The Political Implications of China픀s Social Future: Complacenc - PDF document

The Political Implications of China픀s Social Future: Complacency, Scorn, and the Forlorn dorothy j. solinger Big Bluffer Ye [the Party boss of a Nanjing district] was chauffeured everywhereÑtobusiness meetings, Party confabs, his equestrian club, the Party픀s exclusive tenniscourts in his black Audi 6. ... I was at the gate waiting when the Audi swerved upeet, blaring its horn in the rush-hour traffic. ... As the car sped up to me,cutting into the bicycle lane, Ye reached over to open the door. The door smacked anonto the asphalt. ÒDon픀t worry abouthim,Ó Ye shouted from inside the car as it screeched to halt. ÒGet in.Ó ... ÒHey ..⻓the old man shouted, as he struggled to his feet. The click of the door silenced himthe car. John Pomfret Chinese Lessons: Five Classmates and the pair of poignant themes emerges from John Pomfret픀s anecdote: the hau-ÒhavesÓ toward the poor and the old, and the anger andwerlessness of its Òhave-notsÓ in their hardscrabble existence. Not surprisingly,픀s China is a society in which a concern for social justice leaps from the lipsof more than 90 percent of the people, including some of the country픀s toppoliticians, according to one account.To address these concerns, the regime isstriving to produce some elements of the rule of law. While protests and labor disputes abound, the Chinese Communist Partyinequalities at their roots. To cite a few examples, the central government hascated increasing amounts of investment to the western, less developed part of the country and eliminated the rural tax; recently announced subsistenceallowances for rural residents in abject poverty and increased the funds for therural sector by 15.6 percent a year from 2003; and raised the living guarantee) such that the outlay in 2002 was twentyfold that of 1992. Although the job market is severely compromised and the majority of workersgo without welfare guarantees, the government claims it is giving these problemshigh priority. The results of its efforts remain somewhat clouded, however, bythe mixed reviews it has been receiving: some say the numbers of Òincidents팀and ÒdisturbancesÓ are steadily escalating, others that the reverse is true. people have been surveyed directly, a majority claim to be contented, with theirincomes climbing year by year. China픀s ultimate goal, its leaders state, is to build a Òharmonious society,팀defined by the China Daily in autumn 2006 as Òone that respects the rights ofof the citizenry control a mere 1.4 percent of total income, whereas the top 10percent own a full 45 percent of China픀s total assets. now be accessed through the official media underscores the leadership픀s aware-ness of the urgency of the problem, as too does the government픀s decision tomete out billions of yuan in order to pull up the income of the indigent andexpand the size of the middle class, even as it simultaneously seeks to wipe outcorruption and clamp down on what it terms Òexcessively high salaries.Ó Clearly, the political elite are determined to stay atop and ahead of the tides ofTo assess the leadership픀s chances of making things better, one might look forclues in several social trends and the segments of the population involved: agingand the aged; growing imbalances in sex ratios and their effects on bachelors;urbanization and migrant workers; increasing poverty and unemployment in theate entrepreneurs. These trends픀s social structure is undergoing majorrealignments; at least in the short term, however, there are few signs that theynstead, the next decade or so is likely to see a pro-gressive advance of the better-off, both in their advisory capacity and in theirclout, along with a few gestures (some substantive, others symbolic) to the dis-advantaged, whose members will become entrenched as the socially and politi-픀s social future thus appears headed for a politics of com-placency and sometimes scorn among the better-off, with a persistence of the China픀s Changing Political Landscape Five Trends and Their Associated Groups The issues surrounding the five social groups I have just identified willundoubtedly leave a large mark on China픀s coming politics. Aging and the Aged One striking social trend, confirmed by recent research, is a change in the agestructure of the Chinese population. Demographic calculations indicate thatfrom 2007 to about 2015, those aged sixty-five or older will increase from about7Ð8 percent of the populace to 15 percent. As soon as 2025, their numberssteadily thereafter. As a result, the proportion of working-age people (aged fif-teen to sixty-four) is expected to decline steadily from its level of more than 70percent of the population in 2000, such that the growth rate of the working-agepopulation in the cities is expected to drop from 1.5 percent in 2005 to zero insubsequent years. Indeed, two leading demographers have predicted thatrapid increase in the elderly population that cannot be reversed easily andquickly⻓ umerically, the population over the age of 65 is expected to rise from 100million in 2005 to as many as 329 million in 2050, with their proportion of thetotal population swelling from 7.6 percent to 23.6 percent over that period.Another estimate, by Zhang Yi, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Socialoportion at 14 percent by 2028. part, this aging trendesulting slowdown in the birth ratever time in life expectancy, whichears by the time of the 2000 census. With the increase in the marriage age and greater numbers of young peopleextending their years in school, the birth rate is expected to decline even more,ther increasing the proportion of elderly citizens in the total population. er-larger section of the populace? Social scientistsdo not present an optimistic outlook. While just 8 percent of those aged sixty tosixty-nine are likely to be unable to provide for themselves, 49 percent of thoseaged eighty-five to eighty-nine will require assistance in caring for themselves.Their offspring, who will be down to just one per generation within comingyears, will be under severe strain, even as the Òbaby boomÓ generation starts toretire around 2015. Moreover, certain aspects of China픀s economic reforms areoblem. The demise in the cities of widespread ei (work unit) welfare and the failure, to date, to replace it with an adequate socialDorothy J. Solinger China픀s Social Future systems in the countryside, are likely to make health care for the elderly a popu-lar concern in China in coming years. There was already a serious issue of inade-quate welfare provision in the late 1990s, at which time nearly 90 percent of therural population and 40Ð50 percent of urbanites were without health care insur-ance. As a result, the government began to work on constructing new socialsafety nets in the urban and rural areas, though even now these are not yet fully Two additional aspects of older people픀s lives give cause for worry. First, the2000 census revealed a decline in household size in urban China, down to justabout three people per household, a development that is related to a growingtendency of the elderly to live by themselves. At that time, 8.4 percent of malesand 13.7 percent of females over sixty-five lived alone, while 16.9 percent ofmen in that age group were residing just with their spouse. 5 Second, as pointedesearch, people of lower socioeconomic status age faster thanin age are likely to be short on funds. All in all, many elderly may soon be indigent, unhealthy, and living withoutsufficient support. Their level of satisfaction is already lower than that of otherage groups. Research suggests that many in this group, such as the large num-bers who protested over unpaid pensions in the late 1990s, may still be tied tothe Maoist past, remembering nostalgically all the socioeconomic benefits theyreceived back then. If this is widely the case, they are not apt to become politi-cally active, much less to press for democratization. ws people over theage of fifty-six having the highest level of support for the political regime of anyage group, with those over sixty-five exhibiting the strongest support of anygroup. Of course, some of these surveys were done in 1995 and 1997, before themost extreme of the market reforms took hold, and thus reflect an attachmente. But their continuing support for the regime in 1999 could reflectcept for those who protested over nonreceipt of pensionsÑmanywere ill-disposed to fight for change of any kind. As the author of the studyelationship between aging and resistance to change is a phe-nomenon widely observed.Ó Growing Imbalance in Sex Ratios and Bachelors for democracy consists of multiplying numbers of bachelors, young men unableence for male offspring has induced many women to abort or abandon female China픀s Changing Political Landscape babies. Reportedly, Òsince 1995, an average of more than one million femaleshave been ÔmissingÕ each year from the birth population alone.ÓHere, Òmissing팀simply means that there is no record of their births, not that they have all died. 0 If this trend prevails, by 2020 China should have between 29 million and 33million ÒsurplusÓ males in the age group fifteen to thirty-four. Most of thesemen will be rural-born, poor, and of low status, making it even more difficultfor them to attract female partners. Migrating to the cities will not enhancetheir chances, since the women there will constitute a sellersÕ market, most ofthem having their choice among young, better-off, urban-registered males.Some speculate that men living in these conditions could end up like theirhistorical predecessors: often transient and without steady work, undereducated,and easily stirred to conflict, violence, crime, and even rebellion. If that turnsout to be correct, this subgroup could become activeÑcapable, possibly, ofcates. It is, of course, possible that the regime, aware of this issue, could attemptto install reforms to address the grievances of these frustrated males. So far, it is Urbanization and Migrants According to demographer Judith Banister, China픀s urban population increasedfrom 18 percent of the total population in 1978 to 42 percent in 2004. Although the redefinition of some townships and the expansion into the coun-more important force for urbanization has been the massive rural-to-urbanmigration, which is said to account for Ò60 percent of all urban populationgrowth during the 1990s.Ó While the 2000 census tabulated only 80 million asmigrants on the move, if people who had lived at their then-current place of res-dwellers would have been as high as 120 million. In major east coast cities,the largest concentrations of sojourners are located, one-third or more ofthe populace is composed of these Òoutsiders.Ó in labor protests, especially in the Pearl River Delta,although these actions are, for the most part, little more than cries for unpaid At this point, these people are not politically relevant in any Òdemo-craticÓ sense, not only because of the nature of their demands but also becauseegistration system, which prevents them fromremaining in urban areas and does not permit them to take part in elections. Aspensions, or medical insurance, though reforms that would offer them some ofDorothy J. Solinger China픀s Social Future these goods are currently under experimentation. Migrant parents also have tocontend with the higher education costs for migrant children should they try toenroll in urban schools. 6 Alternatively, they have attempted to create their ownschools but have constantly faced obstacles here. In 2006, for instance, sixteenof the schools that migrant parents had set up for their children in Shanghaiwere shut down, and there have been Òscores of closings in China픀s big Easterncities recently ... [where] most of the nation픀s 20 million or more migrant chil-dren live. ... In some instances as few as 10 percent of the students were 7 Despite recent reforms, the household registration ( to exclude most rural migrants from permanent settlement in the cities. 8 result, Òa new urban underclass that includes a significant proportion of tempo-rary migrants has been gradually developing in many Chinese cities.Ó 9 vey in AnhuiProvince found 74 percent of rural school children living with only one parent,and 31 percent having neither parent at homeÑa situation that is damagingtheir schoolwork and entices many into hooliganism. According to the official China Daily, more than 20 million children throughout China have beenleft in the countryside with either one or no parents. Although more women have begun moving into towns, reportedly up to 47million have been at least temporarily abandoned in the countryside, left to carefor the land, the young, and the old, and at increased risk of becoming targets of Province noted that authorities were investigating ninety recent sexual attacks inthe rural areas, as well as numerous instances of property damage and robbery. The rise in migrant population is likely to accelerate as rural land is appropri-ated for development use, environmental pollution in the countryside continuesoximately half of those along the coast, andthe next twenty years, demographersedict, as many as 300 million people will leave the countryside and move to Some research suggests that these migrant workersÑdespiteents, more comfortablewith modern technology, and more experienced in factory protestsÑwill be Ònonearer to gaining a foothold in the city than [their] predecessors were.Ó In the two and a half decades since migrant workers began leaving the farms,uo, Òchanges in migrant occupational structurehave been insignificant;Ó too, Òmigration has not brought significant socialintegrated part of [the city].Ó Since central policy seems unable to spark funda- China픀s Changing Political Landscape mental changes in these phenomena, the majority of migrants are likely toremain on the fringes of urban society, scratching out a livelihood and notexpressing political inclinations. Neither the emptying out of the countrysideinto the citiesÑmostly of young males, who are compelled to subsist there as anunwelcome, unentitled, undervalued, and socially excluded presenceÑnor therise of crime back in the rural home, where the victims have no real recourse tojustice, suggests that political activism will take hold. Indeed, there has been nosign of any demands for democracy among these groups so far. A rising trend ofchildren dropping out of school in rural areas and a concomitant decline in thepercentage of educated rural youth also seem to augur poorly for democracy. Urban Poverty, Unemployment, and the New Underclass Just how much poverty is there in China픀s cities today? This is a subject for vari-verincome), and regional variation. According to the China Human DevelopmentReport of 2005, prepared under UN auspices, 300 million to 400 million Chi-nese were living on the margins in rural areas that year. Another estimate aroundthe same time, arrived at in a World Bank study using the norm of US$1 a dayto divide the poor from the rest, put the number of poor in all of China at just However, the World Bank픀s Development Report, as cited in theChinese Academy of Social SciencesÕ 2006 Blue Book of Social Development,put the total at 200 million, while the Asian Development Bank, using expendi-Using the Chinese government픀s preferred standardÑnamely, an annual perabout US$85about US$85Ñtate Council found only23.65 million rural residents living in abject poverty at the end of 2005. measured by farmersÕ net incomes and urbanitesÕ disposable incomes reported inearbook for 2004, the rural figure rises to 64.3 million, or the urban areas alone, estimates for the early 2000s range from alow of 14 million to a high of 37 million. es, they are being fanned by China픀s worseningunemployment. The government had aimed to keep the official urban unem-ployment rate under 4.6 percent for 2006, but that goal was apparently notreached, as the target figure was subsequently revised to Òbelow 5 percentÓ for cher at Beijing University픀s China Cen-ter for Economic Research recently estimated the true rate of unemployment tociting a rate of 16.36 percent. Meanwhile, roughly 10 million new workers areDorothy J. Solinger China픀s Social Future entering the labor market each year, even as the manufacturing sector픀s ability to particularly worrisome development is the mounting number of unem-ployed college graduates. In 2006 a reported 1 million applicants competed formere 10,000 posts in the national examination for civil servants, and three ofevery five new university graduates were likely to be jobless. In 2007 the num-ber of young people in search of jobs was expected to rise by 22 percent over theprevious year, while the positions available were down by more than 20percent. 5 Clearly concerned, the government is making an effort to alleviate thesituation, but it will be difficult, if even possible, to find a solution. Yet thesesorts of exigencies do not seem to have affected the political process or producedany political demands for greater inclusion or representation. Protests by bac-calaureates have been narrowly focused on the demand for jobs rather than pleas The CCPÕs efforts to bring the excluded into the political process have notbeen encouraging. What has been occurring is that worker and farmer represen-tation in the party has dropped markedly, from nearly two-thirds of the CCPmembership in 1994 to less than half by the end of 2003. Figures for workersand farmers in the National People픀s CongrNPCNPCy the late1990s their representation had fallen to just 11 percent and 8 percent, respec-tively, after a high of 27 percent and 21 percent in the early 1980s. Further sym-bolizing the marginality of the lower classes in the NPC, migrant laborers were ntrepreneurs In the words of the China Daily Business Weekly, 툀A substantial middle class hastaken shape in China and is likely to keep growing given the country픀s gallopingvernment픀s efforts to expand their ranks in a bid to for weekend getaways.Ó Other defining characteristics of this group would be itseers, and high social standing. According to theNational Bureau of SNBSNBS2004 would have been between ´60,000 and ´600,000 (or US$7,500 to$75,000). Members of this stratum are civil servants, company managers, tech-wnersÑin other words, professional white-collarworkers as well as private entrepreneurs. nate, estimates of its numbers vary considerably. Some put its total at about 65 China픀s Changing Political Landscape million in 2005 (which would be 5.04 percent of the population) and expectthe figure to reach perhaps 750 million (45 percent) by 2020. Others calculatethat the Òmiddle stratumÓ had already reached about 260 million in 2003 (20percent of the population) and will be close to 633 million (38 percent of thetotal population) by 2020. Despite the wide range of these predictions, the upward trend is unmistak-able, but the figures must be considered alongside China픀s 100 million agedliving in poverty. 2 Each of these population segments is likely to continue grow-ing steadily as well (along with the unemployed and the bachelors making upthe broader category of Òthe poor팩⸀One of the newer categories, private entrepreneurs, is also on the rise. Theowners of businesses who belong to this group have an average of ´1.31 millioned 3.65 million in 2004, after increasing at the participating in China픀s 2.44 million privately operated firms, and if so its num-bers rise to 34 million for 2002 (or 4.62 percent of the employed population);of this total, 6.23 million were investors. Another 6.43 percent small propri-etors, small traders, and individual entrepreneurs ( to draw hard conclusions from this set of disparate data, except to note that thiselitism. Upper-income women are enrolling in classes on image-designing, adultincomes have such demands and can afford such costs,Ó remarked the presidentof a Women픀s Training Club). At the same time, private education in Beijing canUS $1,788US $1,788ear for primary school students, whilewealthy parents might well lay out another ´800 a month for dance, music, andhenzhen, the Zuanyuan (Diamond Affinity) Informationepare young women to attract rich bachelors at aospective mates are willingto put out ´60,000 to ´1 million for such matchmaking services. urban consumer societyÑbowling,disco dancing, purchasing luxury housing apartments, and buying bridalgownsÑsurpass the purchasing power of those who are not already members ofthe Òmiddle class.Ó One particularly striking indication of the growth in per-growing numbers of students drive their personal cars to school. In the past fewriche, was planning to offer classes in golf, mandatory for some majors, and aDorothy J. Solinger China픀s Social Future Beijing businessman was putting ´12 million into the construction of pologrounds specifically targeted at a new generation of Chinese elites. The wealthi-coast and are apt to have foreign contacts. These brushes with Western bour-geoisie, one might surmise, could dispose them to dream of democracy, but theevidence shows no clear trajectory leading to this outcome.Politically, most indications are that the middle class and even more so thewealthy are wedded to, and benefit from, the current status quo. True, thesepeople are sometimes willing to engage in resistance, but so far only in defenseof their homes. In any case, the record of success in Òpushing backÓ is not prom- 8 and these people are not inclined to pursue any fundamental political Perhaps as a consequenceÑand also out of the leadersÕ own hopesÑthe regime takes these people as its supporters, to judge from official intentionsfor instance, the party has been makingemployed intellectuals, who numbered some 20 million as of 2006. Such elitesare publicly praised for their tremendous contribution to both the economicand social progress of the country. In the words of a China Daily article, ÒTheParty says it will give reverence, assistance and guidanceÓ to these people, as they툀set the trends for the young generation.Ó The party-state is obviously keen to co-opt persons of this type, no doubt inthe interest of stabilizing society, calling them the future Òbackbone of Chinesesociety⻓ Quite unlike those in the lower sections of society, who are becomingom these new social classes have been incor-porated into urban-level branches of the Federation of Industry and Commerce,local people픀s congresses, and people픀s consultative conferences. As of late 2006,38 of the top 100 business tycoons in the latest edition of China픀s version of the Forbes list were members of the top organs of the state: 19 were deputies to the픀s Congress (a doubling of such individuals in that body in justear), with the rest belonging to the National Committee of the Chineseeople픀s Political Consultative Conference. On top of that, more than 200members of the legislatureÑor nearly 7 percentÑwere private entrepreneurs. lenum of the Sixteenth Party Congress even ed provinces pick a certain number of party members from this segment of societyto serve as deputies to the Seventeenth Party Congress. In a related development, in the party픀s late 2005 statement celebrating itsthe system of multi-party cooperationand political consultation under the leadership of the CPCÓ preceded the oneties that purport to represent wealthy businesspeople, and with which the Com- China픀s Changing Political Landscape munist Party allegedly Òcollaborates.Ó If that document is any indication, inner-party cooperation and consultation are becoming institutionalized and stan-dardized, and thus more important. Equally telling are the important roles thatentrepreneurs are playing in people픀s congresses. They also hold leading posi-tions in government and judicial organs and exercise democratic supervisionover the party and the state. 4 It is these personages, in particular, whom theparty approaches for advice on constructing its Òharmonious society⻓ Clues to China픀s near-term political future can be found not only in the overtselect social groups whose numbers are increasing. These factors suggest thatfrom members of nongovernmental organizations, netizens, intellectuals, andartists to peasants rioting over pollution or against the dispossession of their land,people newly conscious of their rights, and those enraged by official corruptionÑare too geographically dispersed to create broadly based influential movements.Thus there seems to be little potential for organizational success, since many socialbarriers separate the members of these groups. Besides, perilous risks await anyonewho would aspire to lead these groups in demanding sociopolitical change.edicting change to issue from any of these groups, Ilooked at the place of each of them within society and their near-term prospects,along with the regime픀s stancees toward each of them. The government appearsset to concentrate on building its Òharmonious society,Ó in part through the newalliance with the upper strata of the population. At the same time, it will likelytion of the state픀s coffers to quiet those at the baseÑto keepcluded. As a result, the Chineseving not toward democratization, in which numberscount, but toward elitism. This, then, is a politics of complacency and scorn Notes Development of Legal Consciousness,Ó Law and Society Review 40, no20062006ÐThe regime픀s public stance is referenced in note 4. Dorothy J. Solinger China픀s Social Future China Daily March 21, 2005, p. 6.; Gu Wen and Yang Yiyong, Ò2005Ð2006 Nan:Zhongguo shourur fenpei wenti yu zhanwangÓ (2005Ð2006: The issue of Chinese income Shehui lanpishu: 2006 nian (Social blue book: 2006) by Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe (Social sciencedocuments company, 2006), p. 277; Zhao Huanxin, ÒSubsidy Net to Cover All Rural Poor in China Daily December 25, 2007; and Tang Jun, ÒZhongguo chengshi jumin zuidishenghuo baozhang zhidu de ÔtiaoyueshiÕ fazhan팠⠀The leap forward style of development ofChinese urban residentsÕ minimum livelihood guarantee), in Shehui lanpishu: 2003 nian: (Social blue book: 2003: Analysis and predictions ofChina픀s social situation), edited by Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe, 2003), pp. 243Ð45.3. ÒSocial Formula of Hope,Ó China Daily October 12, 2006, states that the SixthPlenum of the Communist Party in October 2006 promised Òguarantees of civil rights underframework of law,Ó a Òreasonable and orderly income distribution system,Ó Òdecent job sup-ply and a social security networkÓ for city and rural residents, plus improved public adminis-tration and services. China Daily states that worker altercations are increasing (the 314,000 cases of 2005 were a 20 percent riseover the number in 2004). But see Zhao Huanxin, ÒFarmersÕ Protests Decline Sharplyⳓ China Daily January 31, 2007. Zhao claims that since the State Council called on local gov-ernments to raise compensation payments to farmers whose land was taken over for develop-ojects and to provide job training and reemployment assistance plus social security forthem, protests in the countryside declined by the same 20 percent.ose between 2000 and 2005, with a peak in 2004: also, 70 percent of theward their overall situation in 2002, while 73.7 percentee Yuan Yue and Zeng Huizhao,Ò2002 nian Zhongguo jumin shenghuo zhiliang diaochaÓ (An investigation of Chinese urban hehui lanpishu: 2003 nian, 140Ð50; and Zhang Hui and Yuan Yue, Ò2005 nian Zhongguo jumin shenghuo zhiliangdiaocha baogaoÓ (Report of an investigation of Chinese urban residentsÕ quality of life in hehui lanpishu: 2006 nian, Zhu Qingfang, ÒJumin shenghuo he xiaofei jiegou de xin bianhuaÓ (New changes in resi-dentsÕ livelihood and consumption structure), in Shehui lanpishu: 2006 nian, edited by Ruarmonious Society to Be a Model for the World,Ó China Daily ber 13, 2006 (www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-10/13/content_707731.htm). Statisticsare from the Hindu, December 27, 2006, citing an investigation published by the NBS inposes. See ÒChina Strives to Narrow Yawning Income Gap for Social Equality,Ó Xinhua NewsAgency, October 1, 2006 (www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-10/01/content_700784.htm). arry Naughton, conomy: Transitions and Growth MIT Press, 2007), pp. 17Ð76.ang Feng and Andrew Mason, ÒThe Demographic Factor in China픀s Transition,Ó in China픀s Economic Transitions: Origins, Mechanisms, and Consequences edited by Loren Brantand Thomas Rawski (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 32. China픀s Changing Political Landscape 10. Zhongwei Zhao and Fei Guo, ÒIntroduction,Ó in Transition and Challenge: China픀sPopulation at the Beginning of the 21st Century, edited by Zhongwei Zhao and Fei Guo(Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 8; Zhang Yi, Ò13 yi zhihou Zhongguo renkou de xintezhengÓ (New characteristics of China픀s population after 1.3 billion), in Shehui lanpishu: edited by Ru and others, p. 104. Judith Banister, ÒPoverty, Progress, and RisingLife Expectancy,Ó in Transition and Challenge edited by Zhao and Guo, pp. 140Ð59, alsoaddresses this.11. Zhang, Ò13 yi,Ó pp. 97Ð98, 101, states that between 1978 and 2004 the birth rate fellfrom 18.25 per thousand to 12.29 per thousand.12. Ibid. pp. 102, 106Ð07.13. Naughton, The Chinese Economy, p. 175.14. Zhao and Guo,퉉ntroduction,Ó p. 8; Banister, ÒPoverty, Progress,Ó p. 143.15. Wang and Mason, ÒThe Demographic Factor,Ó p. 13.16. ÒPoor Are Worse Off in Aging Process,Ó China Daily July 21, 2006 (www.chi-nadaily.com/cn/cndy/2006-7/21/content_645867.htm).17. Raymond Chou, ÒFolks, Are You Happy with Your Lot?Ó China Daily December 16,18. William Hurst and Kevin J. OÕBrien, ÒChina픀s Contentious Pensioners,Ó China Quar-terly, no. 170 (June 2002): 345Ð60. Other accounts of the nostalgia for Maoism amongmembers of the older population are in Ching Kwan Lee, ÒThe ÔRevenge of HistoryÕ: Collec-tive Memories and Labor Protests in Northeastern China,Ó Ethnography 1, no20002000va P. W. Hung and Stephen W. K. Chiu, ÒThe Lost Generation,Ó odern 29 (April 2003): 204Ð36. olitical Support in Urban China University Press, 2004),ea M. den Boer, anches: The Security Implicationsof Asia픀s Surplus Male Population (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), p. 157. Wang and26Ð27, explain how these numbers could be exagger-ated, partly through the underreporting of female births. See also Yong Cai and WilliamLavely, ÒChina픀s Sex Ratios and Their Regional Variation,Ó in Transition and Challenge, 21. See Hudson and den Boer, Bare Branches pp. 179Ð81; and Wang Shanshan, Ò30 Mil-lion Men Face Bleak Future as Singles,Ó China Daily January 12, 2007. Both report on athe State Population and Family Planning Commission indicating that about one inten men aged twenty to and forty-five will be unable to marry. See also Jane Macartney,ÒChina Faces Population Imbalance Crisis,Ó in Times Online, January 12, 2007(www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article1292295.ece). Branches, verty, Progess,Ó p. 157. Lu Xueyi, ÒTiaozheng shehui jiegou, goujian she-huizhuyi hexie shehuiÓ (Adjust the social structure, construct a harmonious socialist society), in Shehui lanpishu: 2006 nian, edited by Ru and others, p. 197, concurs (he cites 41.8 percent).Wang and Mason, ÒThe Demographic Factor,Ó p. 12.25. Ching Kwan Lee, Against the Law: Labor Protests in China픀s Rustbelt and Sunbelt (Uni-ress, 2007).26. Dorothy J. Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, theState, and the Logic of the Market (University of California Press, 1999). More recently, LinQi, ÒClub Warms the Hearts of City픀s Migrant Women,Ó China Daily March 15, 2005; Dorothy J. Solinger China픀s Social Future Wang Zhuqiong, ÒFemale Migrants Suffering at Work,Ó China Daily, November 30, 2006;퉍igrant Workers Earn Monthly Income of 120 Dollars,Ó China Daily October 23, 2006(www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/2006-10/23/content_714825.htm); Fei Guo, ÒTheImpact of Temporary Migration on Migrant Communities,Ó in Transition and Challenge, edited by Zhao and Guo, pp. 216Ð50; and Wang Chunguang, ÒNongmingong qunti de she-hui liudong팠⠀The social mobility of the peasant worker mass), in Dangdai Zhongguo shehui (Social mobility in contemporary China), edited by Lu Xueyi (Beijing: Shehui kexuewenxian chubanshe, 2004), chap. 10.27. Howard W. French, ÒChina Strains to Fit Migrants into Mainstream Classes,Ó NewYork Times January 25, 2007. In an NBS survey of 5,065 migrants who brought childrenwith them to cities, 49.2 percent had to pay an average registration fee of ´1,226 in additiontheir regular tuition fees; see ÒMigrant Workers Earn Monthly Income of 120 Dollars.Ó28. Kenneth Roberts, ÒThe Changing Profile of Labor Migration,Ó in Transition and edited by Zhao and Guo, p. 242.29. Guo, ÒThe Impact,Ó p 30. Roberts, ÒThe Changing Profile,Ó p. 243.at Home,Ó China Daily 32. Roberts, ÒThe Changing Profile,Ó pp.246Ð47; Zhao, ÒRural Women.Ó The statisticcomes from research by Bai Nansheng, professor at the School of Agricultural Economics andRural Development at Renmin University.ural Women Left.Ó34. Macartney, ÒChina Faces Population Imbalance Crisis,Ó citing the report from theopulation and Family Commission mentioned earlier.픀s Policy Shift and the Tuanpai픀s Coming-of-Age,Ó China LeadershipMonitor .15, p.6, from Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan eekly), December 28,2004, p. 1. Wang Chunguang notes that perhaps 80 percent of the 150 million migrants atworkersÓ [www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-12/27/content_507066.htm]).36. Guo, ÒThe Impact,Ó pp. 231, 232.moting Democracy found that nearly 40 percent of junior high students in the countrysidehave dropped out of school, about half of whom stayed at home to farm; ÒChina Experiencesropout Rate,Ó Xinhua News Agency, March 4, 2005 (www.chinadaily.com.cn/ee also Shi Xiuying and Li Wei, ÒZhongguozhiye jiegou de qu gaojihua ji yuanyin fensiÓ (Analysis of the tendency toward a rise in qualityof China픀s professional structure and the reasons), in Dangdai Zhongguo edited by Lu, pp.tunity and the lowerTiaozheng shehui,Ó p. 202, states that less than 70 percent graduate from primary schools in large parts of sevenpoor provinces. The government announced that in 2007, tuition fees would be waived forural children eligible for the nine-year compulsory schooling requirement,and that the fees for 50 million of these were exempted in 2006 (news.xinhuanet.com/politics/38. Xin Dingding, ÒRich-Poor Divide Serious, Study Finds,Ó China Daily December 26, China픀s Changing Political Landscape 39. State Council Leading Group of Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development팀(bbs.chinadaily.com.cn/viewthread.php?tid=547282&extra=page). Zhu, ÒJumin shenghuo,Óp. 92, notes that the NBS counted a total low-income population in the countryside of 75.8740. For farmers, the standard was ´1,000 per capita net annual income; for urbanites, adaily average income of ´6.4. Zhu, ÒJumin shenghuo,Óp. 93.41. He Xuesong, Shehuixue shiyexia de Zhongguo shehui perspective) (Shanghai: Huadong ligong daxue chubanshe [East China Science and Engineer-ing College Publishing Co.], 2002), pp. 168Ð69, cites 15 million to 31 million. Mo Rong,퉊iuye: Zai tiaozhanzong guanzhu kunnan quntiÓ (Employment: In challenge, pay close Shehui lanpishu: 2003 nian edited by Ru and others,p. 40, cites Asian Development Bank data of 37 million. See also Li Peilin, ÒDangqianZhongguo shehui fazhan de rogan wenti he xin qushiÓ (Some issues and new trends in con-temporary China픀s social development), in Shehui lanpishu: 2003 nian, edited by Ru and oth-ers,p. 23.42. ÒChina Aims to Keep Unemployment Rate Below 4.6 percent,Ó Xinhua News Agency,Keep Urban Jobless Rate below 5 Percent,Ó Xinhua News Agency, November 9, 2006(www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-11/09/content_728940.htm).43. He Huifeng, ÒRobust Economy Masks Legions of Unemployed,Ó South China Morn-ing Post, September 17, 2006.u, ÒTiaozheng shehui,Ó p. 200.45. ÒUniversity Graduates Line Up for Government Posts,Ó China Daily October 29,.com.cn/bizchina/2006-10/29/content_719221.htm). According to China Daily hanghai government department statistics show that young job-enty-fiveaccounted for over 40 percent of the total of Shanghai픀s unemployed, one-third of whom areof Future with No Action,Ó China Daily June 27, 2005 (www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/27/content_454969.htm).46. Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba, Injury to Insult: Unemployment, Class, and 47. Membership dropped from 63 percent to 44 percent. See Bruce J. Dickson, ÒBeijing픀sAmbivalent Reformers,Ó Current History, September 2004, pp. 250, 252.u픀s Policy Shift,Ó p. 5. usiness Weekly vember 13, 2006; LuigiTomba, ÒCreating an Urban Middle Class: Social Engineering in Beijing,Ó China Journal (January 2004): 1Ð26.52. Zhang Houyi, ÒSiying qiyezhu jieceng chengzhang de xin jieduan팠⠀The new stage ofthe growth of private entrepreneurs), in Shehui lanpishu: 2003 nian, edited by Ru and others,341. Zhang puts the number of registered private entrepreneurs at 55.65 million in mid-2005, an increase of nearly 20 percent over the year before.Tiaozheng shehui,Ó p. 198, states that another 50 million people were employedin these firms, and that there were another 23.5 million smaller-scale individual firms, with25.21 million people working in them. Dorothy J. Solinger China픀s Social Future 54. Zhang Wanli, 툀Shehui zhongjian jieceng de jueqi팀 (The sudden appearance of the Dangdai Zhongguo edited by Lu, pp. 275Ð78.55. Xiao Changyan, ÒHigh-Income Women Seek New Image,Ó China Daily March 10,2006; Zhang Yu, ÒPrivate Education Struggles for Survival,Ó China Daily, March 6, 2006; LiuJie, ÒPurchasing Patterns,Ó China Daily March 6, 2006; ÒMatches for Aspiring Cinderellas?ÓXinhua News Agency, November 13, 2006 (www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-11/13/con-56. Deborah S. Davis, The Consumer Revolution in Urban China (University of CaliforniaPress, 2000).57. ÒParking a Headache for School Campuses,Ó Eastday May 23, 2005 (www.chi-nadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/23/content_444971.htm); ÒConfidence Building,Ó Shanghai Star January 11, 2005 (www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-01/11/con-tent_407898.htm); ÒElitism in Education,Ó China Daily October 29, 2006; ÒSport of Kingsfor New Elite,Ó China Daily September 28, 2006.58. Yongshun Cai, ÒChina픀s Moderate Middle Class: The Case of Homeowners픀 Resis- Asian Survey 45 (September/October 2005): 777Ð99; Howard W. French, ÒChinese ew YorkTimes 59. Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, andProspects for Change (Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Kellee Tsai, ÒCapitalists without Comparative Political Studies 38 (November 2005): 1130Ð58. 60. ÒUnited Front Expands,Ó China Daily, September 4, 2006.This was the label used by Xiao Mingchao, chief researcher of the national researchproject, China픀s New Middle Class Life Survey, as reported in Liu Jie, ÒTrue Picture,Ó usiness Weekly, vember 13, 2006.usiness People Gain More Political Influence in China,Ó Xinhua Newsocial StratumÕ Playing Important Role inChina,Ó Xinhua News Agency, February 14, 2007 (www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-02/14/content_809712.htm); and Zhang, ÒSiying qiyezhu,Ó p. 346. aily 65. ÒCPC Seeks Advice on Building Harmonious Society,Ó Xinhua News Agency, Octo-ber 13, 2006 (www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-10/13/content_707558.htm). China픀s Changing Political Landscape