S rati cation of any treaty framework that includes binding green house emission targets hope for a sustainable and effective international climate policy appears dim As of only Australia New Zealand and the European Union continue to endorse bindin ID: 68208
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SPECIALSECTION:SAFEGUARDINGFAIRNESSINGLOBALCLIMATECoaxingClimatePolicyLeadershipSteveVanderheideniththefailureoftheinternationalcommunitytonegotiateasuccessortreatytotheKyotoProtocolinlate,andwithlittleprospectofU.S.rati communities,ratherthanwithstates.Sucheffortscanaffectlargeremissionstrendsatthemargins,buttosolvetheproblemitselfaninternationalpolicyfra-meworkisstillneeded.AsothershavestressedinrecentexhortationsformoreleadershipfromsuchkeyactorsastheUnitedStates,inordertobringaboutsuchaframeworkthedisparateandcompetingintereststhathavethusfarpro-ducedonlyaninternationalclimatepolicyimpassemustbealignedthroughtheexerciseofeffectiveleadership.Myaimhereistoexplorethedecisionstructurefromwhichsuchleadershipmightpotentiallyemergeandfromwhichafairandeffectiveclimatepolicyframeworkmightgainrequisiteinternationalsupport.Inwhatfollows,Iidentifyseveralconditionsforandobstaclestoeffectiveinter-nationalpolicyleadershipwithaviewtowardcreatingtheconditionsforthatlea-dershiptoemerge,andsuggesthowsuchanovertlystrategicanalysismightaddresssomekeyunexploredterritoryinclimateethics.First,Isketchthenatureandroleofleadershipininternationalclimatepolicynegotiations,deningleader-shipastheabilitytoinduceactionbyotherparties,andtosubsequentlygeneratefurtherandreciprocalactionbyfollowers.Next,Ianalyzethecurrentdecisionstructurerelatedtonationalactiononclimatechange,showinghowleadershipmighthelptoovercomeresistancetocooperation.Ithensuggesttheuseofcon-ditionalpromisingasameansforinducingclimatepolicyleadershipbyeithertheUnitedStatesorChina.Bytransformingthedecisionstructurefromoneinwhichtheexerciseofsuchleadershipcarrieshighrisksandpromisesfewrewardsintoonewithlowerrisksandhigherprobabilitiesofsuccess,thisapproachcastsleader-shipasanessentialelementformobilizinginternationalcooperationinprotectingtheclimatesystem.Ratherthanviewingsuchleadershipasaspontaneousandper-suasivepowerthatneedonlybesummonedbywould-beleadersandisthusinde-pendentofactionsbypotentialfollows,thisapproachunderstandsleadershipasapowertotriggercooperationthatinsomecasescanbeinducedbypledgesofreci-procalaction.RethinkingLeadershipTheimpasseoverthemaintermsofaneffectiveinternationalclimatepolicyagree-mentcanbeunderstoodinpartashavingresultedfromafailureofleadership.AlthoughtheUNFCCCcalledondevelopedcountriestotaketheleadincom-batingclimatechange,theUnitedStatesinparticularhasshirkedthatcommit-ment,refusingeventofollowothersignatorynationsinacceptingbindingSteveVanderheiden mitigationtargets,letalonetoleadthemindoingso.InadvanceoftheCOP-meetingsinBali,UNSecretary-GeneralBanKi-mooncalledontheUnitedStatesandChinatoplayamoreconstructiveroleinclimatepolicynego-tiations.TheresultsoftheU.S.presidentialelectionsgavemanypeoplerenewedhopethatAmericamightnallyeschewtheclimatepolicyobstructionismthatcharacterizedtheGeorgeW.Bushadministration.AwardingPresidentObamaNobelPeacePrize,theNorwegianNobelCommitteeremarkedthatUSAisnowplayingamoreconstructiveroleinmeetingthegreatclimaticchal-lengestheworldisconfronting.However,therenewedeffortatmultilateraldiplo-macyforwhichObamawasrecognizednevermaterialized.Thepresidentlate-hourefforttosalvageadealfromthemeetingsresultedintheCopenhagenAccord,whichabandonedmultilateraldiplomacyforanendrunaroundtheestablishedUNFCCCprocessandgeneratedanonbindingpledgethatincludesnobindingtargets.Surely,thiswasnottheleadershipthatthesecretary-generalhadcalledfororthattheNobelCommitteehadanticipated.EvenifpotentialleaderssuchastheU.S.presidenthadacteddifferently,aneffectiveinternationalpolicymaynothaveemerged.Itisalsounclearthatotherscouldhavemadeadifference,hadtheybeenintherelevantleadershippositions.Myaimisnottoscrutinizerecentpolicyhistoryorimpugnparticularactorsashavingfailedtolead,exceptinsofarasthismightyieldinsightsintohowsuchlea-dershipmightemergeinthefuture.Rather,attributingongoingdisagreementsoverinternationalclimatepolicytoafailureofleadershiptradesonthedeofleadershipitself,whichinvolvesinducingotherstoactinwaystowhichtheyarenotcurrentlyinclinedortoacceptpolicytermstowardwhichtheyarenotcur-rentlydisposed,andintroduceswhatIcalltheproblemofleadership.Asexplainedbelow,theproblemariseswhencooperativeactionbysomepotentialleaderbecomesnecessaryforsecuringthereciprocalcooperationofothers,butthepro-spectsforthatexerciseofleadershipareaffectedbypotentialfollowers.Apartfromthetermsofaneffectiveandpresumablyfairinternationalclimatepolicyfra-meworkcapableofgainingtheassentoftheworldsnationsandtheirgovern-ments,myaimhereistoexplorehowthepowersrelatedtoleadershipcansometimesbeusedtoovercomepolicydivisions,aswellastherolethatleadershipmightpotentiallyplayinsecuringsuchanagreement.Moreover,contrarytothepresumptionthatleadersactfromthesheerforceofwilltoovercomeexistingobstaclestocooperation,leadershipcanitselfbeenabledorenhancedbypotentialfollowers,andinmanycasesmustbeifitistosuccessfullycoaxingclimatepolicyleadership emissionssignicantlyandsoon,aredistinctfrombutrelatedtothequestion.AsShuenotes,thefactthattheUnitedStatesmakeadifferenceinavoidingseriousfutureharmgeneratesaGoodSamaritanreasonwhyweoughttobetheonestoperformurgentactionnow.Shuegroundstheseremedialobligationsinthecapacityofamajorcontributortoclimatechangetomitigateitsemissions,whichwouldholdevenif[theUnitedStates]borenopriorresponsibilitycontributingtotheproblem.However,addingpriorresponsibilitytothesecapacity-basedconsiderationsunderscoresandstrengthensastatesremedialobli-gations.ThatitwouldbewrongorunjustfortheUnitedStatestorefusetoactondecarbonizationimperatives,letalonefailtoleadothernationsintakingontheirowncommitments,shapesthedecisionstructureinwhichU.S.climatepolicylea-dershipmightemerge,butdoesnotinitselfbringaboutthatleadership.Recognizingandactingononesresponsibilitiesmaybeanecessaryconditionforleadershiptoemerge,butitisaninsufcientone,especiallygiventheentrenchedinterest-basedandideologicaloppositiontoclimatepoliciesincon-temporaryAmericanpoliticsandgovernment,andthecertaincostsanduncertainrisksthatinternationalpolicyleadershipentails.However,ethicalobligationisrel-evanttomoralauthority,anessentialfeatureofleadership,andonethatmightbewieldedonbehalfofcooperativeactiononclimatechange,andthatmustbeexer-cisedintheserviceofdefensibleends.Onlywhenactingtoadvancecollectivegoalscanstateswieldmoralauthority,exertingpoweronbehalfofethicallydefen-sibleends.Thus,theclimatejusticeimperativesthatrequireU.S.participationininternationaleffortstomitigateclimatechangealsoenableittoexercisealeader-shiproleinthoseefforts.Becauseitspotentialshiftfromshirkingitsresponsibil-itiestoundertakingthemcouldtriggerinternationalcooperationthroughthemoralauthorityofleadership,thereasonsnotedbyShueregardingUnitedStatesshouldactalsosuggesthowitmightacquirethemoralauthorityneededtoleadotherstatestowardmutuallybenecialcooperationbyacceptingitsfairshareofburdenstowardthiscooperativeeffort,andthusthecapacitytoeffectchange.Ininternationalpolitics,leadingbyexamplecanpressurefollowersintocontributingtheirfairsharetowardcollectivegoals,butsuchanoutcomedependsontherightexamplebeingsetbytheleadersthemselves.OnlyiftheUnitedStatescanbeinducedtotakeonitsfullcommitmentscanitsactiongen-eratethemoralauthorityneededtocompelotherstodothesame.RodneyBruceHalldescribesmoralauthorityasanideationalpowerresourcethatstatescanacquirebycultivatingitintheirinternationalrelations,andthatcoaxingclimatepolicyleadership mighttherebyexcusetheother,atleastwhereneithersignalsanunwillingnesstorst,Goodinproposesapotentialsolutiontotheproblem.Iftheethicalimperativeincasesofjointactionis,asheputsit,yououghttodoit,ifsufcientlymanyotherswillalsodoit,theneachpotentialrescuerisobligatedtocon-ditionallypromiseIwillifyouwillandatleastonemustpromiseIwillif(youwillifIwill).Theformerpromisesreciprocalactionifoneofferstotaketheinitiativeandactrstinrescuingthechild,andthelatterpromisestoinitiatethatactionwhenreciprocalactionhasbeenpromisedbyothers.Absentthisexpectedreciprocity,thecostsofanyagentactingonhisownarehigh,asothersarelikelytofreerideonanybenetsthatareprovidedbyasingleaction;andifonefollowsGoodininstipulatingathresholdofcooperationneededtopro-videanysuchbenet,thenunilateralactionbecomesevenmoreill-advised.Ontheotherhand,offeringtoreciprocatetheactionsofotherscomesataverylowcost.ModifyingGoodinssolutionslightlyinordertoaccommodatemulti-personjointactions,eachcanofferIwill,ifsufcientlymanyotherswilltobringaboutthedesiredendwithlittlerisk,sinceeitheraninsufcientnumberofotherswillmakethesamepromiseofreciprocity,inwhichcasenoactionhasbeencommitted,orenoughotherswillmakethesamepromise,inwhichcasethepromisedactionwillnotbefutile,asitwillbesufcienttoproducethedesiredoutcomesolongasthesepromisesarekept.Onceenoughpotentialcooperatorshavepledgedtheirreciprocity,someleadercanstepforwardwithaversionofGoodinIwillifandonlyif(youwillifIwill)pledgetoinitiatethecooperativescheme.Onepotentialobstacletosuccessfulcooperationremainsifbenetsproducedthroughthecooperationofsomeareavailabletoothersregardlessoftheirroleinprovidingthem.Ifsomecanfreerideontheeffortsofotherstheywillbetemptedtodoso.Becausefreeridingincommonstragediesinvolvessomepartiestakingunfairadvantageofothersbyacceptingbenetsofacooperativeschemewhilerefusingtocontributetheirfairshareofthecosts,therebydiminishingthosebenetsavailabletoothers,itviolatesthetermsoffairplay.Sincetheobjectivesofclimatepolicyleadershipincludenotonlyspeciedoutcomes(avoid-ingdangerousclimatechange)butalsoidentifynormativeconstraints(afairallo-cationofburdensamongvariousparties),leadersmustaimtopreventfreeriding,whetherornotithastheeffectofdegradingthecollectivegoodinquestion.Wherewould-befreeriderscannotbepreventedfromenjoyingthebenetsofthegoodinquestion,asisthecasewithclimatechange,leadersmightseektomakecontributionscompulsoryorotherwisepunishthoseshirkingtheirsharescoaxingclimatepolicyleadership tolimitthesizeoftheirownherdsunlessallotherstakeonsimilarcommitments,statesare,inArnesonsterms,oftennervousorreluctantcooperatorsindecidingwhethertoadoptunilateralormultilateraldecarbonizationeffortsoutsideaninternationaltreatyframeworkinwhichallmajorpollutersundertakesimilarcommitments.Theinabilitytocontrolfreeridingortocoerceuniversalcooperationleavesmanyasbystanderstotheprocess,neitherparticipatingnorsignalingtheirwillingnesstobeled,withtheeffectofreinforcingstatusquomomentumagainstparticipation.Thisanalysisilluminatesthecausesoftheunderprovisionofcarbonabatementprograms,butalsopointsthewaytoapoten-tialsolutiontoitscoredilemma.Canleadershipplayaroleinovercomingthisimpasse,and,ifso,how?Itcan,butnotinthestraightforwardfashionbywhichleadershipisoftencharacterized,whereinleadersactontheirownandagainstthetide,stakingoutapositionandmovingformeropponentsovertotheirsidethroughtheforceofpersuasion.Supposethat,insteadofjustifyingitsoppositiontoorwithdrawalfromtheKyotoProtocolframeworkbyreferencetoChinasandIndiasrefusaltoacceptbindingemissionscaps,theU.S.governmenthadmadeaconditionalpromise:Wewill,ifChinaandIndia(andrelevantothers)will.Thiskindofcommitmentshouldberelativelyeasytomake,particularlygivenskepticismaboutthepro-spectsofothercountriesfollowingsuit,asthiswouldallowforthestakingoutofsomemoralhighgroundwithouttheassociatedcostsofclaimingthatsamegroundthroughunilateralaction.Iftheschemefallsapart,otherstateswouldbeheldresponsible,eventhoughthosecountriesbehavednodifferentlythantheUnitedStates.TheUnitedStatesdidnotmakesuchaconditionalpromise,andlikelywillnot,thoughotherpartieshavemadeconditionalcommitmentstomoreambitiousemissionstargetsiftheUnitedStateswouldjoininaninternationalclimatetreatyframework.Initsdeedsifnotitswords,theUnitedStateshasthussignaledthatitwouldpreferthefailureofinternationalclimatepolicydevelopment(andthere-foredangerousclimatechange)toaninternationaltreatyframeworkinwhichallarerequiredtodotheirfairsharetomitigateclimatechange.Thisisobviouslyanethicallyindefensibleposition,butthatisnotwhatisatissuehere.SupposethattheUnitedStatescontinuestoresistcallstodoitsfairshareinavoidingclimate-relatedharm,muchlessforittoleadotherstowardsolutionstothepro-blem,andsupposeothercountriesconsequentlyavoidundertakingcostlybutpotentiallyeffectivedomesticmitigationactions.Thestatusquopersists.ButSteveVanderheiden istheformofleadershipdescribedabove,wherenominalleadersemergeastheresultofincentiveshifts,triggeringthefairandeffectivecooperativeschemethatothershavedenedinadvance.Notonlydoethicalconsiderationsboundthisschemeinadvance,asthekindofpowerthatitinvolvesislegitimateonlywhenusedonbehalfofjustoutcomesandprocesses,butthesefairtermsalsoemergefromthatmannerinwhicheachpartymustformulateitsconditionalpromise,asgoodfaithoffersofreciprocitycannotcontainobjectionabletermsofcooperation.GoodinsrescuerscouldneveragreetoworktogetherifeitherofferedtheotherascenarioinwhichIwill,butonlyifyoudomostoftheworkandtakeonmostoftherisks,asthiswouldbetransparentlyunfair,andwouldnotsufcetoabsolvethepartythatoffereditfromblamefortheschemecollapse.Byjointlydevisingtheschemesterms,throughpromisesofreciprocalactionthatallwouldundertake,acontractualisthypotheticaldisciplinestheformthateachoffermusttake.Leadersincooperativeschemesofthiskindcannomoredictatethetermsthatotherswillofferthemthanthosethattheywilllike-wiseneedtoofferothers,asbotharedenedintermsoftheirmutualacceptabil-ity.Whiletheapproachtakenabovelookspurelyinstrumentalasconcernedonlywiththemeansofbringingaboutcooperation,ratherthaneitheritsendsortermsitisnecessarilyconcernedwithallthree,andaimstobringthemtogetherinaconstructiveandmutually-reinforcingmanner.NOTESJeffreyMarlow,E.U.LookstoU.S.forClimateLeadership,NewYorkTimes(onlineedition),JuneElisabethRosenthal,UNChiefSeeksMoreClimateChangeLeadership,NewYorkTimes(onlineedi-tion),NovemberKarlssonetal.examinethedemandsideofclimatepolicyleadershipbysurveyingperceptionsofpotentialleadersbutstopshortofproposingstrategiesforinducingsuchleadership.SeeChristerKarlssonetal.,LookingforLeaders:PerceptionsofClimateChangeLeadershipamongClimateChangeNegotiationParticipants,GlobalEnvironmentalPolitics,no.),pp.See,e.g.,JonA.KrosnickandDonaldR.Kinder,AlteringtheFoundationsofSupportforthePresidentthroughPriming,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,no.),pp.HenryShue,FaceReality?AfterYou!ACallforLeadershiponClimateChange,Ethics&InternationalAffairs,no.),p.See,e.g.,RobertRepetto,sClimateProblem:TheWayForward(NewYork:Routledge,Also,seenotesFaceReality?SeeSteveVanderheiden,Leadership,MoralAuthority,andGlobalClimateChange,inD.A.HicksandT.Williamson,eds.,LeadershipandGlobalJustice(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,),pp.RodneyBruceHall,MoralAuthorityasaPowerResource,InternationalOrganization,no.),p.TalcottParsons,SociologicalTheoryandModernSociety(NewYork:FreePress,),p.UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange,art.,principle(NewYork:UnitedSteveVanderheiden