\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 130-NOV-119:19 . - PDF document

��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 130-NOV-119:19 Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: The Status of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan Under International Law Andrew C. Orr ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 230-NOV-119:19 ��730 Cornell International Law Vol. 44 ..................................................... 746 A. Proportionality........................................ 747 B. Distinction............................................ 748 ..................................... 749 .......................... 750 ........................... 750 ...................... 751 .............................. 751 ...................................................... 752 . The Pakistani government Afghan Taliban are beyond the scope of this note. For the sake of convenience, my analpart of the same overall (though broadly defined) “war” against America. I use the terms , Oct. 26, 2009. This note relies both law review articles and other media sources. While various news outlets report on , Oct. 4, 2010, at A13. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 330-NOV-119:19 ��731 &#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;&#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;2011 Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved tary personnel. Under international law, however, drone strikes against al can drone strikes in Pakistan. First, terrorism is a law enforcement issue . Similarly, the drone attacks violate the Similarly, the drone attacks violate the ”’the United States and al Qaeda do not rise to the level of an “armed con&#x/MCI; 35;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 35;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 36;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 36;&#x 000;flict.”&#x/MCI; 37;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 37;&#x 000;17&#x/MCI; 38;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 38;&#x 000; Moreover, al Qaeda is actually a network of separate, loosely affili&#x/MCI; 39;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 39;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 40;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 40;&#x 000;ated entities, and it does not make sense to characterize every act of violence carried out in the name of al Qaeda as actually the work of a single, well-defined &#x/MCI; 41;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 41;&#x 000;organization.&#x/MCI; 42;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 42;&#x 000;18&#x/MCI; 43;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 43;&#x 000; Finally, even if an armed conflict does exist, the drone strikes fail the jus in bello requirements of distinction and , Mary Ellen O’Connell, . 77 (2010) (argu L. 339 (2010); Peyton Cook, Study of Pakistan, 2004– 2009note 9, at 119 (arguing that drone attacks amount to “armed attacks 9, at 119 (arguing that drone attacks amount to “armed attacks &#x/MCI; 70;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 70;&#x 000;15. &#x/MCI; 71;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 71;&#x 000;See Shah, supra note 9, at 122– 23. note 11, at 13. “Armed attack” and “armed conflict” are separate concepts. The former note 11, at 21– 23. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 430-NOV-119:19 ��732 Cornell International Law Vol. 44 . First, . Given its capability and organization, al Qaeda is larly when that group takes credit for the attacks. Finally, the drone strikes . Without explicthe domestic ban on assassinations. The ban, however, defines that term permissible during armed conflict. In any case, the compelling national fighters in Pakistan. Thus, the question becomes whether the program is Roy S. Sch¨. 1 (2004) (considering the shortcomings of note 20, at 249– 50. 50. (’States’ right of self-defense against non-state actors, and arguing that States have that right); see also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1136 (6th ed. 2008) . &#x/MCI; 50;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 50;&#x 000;25. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001). 26. 50 U.S.C. § 413b. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 530-NOV-119:19 ��733 &#x/Att;¬he; [/;&#xTop ;&#x]/BB;&#xox [;Ń ;ڒ ;ѧ ;܅ ;&#x]/Su;typ; /H;&#xr /T;&#xype ;&#x/Pag;&#xinat;&#xion ;&#x/Att;¬he; [/;&#xTop ;&#x]/BB;&#xox [;Ń ;ڒ ;ѧ ;܅ ;&#x]/Su;typ; /H;&#xr /T;&#xype ;&#x/Pag;&#xinat;&#xion ;2011 Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved by-case legality of individual drone strikes. It will argue that international ties increases. Moreover, the strikes are cle 51 of the UN Charter. Because hostilities between the United States analysis. Part II argues that the campaign as a whole is permissible as a ders. Part III considers the drones’ compliance with availability of facts. Part VI considers the drones’ compliance with given the limited availability of facts. Part VII presents a comparison ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 630-NOV-119:19 ��734 Cornell International Law Vol. 44 laws of war have been readily applied. Groups like the Tamil Tigers and the sumably seek to join the international community. Such groups, in other other Predator Drones and UAVs]. &#x/MCI; 46;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 46;&#x 000;33. &#x/MCI; 47;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 47;&#x 000;See Northam, supra note 31. &#x/MCI; 48;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 48;&#x 000;34. &#x/MCI; 49;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 49;&#x 000;Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443, 468– 69 (2007). 69 (2007). l Qaeda Goals]; see generally MESSAGES TO THEMENTS OFOFESSAGES TO THE ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 730-NOV-119:19 ��735 &#x/Att;¬he; [/;&#xTop ;&#x]/BB;&#xox [;Ń ;ڒ ;ѧ ;܅ ;&#x]/Su;typ; /H;&#xr /T;&#xype ;&#x/Pag;&#xinat;&#xion ;&#x/Att;¬he; [/;&#xTop ;&#x]/BB;&#xox [;Ń ;ڒ ;ѧ ;܅ ;&#x]/Su;typ; /H;&#xr /T;&#xype ;&#x/Pag;&#xinat;&#xion ;2011 Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved board pilot. On the other hand, critics argue that removing the risk elimifactors contribute to the drones’ accidental killing of non-militants. First, by-strike basis. In particular, the campaign does not violate Pakistani sovattacks and threats from al Qaeda. Consequently, because hostilities Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004– 2010 ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 830-NOV-119:19 ��736 Cornell International Law Vol. 44 4 &#x/MCI; 16;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 16;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 17;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 17;&#x 000;tional law to use force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, [and] the second State is unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against the first State launched from its territory.”&#x/MCI; 18;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 18;&#x 000;52 &#x/MCI; 19;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 19;&#x 000;Here, the United States is conducting drone strikes in Pakistan with that country’s &#x/MCI; 20;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 20;&#x 000;permission.&#x/MCI; 21;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 21;&#x 000;53&#x/MCI; 22;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 22;&#x 000; Even without Pakistan’s permission, however, targeted drone killings would not constitute an improper violation of Pakis&#x/MCI; 23;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 23;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 24;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 24;&#x 000;tani sovereignty. Because of Pakistan’s failure to prevent al Qaeda from , para. 29, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 &#x/MCI; 53;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 53;&#x 000;53. &#x/MCI; 54;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 54;&#x 000;Ignatius, supra note 8. &#x/MCI; 55;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 55;&#x 000;54. &#x/MCI; 56;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 56;&#x 000;ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 472 (2d ed. 2005). &#x/MCI; 57;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 57;&#x 000;55. &#x/MCI; 58;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 58;&#x 000;See, e.g., Associated Press, ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 930-NOV-119:19 ��737 &#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;&#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;2011 Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved the ‘inherent right of self-defense.’””Nicaragua majority’s] ‘armed attack’ thresh&#x/MCI; 26;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 26;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 27;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 27;&#x 000;old must, in its view, simply endure low-intensity violence, even in the face of a paralyzed Security Council that proves consistently unable to respond as the Charter presupposes.”&#x/MCI; 28;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 28;&#x 000;68&#x/MCI; 29;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 29;&#x 000; Antonio Cassese explains that “self-defence must cease as soon as its purpose . . . has been achieved,” but otherwise, “self-defence may continue until the [Security Council] has taken effective action rendering armed force by the victim unnecessary.”&#x/MCI; 30;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 30;&#x 000;69&#x/MCI; 31;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 31;&#x 000; Presently, the Security Council has not acted to address the ongoing threat to the United States from militants located in Pakistan. &#x/MCI; 32;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 32;&#x 000;Moreover, beyond “mere frontier incidents,”&#x/MCI; 33;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 33;&#x 000;70&#x/MCI; 34;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 34;&#x 000; violence by al-Qaeda and associated fighters has lasted since at least 1992 and left thousands dead in several different countries. The ongoing threat from al Qaeda is The ongoing threat from al Qaeda is &#x/MCI; 37;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 37;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 38;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 38;&#x 000;after Oil Platforms]. &#x/MCI; 39;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 39;&#x 000;60. &#x/MCI; 40;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 40;&#x 000;Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 94. note 59, at 195. at 195– 96. note 54, at 354. note 52, at para. 41. note 9, at 94. note 14, at 93. note 14, at 93. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 1030-NOV-119:19 ��738 Cornell International Law Vol. 44 elimination of ongoing threats to the United States. Such a goal would be ESSAGES TO THEnote 36, at 140. Bin Laden also said, “The voted for their president. Their government makes weapons and provides them to Israel, which they use to kill Palestinian Muslims. Given that the American Congress is a com at 140– 41. note 14, at 93. note 68, at 69. at 68– 70. note 9, at 93. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 1130-NOV-119:19 ��739 &#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;&#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;2011 Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved missible as self-defensive force against a non-state actor. While the ICJ has response to hostilities by non-state actors. The Vienna Convention on the limited to State actors. While considering the Charter’s accommodation of or rejected a state actor requirement under Article 51. In an era where non- In an era where non-&#x/MCI; 40;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 40;&#x 000;80. &#x/MCI; 41;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 41;&#x 000;Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 103; note 78, at para. 139. 78, at para. 139. &#x/MCI; 46;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 46;&#x 000;82. &#x/MCI; 47;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 47;&#x 000;U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see also Murphy, supra note 10, at 47. note 78, at para. 33 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) (emphasis in note 81, at art. 32. ISTORY OF THEOLE OF THE 1940– 1945, at 698 (1958). note 24, at 337, para. 12 (separate opinion of Judge note 24, at 1136. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 1230-NOV-119:19 ��740 Cornell International Law Vol. 44 also supports this definition of an armed attack. The note 24, at 314, para. 30 (separate opinion of Judge note 24, at 1131. , 32 Am. J. Int’l L. 82, 82– 89 note 10, at 50. note 24, at 1136. note 54, at 474. AW AND THESE OFORCE BY 275– 78 EFENSE INnote 14, at 94. note 94, at 182. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 1330-NOV-119:19 ��741 &#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;&#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;2011 Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved note 54, at 476. 476. Annex I, art. 8, ICC Doc. RC/Res.6 (advance version June 28, 2010). &#x/MCI; 39;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 39;&#x 000;103. &#x/MCI; 40;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 40;&#x 000;G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974) [herein&#x/MCI; 41;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 41;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 42;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 42;&#x 000;after G.A. Res. 3314]. &#x/MCI; 43;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 43;&#x 000;104. &#x/MCI; 44;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 44;&#x 000;Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 71, 108– 109 (2010). note 104, at 108. note 104, at 108. In note 24, at 180, para. 23. Part II.A– D. PPROACHES TO at 46– 50. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 1430-NOV-119:19 ��742 Cornell International Law Vol. 44 note 52, at para. 28. 52, at para. 28. Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter&#x/MCI; 49;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 49;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 50;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 50;&#x 000;national Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 1(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinaf&#x/MCI; 51;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 51;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 52;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 52;&#x 000;ter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 1(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611 [hereinafter Protocol II]. &#x/MCI; 53;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 53;&#x 000;114. &#x/MCI; 54;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 54;&#x 000;See SHAW, supra note 24, at 1190. 1190. &#x/MCI; 59;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 59;&#x 000;116. &#x/MCI; 60;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 60;&#x 000;Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, at 78– 93 (Int’l Crim. Crim. &#x/MCI; 61;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 61;&#x 000;117. &#x/MCI; 62;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 62;&#x 000;Id. &#x/MCI; 63;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 63;&#x 000;118. &#x/MCI; 64;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 64;&#x 000;Id. at 132. &#x/MCI; 65;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 65;&#x 000;119. &#x/MCI; 66;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 66;&#x 000;Alston Report, supra note 52, at 28. at 113– 14. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 1530-NOV-119:19 ��743 &#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;&#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;2011 Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved war, and clearly such treatment should not be dispositive. The American First, al Qaeda is clearly able to carry out military operations. Some Second, Al Qaeda has a hierarchical command structure. A former al al ”&#x/MCI; 31;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 31;&#x 000;130&#x/MCI; 32;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 32;&#x 000; The group’s governance structure also includes regional commanders who operate in accordance with the “Annual Plan” adopted at the “command council,” where Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri casted “the deciding vote[s].”&#x/MCI; 33;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 33;&#x 000;131&#x/MCI; 34;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 34;&#x 000; In addition, al Qaeda has multiple tiers of management, and &#x/MCI; 35;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 35;&#x 000;123. &#x/MCI; 36;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 36;&#x 000;Id. &#x/MCI; 37;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 37;&#x 000;124. &#x/MCI; 38;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 38;&#x 000;Id. &#x/MCI; 39;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 39;&#x 000;125. &#x/MCI; 40;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 40;&#x 000;Id. &#x/MCI; 41;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 41;&#x 000;126. &#x/MCI; 42;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 42;&#x 000;Id. at 125. &#x/MCI; 43;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 43;&#x 000;127. &#x/MCI; 44;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 44;&#x 000;Id. at 123. &#x/MCI; 45;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 45;&#x 000;128. &#x/MCI; 46;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 46;&#x 000;Id. at 122. &#x/MCI; 47;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 47;&#x 000;129. &#x/MCI; 48;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 48;&#x 000;Andrew Wander, A History of Terror: Al Qaeda 1988– 2008, July 13, ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 1630-NOV-119:19 ��744 Cornell International Law Vol. 44 Finally, al Qaeda behaves like a political entity. Before the fall of the readily apparent. Moreover, many of the group’s stated goals, including the not involve occupation, so that Convention does not apply. Similarly, ESSAGES TO THEnote 52, at para. 50. note 113, at art. 2. note 113, at art. 3. note 52, at para 30. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 1730-NOV-119:19 ��745 &#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;&#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;2011 Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved . Far from arbitrary, however, targeted drone strikes against al Far from arbitrary, however, targeted drone strikes against al factual power that a state exercises over persons or territory,” from the more common legal term for the competence of a particular court.&#x/MCI; 27;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 27;&#x 000;149&#x/MCI; 28;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 28;&#x 000; Arti&#x/MCI; 29;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 29;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 30;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 30;&#x 000;cle 2(1), of the ICCPR obliges the United States to protect the human rights of persons “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction,”&#x/MCI; 31;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 31;&#x 000;150&#x/MCI; 32;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 32;&#x 000; and al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan are clearly not within American territory. While such a construction is strained. Indeed, the note 52, at para 29. 52, at para 29. &#x/MCI; 50;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 50;&#x 000;145. &#x/MCI; 51;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 51;&#x 000;Id. at art. 4; Alston Report, supra note 52, at para. 37. note 144, at art. 2(1). note 81, at art. 31(1). ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 1830-NOV-119:19 ��746 Cornell International Law Vol. 44 . Reading the “and” in Article 2(1) to mean “or” is obviously a . Thus, properly construed, the Thus, properly construed, the State’s] agents commit upon the territory of another State.”&#x/MCI; 9 ;&#x/MCI; 9 ;156&#x/MCI; 10;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 10;&#x 000; This read&#x/MCI; 11;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 11;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 12;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 12;&#x 000;ing, however leads to “a result which is manifestly absurd” by extending a State’s ICCPR obligations universally.&#x/MCI; 13;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 13;&#x 000;157&#x/MCI; 14;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 14;&#x 000; Interpreting “subject to its juris&#x/MCI; 15;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 15;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 16;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 16;&#x 000;diction” to include any situation where a state’s agents affect a person’s ICCPR rights would eliminate the concept of jurisdiction altogether because a state’s human rights obligations are only ever at issue because its agents have affected a person’s rights.&#x/MCI; 17;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 17;&#x 000;158 &#x/MCI; 18;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 18;&#x 000;Thus, neither the Geneva Conventions nor the ICCPR prohibit the United States’ drone attacks against al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan. &#x/MCI; 19;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 19;&#x 000;It is also worth noting that, beyond refusing to adhere to both IHL, such as the Geneva Conventions, and human rights law, such as the ICCPR, al Qaeda completely rejects the premises that underlie those princi&#x/MCI; 20;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 20;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 21;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 21;&#x 000;ples. As one The common denominator of the war convention— which, absent reciprochowever imperfectly— is a shared normative commitment to reducing superfluous suffering and harm in war. And the main convention by which IHL transnational terrorist networks typified by al Qaeda reject. This “new” becomes whether individual strikes violate international law. Under the PPLICATION OFnote 81, at art. 31(1). note 81, at art. 32(b). note 153, at 45. note 34, at 468– 69. , O’Connell,note 11, at 12. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 1930-NOV-119:19 ��747 &#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;&#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;2011 Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved restricts individual operations. Because the permissibility of the individual drone strikes. What is A. salient. First, the entire program’s non-militant casualty rate is roughly note 24, at 1184. note 113, at arts. 51(4), 52(2); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 257, paras. 78– 79 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; note 54, at 416. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 2030-NOV-119:19 ��748 Cornell International Law Vol. 44 means of attacking al Qaeda fighters. The lawless FATA region is difficult ground operations could result in even more casualties. Given the diffidiffiaimed individually.”&#x/MCI; 17;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 17;&#x 000;173&#x/MCI; 18;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 18;&#x 000; In the Nuclear Weapons case, the ICJ held that “weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and mili&#x/MCI; 19;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 19;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 20;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 20;&#x 000;tary targets” are forbidden,&#x/MCI; 21;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 21;&#x 000;174&#x/MCI; 22;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 22;&#x 000; but declined to hold that nuclear weapons are per se incapable of distinction&#x/MCI; 23;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 23;&#x 000;175&#x/MCI; 24;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 24;&#x 000;. Accordingly, drones cannot be said unlawful. In general, drones are capable of achieving this distinction to the themselves, able to accurately distinguish. Therein, however, lies the note 113, at art. 51(5)(b); note 24, at 1184. RIMES OF195– 97 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999). note 163, at para. 78. note 113, at art. 3(1). ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 2130-NOV-119:19 ��749 &#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;&#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;2011 Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved tify themselves in such a way as to facilitate distinction. Accordingly, of this intelligence. Moreover, al Qaeda’s use of human shielding underof American drone strikes in Pakistan. When civilians become “involunattacks, however, the question becomes more complex. One view holds holds &#x/MCI; 29;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 29;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 30;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 30;&#x 000;tion . . . he contributes to military action in a direct causal way [and] it is difficult to style his behavior as anything but direct participation.”&#x/MCI; 31;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 31;&#x 000;183&#x/MCI; 32;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 32;&#x 000; This latter view is intuitively more compelling where, as here, voluntary human shielding thwarts defensive military operations. In other words, by intenUnited States. Accordingly, voluntary human shielding should be regarded note 163, at 226– 27. note 177, at 1015. L. 292, 316– 18 (2009). Jean-Fran¸ 793, 815– 17 (2006). note 181, at 319. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 2230-NOV-119:19 ��750 Cornell International Law Vol. 44 extremely fact-specific. In the FATA region, however, facts are difficult to come by. All three of these issues potentially require consideration of a courtroom with witnesses. Indeed, determining what a person did and why is a challenge in many branches of the law. Therefore, requiring cominferences and questionable intelligence, is a tremendous burden. This note cannot resolve that difficulty. Hopefully, however, the discussion has . A former CIA lawyer has even United States has paradoxes and ambiguities of its own. For example, al . Similarly, al Qaeda fighters inteninternational law of espionage and invites comparison. If the law has, or or &#x/MCI; 37;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 37;&#x 000;186. &#x/MCI; 38;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 38;&#x 000;Cooke supra note 10, at 609. . L. 595, 596– 97 (2007). note 34, at 468– 69. note 181, at 319. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 2330-NOV-119:19 ��751 &#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;&#x/BBo;&#xx [1;C 6;’ 4;g 7;] ;&#x/Typ; /P; gin; tio;&#xn /S;&#xubty;&#xpe /;&#xHead;r /; tta;hed;&#x [/T;&#xop] ;2011 Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved ”spies do not enjoy prisoner of war status.&#x/MCI; 11;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 11;&#x 000;193&#x/MCI; 12;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 12;&#x 000; A former lawyer for U.S. European Command similarly remarked that “the status of espionage under international law is ambiguous, not specifically permitted or prohibited.”&#x/MCI; 13;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 13;&#x 000;194 &#x/MCI; 14;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 14;&#x 000;Simon Chesterman writes: “Spies, therefore, bear personal liability for their acts but are not war criminals as such and do not engage the interna&#x/MCI; 15;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 15;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 16;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 16;&#x 000;tional responsibility of the state that sends them . . . [resulting in] the nec&#x/MCI; 17;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 17;&#x 000;-&#x/MCI; 18;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 18;&#x 000;essary hypocrisy of states denouncing the spies of their enemies while maintaining agents of their own.”&#x/MCI; 19;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 19;&#x 000;195&#x/MCI; 20;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 20;&#x 000; Therefore, states gain a kind of advantage by sending spies rather than soldiers, because individual actors, rather than governments, bear the risk of operations.&#x/MCI; 21;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 21;&#x 000;196&#x/MCI; 22;&#x 000;&#x/MCI; 22;&#x 000; States engaging in espionage activities might be said to have it both ways, in that the States themselves will avoid responsibility, while enjoying the benefits of activities conducted by their agents. By attacking states but avoiding the accountanage, which often necessitates violence of its own. Such a conclusion, however, leads further into the legal void. Instead, because the legal hurshould promote transparency. Perhaps, taking a cue from the realism against al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan. If drone strikes were unambiguously ity and distinction easier to enforce. Moreover, the United States would note 187, at 596– 97. note 113, at art. 37. note 192, at 1081. ��\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-3\CIN308.txtunknownSeq: 2430-NOV-119:19�� &#x/Att;¬he; [/;&#xTop ;&#x]/BB;&#xox [;Ń ;ڒ ;ѧ ;܅ ;&#x]/Su;typ; /H;&#xr /T;&#xype ;&#x/Pag;&#xinat;&#xion ;&#x/Att;¬he; [/;&#xTop ;&#x]/BB;&#xox [;Ń ;ڒ ;ѧ ;܅ ;&#x]/Su;typ; /H;&#xr /T;&#xype ;&#x/Pag;&#xinat;&#xion ;752 Cornell International Law Vol. 44 have more incentive to adhere to those principles. Although clearly not a terrorism is a law enforcement matter. The scale, sophistication, and comsubstantial. Perhaps the first step international law will change. It seems likely, however, that the United stan to address terrorist threats no matter what. To those who envision a ach. But international law regarding the use of force against terrorists can also conform to reality, rather than the other way around. A framework ity needs and compliance with international norms. In the meantime,