Submarines & Safeguards - PowerPoint Presentation

Slide1

Submarines & Safeguards

ChenÉe

Tracey

Research Sponsored

by Brookhaven National Laboratory Slide2

introduction

Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) that are signatory to the Nonproliferation

Treaty (NPT)

agreed not to

pursue nuclear explosives

and to

safeguard their civilian energy sectors

Nuclear propulsion is not a nuclear explosive and is used by the military

Brazil has demonstrated interest in pursuing naval nuclear propulsion for use in nuclear-powered submarines Slide3

Questions that Need answers

Which part of

nuclear-powered

submarines

are safeguarded

?

Is Brazil likely to proliferate? If not Brazil, then who?

What are options for the international

community

to protect

against proliferation with this technology? Slide4

introduction

In 2008, Brazil and France signed a contract to share submarine technology to help Brazil obtain diesel-electric attack submarines

Brazil plans to use this same technology to

build nuclear reactors indigenously for six nuclear-powered

submarines

Brazil

would be the first NNWS to have nuclear-powered submarines

Uranium used to power

the submarine is

not subject to safeguards while it is used in reactor

and can

be removed from safeguards verification

Brazil has agreed to maintain enrichment

below 20% Slide5

Why does brazil need a nuclear-powered submarine?

Protect

oil and natural gas off the coast

Technological development and national independence

Prestige and importance Slide6

Protect the “Blue Amazon”

Compartments: Sonar, Missile Room, Control Room, Crew Rooms, Reactor

PWR provide energy Slide7
Slide8

why nuclear-powered Submarines?

Nuclear-powered submarines are powered by nuclear material.

They do not house nuclear weapons.

Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR)

Higher enriched nuclear material means more energy and time between refueling

PWRs have long core lives and require refueling every 30-40 years when used with HEU

The submarine hull will have a hatch to facilitate refueling in lieu of cutting the internal structure of the submarine Slide9

IAEA Safeguards regime loopholes

IAEA INFCIRC 153 details the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and NNWS

A

state can “exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under the Agreement.”

Nuclear material is

not subject to safeguards while it is being used in the naval reactor Slide10

IAEA Safeguards regime loopholes

There are a series of steps to be taken before the material is withdrawn from safeguards

State must inform the IAEA of the activity and that the material

will be used in peaceful nuclear activity

State must inform the IAEA that the material will

not be used for production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices

IAEA and the state must

make an “arrangement

” that the material will not be safeguarded for a certain length of

time and where in the fuel cycle

Because nuclear-powered submarines are controlled by military, the IAEA does not have access to

classified information

and has difficulty pinpointing when fuel is removed from safeguards Slide11

Brazil and Nonproliferation

Brazil and Argentina signed the NPT in 1998 and are not signatories to the Additional Protocol

Brazilian officials believe it

created a divide between “haves” and “have nots”

Nuclear Weapon States have made little to no progress on disarmament

goals in the NPT

Former Brazilian

Foreign Minister

João

Augusto de

Araújo

Castro stated “The NPT drafts propose limitations only for those countries that do not possess nuclear weapons and they include restrictions which are not essential to the objectives of proliferation.” Slide12

Cooperation between The iaea

and abacc

Brazil is a member of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) created in 1991

ABACC enforces the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (SCCC) in Brazil and Argentina

This agreement prohibits Brazil and Argentina from “carrying out, promoting, or authorizing directly or indirectly or from participating in the testing, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means of any nuclear weapon.” Slide13

IAEA Loopholes and

ABACC catchalls

Brazil’s

SCCC Quadripartite agreement accounts for nuclear-powered submarines

“none of the provisions of the…Agreement shall limit the right of the Parties to use nuclear energy for the propulsion of any type of vehicle, including submarines, since

propulsion is a peaceful application of nuclear energy

.”

Calls for Brazil and Argentina “to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in

all nuclear activities

.” Slide14

IAEA and ABACC Cooperation

ABACC has certain liberties that the IAEA does not

ABACC’s safeguards include military bases

For

example

, Brazil inspected Argentina’s

unfinished reprocessing plant, even though it is

not safeguarded

by ABACC

Both agencies conduct independent evaluations using same equipment, standards, and procedures for inspections

Miscommunications may occur due to

chain

of command Slide15

Policy recommendations

NWS should promote use of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) in nuclear-powered submarines

U.S. uses 93%; Russia uses 45%

France and China are using caramel fuel (uranium dioxide composite)

Lasts for upwards of 33 years in reactor core with 20% enrichment

US should recommit itself to the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program

DOE launched this program in 1978 Slide16

Long Term Options

Nuclear Weapon States recommitment to disarmament during the NPT Review Conference in 2020

Renewed commitment to promoting the Additional Protocol especially with Brazil and Argentina

Potential for Brazil, Argentina, ABACC, and ABACC to negotiate a modified Additional Protocol with the

IAEA

Nuclear Suppliers’ Group acknowledges ABACC

Slide17

Thank You!

ChenÉe

Tracey

L

chtracey@gmail.com