You: The most important piece of the bulk power system - PowerPoint Presentation

You: The most important piece of the bulk power systemHuman factors in supporting reliability and recovery from physical and cyber events Mike Legatt, Ph.D.Principal Human Factors EngineerElectric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc.Michael.Legatt@ercot.com 1

Introduction This exercise is intended to prepare you for things that don’t seem “quite right” – how you can communicate and collaborate to identify events and reduce their impactsFurthermore, it’s intended to serve as a brief primer on maintaining human performance by tracking stress, accuracy, and keeping cognitive biases in check2

Objectives You will:Identify the systematic strengths and weaknesses of people, technology, and their interactionsRecognize the role of your “gut feelings” in operationsIdentify when and how to share these feelings within and outside your organization and prevent against biases 3

Definitions Running estimateCommon operational picture (COP)Cognitive biasSituation awarenessSelective attentionEgo depletionHyperstress / hypostress 4

PATTERN RECOGNITION:The core human activity 5

Running Estimate Process 6

Attention, Memory and Mistakes 7

Selective Attention8

In which state of stress are you most likely to make a mistake in an emergency?HypostressHyperstressHypostress before the emergency, then hyperstress when it happensBeing in the “zone of maximum adaptation”9

Human Performance Under Stress Stress and performance, from Hancock (2008)10

In which state of stress are you most likely to make a mistake in an emergency?HypostressHyperstressHypostress before the emergency, then hyperstress when it happensBeing in the “zone of maximum adaptation”11

If you’re operating a substation remotely and flip the wrong breaker because you were on “autopilot” (very familiar with this substation), what was the likely cause?InattentionMisinterpretation of a ruleInaccurate mental modelOrganizational bias12

How we make mistakes From: NERC Cause Analysis Methods13

If you’re operating a substation remotely and flip the wrong breaker because you were on “autopilot” (very familiar with this substation), what was the likely cause?InattentionMisinterpretation of a ruleInaccurate mental modelOrganizational bias14

In a prolonged emergency situation (or even after a long shift), what do you need to be most careful about watching for?Ego depletionSemmelweis reflexOutgroup homogeneityHindsight bias15

Ego DepletionSelf-control is a limited resource, and like a muscle, it tires out.16

Situation Awareness17

COGNITIVE BIASES 18

Cognitive Biases (a sampling)19“Apparently, when you publish your social security number prominently on your website and billboards, people take it as an invitation to steal your identity .” – Zetter, K. “LifeLock CEO’s Identity Stolen 13 Times.” Wired.com, April 2010.

There’s an emergency, and you have idea how to solve it, while a co-worker has a different idea. What might make you think yours is better than theirs?Zero-risk biasIKEA affectOrganizational biasConfirmation bias20

You’re looking at a one-line, and thinking about keeping flows under thermal limits. Why are you more likely to notice a base case violation then?Cognitive dissonance avoidanceGoogle effectIKEA effectAttentional bias21

Cognitive Biases (a sampling)Anchoring – something you’ve seen before seems like the benchmark (e.g., first time you paid for gas)Attentional bias – You’re more likely to see something if you’re thinking about itCognitive dissonance – uncomfortable to have to conflicting thoughtsConfirmation bias – pay attention to things that support your belief22

Cognitive Biases (a sampling)Diffusion of responsibility – “someone else will take care of it”Google effect – easy to forget things that are easily available electronicallyGroupthink – people less likely to contradict ideas in a large groupHindsight bias – the past seems perfectly obvious23

Cognitive Biases (a sampling)IKEA effect – things you’ve built seem more valuable to you than things others have builtIllusion of transparency-expect others to understand your thoughts/feelings more than they canLoss aversion – you’re more likely to try avoid losing than gaining24

Cognitive Biases (a sampling)Organizational bias – you’re likely to think ideas within your organization are betterOutgroup homogeneity – you’re likely to think that people in another group all think the sameSemmelweis reflex – rejecting new ideas that conflict with older, established onesZero-risk bias – likely to choose worse overall solutions that seem less risky25

There’s an emergency, and you have idea how to solve it, while a co-worker has a different idea. What might make you think yours is better than theirs?Zero-risk biasIKEA affectOrganizational biasConfirmation bias26

You’re looking at a one-line, and thinking about keeping flows under thermal limits. Why are you more likely to notice a base case violation then?Cognitive dissonance avoidanceGoogle effectIKEA effectAttentional bias27

In a prolonged emergency situation (or even after a long shift), what do you need to be most careful about watching for?Ego depletionSemmelweis reflexOutgroup homogeneityHindsight bias28

Scenarios29

Group exercise: Scenario 1 Substation X Camera malfunction Low oil level alarm on a transformer Dispatch troubleshooter Bullet holes in camera and transformer Random act of vandalism, ploy or directed threat? 30

Group exercise: Scenario 2 Substation Y Communications vaults for 2 providers damaged (AT&T and Level3). > 100 shots fired at transformers, oil leakages in several transformers (> 51k gallons spilled). Only energized transformers shot. Attackers never entered substation Initial assumption: vandalism? Dress rehearsal for future attacks? It happened: April 16, 2013, Metcalf Substation 31

Group exercise: Scenario 3 Utility control room Telemetry doesn’t look quite right – not sure why Sees significant flow into substation without a load, then goes away RTU failure, manipulated data, cyberattack ? 32

Group exercise: Scenario 4 ISO Control Room News report of civil unrest in an area Call from utility: substation transformer Call from utility: telemetry issues Several other “below the line” calls To whom do you share this information? 33

Summary Value of communication and collaboration when “things are not quite right.”Reporting structure for handling incidentsRemember – your data may just be part of something larger 34

References NERC CAP Annex D, Phase 0 (draft)NERC CIPC Report to Texas RE MRCNERC Cause Analysis MethodsMacmillan, N.A., Creelman, C.D. (1991). Detection theory: a user’s guide. New York: Cambridge University Press Hancock, P.A., & Szalma. J.L. (Eds.). (2008). Performance under stress. Ashgate, Chichester, England.. 35

Questions ? ? 36

There’s an emergency, and you have idea how to solve it, while a co-worker has a different idea. What might make you think yours is better than theirs?Zero-risk biasIKEA affectOrganizational biasConfirmation bias37

In which state of stress are you most likely to make a mistake in an emergency?HypostressHyperstressHypostress before the emergency, then hyperstress when it happensBeing in the “zone of maximum adaptation”38

If you’re operating a substation remotely and flip the wrong breaker because you were on “autopilot” (very familiar with this substation), what was the likely cause?InattentionMisinterpretation of a ruleInaccurate mental modelOrganizational bias39

You’re looking at a one-line, and thinking about keeping flows under thermal limits. Why are you more likely to notice a base case violation then?Cognitive dissonance avoidanceGoogle effectIKEA effectAttentional bias40

In a prolonged emergency situation (or even after a long shift), what do you need to be most careful about watching for?Ego depletionSemmelweis reflexOutgroup homogeneityHindsight bias41