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Public key encryption from
Public key encryption from

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Diffie Hellman The ElGamal Publickey System Online Cryptography Course Dan Boneh Recap public key encryption Gen E D E D pk m c c m ID: 687133 Download Presentation

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Slide1

Public key encryptionfrom Diffie-Hellman

The

ElGamal Public-key System

Online Cryptography Course Dan BonehSlide2

Recap: public key encryption: (Gen, E, D)E

D

pkm

c

c

m

s

k

GenSlide3

Recap: public-key encryption applicationsKey exchange (e.g. in HTTPS)Encryption in non-interactive settings:Secure Email: Bob has Alice’s pub-key and sends her an emailEncrypted File Systems

Bob

write

E(

kF, File)

E(

pk

A

, K

F

)

E(

pk

B

, K

F

)

Alice

read

File

sk

ASlide4

Recap: public-key encryption applicationsKey exchange (e.g. in HTTPS)Encryption in non-interactive settings:Secure Email: Bob has Alice’s pub-key and sends her an emailEncrypted File SystemsKey escrow: data recovery without Bob’s key

Bob

write

E(

kF

, File)

E(

pk

escrow

, K

F

)

E(

pk

B

, K

F

)

Escrow

Service

sk

escrowSlide5

ConstructionsThis week: two families of public-key encryption schemesPrevious lecture: based on trapdoor functions (such as RSA)Schemes: ISO standard, OAEP+, …This lecture: based on the Diffie-Hellman protocolSchemes: ElGamal encryption and variants (e.g. used in GPG)

Security goals: chosen ciphertext securitySlide6

Review: the Diffie-Hellman protocol (1977)Fix a finite cyclic group G

(e.g G = (Zp)

* ) of order nFix a generator g in G (i.e. G = {1, g, g2, g3, … , gn-1 } )AliceBob

c

hoose random a in {1,…,n}

c

hoose random

b

in {1,…,

n

}

k

AB

=

g

ab

=

(

g

a)b =

Ab Ba

= (gb)

a

=

A =

g

a

B

=

g

bSlide7

ElGamal: converting to pub-key enc. (1984)Fix a finite cyclic group G (e.g G = (Zp)* ) of order n

Fix a generator g in G (i.e. G = {1, g, g2, g3

, … , gn-1} )AliceBobchoose random a in {1,…,n

}

choose random b in {1,…,n}

A =

g

a

B

=

g

b

Treat as a public key

c

t

=

[

,

]

c

ompute g

ab = A

b

,

d

erive symmetric key k ,

e

ncrypt message m with kSlide8

ElGamal: converting to pub-key enc. (1984)Fix a finite cyclic group G (e.g G = (Zp)* ) of order n

Fix a generator g in G (i.e. G = {1, g, g2, g3

, … , gn-1} )AliceBobchoose random a in {1,…,n

}

choose random b in {1,…,n}

A =

g

a

B

=

g

b

Treat as a public key

c

t

=

[

,

]

c

ompute g

ab = A

b

,

d

erive symmetric key k ,

e

ncrypt message m with k

To decrypt:

compute g

ab

= B

a

,

derive k, and decryptSlide9

The ElGamal system (a modern view)G: finite cyclic group of order n (Es, Ds) : symmetric auth. encryption defined over (K,M,C)H: G2 ⟶ K a hash function

We construct a pub-key enc. system (Gen, E, D):Key generation Gen:

choose random generator g in G and random a in Znoutput sk = a , pk = (g, h=ga )Slide10

The ElGamal system (a modern view)E( pk=(g,h), m) :

b ⟵ Zn , u ⟵ g

b , v ⟵ hb k ⟵ H(u,v) , c ⟵ Es(k, m) output (u, c)

D(

sk=a, (u,c) ) :

v

u

a

k ⟵ H

(

u,v

) , m

D

s(k, c)

output m

G: finite cyclic group of order n (Es

, Ds) : symmetric auth. encryption defined over (K,M,C)

H: G2 ⟶ K a hash function

RSlide11

ElGamal performanceEncryption: 2 exp. (fixed basis) Can pre-compute [ g(2^i) , h(2^i) for i=1,…,log2 n ]

3x speed-up (or more)Decryption: 1 exp. (variable basis)

E(

pk

=(

g,h

), m)

:

b ⟵ Z

n

, u ⟵

g

b

, v ⟵

h

b

D(

sk

=a, (

u,c

) )

:

v ⟵

u

aSlide12

End of SegmentNext step: why is this system chosen ciphertext secure? under what assumptions?Slide13

Public key encryptionfrom Diffie-Hellman

ElGamal

Security

Online Cryptography Course Dan BonehSlide14

Computational Diffie-Hellman AssumptionG: finite cyclic group of order n

Comp. DH (CDH) assumption holds in G if: g, ga , g

b ⇏ gab for all efficient algs. A:

Pr[ A

(g, ga, gb )

=

g

ab

]

< negligible

where g ⟵

{

generators of G

}

, a,

b

ZnSlide15

Hash Diffie-Hellman AssumptionG: finite cyclic group of order n

, H: G2 ⟶ K a hash functionDef

: Hash-DH (HDH) assumption holds for (G, H) if: (g, ga, gb , H(gb,

gab)

) ≈p (

g,

g

a

,

g

b

,

R

)

where g ⟵

{

generators of G} , a, b

⟵ Z

n , R

⟵ KH acts as an extractor: strange distribution on G2 ⇒ uniform on KSlide16

Suppose K = {0,1}128 and H: G2 ⟶ K only outputs strings in K that begin with 0 ( i.e. for all x,y: msb

(H(x,y))=0 )

Can Hash-DH hold for (G, H) ? Yes, for some groups GNo, Hash-DH is easy to break in this caseYes, Hash-DH is always true for such HSlide17

ElGamal is sem. secure under Hash-DHKeyGen: g ⟵ {generators of G} , a ⟵ Zn

output pk = (g, h=

ga) , sk = a

D(

sk

=a, (

u,c

) )

:

k ⟵ H(

u,

u

a

) , m ⟵ D

s

(k, c)

output m

E(

pk

=(

g,h

), m)

:

b ⟵ Z

n

k ⟵ H(

g

b

,h

b

) , c ⟵

E

s

(k, m)

output (

g

b

, c)Slide18

ElGamal is sem. secure under Hash-DH≈p≈p

≈p

chal.adv. A

pk,sk

m0 , m

1

g

b

,

E

s

(

H(),

m

0

)

b

1

p

k

= (

g,g

a

)

c

hal

.

a

dv

. A

p

k,sk

m

0

,

m

1

g

b

,

E

s

(

H(),

m

1

)

b

1

p

k

= (

g,g

a

)

c

hal

.

a

dv

. A

p

k,sk

m

0

,

m

1

g

b

,

E

s

(

k

,

m

0

)

b

1

p

k

= (

g,g

a

)

k

K

c

hal

.

a

dv

. A

p

k,sk

m

0

,

m

1

g

b

,

E

s

(

k

,

m

1

)

b

1

p

k

= (

g,g

a

)

k

K

(

g

b

, g

ab

)

(

g

b

, g

ab

)

pSlide19

ElGamal chosen ciphertext security?To prove chosen ciphertext security need stronger assumptionInteractive Diffie-Hellman (IDH) in group G:

IDH holds in G if:

∀efficient A: Pr[ A outputs gab] < negligibleChal.

Adv. A

(u

1

,v

1

)

g⟵{gen}

a,b⟵Z

n

g, h

=

g

a

, u

=

g

b

if (u

1

)

a

= v

1

0 otherwise

v

w

ins if v=g

abSlide20

ElGamal chosen ciphertext security?Security Theorem: If IDH holds in the group G, (Es, D

s) provides auth. enc. and H: G

2 ⟶ K is a “random oracle” then ElGamal is CCAro secure.Questions: (1) can we prove CCA security based on CDH? (2) can we prove CCA security without random oracles?Slide21

End of SegmentSlide22

Public key encryptionfrom Diffie-Hellman

ElGamal

VariantsWith Better Security

Online Cryptography Course Dan BonehSlide23

Review: ElGamal encryptionKeyGen: g ⟵ {generators of G} , a ⟵ Z

n output pk = (g, h=

ga) , sk = a

D(

sk

=a, (

u,c

) )

:

k ⟵ H(

u,

u

a

) , m ⟵ D

s

(k, c)

output m

E(

pk

=(

g,h

), m)

:

b ⟵ Z

n

k ⟵ H(

g

b

,h

b

) , c ⟵

E

s

(k, m)

output (

g

b

, c)Slide24

ElGamal chosen ciphertext securitySecurity Theorem: If IDH holds in the group G, (

Es, Ds) provides auth. enc.

and H: G2 ⟶ K is a “random oracle” then ElGamal is CCAro secure.Can we prove CCA security based on CDH (g, ga , gb ↛ g

ab ) ?

Option 1: use group G where CDH = IDH (a.k.a bilinear group)Option 2: change the ElGamal systemSlide25

Variants: twin ElGamal [CKS’08]KeyGen: g ⟵ {generators of G} , a1, a2 ⟵ Zn output pk = (g,

h1=ga1, h2

=ga2) , sk = (a1, a2)

D

(

sk

=(a1,a2), (

u,c

)

)

:

k ⟵ H(u, u

a1

, u

a2

)

m ⟵ D

s

(k, c) output m

E

(

pk

=(g,h

1

,h

2

), m

)

:

b ⟵ Z

n

k ⟵ H(

g

b

, h

1

b

,

h

2

b

)

c ⟵

E

s

(k, m)

output (

g

b

, c)Slide26

Chosen ciphertext securitySecurity Theorem: If CDH

holds in the group G, (Es, Ds

) provides auth. enc. and H: G3 ⟶ K is a “random oracle” then twin ElGamal is CCAro secure.Cost: one more exponentiation during enc

/dec

Is it worth it? No one knows …Slide27

ElGamal security w/o random oracles?Can we prove CCA security without random oracles?Option 1: use Hash-DH assumption in “bilinear groups”

Special elliptic curve with more structure [CHK’04 + BB’04]

Option 2: use Decision-DH assumption in any group [CS’98]Slide28

Further ReadingThe Decision Diffie-Hellman problem. D. Boneh, ANTS 3, 1998Universal hash proofs and a paradigm for chosen ciphertext secure public key encryption. R. Cramer and V. Shoup,

Eurocrypt 2002Chosen-ciphertext

security from Identity-Based Encryption.D. Boneh, R. Canetti, S. Halevi, and J. Katz, SICOMP 2007The Twin Diffie-Hellman problem and applications.D. Cash, E. Kiltz, V. Shoup, Eurocrypt 2008

Efficient chosen-ciphertext security via

extractable hash proofs.H. Wee, Crypto 2010Slide29

Public key encryptionfrom Diffie-Hellman

A Unifying Theme

Online Cryptography Course Dan BonehSlide30

One-way functions (informal)A function f: X ⟶ Y is one-way ifThere is an efficient algorithm to evaluate f(⋅), butInverting f is hard: for all efficient A and x ⟵ X : Pr[ A

(f(x)) ] < negligible

Functions that are not one-way: f(x) = x, f(x) = 0Slide31

Ex. 1: generic one-way functionsLet f: X ⟶ Y be a secure PRG (where |Y| ≫ |X| ) (e.g. f built using det. counter mode)Lemma: f a secure PRG ⇒ f is one-wayProof sketch:

A inverts f ⇒ B(y) = is a distinguisherGeneric: no special properties. Difficult to use for key exchange.Slide32

Ex 2: The DLOG one-way functionFix a finite cyclic group G (e.g G = (Zp)

* ) of order ng: a random generator in G

(i.e. G = {1, g, g2, g3, … , gn-1} )Define: f: Zn ⟶ G as f(x) = gx ∈ GLemma: Dlog hard in G ⇒ f is one-

wayProperties: f(x), f(y) ⇒ f(

x+y) = f(x) ⋅ f(y) ⇒ key-exchange and public-key encryptionSlide33

Ex. 3: The RSA one-way functionchoose random primes p,q 1024 bits. Set N=pq.

choose integers

e , d s.t. e⋅d = 1 (mod (N) ) Define: f: as f(x) = xe in

Lemma: f is one-way under the RSA assumption

Properties: f(x⋅y) = f(x) ⋅ f(y) and

f has a trapdoorSlide34

SummaryPublic key encryption: made possible by one-way functions with special properties homomorphic properties and trapdoorsSlide35

End of SegmentSlide36

Farewell (for now)

Online Cryptography Course Dan BonehSlide37

Quick Review: primitivesPRGPRF, PRP

MAC

GGMCTR

CMAC, HMAC

PMAC

Collision

resistance

k

ey exchange

Trapdoor

Functions

p

ublic key

encryption

Diffie

-Hellman groupsSlide38

Quick Review: primitivesTo protect non-secret data: (data integrity)using small read-only storage: use collision resistant hashno read-only space: use MAC … requires secret keyTo protect sensitive data: only use authenticated encryption

(eavesdropping security by itself is insufficient)Session setup

:Interactive settings: use authenticated key-exchange protocol When no-interaction allowed: use public-key encryptionSlide39

Remaining Core Topics (part II)Digital signatures and certificatesAuthenticated key exchangeUser authentication: passwords, one-time passwords, challenge-responsePrivacy mechanismsZero-knowledge protocolsSlide40

Many more topics to cover …Elliptic Curve CryptoQuantum computingNew key management paradigms: identity based encryption and functional encryptionAnonymous digital cashPrivate voting and auction systemsComputing on ciphertexts: fully homomorphic encryptionLattice-based crypto

Two party and multi-party computationSlide41

Final WordsBe careful when using crypto:A tremendous tool, but if incorrectly implemented: system will work, but may be easily attackedMake sure to have others review your designs and code Don’t invent your own ciphers or modesSlide42

End of part I

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