law enforcement. A Brief History of theRelationship between theMilitary and Civilian Law The use of British troops to enforceunpopular laws in the American colonieshelped to convince the colonists that KingGeorge III and Parliament were intent onestablishing tyranny. The Declaration ofIndependence specifically refers to thosepractices, castigating King George for “quartering large Bodies of Armed Troops amongus” and for “protecting [soldiers], by mockTrial, from Punishment, for any Murderswhich they should commit on the Inhabit-ants of these States.” The colonists complained that the king “has kept among us, inTimes of peace, Standing Armies, withoutthe consent of our Legislatures. He has affected to render the Military independent of, andsuperior to, the Civil Power.”After the Revolutionary War, Americanswere determined to protect themselvesagainst the threat of an overbearing military. The Founders inserted several safeguards into the Constitution to ensure thatthe civilian powers of the new republicwould remain distinct from, and superiorto, the military: The Congress shall have Power . . .To declare War . . . To raise and support Armies . . . To make Rules for theGovernment and Regulation of theland and Naval Forces . . . To providefor organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . keep Troops, orShips of War in time of Peace, . . . orengage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger aswill not admit of delay. The President shall be Command-er in Chief of the Army and Navy ofthe United States, and of the Militiaof the several States, when called intothe actual Service of the United A well regulated Militia, beingnecessary to the security of a freeState, the right of the people to keepand bear Arms, shall not be No soldier shall, in time of peacebe quartered in any house, withoutthe consent of the Owner, nor intime of war, but in a manner to beprescribed by law. It is important to emphasize that thoseprovisions were not considered controversial. Indeed, the debate at the time of the After theWar, Americanswere determined to protect themselvesagainst thethreat of an founding did not concern the wisdom oflimiting the role of the military. The debatewas only with respect to whether those constitutional safeguards would prove ade During the Civil War period the principleof civil-military separation broke down.President Abraham Lincoln suspended thewrit of habeas corpus, and citizens werearrested and tried before military tribunals. After the Civil War, Congress imposed martial law in the rebel states. And to shield themilitary’s reconstruction policies from constitutional challenges, Congress barred theSupreme Court from jurisdiction over federal appellate court rulings involving postwarreconstruction controversies. The Army enforced an array of laws in theSouth and, not surprisingly, became politically meddlesome. In several states the Armyinterfered with local elections and state political machinery. Such interference during thepresidential election of 1876 provoked apolitical firestorm. The Democratic candidate, Samuel J. Tilden, won the popular votewhile the Republican candidate, RutherfordB. Hayes, garnered more electoral votes. TheRepublican victory was tainted by accusations that federal troops had stuffed the ballot box in a few southern states to favorHayes. Negotiations between the politicalparties ensued and a compromise wasreached. The Democrats agreed to concedethe election to “Rutherfraud” Hayes (as disgruntled partisans nicknamed him) on thecondition that federal troops be withdrawnfrom the South. The Republicans agreed. The Army’s machinations in the South alsoset the stage for a landmark piece of legislation, the Posse Comitatus Act. The one-sentence law provided, “Whoever, except in casesand under such circumstances expresslyauthorized by the Constitution or by Act ofCongress, willfully uses any part of the Armyas a posse comitatus or otherwise to executethe laws shall be fined no more than $10,000or imprisoned not more than two years, or Southern Democrats proposed thePosse Comitatus bill in an effort to getCongress to reaffirm, by law, the principle ofcivil-military separation. President Hayessigned that bill into law in June 1878. Federal troops have occasionally played arole in quelling civil disorder—without priorcongressional authorization—in spite of theplain terms of the Posse Comitatus Act. TheU.S. Army, for example, was used to restoreorder in industrial disputes in the late 19thand early 20th century. Except for the illegaloccupation of the Coeur d’Alene miningregion in Idaho in 1899–1901, army troopswere used by presidents to accomplish specific and temporary objectives—after which theywere immediately withdrawn. troops and federalized National Guardsmenwere called upon to enforce the desegregation of schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, in1957; in Oxford, Mississippi, in 1962; and inSelma, Alabama, in 1963. Over the past 20 years there has been a dramatic expansion of the role of the military inlaw enforcement activity. In 1981 Congresspassed the Military Cooperation with LawEnforcement Officials Act. That law amended the Posse Comitatus Act insofar as it authorized the military to “assist” civilian police inthe enforcement of drug laws. The act encouraged the military to (a) make available equipment, military bases, and research facilities tofederal, state, and local police; (b) train andadvise civilian police on the use of the equipment; and (c) assist law enforcement personnel in keeping drugs from entering the country. The act also authorized the military toshare information acquired during militaryoperations with civilian law enforcementagencies. As the drug war escalated throughoutthe 1980s, the military was drawn furtherand further into the prohibition effort by aseries of executive and congressional initiatives: • In 1986 President Ronald Reagan issueda National Decision Security Directivedesignating drugs as an official threat to“national security,” which encouraged atight-knit relationship between civilian As the drugwar escalatedthroughout the1980s, the mili-tary was drawnfurther and further into the law enforcement and the military. In 1987 Congress set up an administrative apparatus to facilitate transactions between civilian law enforcementofficials and the military. For example,a special office with an 800 number wasestablished to handle inquiries bypolice officials regarding acquisition ofmilitary hardware. In 1988 Congress directed the NationalGuard to assist law enforcement agencies in counterdrug operations. TodayNational Guard units in all 50 states flyacross America’s landscape in darkgreen helicopters, wearing camouflageuniforms and armed with machineguns, in search of marijuana fields. In 1989 President George Bush createdsix regional joint task forces (JTFs)within the Department of Defense.Those task forces are charged withcoordinating the activities of the military and police agencies in the drugwar, including joint training of militaryunits and civilian police. JTFs can becalled on by civilian law enforcementagencies in counterdrug cases whenpolice feel the need for military rein In 1994 the Department of Justice andthe Department of Defense signed amemorandum of understanding,which has enabled the military totransfer technology to state and localpolice departments. Civilian officersnow have at their disposal an array ofhigh-tech military items previouslyreserved for use during wartime. All of those measures have resulted in themilitarization of a wide range of activity inthe United States that had been previouslyconsidered the domain of civilian lawenforcement. As one reporter has observed,“Not since federal troops were deployed tothe former Confederate states duringReconstruction has the U.S. military been sointimately involved in civilian law enforce The Militarization of thePolice Department Not only is the military directly involvedin law enforcement; police departments areincreasingly emulating the tactics of thearmed forces in their everyday activities.This aspect of the militarization phenomenon has gone largely unnoticed.The Early American Police ForceIn one sense, the paramilitarism intoday’s police departments is a consequence of the increasing professionalism ofpolice in the 20th century. Professionalismessentially grants a monopoly of specializedknowledge, training, and practice to certaingroups in exchange for a commitment to apublic service ideal. While that may sounddesirable for law enforcement officers, theeffects of professionalism have, in manyrespects, been negative. Over the last century police departments have evolved intoincreasingly centralized, authoritarian,autonomous, and militarized bureaucracies, which has led to their isolation fromthe citizenry.Early police departments were anythingbut professional. Officers were basically political appointees, with ties to ward bosses.Officers also had strong cultural roots in theneighborhoods they patrolled. Police workwas more akin to social work, as jails providedovernight lodging and soup kitchens fortramps, lost children, and other destitute individuals. Discipline was practically nonexistent,and law enforcement was characterized by anarbitrary, informal process that is sometimesdubbed “curbside justice.” Barely trained andequipped, police aimed at regulating ratherthan preventing crime, which, in the previouscentury, meant something closer to policingvice and cultural lifestyles. On the positive side, the early policeforces were well integrated into their communities, often solving crimes by simplychatting with people on the street corners.On the negative side, the police were suspicious of and often hostile to strangers and Police departments haveevolved intoand militarized immigrants, and, having strong loyalties tothe local political machine, they were susceptible to bribery and political influence.Throughout the 19th century police workwas considered casual labor, making it difficult for either municipalities or precinctcaptains to impose any uniform standardson patrolmen. Police did not considerthemselves a self-contained body of lawofficers set apart from the general popuThe initial round of professionalizationtook place during the Progressive Era with theappearance of early police literature, fraternalorganizations, and rudimentary recruitmentstandards—all of which suggest the emergenceof a common occupational self-consciousness.Internal and external pressures forced thedepoliticization and restructuring of policedepartments, which gradually reformed intocentralized, depersonalized, hierarchicalbureaucracies. To gain control of the rank andfile, police chiefs assigned military ranks andinsignia to personnel, and some departmentsrequired military drills. “Military methodshave been adopted and military disciplineenforced,” wrote Philadelphia police superintendent James Robinson in his department’s1912 annual report. A wave of police unionism from 1917 to 1920 was a strong indicationthat police not only were acquiring a sharedoccupational outlook but had come to regardpolicing as a full-time career.Two events, however, signaled the breakaway of police from their communities andinto their modern professional enclave. In1905 the first truly modern state police forcewas formed in Pennsylvania. Ostensibly created to control crime in rural areas, the Pennsyl-vania State Police was used mainly in labor disputes, since the state militias and local police(who were more likely to sympathize withstrikers) had been ineffective. That centralizedorganization, under one commander appointed by the governor, recruited members fromacross the state so that no more than a handful of officers had roots in any single community. This new force was considered so militaristic that the Pennsylvania Federation ofLabor referred to it as “Cossacks.” Despite themisgivings of many people, Pennsylvaniastarted a trend. Other states began to emulatePennsylvania’s state police force.The other significant event was J. EdgarHoover’s directorship of the Federal Bureauof Investigation. By raising standards oftraining and recruitment, Hoover rescuedfederal law enforcement from its formerstate of corruption and mismanagement.Hoover imbued his agents with a moral zealto fight crime, and in 1935 he opened theNational Police Academy, which has exerted tremendous influence on police training Hoover’s FBI acquired a prestigethat made it the model police organization. Elite SWAT Units CreatedThere is agreement in police literature thatthe incident that inspired the SWAT conceptoccurred in 1966. In August of that year aderanged man climbed to the top of the 32-story clock tower at the University of Texas inAustin. For 90 minutes he randomly shot 46people, killing 15 of them, until two policeofficers got to the top of the tower and killedhim. The Austin episode was so blatant that it“shattered the last myth of safety Americansenjoyed [and] was the final impetus the chiefsof police needed” to form their own SWATteams. Shortly thereafter, the Los AngelesPolice Department formed the first SWATteam and, it is said, originated the acronymSWAT to describe its elite force. The LosAngeles SWAT unit acquired national prestigewhen it was used successfully against theBlack Panthers in 1969 and the SymbioneseLiberation Army in 1973.Much like the FBI, the modern SWATteam was born of public fear and the perception by police that crime had reachedsuch proportions and criminals hadbecome so invincible that more armamentand more training were needed. SWATteam members have come to considerthemselves members of an elite unit withspecialized skills and more of a militaryethos than the normal police structure.Another striking similarity with the FBI is Hoover’s FBIacquired aprestige thatmade it themodel policeorganization. that SWAT units have gained their statusand legitimacy in the public eye by theirperformance in a few sensational events.The earliest SWAT teams consisted ofsmall units that could be called into actionto deal with difficult situations, such asincidents involving hostages, barricadedsuspects, or hijackers. Early SWAT teammembers were not unlike regular policeofficers and were only slightly betterequipped. SWAT Teams Everywhere, DoingThe 1980s and 1990s saw marked changesin the number of permanent SWAT teamsacross the country, in their mission anddeployment, and in their tactical armament.According to a 1997 study of SWAT teamsconducted by Peter Kraska and VictorKappeler of Eastern Kentucky University,nearly 90 percent of the police departmentssurveyed in cities with populations over50,000 had paramilitary units, as did 70 percent of the departments surveyed in communities with populations under 50,000. Although the proliferation of those specialunits was slow in the late 1960s and early1970s, their numbers took a leap in the mid-1970s, and growth has remained high sincethe 1980s. In fact, most SWAT teams havebeen created in the 1980s and 1990s. Townslike Jasper, Lakeland, and Palm Beach,Florida; Lakewood, New Jersey; Chapel Hill,North Carolina; Charlottesville, Virginia; andHarwich, Massachusetts, have SWAT teams.The campus police at the University ofCentral Florida have a SWAT unit—eventhough the county SWAT team is available.Kraska refers to the proliferation as the “militarization of Mayberry,” and he is rightlyalarmed that the special units are becoming anormal and permanent part of law enforcement agencies.Under the Military Cooperation with LawEnforcement Officials Act, Congress directedthe military to make equipment and facilitiesavailable to civilian police in the anti-drugeffort. As a result, police departments began toacquire more sophisticated tactical equipment: automatic weapons with laser sightsand sound suppressors, surveillance equipment such as Laser Bugs that can detectsounds inside a building by bouncing a laserbeam off a window, pinhole cameras, flashand noise grenades, rubber bullets, bulletproof apparel, battering rams, and more. TheBoone County Sheriff’s office in Indiana hasacquired an amphibious armored personnel In Fresno, California, the SWAT unithas access to two helicopters equipped withnight vision goggles and an armored personnel carrier with a turret. According to CalBlack, a former SWAT commander for theFBI, “The equipment SWAT teams use todayis many times more sophisticated than it waswhen I began in SWAT in the 1970s. . . .Because of this high-tech equipment, the ability of SWAT teams has increased dramatical The National Institute of Justice reporton the DOJ-DOD technology “partnership”boasted a number of high-tech items thatSWAT teams now have at their disposal.Included among the showcase militarytechnologies deemed applicable to lawenforcement were “inconspicuous systemsthat can detect from more than 30 feet awayweapons with little or no metal content aswell as those made of metal.” Other itemsin the pipeline include “a gas-launched,wireless, electric stun projectile”; a “vehicular laser surveillance and dazzler system”;“pyrotechnic devices such as flash-banggrenades [and] smoke grenades”; instruments of “crowd control”; mobile, evenhand-held, systems to locate gunfire; andtagging equipment to locate, identify, andmonitor the “movement of individuals,vehicles and containers.” Special bodyarmor and helmets are also under consideration. Nick Pastore, former police chief inNew Haven, Connecticut, says: “I wasoffered tanks, bazookas, anything I wanted.. . . I turned it all down because it feeds amind-set that you’re not a police officerserving a community, you’re a soldier at The 1980s and1990s sawmarked changesin the numberof permanentSWAT teamsacross the country, in their mission and deployment, and intheir tacticalarmament. An even more disturbing developmentreported in the Kraska-Kappeler study, however, is the growing tendency of police departments to use SWAT units in routine policinactivity. The Fresno SWAT unit, for example,sends its 40-person team, with full militarydress and gear, into the inner city “war zone”to deal with problems of drugs, gangs, andcrime. One survey respondent described hisdepartment’s use of SWAT teams in the following way:We’re into saturation patrols in hotspots. We do a lot of our work withthe SWAT unit because we have bigger guns. We send out two, two-to-four-men cars, we look for minor violations and do jump-outs, either on people on the street or automobiles. Afterwe jump-out the second car providesperiphery cover with an ostentatiousdisplay of weaponry. We’re sending aclear message: if the shootings don’tstop, we’ll shoot someone. A midwestern community with a population of 75,000 sends out patrols dressed intactical uniform in a military personnel carrier. The armored vehicle, according to theSWAT commander, stops “suspicious vehicles and people. We stop anything thatmoves. We’ll sometimes even surround suspicious homes and bring out the MP5s(machine gun pistols).” Unfortunately, it is likely that the numberof SWAT “patrols” will rise in the future. Intheir survey, when Kraska and Kappeler askedthe question, Is your department using thetactical operations unit as a proactive patrolunit to aid high crime areas? 107 departmentsindicated that they were. Sixty-one percent ofall respondents thought it was a good idea. Infact, 63 percent of the departments in that survey agreed that SWAT units “play an important role in community policing strategies.” According to Police magazine, “Police officersworking in patrol vehicles, dressed in urbantactical gear and armed with automaticweapons are here—and they’re here to stay.” Limiting the SWAT Missionto Bona Fide Emergencies The relatively recent phenomenon of special, commando-type units within civilian lawenforcement agencies is occurring on bothsides of the Atlantic. The British counterpartto the SWAT team in America is the PoliceSupport Unit (PSU). In 1993 the British Journalof Criminology published opposing views onBritish paramilitarism by P. A. J. Waddingtonand Anthony Jefferson. Both scholars agreedthat public order policing in Britain by PSUswas becoming paramilitaristic, but they couldnot agree on a precise definition of “paramilitarism.” While Jefferson defined paramilitarism as “the application of quasi-militarytraining, equipment, philosophy and organization to questions of policing,” Waddingtonconfined paramilitarism to police methods ofriot control, namely, “the coordination andintegration of all officers deployed as squadsunder centralised command and control.” third scholar, Alice Hills, has sought the middle ground, rounding off the differences bylooking at paramilitary forces of other countries, such as the French Gendarmerie, theItalian Carabiniere, the Frontier Guards inFinland, Civil Defense Units in Saudi Arabia,and the National Security Guards in India. ByHills’s reckoning, paramilitarism should “bedefined in terms of function . . . and relationships; of the police to the military and to thestate, as well as to the legal system and style ofpolitical process.” In general, however, as hasbeen the case in this country, British studieshave largely “neglected . . . the relationship ofthe police to the other uniformed services, particularly the army, in the late twentieth centu What is disturbing is that under any of thedefinitions offered by the British analysts,American SWAT teams can be regarded asparamilitary units. The institutional cooperation between civilian law enforcement andthe military has emerged under the directpolitical sponsorship of elected leaders in thenational legislature and the presidency. In1981 Congress diluted the Posse Comitatus A disturbingdevelopment isthe growing tendency of policedepartments touse SWAT unitsin routineing activity. Act—a law that was designed to keep the military out of civilian affairs—in order to givethe military an active role in the war ondrugs, and that role has been expanded bysubsequent congressional action and by thesupport of presidents of both political parties. The military–law enforcement connection is now a basic assumption within thefederal government, and it receives enthusiastic support in government literature. Forexample, in a 1997 National Institute of Jus-tice report on the transfer of military technology to civilian police departments, theJoint Program Steering Group explained the“convergence in the technology needs of thelaw enforcement and military communities”as due to their “common missions.” In themilitary’s newest “peacekeeping” role abroad,it is obliged—much as civilian police—to be“highly discreet when applying force,” giventhe “greater presence of members of themedia or other civilians who are observing, ifnot recording, the situation.” Moreover, themilitary’s enemy abroad has begun to resemble law enforcement’s enemy at home: “Lawofficers today confront threats that havemore and more military aspects” due to thechanged “nature of criminals and their With widespread political sanction, themilitary is now encouraged to share training,equipment, technology—and, most subtle,mentality—with state and local civilian police.SWAT team members undergo rigorous training similar to that given military special operations units. Training, as one study has noted,“may seem to be a purely technical exercise,[but] it actually plays a central role in paramilitary subculture” and moreover reinforces“the importance of feeling and thinking as a The research of Kraska and Kappelerrevealed that SWAT units are often trainedalongside, or with the support of, military special forces personnel. Of 459 SWAT teamsacross the country, 46 percent acquired theirinitial training from “police officers with special operations experience in the military,” and43 percent with “active-duty military expertsin special operations.” Almost 46 percentcurrently conducted training exercises with“active-duty military experts in special opera Twenty-three respondents to the survey indicated that they trained with eitherNavy SEALs or Army Rangers. One respondent went into greater detail:We’ve had special forces folks whohave come right out of the junglesof Central and South America. . . .All branches of military service areinvolved in providing training tolaw enforcement. U.S. Marshals actas liaisons between the police andmilitary to set up the training—ourgo-between. They have an arrangement with the military throughJTF-6 [Joint Task Force 6]. . . . I justreceived a piece of paper from afour-star general who tells us he’sconcerned about the type of training we’re getting. We’ve had teamsof Navy Seals and Army Rangerscome here and teach us everything.We just have to use our judgmentand exclude the information like:“at this point we bring in the mortars and blow the place up.” Because of their close collaboration withthe military, SWAT units are taking on thewarrior mentality of our military’s specialforces. SWAT team organization resemblesthat of a special combat unit, with a commander, a tactical team leader, a scout, arear guard or “defenseman,” a marksman(sniper), a spotter, a gasman, and paramedics. Moreover, SWAT teams, like military special forces, are elite units: Their rigorous team training; high-tech armament;and “battle dress uniforms,” consisting oflace-up combat boots, full body armor,Kevlar helmets, and goggles with “ninja”style hoods, reinforce their elitism withinlaw enforcement agencies. One command-er—who disapproved of proactive SWATpolicing and turned down requests fromteam members to dress in black battle dressuniforms while on patrol—nevertheless Because oftheir close col-laboration withthe military,SWAT units aretaking on thewarrior mentality of ourmilitary’s special forces. understood its attraction to team members:“I can’t blame them, we’re a very elite unit,they just want to be distinguishable.” The so-called war on drugs and other martial metaphors are turning high-crime areasinto “war zones,” citizens into potential enemies, and police officers into soldiers. Prepar-ing the ground for the 1994 technology transfer agreement between the Department ofDefense and the Department of Justice,Attorney General Reno addressed the defenseand intelligence community. In her speech,Reno compared the drug war to the Cold War,and the armed and dangerous enemies abroadto those at home:So let me welcome you to the kind ofwar our police fight every day. Andlet me challenge you to turn yourskills that served us so well in theCold War to helping us with the warwe’re now fighting daily in the streetsof our towns and cities across the The martial rhetoric can be found inboth political parties. Bill McCollum (R-Fla.), chairman of the Subcommittee onCrime of the House Judiciary Committee,has criticized the Clinton administrationfor not waging the war on drugs aggressively enough: “The drug crisis is a top—if notthe top—national security threat facing ournation today . . . [the Clinton] administration’s clear unwillingness to wage an all-outdrug war cannot go unchallenged.” In thecurrent political climate, anyone who doesnot support an escalation of the drug war iscondemned for being “soft on crime.” Departmental SWAT teams have accepted the military as a model for their behaviorand outlook, which is distinctly impersonaland elitist; American streets are viewed asthe “front” and American citizens as the“enemy.” The sharing of training and technology by the military and law enforcementagencies has produced a shared mindset,and the mindset of the warrior is simply notappropriate for the civilian police officercharged with enforcing the law. The soldierconfronts an enemy in a life-or-death situation. The soldier learns to use lethal forceon the enemy, both uniformed and civilian,irrespective of age or gender. The soldiermust sometimes follow orders unthinkingly, acts in concert with his comrades, andinitiates violence on command. That mentality, with which new recruits are strenuously indoctrinated in boot camp, can be amatter of survival to the soldier and thenation at war.The civilian law enforcement officer, onthe other hand, confronts not an “enemy”but individuals who, like him, are both subject to the nation’s laws and protected by theBill of Rights. Although the police officer canuse force in life-threatening situations, theConstitution and numerous Supreme Courtrulings have circumscribed the police officer’s direct use of force, as well as his power ofsearch and seizure. In terms of violence, thepolice officer’s role is—or should be—purelyreactive. When a police officer begins tothink like a soldier, tragic consequences—such as the loss of innocent life at Waco—willAfter some controversial SWAT shootingsspawned several wrongful death lawsuitsagainst the police department of Albuquer-que, New Mexico, the city hired Professor SamWalker of the University of Nebraska to studyits departmental practices. According toWalker: “The rate of killings by the police wasjust off the charts. . . . They had an organizational culture that led them to escalate situations upward rather than de-escalating.” city of Albuquerque subsequently hired a newpolice chief and dismantled its SWAT unit.The tiny town of Dinuba, California (population 15,000), created a SWAT unit in thespring of 1997. A few months later an innocent man, Ramon Gallardo, was killed by theSWAT team when it raided his home lookingfor one of his teenage sons. The SWAT unitrushed into the Gallardo household at 7 a.m.wearing hoods and masks, yelling “searchwarrant.” Gallardo and his wife were awakened by the ruckus, but before they could The mindset ofthe warrior issimply notappropriate forthe civilianpolice officercharged withenforcing thelaw. determine what was happening, Ramon wasshot 15 times. A police brutality lawsuit was laterbrought against the city. At trial, the policesaid they had to shoot in self-defense becauseGallardo had grabbed a knife. Gallardo’s wifetestified that the knife on the scene did notbelong to her husband and alleged that thepolice had planted it there to legitimize theshooting. The jury awarded the Gallardofamily $12.5 million. Because the whoppingverdict exceeded the small town’s insurancecoverage, the city is now in financial straits.After Gallardo’s killing, the city fathers ofDinuba disbanded the SWAT unit and gaveits military equipment to another police Some local jurisdictions may wish toretain SWAT units for the special skills theypossess, but the deployment of such unitsshould be limited to extraordinary circustances—such as a hostage situation. If aSWAT unit is created (or retained), the needfor that unit should be assessed annually bylocally elected officials. Policymakers mustbe especially wary of “mission creep” andguard against it. Inactive SWAT teams havea strong incentive to expand their original“emergency” mission into more routinepolicing activities to justify their existence.In recent years, city officials in Dallas andSeattle have curtailed the activity of theirSWAT units, taking them off drug raidsand suicide calls. Other cities should followtheir lead by curtailing the SWAT mission—or even dismantling the entire unit as wasdone in Albuquerque and Dinuba. Conclusio The militarization of law enforcement inAmerica is a deeply disturbing development. Police officers are not supposed to bewarriors. The job of a police officer is tokeep the peace while adhering to constitutional procedures. Soldiers, on the otherhand, consider enemy personnel humantargets. Confusing the police function withthe military function can lead to dangerousand unintended consequences—such asunnecessary shootings and killings.The proliferation of SWAT teams is particularly worrisome because such units arerarely needed. SWAT teams are created todeal with emergency situations that arebeyond the capacity of the ordinary streetcop. But, as time passes, inactive SWATunits tend to jettison their original, limitedmission for more routine policing activities.Local jurisdictions should carefully assessthe need for SWAT units and guard againstthe danger of mission creep. SWAT teamsdo possess specialized skills, but theyshould only be deployed on those extraordinary occasions when their skills are necessary—such as a hostage situation.More generally, Congress should recognizethat federal policies have contributed to theculture of paramilitarism that currently pervades many local police departments. Federallawmakers should discourage paramilitarismby restoring the traditional American principle of civil-military separation embodied inthe Posse Comitatus Act. The Military Coop-eration with Law Enforcement Officials Actcreated a dangerous loophole in the PosseComitatus Act. That loophole should beclosed immediately. Congress should alsoabolish all military-civilian law enforcementjoint task forces and see to it that all militaryhardware loaned, given, or sold to law enforcement agencies is destroyed or returned.Armored personnel carriers and machineguns, should not be a part of everyday lawenforcement in a free society. 1. See Lee Hancock, “ATF Official Defends RaidPlanning,” Dallas Morning News, March 27, 1993,p. 25A; and Janet Reno, Statement, Hearing onEvents Surrounding the Branch Davidian CultStandoff in Waco, Texas, before the House Committeeon the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st sess., 1993(Washington: Government Printing Office,1995), p. 15. For a thorough account of whattook place at Waco, see David B. Kopel and PaulH. Blackman, No More Wacos(Amherst, N.Y.:Prometheus, 1997). Federal lawmakers should discourage paramilitarism byrestoring theprinciple of 2. See Timothy Egan, “Soldiers of the Drug WarRemain on Duty,” New York Times, March 1, 1999,p. A1; “Wilson Praises LAPD Acquisition of 600Army Surplus Assault Rifles,” Los Angeles TimesSeptember 17, 1997, p. A18; and “Gearing Up,” 6, December 21, 1997, transcript.3. “Clinton Picks General to Lead War on Drugs,”New York Times, January 24, 1996, p. A15. GeneralMcCaffrey retired from the Army after the Senateapproved his appointment.4. See Dana Priest and Douglas Farah, “U.S. ForceTraining Troops in Colombia,” Washington PostMay 25, 1998, p. A1; and “U.S. Military FightsDrugs in Haiti,” Reuters News Service, May 15,5. See Sam Howe Verhovek, “In Marine's Killingof Teen-Ager, Town Mourns and Wonders Why,”New York Times, June 29, 1997, p. A1; and WilliamBranigin, “Questions on Military Role FightingDrugs Ricochet from a Deadly Shot,” Washingto, June 22, 1997, p. A3.6. “Drug House Razed with Federal Money,” NeYork Times, January 19, 1998; and Bill Miller,“Nuisance Law Claims Its First Success,”Washington Post, June 2, 1999, p. B1.7. See William J. Broad and Judith Miller,“Pentagon Seeks Command for Emergencies in theU.S.,” New York Times, January 28, 1999, p. A19.Andrew Krepinevich, executive director of theCenter for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment,believes the federal government will establish a“Homeland Defense Command,” with a four-stargeneral at its head within two years. See ThMcLaughlin Group, April 3, 1999, transcript.8. Quoted in Egan.9. For additional background, see John Phillip, IDefiance of the Law: The Standing-Army Controversy, theTwo Constitutions, and the Coming of the American(Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolina Press, 1981).10. Article I, section 8.11. Article I, section 10.12. Article II, section 2. For a fuller discussion of thewar power under the U.S. Constitution, see LouisFisher, Presidential War Power(Lawrence: UniversityPress of Kansas, 1995).13. Amendment II. For a fuller discussion of thehistory of the Second Amendment, see Stephen P.Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed: The Evolution ofa Constitutional Right(Oakland, Calif.: IndependentInstitute, 1994); and Joyce Lee Malcolm, To Keepand Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,14. Amendment III.15. Thomas Jefferson, for example, wanted anexplicit protection against standing armies. SeeLetter to James Madison, December 20, 1787, inJefferson Writings (New York: Library of America,1984), p. 914.16. See William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One(New York: Knopf, 1998), pp. 59–74.17. See David Engdahl, “Soldiers, Riots, andRevolution: The Law and History of MilitaryTroops in Civil Disorders,” Iowa Law Review(1971): 58.18. See generally Jerry M. Cooper, “Federal MilitaryIntervention in Domestic Disorders” in The UnitedStates Military under the Constitution of the United States,, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York: NewYork University Press, 1991).19. See Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Emancipating Slaves,Enslaving Free Men: A History of the American Civil War(Chicago: Open Court, 1996), pp. 320–21.20. The term “posse comitatus” is defined as a“group of people acting under authority of policeor sheriff and engaged in searching for a criminalor in making an arrest.” Black's Law DictionaryPaul: West, 1983), p. 606. “In ancient Rome, governmental officials were permitted to have retainers accompany and protect them on their travelsthroughout the Empire. This practice was knownas 'comitatus.' In medieval England, the sheriffcould require the assistance of able-bodied men inthe county over the age of fifteen in suppressingsmall insurrections and capturing fugitives. Thiscivilian force was called the 'posse comitatus,'deriving its name from the old Roman practice.”Note, “Fourth Amendment and Posse ComitatusAct Restrictions on Military Involvement in CivilLaw Enforcement,” George Washington Law Review54 (1986): 406 (citations omitted).21. 18 U.S.C. § 1385. In 1956 the act was updatedto include the Air Force, and a DOD directiveadded the Navy and the Marine Corps. See RichterMoore Jr., “Posse Comitatus Revisited: The Use ofthe Military as Civil Law Enforcement,” Journal ofCriminal Justice15 (1987): 376.When Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) discovered that an active duty Army colonel was servingat the Federal Bureau of Investigation as deputychief of a counterterrorism unit, he asked theJustice Department for an explanation. AssistantAttorney General Andrew Fois replied that thecolonel was not “directly” involved in law enforcement activity. See Benjamin Wittes, “A PosseComitatus Crusade,” Legal Times, September 1, 1997, p. 8.22. Cooper, pp. 129–35.23. 10 U.S.C. §§ 371–74.24. See Keith B. Richburg, “Reagan Order DefinesDrug Trade as Security Threat,” Washington PostJune 8, 1986.25. Kopel and Blackman, p. 341.26. See Ted Galen Carpenter and R. ChanningRouse, “Perilous Panacea: The Military in the DrugWar,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 128,February 15, 1990.27. Kopel and Blackman, p. 341.28. U.S. Department of Justice and U.S.Department of Defense, Department of Justice andDepartment of Defense Joint Technology Program:Second Anniversary Report (Washington: U.S.Department of Justice, February 1997), pp. 8–18. 29. David C. Morrison, “Police Action,” Nationa, February 1, 1992, p. 267. See also JimMcGee, “Military Seeks Balance in DelicateMission: The Drug War,” Washington PostNovember 29, 1996, p. A1.30. Quoted in Sam Walker, A Critical History of PoliceReform: The Emergence of Professionalism (LexingtonMass.: Lexington Books, 1977), p. 63. 31. Ibid., pp. 151–6032. Robert Snow, SWAT Teams: Explosive Face-Offswith America's Deadliest Criminals(New York:Plenum, 1996), p. 7.33. Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler, “MilitarizingAmerican Police: The Rise and Normalization ofParamilitary Units,” Social Problems44 (1997): 5–6.34. Egan35. Ibid.36. Quoted in Robert Snow, “The Birth andEvolution of the SWAT Unit,” Polic21 (1997): 24. 37. U.S. Department of Justice and U.S.Department of Defense, p. 9. 38. Ibid., pp. 11–18.39. Quoted in Egan.40. Quoted in Kraska and Kappeler, p. 10 (emphasis added).41. Quoted in ibid.42. Quoted in ibid., p. 13.43. Cited in ibid., p. 9.44. Quoted in Alice Hills, “Militant Tendencies:'Paramilitarism' in the British Police,” BritisJournal of Criminology35 (1995): 450–51.45. Ibid., p. 457.46. Ibid., p. 451.47. U.S. Department of Justice and U.S.Department of Defense, pp. 1, 5.48. Ibid., pp. 5–6.49. Kraska and Kappeler, p. 11.50. Peter Kraska, “Enjoying Militarism:Political/Personal Dilemmas in Studying U.S.Police Paramilitary Units,” Justice Quarterly(1996): 417.51. Kraska and Kappeler, p. 11.52. Ibid.53. Ibid.54. Quoted in ibid., p. 12.55. Quoted in ibid., p. 11.56. Quoted in “Technology Transfer FromDefense: Concealed Weapon Detection,” NationaInstitute of Justice Journal, no. 229 (August 1995): 35.57. Bill McCollum, “Waving the White Flag inDrug War?” Washington Times, March 10, 1998,p. A17.58. Lieutenant Steve Lagere, who heads the SWATteam in Meriden, Connecticut, says: “We ought tobe looking at some other options. . . . It's politically incorrect to say that as a cop. You really can't discuss it much here, because people will think you'resoft on drugs. But I don't see crack use going up ordown, no matter what we've tried to do.” Quotedin Egan. 59. See, for example, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1(1985); and Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).60. Quoted in Egan.61. See Mark Arax, “Small Farm Town's SWATTeam Leaves a Costly Legacy,”Los Angeles TimesApril 5, 1999, p. A1.62. Ibid. 1 Published by the Cato Institute, Cato Briefing Papers is a regular series evaluating government policies andoffering proposals for reform. Nothing in Cato Briefing Papers should be construed as necessarily reflectingthe views of the Cato Institute or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.Additional copies of Cato Briefing Papers are $2.00 each ($1.00 in bulk). To order, or for a complete listingof available studies, write the Cato Institute, 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001, call(202) 842-0200 or fax (202) 842-3490. Contact the Cato Institute for reprint permission.