y PointsIntroduction7rgarita S.Studemeisteruilding the Rule ofLaw in P - PDF document

y PointsIntroduction7rgarita S.Studemeisteruilding the Rule ofLaw in Post-War El Salvador10rgaret PopkinDemilitarizing Public Security:Lessons from El Salvador20Gino CostaDemilitarizing and Democratizing Salvadoran Politics27icardo Córdova MacíasThe UNs Role in Peace-building in El Salvador33esa WhitfieldEl Salvador and Colombia:Lessons ofthe Peace Process41nthia J.Arnsonnclusion:Assessing the Results ofthe Peace Process47n Osler HampsonConference PanelistsAbout the Contributors y PointsThe following key points highlight perspectives on the implementation ofthe El Salvadorpeace accords discussed at a December 1999 conference on the topic at the United Statesnstitute ofPeace.Readers are invited to consult the papers by five experts and the con-cluding summary ofthe discussion contained in the body ofthis publication for a morensive and detailed treatment ofkey points below.1.Under the auspices ofthe United Nations,twenty months ofnegotiations and aseries ofpartial settlements between the government ofEl Salvador and the rebelabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) culminated January 16,1992in the signing ofthe Chapultepec Peace Accords in Mexico City.The implementa-tion ofthe accords initiated a transition from war to peace and profoundly trans-formed political life in El Salvador.2.El Salvadors peace settlement providedfor a cease-fire;the demobilization ofmili-tary and guerrilla forces;the establishment ofthe FMLN as a political party and theintegration ofits combatants into society;changes in the nature,responsibilities,and size ofthe countrys armed forces;creation ofa new national civilian policeforce and an intelligence service separate from the military;human rights measures;electoral and judicial reforms;and limited social and economic programs primarilybenefiting members ofthe demobilized forces and war-ravaged communities.3.Major accomplishments ofthe peace accords were the end ofhostilities and politicaliolence,the disarmament and demobilization ofthe FMLN,and the retreat ofthemilitary from politics,as the army was downsized and subjected to civilian controland its constitutional role confined to national defense.Eventually,the governmentpurged high-ranking members ofthe military,and subsequently,an amnesty law,favored by both sides to the conflict,was passed,exempting all those responsible forajudicial crimes during the war.4.Furthermore,three existing security forces under military oversight were dissolvedand a new civilian police force under the Ministry ofPublic Defense was organizedand deployed.Noteworthy was the adoption ofa modern police doctrine focusingon the protection ofcitizensrights and the development ofthe new forces crime-fighting capacity.5.Experience shows that a disarmament and demobilization process must be intelli-gently designed and managed in order to prevent post-conflict violence and crime.El Salvador,the demobilization ofarmed government and guerrilla forces leftmany combatants from both sides unemployed and maladjusted,contributing to aise in public insecurity.6.The conversion ofthe FMLN into a political party,and electoral reform as mandat-ed in the accords,have led to unprecedented levels ofpolitical pluralism,highlympetitive political processes,and free and fair elections,and more generally tobrant political debates in El Salvador.Politics have been marked by partisanship, Introductionhe largest offensive ever ofthe rebel Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front(FMLN),in November 1989,made evident the urgency ofa negotiated settlementofEl Salvadors protracted civil war.The Salvadoran military had been unable todefeat the rebels;the FMLN lacked the power to overthrow the elected government ofAlfredo Cristiani„a costly stalemate.The murder ofsix Jesuit priests by the Salvadoranarmy during the offensive shook public opinion worldwide.Threatening a cutoffofmili-tary assistance to El Salvador,the United States pressured for peace negotiations.er,worldwide changes at the end ofthe Cold War impelled the negotiations be-inning in early 1990.Nearly two years later,United Nations…brokered peace accords con-cluded a war that had claimed the lives ofmore than 75,000 Salvadorans,internallydisplaced another halfmillion,and sent nearly one million citizens fleeing the country.The Chapultepec Accords,as they are known,signed on January 16,1992,in Mexico City,culminated twenty months ofnegotiations and a series ofpartial settlements between thegovernment ofEl Salvador and the FMLN. a December 1999 conference in Washington,D.C.,the United States Institute oface set out to assess the significance ofthe implementation ofthe peace accords nearlyn years after the initiation ofnegotiations under United Nations auspices.The confer-ence considered a number ofimportant questions.To what extent have the constitutionalforms called for in the peace agreements consolidated the political transformation in ElSalvador? What has been the impact ofambiguities,strengths,and weaknesses in the pro-isions encountered during their implementation? How did the third-party role ofthenited Nations (UN) contribute to the political transition? Do any troubling portents re-main? Is the transformation durable and irreversible? What lessons from peace-buildingin El Salvador are applicable to other international conflicts?Five distinguished experts guided discussions on a wide range oftopics.Their papers,and a summary ofthe days discussion by Fen Osler Hampson ofCarleton University,arepublished here.The views expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect those oftheS.Institute ofPeace.The final El Salvador accords provided for the cessation ofarmed conflict by means ofa cease-fire,the demobilization offorces,and the establishment ofthe FMLN as a politicalentity.Among the key provisions were a number seeking to transform the nature and re-sponsibilities ofEl Salvadors armed forces.These included measures redefining thearmed servicesmission as the defense ofEl Salvadors territory and its sovereignty;plac-ing the armed services under civilian control;and reducing their size,reorganizing them,and revising their training programs.Other stipulations addressed the creation ofa newnational civilian police force and intelligence service separate from the military,andform ofthe judicial system to include a new judicial training school and an Office of Margarita S.Studemeister ofwarring forces toward peace negotiations.Conditions on the battlefield may alter per-ptions,Žshe writes,but they do not necessarily generate sufficient political will to nego-tiate a settlement.ŽArnson also underscores that the history ofdemobilizationnegotiations with rebel forces in Colombia suggests that any acceptable peace proposalsthere need to go beyond the political solutions attempted in the past.Further,whileacknowledging the importance ofinvolving civil society in any peace process,she is cau-tious about the leverage ofthe international community,asserting that no internationalbody can substitute for the political will ofthe contending parties.Žn Osler Hampson ofCarleton University summarizes the discussion and the recom-mendations contributed by conference participants,including measures to strengthen hu-man rights and judicial reform,public security,and democratic development in ElSalvador.This discussion,and the expertspapers,confirm that there are many lessons tobe learned from the implementation ofthe peace accords in El Salvador„lessons thatspeak not only to the people ofEl Salvador themselves but also to the wider Latin Ameri-can community and the world. thanks to those who contributed to the organization ofthis conference and tothis publication:U.S.Institute ofPeace Vice President Charles Nelson;Patrick Cronin,director ofthe Institutes research and studies program;William Stuebner,formerly ofitsule oflaw program;Debbie Liang-Fenton ofthe Human Rights Policy Project at thenstitute;research and studies program assistant Christina Zechman;and the Institutespublication and marketing department staff.Special thanks to the authors ofthe papers,and to commentators and attendees who generously gave their time and shared theirvaluable thoughts and expertise during the conference.Commentators included the Hon-orable Bernard Aronson,Ambassador Mauricio Granillo Barrera,Phillip Chicola,LouisDuPart,the Honorable Gerson Martínez,the Honorable James McGovern,Aryeh Neir,and Margaret Sarles. ment advised the United Nations ofits plan to implement the remaining recommenda-The Ad Hoc Commissions unanticipated decision to focus on the highest ranking offi-rs increased the symbolic impact ofits work at the same time that it heightened resis-tance to implementation ofits recommendations.The commissions work,thoughlimited in scope by the time and resources available,constituted an unprecedented civilianew ofthe military.ilitary officers,while apparently unrepentant about the human rights abuses com-mitted by the army,generally seem to have accepted the new doctrine and the limited roleofthe armed forces as defined in the peace accords.Reports on human rights violationsno longer find the army to be a major perpetrator ofabuses.With little reason for concernabout the possibility ofprosecution for human rights crimes in El Salvador,former mili-tary leaders,including some named by the Truth Commission,are active in politics andhe Truth CommissionThe Truth Commission for El Salvador issued its powerful report on March 15,1993.Itincluded specific findings on thirty-two particularly notorious or representative cases,andimplicated virtually the entire High Command ofthe Salvadoran Armed Forces in thember 1989 murder ofsix Jesuit priests,their cook,and her daughter.The report at-ibuted the vast majority ofviolations to agents ofthe Salvadoran state,although it didfind that the FMLN had also committed serious violations.Despite intense lobbying by the Salvadoran government,the Truth Commission con-cluded that its mandate to disclose the complete truth required it to name those responsi-ble for abuses when they could be identified.The commissions broad mandate alsoallowed it to make far-reaching,binding recommendations designed to address its find-ings;strengthen state institutions;eradicate the structural causes ofviolence;overcomeimpunity;prevent the repetition ofpast violence;and promote reconciliation.More thanhalfthe commissions recommendations addressed problems in the justice system.The negotiating partiesdecision to rely on a wholly international Truth Commissionboth helped and limited the process. Salvadorans maintain that it would have beenimpossible to have an impartial Salvadoran or mixed commission.The internationalmposition ofthe commission undoubtedly made it easier for many people to come for-ward and facilitated international technical assistance.However,without Salvadoran involvement in the commission and with limited Salvadoran input,the Truth Commis-sion in no way constituted a national process.In contrast,the Guatemalan Historical Clar-ification Commission,which carried out its work five years later,was a mixed(international and Guatemalan) commission that involved Guatemalan civil society in its and the presentation ofits findings.The Truth Commission delivered a scathing indictment ofthe Salvadoran judiciaryand concluded that undertaking prosecutions without significant judicial reform wouldbe counter-productive.The commission recommended the immediate replacement oftheentire Supreme Court,and called for the removal from public office ofofficers and civil-ians found responsible for abuses.It further recommended barring them from serving inBuilding the Rule of Law in El Salvador neighboring Guatemala.An important exception is the work ofthe Association in SearchofMissing Children (Asociación Pro-Búsqueda de Niñas y Niños Desaparecidos),formedin 1994 by families whose children had been taken away by the military or otherwise sepa-d from their families during the war.Culling through orphanage and adoptionds,collecting witness testimony,and using DNA tests to confirm suspected matches,o-Búsqueda has succeeded in locating more than 100 children in other countries and inEl Salvador.The courts have been reluctant to get involved in this endeavor and the mili-tary has not been forthcoming with information. an attempt to preserve historic memory,a number ofSalvadoran human rightsNGOs have joined together and in 1998 persuaded San Salvadors mayor to set aside partofthe citys Cuscatlán Park for a monument to the civilian victims ofthe war.In early2000,forensic anthropologists began a renewed effort to locate and exhume the remainsofthe victims ofthe El MozoteŽmassacre,an effort that had been suspended in the wakeofthe 1993 amnesty law.Following the decision ofthe Inter-American Commission foruman Rights,the Jesuits asked the attorney general to reopen the Jesuit murder investi-gation,to prosecute those responsible for ordering and covering up the 1989 murders.The attorney general initially declined to reopen the case,maintaining that he had to awaitthe Supreme Courts response to petitions challenging the constitutionality ofthe 1993amnesty law.he Salvadoran Amnesty LawSalvadoran military and political leaders have described the amnesty as the embodimentofreconciliation and an end to the discussion ofthe past.Many consider it a majorachievement ofthe peace process and stress the need to forgo investigations ofpast hu-man rights abuses and to impose a veil offorgetting and forgiving.hile politically ex-pedient and advantageous for those who might have to answer for past crimes,suchpositions fail to take into account the rights ofvictims and survivors and the requirementsofinternational law applicable in El Salvador.mmediately following passage ofthe amnesty law,Salvadoran NGOs petitioned thepreme Court to find it unconstitutional.The Court dismissed their challenges byming the amnesty a political question not subject to judicial review.The Inter-Amer-ican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has found that El Salvadors sweepingamnesty law contravenes its obligation to investigate,prosecute,and sanction thoseesponsible for human rights violations under the American Convention on HumanRights.The IACHR has specifically stated that the Truth Commission process did notlieve El Salvador ofthese obligations. the case ofEl Salvador,the international community largely accepted the amnestylaw.The UN secretary-general expressed concern,noting that it would have been prefer-able to have achieved a broad degree ofnational consensus before approving an amnestylaw.The United States did not oppose the amnesty law,but did challenge itsapplication in cases involving the murder ofU.S.citizens.Although the United Stateswas the principal donor involved in justice reform in El Salvador at the time,it clearly didnot perceive that efforts to reform the administration ofjustice cannot be divorced fromjustice for human rights violations,past and present.Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador adequately (including some in which police officers were found to have been involved);and successfully challenged the constitutionality ofprovisions ofemergency anti-crimelegislation.Throughout her term,Velásquez de Avilés maintained close relations with hu-man rights NGOs and womens organizations.As her three-year term drew to a close,itwas clear that the governing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) party would notountenance her re-election,and she decided to vie for the FMLN presidential nomina- 1998,after lengthy delays and discussions,the political parties in the Legislative As-sembly,including the FMLN,appointed appellate judge Eduardo Peñate Polanco to theuman rights post.Previously unknown in human rights circles,Peñate Polanco turnedout to have had a number ofcomplaints lodged against him for his conduct as a judge.ncerns about Peñates qualifications were borne out by his performance as Nationalounsel.Resorting to wartime rhetoric,he publicly labeled dissenting staffmembersommunists.Žy staffmembers with significant training and experience were forcedout ofthe institution.Questions were raised about the institutions use offunds andessive and unnecessary travel expenditures.The offices profile was significantly low-ered,with far fewer cases investigated and resolutions issued.Most international donorssuspended funding to the institution,and the damage to the institution,which was by nomeans consolidated,was incalculable.ealizing that it had made a serious mistake with this appointment,in late 1999 thelegislature assigned a commission to examine Peñates performance.The undermining ofthe National Counsels office represented a very serious threat to one ofthe key humanhts guarantees established by the peace accords.In early 2000,facing legislative action remove him from office,Peñate resigned.As the year drew to a close,the legislature hadt to name his successor.ustice ReformDespite the peace accordslimited focus on the justice system,all parts ofthe justice sys-m have been the focus ofreform efforts in the post-war period.Ongoing reform effortsled by the Ministry ofJustice,which were funded and promoted by the United Statesency for International Development (USAID),received new impetus as the peace ac-ds were implemented and the climate for reform improved significantly.The Unitedtions,through ONUSAL and the permanent UN Development Program mission,alsobegan to look for ways to encourage justice reform,although not always in coordinationith ongoing U.S.-funded efforts.The peace negotiators had agreed to reforms designed to increase the independence ofthe judiciary from other branches ofgovernment and from political party control. an attempt to end one-party domination ofjustice sector institutions,negotiatednstitutional reforms introduced a requirement that Supreme Court justices,the attor-ney general,the state counsel,and the newly established National Counsel for the DefenseofHuman Rights all be elected by a two-thirds majority ofthe Legislative Assembly.Although these reforms established new procedures for nominating Supreme Courtjustices and lower court judges,the latter were still to be named by the Supreme Court.nstitutional reforms also enhanced the independence ofthe National Judiciary Coun-Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador ern criminal,criminal procedure,and sentencing codes after the peace accords weresigned.The inclusion ofrecommendations about criminal justice reform in the Truth Com-mission report opened the door for UN verification ofthe reform process.In late 1996,after the United Nations exerted substantial pressure on Salvadoran authorities,the formed codes were finally approved.The new codes,which took effect in April 1998,sought to transform the Salvadoran criminal justice system into a more adversarial,trans-parent,efficient,oral process,with greater protection for individual rights.The new Criminal Procedure Code represents a radical change from the traditionalinquisitorialŽwritten process to an adversarial oral process.It has separated judicialinvestigative and sentencing functions and given prosecutors and defense attorneys fareater roles.It also provides greater protection for individual rights and gives victims aeater role in criminal proceedings.The reforms sought to limit the use ofpreventive de-ntion,introduce the notion ofprosecutorial discretion,encourage conciliation betweenperpetrators and their victims,and encourage alternative sentences.Under the new code,an extra-judicial confession can only serve as evidence ifthe suspect has had a chance tonsult with counsel and counsel is present when the confession is made.The new lawalso guarantees the right to defense from the beginning ofproceedings,strengthens thepresumption ofinnocence,and seeks to ensure strict compliance with time limits for de-ntion.Despite these provisions,the percentage ofprisoners without sentences remainshigh.Statistics from May 1999 showed a prison population of7,027,out ofwhich 1,576inmates (22.43 percent) were serving sentences,while 5,451 (77.57 percent) had yet to besentenced.A year after the new laws went into effect,Minister ofPublic Security Hugo Barreradescribed the new codes as the principal public security problem,as they give exagger-ated protection to criminals,Žand blamed the codes for the failure to adequately controlmmon crime.olice complained that their hands were tied by the new codesrequire-ments regarding searches and detentions.Dozens ofreforms to the new legislation havebeen presented and many have already been approved.Although the draft laws were avail-able and in circulation for several years before they were approved,it was not until theyentered into effect that many provisions were questioned.Important advances in the newdes,including the greater transparency and efficiency oforal proceedings,the reductionin the number ofpre-trial detainees,and the separation ofresponsibilities for investiga-tion and sentencing,have not been adequately recognized.The new civilian police force,while clearly an enormous improvement over its prede-essors,has proven woefully inadequate to address El Salvadors soaring crime rate„scores ofpolice officers have themselves been killed.The crime wave needs to beaddressed on many fronts.While post-war El Salvador is awash with weapons and peoplewho know how to use them,virtually nothing has been done to limit the flow or posses-sion ofweapons.And Salvadoran authorities have been slow in establishing and imple-menting an integrated crime prevention strategy and targeted crime prevention measures.Longer-term measures contemplated include improved educational,recreational,andemployment opportunities for youth;anti-violence campaigns in the media;and otherBuilding the Rule of Law in El Salvador work on building the capacity ofNGOs to contribute to institution-building.Thenited States,the principal donor involved in justice reform,neither called for justice forpast human rights violations nor consistently embraced the Salvadoran priorities reflectedin the peace accords.Salvadoran institutions,for their part,failed to capitalize on the tech-nical assistance available. particularly controversial or difficult areas,including many aspects ofjustice reform,international donors could assist by creating opportunities to learn about other (particu-larly Latin American) experiences with different reforms.Likewise,confronting the post-war crime wave requires ongoing study ofdifferent measures and their effectiveness.d with a massive crime wave and calls for authoritarian measures,El Salvador mustise to the challenge ofdeveloping comprehensive anti-crime policies consistent withinternational human rights norms,at the same time maintaining key democratic reforms.Although the Legislative Assembly now includes political parties representing a broadpolitical spectrum,it has yet to rationalize its legislative processes.Laws are seeminglyapproved,and reformed,and reformed again without serious consideration ofthe conse-quences.The legislature remains unable to fill important positions based on the qualifica-tions ofcandidates rather than on political considerations,and therefore tends to selectless qualified„even completely unqualified„candidates.The Salvadoran experience has shown that guaranteeing the independence ofthe judi-ciary from the other branches ofgovernment is an essential but insufficient step to trans-form it into a credible institution.Such a transformation is,ofcourse,a long-termprocess.In this sense,building Salvadoran capacity to propose,implement and overseeforms becomes particularly important.Reforming and strengthening legal educationbecomes key,so that future generations oflawyers will have a different conception oftheirole and that ofthe justice system.Educating the public about the roles ofthe differentinstitutions in the justice system and improving access to justice are also essential to build-ing a more democratic system.Thus El Salvador still faces the serious challenges ofcon-solidating a credible and reliable justice system,accessible to all Salvadorans.Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador and apparently into large-scale corruption in the management ofresources.Corruptionled to the subordination ofduty to the need for profit,affecting efficiency and perfor-mance.With the end ofwar,the illegal forces ofpolitical repression within the securityforces turned into criminal gangs involved in common crime and equally willing to com-mit politically motivated crimes.The El Salvador experience shows that the reluctance ofthe old forces to disappear had do not so much with concern for public security as with their membersdesire to pre-serve their privileges and prerogatives.The survival ofthe security forces actually becamea cause ofinsecurity,not only because ofthe corruption and criminal activity ofmany oftheir members but because ofthe inefficiencies thus created in the whole body.tizensrights aside,corruption and crime undermine peace and democracy,and arenot the best features ofa force that needs to inspire trust in the public it is meant to pro-ct.The challenge ofdealing with increasingly widespread crime,ordinary and orga-nized,is a major concern ofgovernments and citizens throughout Latin America today.iously,none ofthe legislative reform processes in Latin America in the last decadehave addressed the issue ofreforming the security forces,still less the military.This is anindication ofthe low level ofcontrol Latin American societies have over their police andmilitary,reflecting a legacy from years ofauthoritarianism and conflict.In many cases,thelegacy is even older and creates an obstacle not only to democratic but especially to eco-nomic and social development. fact,not only political reasons justify the transformation ofthe security forces.Theirhigh degree ofautonomy translates into inefficient resource management and deficientpublic service,forcing those who can afford it to invest directly in private securityproviders.The absence ofaccountability ofofficial security forces further aggravates large-scale corruption.Now that most large state companies in Latin America have been priva-tized,the security forces are the most inefficient ofthe surviving state entities.Since theycannot be privatized,they must be modernized.To fail to do so would be contrary toefforts to streamline public spending and to make state services more efficient.Dilemmas of Police Reformanama,in 1990,and Haiti,in 1994,opted for civilian police forces,in response to the col-lapse oftheir discredited armed forces,until then the guarantors ofinternal order.El Sal-vador did the same at the negotiating table in 1991,in an effort to demilitarize the stateand public security.But all three faced the same dilemmas,as did Guatemala and Hon-duras.Other ofthe regions countries may encounter the same predicament in the future.xico,for example,has an almost overwhelming problem with corruption in its variouspolice forces,and Brazils Military Police have been widely implicated in the illegal use offorce for what is called social cleansing.ŽEl Salvadors experience has shown,better than any other attempt at transformingpublic security,what these dilemmas are,and how to respond to them and the corre-sponding dangers.Generally,the success ofpolice reform depends on how three mainhallenges are handled.The first concerns identifying the most feasible and enforceablepolice model and doctrine.The second concerns the depth ofthe institutional changes tobe made„whether to retrain few or many current personnel,or whether to start overDemilitarizing Public Security iable and faster,because when a force is unsound and out ofcontrol as a result ofyears ofabuse ofpower and corruption,there is little that re-engineering can be expected to do. recently,Guatemala and Honduras have encountered the same dilemma.OfallCentral American security forces,Guatemalas were clearly the most corrupt and discred-ited,yet Guatemala has ignored various international missionsdiagnoses ofthe conditionofits security forces,and international experience ofpolice reform.With the enthusiasticsupport ofthe Spanish Civil Guard,the government has decided to change the name ofthe National Police and retrain the personnel with a few courses.Time will tell ifit was theGenerally,decisions about reforming or dissolving existing security forces should resultfrom objective diagnoses that identify institutional strengths and weaknesses.In somecases,they are already so discredited that it is easy to create consensus for their dissolution.it is often difficult to make such a diagnosis because the organizations them-selves provide the information,which tends to be not only scant,but biased.Hence,analy-ses ofnecessary change,ifthey are to be objective and dispassionate,must be made bypeople outside the institution and must go hand in hand with an independent audit.Onlythen will it be possible to know enough to determine the direction ofthe reform.a wholly new force is to be created,the disposition ofexisting staffmust be deter-mined.Panama,Haiti,and El Salvador decided to incorporate the old personnel into thenew forces.In Panama,after the defense forces were purged,remaining members wereansferred to the new national police force.El Salvador and Haiti have tried to limit theumber ofpolice transferring into the new force.The difficulty ofsuch a process is,again,the lack ofreliable information about the policemen being evaluated,since the informa-tion comes from the very institution subject to reform.rguments for retaining former policemen cite the convenience ofnot wasting theirxperience or the limited resources spent on training them.But the experience retainedusually goes together with all the defects institutionalized in a deteriorating police force.Ifthis is the case,the influence ofsuch staffon the new force will be more pernicious thanpositive,perpetuating in it precisely those vices that were to have been reformed.he Transition The third challenge concerns the length ofthe transition period.The reforms in Panama,aiti,and El Salvador had extremely short transition periods,by force ofcircumstance.llowing military interventions in Panama and Haiti,the collapse ofpublic order madeit imperative to speed up the preparation ofa new police force,with serious consequencesfor selection and training.In El Salvador,the FMLNs distrust ofthe old forces made itnecessary to agree on a two-year transition which,while certainly longer than earliersimilar processes,was nevertheless dramatically short.In future police reform processes,the pressure oftime is unlikely to disappear,because ifa police force must be dissolved,itis best to replace it as soon as possible.At any rate,the longer the transition,the better theselection and training ofnew personnel,and the easier it will be to manage the demobi-lization ofthe original forces.The El Salvador experience shows that a badly managed demobilization process canntribute to a significant deterioration in public security.This is not a good reason toDemilitarizing Public Security modernizing the security forces,as ifthis task were not as urgent,and as ifthe success ofjudiciary reform were not somehow dependent on the quality ofpolice action.he Role of the International CommunityGiven the political nature ofinstitutional change and the level ofresistance peace-buildingencounters,intelligent political leadership and extensive public participation will beneeded to transform those institutions that have become incompatible with peace anddemocracy.The role ofthe international community is decisive at this time,as it was in ElSalvador.Its role should be to strengthen and support civilian power and to subordinatethe security forces and other state institutions to it,submitting them to the control ofpar-liament and the oversight ofan independent press,human rights bodies,and civil societyin general. the short term,outside help from multilateral banks,bilateral aid agencies,and otherinternational groups could help civilians strengthen their understanding ofpublic secu- problems by identifying new crime phenomena and ways oftackling them;analyzingtheir security forcesperformance;and learning about how the forces are administered.The closed nature ofsecurity institutions,their lack ofinteraction with civilians,and theirgenerally defensive attitudes toward the community make it very difficult for citizens toknow more about or study these institutions.International agencies should work for theacknowledgment that public security is a component ofdevelopment,and for the recog-nition ofits civil and democratic nature as an indicator ofgood government.This wouldencourage a change in attitudes in places where this idea is not part ofcivil culture.The multilateral banks could also help carry out assessments ofthe security forces andempirical studies ofpublic security problems to provide the basis for defining strategiesand guidelines for institutional reform and modernization.The slight interest shown bythe international community to these issues is surprising,especially because many secu- forces are the most inefficient and expensive state enterprises in their respective coun-ies,which clearly is in the interest neither ofthe country nor its lenders. the same time,it is important to have more detailed knowledge and a comparativeperspective ofthe experience ofdealing with public insecurity.Where conditions are ripefor reform,it is important that multilateral banks and donor countries strengthen thecivilian authoritiespolitical will with easily and rapidly available resources.It is also im-portant that the various international actors coordinate their efforts in reform programs,so that the scarce resources available complement each other and the efforts are not dupli-cated and wasted,as often happens.The international communitys political and diplo-matic backing,and its technical support,will continue to be decisive in shaping themomentum for change.El Salvadors experience with public security reform leaves four unavoidable lessons forould-be reformers.First,it is fundamental to examine Latin Americas current publicsecurity systems from the focus ofdemocracy,human rights,and peace.Second,the substance ofdilemmas faced in police force reform anywhere are much thesame as those that arose in El Salvador.Is the police force civilian or military? Should aDemilitarizing Public Security Demilitarizing and DemocratizingSalvadoran Politicsndoubtedly,El Salvadors peace agreements have led to its most important polit-ical transformation in the twentieth century.The end ofthe war in El Salvadormarked the beginning ofa political transition that can be characterized as a fun-damental change in its regime,which determines the means ofaccess to power,restric-tions on those who hold political power,and who is included in or excluded from thepolitical process.El Salvadors political transition created the necessary conditions for theinclusion ofhistorically unempowered sectors ofsociety and a new set ofrules for politi-cal competition.It also delegitimized the use ofviolent means to resolve political con-frontation.This paper focuses on political accomplishments resulting from the implementation ofthose peace accord provisions mainly dealing with military reform,the conversion oftheinsurgent Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) into a political party,andelectoral reform.It also examines challenges to consolidation ofthese political accom-plishments,more democratic governance,and the development ofnational consensus inpost-war El Salvador.Demilitarizing the State and Societyom the outset ofnegotiations,proposals for the dissolution ofEl Salvadors armedforces and the fusion ofthe Salvadoran military and FMLN units into a joint force weregarded as untenable.Three sweeping measures„force reduction,mission redefinition,and purging those military most directly responsible for human rights abuses during thenflict„became the essence ofthe military reform written into the peace agreements.easures for both military reform and the demobilization ofthe FMLN sought civilianntrol over the military and the establishment ofthe rule oflaw in El Salvador.nstitutional reforms redefined the mission ofthe military,limiting it to the defenseofsovereignty and the territorial integrity ofthe state,reducing its broad decision-makingpowers,range ofaction,and autonomy,and placing it under executive control.Until then,under the Salvadoran Constitution,the armed forces had multiple responsibilities,includ-ing internal order and public security;the defense ofthe constitution and ofthe nationsform ofgovernment and political regime;and the protection ofcitizenspolitical and uman rights.The new constitutional role was introduced into military education un-der the oversight ofan academic council composed ofcivilian and military members inharge ofcurriculum,admissions,and faculty appointments at the military school.Between January 1992 and February 1993,the size ofthe armed forces diminishedfrom 63,175 to about 31,000 members,with the demobilization ofsome units,such asthose charged with public security and intelligence,which were re-established under Córdova Macías is almost nil and the permanence ofeconomic activities is not ensured.The beneficiariesofthe various programs fear that in the future their enterprises will be worse offthantoday.Žinsertion programs would thus seem to bear careful scrutiny,not only oftheir per-formances but oftheir design,objectives,and long-term effectiveness.Nonetheless,eco-nomic support for ex-combatants during the period ofdemobilization and disarmament,and immediately thereafter,contributed significantly to the political stability necessary forimplementation ofthe peace accords.Broadening the Party SpectrumOn December 15,1992,the United Nations certified that the FMLN had turned in all itsarmaments and could therefore register as a political party.Less than six months later,however,a weapons deposit belonging to an FMLN member organization exploded inanagua,Nicaragua.The UN secretary-general described the discovery as a serious viola-tion ofthe peace accords,and called on the FMLN to hand over all remaining weapons. mid-1993,the FMLN had identified another nine deposits in Nicaragua,two in Hon-duras,and 109 in El Salvador,satisfying the UN that it had completed demobilization quirements.Any future discovery ofweapons would be considered an ordinary criminalmatter.The FMLNs acceptance ofresponsibility for the arms deposits was a crucial momentin peace-building,marking its serious commitment to,and acceptance of,the politicalourse mandated in the peace accords.The price paid by the FMLN for the breach washigh at the time,hurting its credibility nationally and worldwide.Afterwards,the FMLNorganized itselfas a political party to participate in the presidential,legislative,and munic-ipal elections of1994.For the first time in the contemporary history ofEl Salvador,thepolitical parties contesting an election reflected the nations entire ideological spectrum.Defining Rules for Political CompetitionA new electoral code proposed by a special commission ofthe Legislative Assembly wasenacted in 1993.Constitutional reforms created the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) toplace the Central Election Council,and a special body to ensure the impartiality oftheSE and its members,who were to be elected by the Legislative Assembly.This set ofhanges fulfilled the electoral reforms in the peace accords.the shortcomings ofthe electoral code became evident with the emergence ofhnical irregularities during the first round ofpresidential elections in March 1994,leading presidential candidates Armando Calderón Sol and Rubén Zamora to sign ampromise prior to the second electoral round.The UN secretary-general opined thatform was absolutely necessary.on taking power,President Calderón named a multiparty commission to propose aset ofelectoral reforms.The commission proposed the creation ofa national voter reg-istry responsible for issuing personal identification and voter registration cards;establish-ing the ability to vote by place ofresidence;and proportional representation in theunicipal councils.Only the first proposal was approved by the Legislative Assembly,inDecember 1995.Though the Legislative Assembly has continued to work on electoral re- post-war initiatives addressing wide-ranging social and economic concerns demonstratethis need.Three have failed;the outcome ofa fourth one is pending. called for in the peace agreements,the Forum for Economic and Social Consulta-tion was officially installed in September 1992 once the private sector agreed to partici-pate.It was a unique vehicle for fostering dialogue,understanding,and consensus amonggovernment,business leaders,and labor union representatives.Until then,these sectorshad traditionally no formal venue to exchange views and ideas.Consequently,bringing allparties to the forum became a challenging endeavor.The forum defined an agenda andplan ofwork,which were made public,and established a number ofsub-commissionsparticularly dealing with economic reactivation ofthe industrial sector and revisions tothe labor code.Soon after forum representatives signed an agreement ofprinciples andmmitments in mid-February 1993,there were labor protests and firings,and seriousdifferences regarding International Labor Organization conventions and El Salvadorsnew labor code emerged among forum members.The work ofthe forum was suspendedand none ofthe represented parties seemed interested in its reactivation.o other short-lived initiatives were the 1995 San Andrés Pact,between the govern-ment and the newly formed Democratic Party,a center-left grouping ofpolitical parties,and the 1996 Salvadoran ManifestoŽissued by the National Association ofPrivate Enter-prises.The first was criticized as an attempt by the ruling ARENA party and the govern-ment to secure political support for a proposed increase in the value-added tax.TheSalvadoran Manifesto advocated three principles for El Salvador:economic growth basedon internal savings,social spending with fiscal responsibility,and democratic develop-ment.The document was well received among social and political sectors.For the firsttime,Salvadoran businessmen presented their views on national objectives for public dis-cussion.The Manifesto created awareness ofthe need for a long-term vision on eco-nomic,political,and social issues,but failed to create or define one. 1997,then-President Calderón established a National Commission on Development(CND),which,between February and December 1998,led nationwide public consulta-tions to develop a shared vision ofwhat would be necessary to consolidate democracy andpromote development in El Salvador.In October 1999,when the CND unveiled its pro-posals,their potential impact was unclear,particularly since a new president had taken of-fice months before.In November 2000,President Francisco Flores and political parties inthe National Assembly endorsed the CNDs recommended development projects target-ing five different areas ofEl Salvador. is important to recall that parties to the peace negotiations agreed not to considerbroad economic and social matters.Limited economic provisions primarily targeted for-mer combatants and war-ravaged communities.Therefore,the political reforms stem-ming from the accords had no relation to subsequent concerns about the economicdevelopment ofEl Salvador.Nonetheless,they were instrumental in creating conditionsfor a new generation ofchanges in response to growing concerns for the future.Theestoration ofpublic trust and participation in political processes will require the state andpolitical parties to lead,reform,and further advance the consolidation ofdemocracy. Fives Role in Peace-building in El Salvadoror a number ofreasons El Salvador presents an excellent example ofpeace-build-ing from which the United Nations,as well as other members ofthe internationalmmunity involved in its peace process,can derive important lessons.The extentofUN involvement in El Salvadors transition from a civil war to peace was unprecedent-ed at the time;it was consequently highly improvisational,and nothing lends itselfto thelearning oflessons so readily as the considered assessment ofimprovisation.er,the United Nationsengagement in El Salvador took place at a crucial mo-ment in the organizations history.As the Cold War ended,it appeared that the United Na-tions was ideally placed to take on the role ofworld troubleshooter.Successes inhanistan (1988…90) and Namibia (1989…90) and the comprehensive role given thenited Nations by the Paris Accords on Cambodia in October 1991 contributed to thisoptimism.El Salvador also came at a moment ofconceptual importance for United Na-tions peace operations.In nda for Peace,published in June 1992,it was with newdepartures in peace-keepingŽin mind„El Salvador foremost among them„that Secre-tary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced the concept ofpost-conflict peace-build-ing„action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidifypeace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.ŽThe United Nationsleadership ofthisprocess in El Salvador makes it relatively easy to look back on who did what,when andhow,and to consider the consequences.Finally,the role ofthe United Nations in El Sal-vador is widely,and rightly,considered to have been successful.Recognizing its success al-lows room for constructive criticism. assessment ofpeace-building in El Salvador is particularly timely in view oftheother locations in which the United Nations has been tasked with broad responsibilitiesfor peace-building,a number ofthem in situations considerably less auspicious than ElSalvadors.In any discussion ofpeace-building and the United Nations,Kosovo and Eastimor must come to mind,both situations in which the organization faces daunting chal-lenges.Meanwhile,in the Latin American context,much thought is being given to theenormous challenges that the international community will eventually face in supportingthe construction ofdurable peace in Colombia.Negotiation: Peace-building Foreseen an account ofthe negotiations published in ding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in aomplex World (United States Institute ofPeace Press,2000),Alvaro de Soto,the UN me-diator in El Salvador,remarks that the peace negotiation in El Salvador turned out to beabout the building ofdemocracy.ŽBy implication,it is impossible to consider the UNsntribution to peace-building in El Salvador without looking first at the negotiation itself. Whitfield address the past through the agreement that a Truth Commission,headed by threeprominent international figures,would be formed.Some ofthe more negative aspects ofthe negotiations and agreements include a num-ber ofelements that were either unavoidable or unforeseeable.However,that makes themnone the less valid as lessons for the future.The other side ofthe coin ofconducting direct negotiations between two strong partieswas that other key political and social forces were not represented within them.This led toa certain alienation from both the negotiation and implementation processes ofimpor-tant constituents ofSalvadoran society,despite efforts to broaden the base for implemen-tation with the creation ofthe National Commission for the Consolidation ofPeace(COPAZ) and other mechanisms such as the Economic and Social Forum.The lack ofattention by UN negotiators to how implementation was to be financed(everyone presumed that the United States would foot the bill),both with respect to exter-nal assistance and the possibility ofthe mobilization ofdomestic resources,has beenopenly acknowledged as a substantial oversight.More specifically,there was a lack ofcon-sultation with the Bretton Woods institutions deeply involved in the guidance ofeco-nomic policy in El Salvador.In 1994,in an influential article in ign Policy,de Soto,iting with Graciana del Castillo,raised the flag on this issue by warning that the macro-economic stabilization pursued by the international financial institutions could be on allision courseŽwith the implementation ofthe peace accords.This dislocation raisedserious concerns about the funding ofsome aspects ofimplementation,particularly thePNC and some elements ofreintegration.It also suggested the possibility that broadergoals could be undermined by an economic policy designed and executed without refer-ence to the political requirements ofthe peace process.The lack ofconsultation hit closer to home for some other UN actors,mostly becauseofthe institutional differences and distrust prevalent at the time.It contributed to boththe conceptual and practical difficulties experienced in working with agencies and pro-ams during the period ofimplementation.(Luckily some ofthese deep-rooted institu-tional problems have since been addressed„ifnot yet fully resolved„as a result oftheform process initiated by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1997.)The dynamics ofthe El Salvador negotiation led to inherent weaknesses that would besorely felt during implementation.Two much cited examples come to mind.The first wasthe relative weakness ofthat section ofthe accords dealing with judicial reform,in part asa result ofthe FMLNs concentration on military aspects ofthe April 1991 negotiations onnstitutional reform and in part because ofthe clear opposition to the negotiations as awhole demonstrated by the then-president ofthe Supreme Court.This weakness was to atain extent rectified by the binding recommendations ofthe Truth Commission,which made subject to UN verification.The second major area ofweakness was revealed by the limitations ofthe socio-economic chapter ofthe agreements,which was primarily restricted to issues relevant tointegration.This was largely the result ofthe FMLNs acceptance ofthe governmentsposition that economic policy was not up for negotiation and that the most to be gainedwas the right to pursue change through the democratic process.It was also a consequenceThe UNs Role in El Salvador mation gathered from verification,rather than being the result ofa specific mission strat-egy.It is indicative ofthe complexity ofthis relationship that the case may also be madethat concern for institution-building led the mission to pull its punches in its reporting,for example on some ofthe problems besetting the formation ofthe National Civil Policeand the office ofthe human rights ombudsman.A briefreview ofpeace-building activities within three broad areas ofthe accords illus-ates the kinds ofdifficulties encountered in the implementation process.The accordsplaced priority on the incorporation ofthe FMLN into civilian life as a political party,andon the rapid and efficient reintegration into society ofcombatants from both sides,as wellas their civilian base,refugees,displaced,war wounded and others marginalized by thenflict.The main vehicles for this reintegration were to be an extensive land transfer pro-am (PTT) and the creation ofthe National Civil Police,or PNC.Additional measuresincluded programs and packages earmarked for former combatants.The UNs emphasison reintegration was in part in recognition oferrors made in Nicaragua,where neglectingthe issue set back the peace process considerably.However,a direct challenge to the UNsefforts soon emerged,with the explosion ofa post-war crime wave and clear indicationsthat former combatants ofboth sides were involved.hile the PTT would result in the transfer ofabout 10 percent ofEl Salvadors ruralland,it was essentially a political program,offering land for armsŽand designed in ac-knowledgment that the issue ofland was one ofthe root causes ofthe Salvadoran conflict.mplementation ofthe PTT involved an enormous effort on the part ofboth the Unitedtions and the United States,its key donor.That,in the end,its funding difficulties werenot as acute as had appeared possible to de Soto and del Castillo,was largely a conse-quence ofUSAID commitment to the program.Rather,the major obstacles were logisticaland bureaucratic headaches,magnified by an absence ofpolitical will to proceed with thePTT,particularly evident in officials ofthe governments implementing agencies.Whilethe PTT was eventually brought to virtual completion,questions remain about its sustain-ability,in part as a result ofthe failure to provide land,credit,and technical assistancesimultaneously.Over the long term,the gradual diminution ofthe importance oftheagricultural sector to El Salvadors economy,compounded by the lack ofa clear agrarianpolicy in the years since the wars end,and the difficulty oftaking up hardscrabble subsis-nce farming by those who have only military training,also raise concerns.Institutional Reformhile verification ofinstitutional reform constituted a central axis ofthe United Nationsesponsibilities under the peace accords,its direct contribution to institution-building was more limited until the latter stages ofONUSALs mandate,after 1994.This was thecase for a number ofreasons,some unavoidable.They included fluctuations in access toand influence on the formation ofthe PNC;the fact that Supreme Court opposition tothe thrust ofreform contained in peace accords drastically limited ONUSALs ability toact;the slow formation ofthe office ofthe ombudsman for human rights;and the reluc-tance ofthe first ombudsman to work with ONUSAL.The problems encountered in the consolidation ofthe National Civil Police wereindicative offundamental difficulties that the United Nations is likely to encounter inThe UNs Role in El Salvador h 1993 with the fervent hopeŽthat it would be an adequate starting point fornational reconciliation and the desired reunification ofnational society.ŽBut while aumber ofits concrete recommendations relating to institutional and legislative change eventually complied with,the governments immediate guarded,even hostile,re-sponse to the report,its promotion ofa sweeping amnesty,and its subsequent failure toact on recommendations aimed at promoting reconciliation among Salvadorans,repre-sent a loss to Salvadoran society as a whole.A number ofspecific lessons for peace-building may be extracted from the UNs experi-ence in El Salvador.ace-building is a long haul.UN engagement in El Salvador through negotiations,a major multifunctional peacekeeping operation mandated by the Security Council,smaller political missions mandated by the General Assembly,and then close liaisonthrough UNDP provides a successful example ofthe merits ofstaying the course.Žit is in obvious contrast with Cambodia,where it can be argued that a pricewas paid for the UNs precipitous departure after the 1993 elections.Planning for peace-building should begin early,during negotiations when this ispossible.The phrase post-conflict peace-buildingŽcan be deceptive,in giving rise tothe impression that post-conflict peace-building follows peacekeeping,causally andmporally,as peacekeeping itselffollows peacemaking.Rather it should be presentin some form throughout.ost-conflict peace-building ofthis kind is essentiallya political activity,intended toprevent the recurrence ofconflict.The strong political leadership given to ONUSALll illustrates the difference that can be made by the personal abilities ofthe specialpresentative ofthe secretary-general when the United Nations is involved.gotiators need to consult with those who will be involved in financing the agree-ments that may be reached.How will implementation be paid for? Will broadereconomic policy support the peace process as a whole? Not a small consideration ishow much easier it will be to line up multilateral and bilateral actors before anagreement is signed„afterwards,once the pressure to bring hostilities to an end isoff,it becomes much harder to collect.(Guatemala provides a successful example inthis regard.)ordination is vital at all stages ofthe process,whether within the UN system orith appropriate regional and other organizations.Efforts made within the Unitedtions,for example in the design ofmissions in Kosovo and East Timor,areindicative ofthe importance now given this aspect ofpeace-building.The UNs Role in El Salvador El Salvador and ColombiaLessons of the Peace Process his paper focuses on the implications ofthe peace process in El Salvador for theone currently underway in Colombia.It also considers the nature ofthe politicaldebates in the United States over the wars in Colombia and El Salvador,highlight-ing similarities as well as key differences.As the United States is significantly increasing itsfinancial commitment to Colombia,the ability to positively influence the peace processwhile pursuing other U.S.objectives will depend on a close reading ofthe lessons ofpeace processes elsewhere in the hemisphere.olombia and El Salvador differ more than they resemble one another,in terms ofthesize oftheir territories and populations;the nature and roots ofthe insurgencies;theumber ofactors involved in overlapping forms ofpolitical,social,and criminal violence;the proportion ofpolitical violence relative to violence overall;the sources offinancing forthe military activities ofboth guerrillas and paramilitary groups;the size oftheireconomies and national budgets relative to all forms ofexternal assistance;and the depthofdivisions and conflicts within and among the guerrilla movements themselves.otwithstanding the complexity and particularity ofthe Colombian situation,however,the Salvadoran experience contains useful precedents and constructs that have enrichedthe field ofconflict resolution.TheHurting StalemateOne important lesson ofthe Salvadoran negotiations has to do with the relationshipbetween battlefield stalemate and the successful outcome ofpeace talks.Conflict resolu-tion theory has long held that a mutually hurting stalemate,Ždefined as a condition ofutually blocking vetoesŽin which military escalation provides no hope ofa satisfactoryoutcome,generates the most propitious moment for a negotiated settlement.tary outcome ofthe FMLNs 1989 offensive,in which the guerrillas moved into the capitalofSan Salvador with massive numbers oftroops,was seen as the expression par excellenceofstalemate:the guerrillas could not produce a popular uprising sufficient to seize power,nor could the government,despite a decade ofeffort and billions ofU.S.dollars,defeat theinsurgency.The Salvadoran negotiations thus took place almost in laboratory condi-tions,Žin the words ofUnited Nations negotiator Alvaro de Soto,the product ofcondi-tions internal to El Salvador as well as a favorable international climate at the end oftheold War.hat is often overlooked in the Salvadoran case,however,is the relationship betweenthe so-called objective conditionsŽofthe battlefield and the subjective,human elementsofperception and choice.Conflict resolution theory has captured this distinction,moving ynthia J. r the logic ofmilitary balance to produce positive results,the role ofperceptions andnot just objective conditionsŽmust be kept in the forefront ofpolicy planning.Incentivesust accompany force,in order to influence minds and not just thresholds ofpain.Thegoal should be to contribute to a process by which the insurgent movement begins to con-e ofa future without war,and sees the prospect ofrealizing its agenda at the peacetable rather than through combat.This evolutionary process almost certainly would beuncated by policies aimed at strengthening government capacity alone.hat might this effort look like? One aspect would include fostering dialogue betweenthe politically isolated and insular guerrilla leadership and representatives ofvariousoups in Colombian civil society,along the lines ofthe process fostered by the Norwe-ian government between the Guatemalan rebel group URNG and representatives oftheuatemalan church,private sector,labor,and academic groups.Indeed,the process ofengaging the guerrillas politically took major steps forward in early 2000,when a jointC-government delegation visited several European capitals in February,and a num-ber ofColombias most prominent business leaders visited the demilitarized zone the fol-lowing month.Another possibility is to encourage guerrilla participation,alongside thegovernment and non-governmental organizations,in development projects or pilot drugeradication programs.Such engagement would not only test the guerrillasstated interestin ending their involvement in the drug trade,it would minimize the possibility that state-launched development projects throughout rural areas would become,as they did in ElSalvador,targets ofguerrilla military attack.Additionally,the United States governmentshould consider weathering the domestic political fallout ofrenewing direct contact withthe guerrilla leadership,ifthe Colombian government should again request it.Ultimately,however,and in contrast to El Salvador,what the Colombian guerrillas seekat the bargaining table is the ability to negotiate aspects ofa socio-economic agenda thathave proven so elusive in other peace settlements in the hemisphere.The peace accord inEl Salvador gave priority to political and security force reform,given the history ofpoliti-cal exclusion and human rights violations by the government security apparatus,as wellas the governments refusal to consider socio-economic issues.However,in Colombia,the created a political party in the mid-1980s„the Unión Patriótica,or Patrioticnion„that was subsequently decimated by political assassination.Similarly,Colombiaspolitical system underwent significant political reform as a result ofthe drafting ofa newnstitution in 1991.Demobilized guerrilla groups played a significant role in thatprocess.Given this background,there is an insistence by the guerrillas,and a recognition byprominent Colombian academics and policymakers (including several former peace ad-isers),that the current peace process must go beyond prior formulas ofdisarmament,demobilization,and reincorporation and deal instead with the root causes ofconflict.forms in Colombia must be deep and novel enough to warrant the risk oflaying downeapons.As Cynthia McClintock and others have argued,post…Cold War insurgencies inLatin America obey a different logic than their Cold War predecessors,enduring anding despite periods ofpolitical opening and giving priority to structural economic is-what is at stake in Colombia is not only the reform ofstate institutions and stateEl Salvador and Colombia ll ofthe contending parties.Whether that will exists or can be constructed is yet to beseen in Colombia.he Nature of the Debate addition to the parallels concerning peace processes,there are also similarities betweenthe debates in the United States over El Salvador and Colombia policies.One is that bothEl Salvador and Colombia have been deemed vital,in some important way,to U.S.national interests.In El Salvador from 1979 onward,the issue was to prevent a leftist guer-lla victory and defeat communism,and external actors„the Soviet Union,Cuba,andicaragua„were seen as playing decisive roles in guerrilla insurrection..S.interests in Colombia have for at least a decade been overwhelmingly framed inms ofcounter-narcotics,given Colombias central role in narcotics production andafficking.nlike in El Salvador,where many liberals and moderates questionedwhether issues ofvital national security were actually at stake,most Americans„and a bi-partisan majority in Congress„see drugs as a threat to American society and source re-duction as an important strategy to confront it.The role ofColombian guerrillas,principally the FARC,in protecting coca producers and drug-producing installations hasblossomed,yielding millions ofdollars in profits for the insurgents,and the vast expan-sions ofcoca production in southern Colombia have occurred precisely where the guerril-las control major swaths ofterritory.Thus,even ifnarco-guerrillasŽdo not represent thefull panoply ofactors in the drug trade,they constitute a highly salient threat in terms ofdomestic U.S.politics,combining historical fears ofthe Cold War with the post-Cold Waragenda regarding new hemispheric security challenges.There are several difficulties,however,with the sort ofpolicy that evolves from a threatscenario.One is the tendency toward reductionism,where certain goals have supremacyer others.In El Salvador,for example,human rights improvements were viewed strate-ically in terms oftheir place in winning in the war.In many cases,however,the UnitedStates did not have sufficient influence to prevent rightist officers known for their brutal-ity or death squad connections from achieving positions ofprominence in the Salvadoranarmed forces.At other times,the United States actively chose not to exercise the influenceit did have,when human rights considerations interfered with the prosecution ofthe waror other U.S.policy goals.U.S.documents declassified in the wake ofthe report oftheuth Commission in El Salvador establish unequivocally that the United States knew ex-actly with whom it was dealing in the Salvadoran officer corps,and persisted with thoselationships in the pursuit ofoverarching strategic goals. Colombia as in El Salvador,the political imperative to confront the central threat ofdrugs risks displacing a more complex,and thereby less politically appealing,analysis ofthe multiple ills besetting Colombian democracy:paramilitarism,human rights abuse,uption,economic decline,institutional decay.The U.S.State Department has advo-cated a multi-faceted approach to Colombia,emphasizing the inter-relatedness ofanti-drug efforts,the peace process,human rights reform,and democratic governance.only belatedly seized the policy initiative,which for several years remained largely withpublicans on Capitol Hill,and with the Office ofNational Drug Control Policy(ONDCP) and the U.S.Southern Command within the administration.All have increas-El Salvador and Colombia SevenAssessing the Results of the Peace Processndoubtedly,the implementation ofthe El Salvador peace accords brought the12-year war to an end and inaugurated the countrys transition to peace.Thepeace-building experience ofEl Salvador is noteworthy in a number ofkeyaspects,argued participants at the December 1999 U.S.Institute ofPeace conference onthe subject.First,the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) wasthe first UN peace-building mission to have a special focus on human rights in its man-date,and soon included responsibility for verifying all aspects ofthe cease-fire and demo-bilization offorces under the peace agreements;responsibility for monitoring publicorder during the transitional period while a new National Civil Police was established;and,at the request ofthe Salvadoran government,responsibility for observing thenational elections held in March and April 1994.Second,among the more recent UN peace-building operations,the Salvadoran peaceprocess is regarded as one ofthe more successful.In this sense,conference participanth Neir noted that the Salvadoran experience was particularly significant in the for-mation ofthe Latin American human rights movement and the operation ofhumanhts organizations worldwide. ofthe conference participants expressed the view that the overall terms ofthepeace settlement were essentially sound.The UN-monitored cease-fire was seen as crucial the demobilization offorces by both sides and the consolidation ofthe peace process.The settlement included provisions not only for free and fair elections,but also for far-eaching reforms ofthe judiciary and security institutions.Several key elements ofthe ac-ds led to a fundamental change in the civil-military relationship.nference participants acknowledged that the accords contributed to real changes inEl Salvadors human rights regime and the retreat ofthe military from national politics.ilian controls over the military and security apparatus ofthe state were also strength-ened.Electoral reforms derived from the peace process have helped bolster democracyand achieve greater levels ofpolitical pluralism in El Salvador.There were serious efforts atpolice reform with the disbanding ofthe existing National Police and other security forcesand the establishment ofa new National Civil Police force.The Truth Commissions pub-lic naming ofthose guilty ofhuman rights abuses contributed to the purge oftop levels ofthe military.nference participants also noted difficulties with the various judicial,hu-man rights,electoral,military,and police reforms initiated by the accords.They offeredtheir recommendations to advance the reforms or to meet challenges either partially en OslerHampson iding adequate funding for the attorney-generals office as well as the office ofthe public defender;Ensuring that the office ofthe National Counsel for the Defense ofHuman Rights,which has a broad mandate to oversee the countrys human rights situation and thenduct ofstate institutions,is properly staffed and led by an individual who hascredibility and a national profile;Encouraging El Salvadors courts to rely on the jurisprudence ofthe Inter-erican Court and Commission on Human Rights,which establishes that a statecannot use amnesty laws that abrogate its obligation to investigate and punish thoseguilty ofserious human rights abuses;andStrengthening civil society and community-based organizations while also forgingalitions between groups that are working for human rights and judicial reform.he Role of the Armed Forces and National Civil PoliceThe retreat ofthe Salvadoran armed forces from politics was one ofthe major achieve-ments ofthe accords;however,conference participants considered that subsequent re-forms failed to adequately address several important areas in which the military retainedpolitical influence.Although the army was downsized and its constitutional role confined national defense,there continue to be concerns about civilian control over the military,ansparency,and accountability.mmentators noted that corruption and what Gino Costa calls the subordination ofduty to the need for profitŽhad become one ofthe chiefproblems ofpublic security dur-ing the war,affecting not only the efficiency but also the conduct ofEl Salvadors securityforces.In post-war El Salvador,many security officials have sought to preserve their privi-leges and prerogatives,turning to criminal elements,and,in the process,undermining theintegrity and ability ofthe public security sector to fight common and organized crime.The new National Civil Police (PNC),now under the Ministry ofPublic Security,re-placed the three previously existing security forces.It has been,however,challenged by theing number ofmurders and assaults and a resurgence ofillegally armed groups.Some participants argued that rising violence and criminality pose a real risk to demo-cratic consolidation in El Salvador.The overall effectiveness ofthe PNC has been hindered a number ofproblems.Delays in creating the PNCs Investigations Division havethwarted the creation ofa new,professional investigative body.The incorporation ofper-sonnel from the former and much-criticized body,the Commission to Investigate Crimi-nal Acts (CIDH),was done without the kind oftraining and vetting mandated by thePNC law.Many ofthe PNCs own officers have been killed in the line ofduty,which hashad an adverse impact on morale and police force capabilities.The PNC continues to suf-fer from lack ofresources,basic equipment,and proper training programs for its person-nel.Many ofthese problems are attributable to a lack ofinternational donor support forthe reform ofthe public security sector. The existence ofillegal armed groups pose a continuing threat to democracy.The process ofreconciliation between El Salvadors two major political parties,ARENA and FMLN,has not been accompanied by a similar process at broader lev-els ofcivil society,giving rise to the possibility ofa resurgence ofdemands for justicefor past human rights violations. is widely recognized that the United Nations played a critical role in the various phasesofthe peace process.Once the settlement was reached,as noted by Teresa Whitfield,theUNs role in the peace process became even more important.Although the UN wasinstrumental in ensuring that the peace process stayed on track,difficulties and problemshampered it.While the reintegration ofthe FMLN was successful,arrangements for trans-ferring land to former combatants ofboth sides,and for legalizing wartime occupationsofland,were delayed by the governments continuing opposition to the transfer condi-tions.There was poor coordination among donors and little UN attention to financing issues associated with implementation ofthe accords.These problems were accentuated lack ofconsultation between the negotiators and those responsible for implementationith the Bretton Woods institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and therld Bank.Insufficient funding ofthe implementation ofthe accords and the absence ofan overall economic strategy for development weakened the peace process.ong the various lessons and recommendations that came out ofthe discussion ofthe UN role in El Salvador were the following:ace-building is a long-term process that requires a great deal ofcommitment.There is a real need for early and continuous consultation with international finan-cial agencies and donors during the negotiation ofany peace settlement.The United Nations role within any peace negotiation is set by the unique dynam-ics ofeach agreement so that the framework ofthe accords will determine the levelofUN activism.The United Nations cannot dictate the role ofcivil society in the peace process.Although civil society groups are critical to the peace process,they must establishtheir own roles,as outside intervention is not viewed as legitimate.UN leverage over the actors in any peace process is a declining resource once thesettlement is signed and ratified by the parties.The United Nations and other inter-national actors will have a waning influence over outcomes as the actors becomemore independent and democracy is strengthened. State Departments Bureau ofWestern Hemisphere Affairs,offered the following moregeneral lessons about U.S.policies in El Salvador and the relationship between democracyand peace-building.The United States should never disengage its national interests from its democraticvalues.When democracy is threatened in any society,the U.S.should help defendthe democratic center from hostile forces on the right and the left.The experience in El Salvador demonstrates the need to internationalize the peaceprocess by helping to build the appropriate infrastructures for peace and bringingall ofthe relevant parties into the peace process.The mobilization ofcivil society is critical for any peace process and is necessary forall phases ofthe peace process,including the negotiation and implementation phas-es ofa political settlement.Although the lack ofcertainty regarding implementation details in a peace settle-ment may foster ambiguous outcomes,there is also a real risk that ifthe endgame isdefined too early in the negotiations,key actors will never be brought to the table.ong the more general conclusions to emerge at the end ofthe conference were these:A peace settlement is an obsolescing bargain.As soon as it goes into effect,the par-ties will gradually take over the process ofimplementation.adership and political will are critical to the successful implementation ofany set-tlement,and civil society has an important oversight role in the formulation ofsub-The peace process in any setting demands a principled defense ofdemocracy andquires risk takers at all levels:the national,the subnational or community level,and the international.n years later,the peace process in El Salvador demonstrates some ofthe strengths andlimitations ofa negotiated settlement and peace process.On the one hand,the settlementand the peace process brought about real change in the overall human rights climate ofaountry that had been wracked by a brutal civil war.It also created real political opportu-nities for the country to move forward.On the other hand,it is undeniable that some ele-ments ofthe peace process could have been approached differently,particularly to deepenand accelerate the pace ofpolitical,judicial,economic,and security reforms.But the reallesson is that a negotiated settlement is indeed possible ifthere is sufficient commitment a peace process,not only by outside third parties,but also„and more crucially„by thedirectly concerned parties themselves,who must not allow their commitment to wane inthe months and years that follow. Salvadoran authorities that this was actually a common crime,Ž not subject to amnesty. In the military terror. President Pastrana has dismissed four generals that participated or acquiesced in About the Contributors ITLESINTHEEACEWORKS