PPT-Truthful Mechanism for Facility Allocation:

A Characterization and Improvement of Approximation Ratio Pinyan Lu MSR Asia Yajun Wang MSR Asia Yuan Zhou Carnegie Mellon University. Dynamic Fair Division of Multiple Resources . Ian Kash. 1. Ariel Procaccia. 2. Nisarg. Shah. 2. (Speaker). 1. MSR Cambridge. 2. Carnegie Mellon University. Allocation of Multiple Resources Without Money. Lecture 3: Myerson’s Lemma. Yang. . Cai. Sep 10,. . 2014. An overview of . today’s class. Case Study: Sponsored Search Auction. Myerson’s Lemma. Back to Sponsored Search Auction. Case. . Study:. of Manipulability. Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm. Carnegie Mellon University. Computer Science Department. The revelation principle. Foundational result of mechanism design. Equivalence of . manipulable. Realtime. D2D Streaming Networks: A Mean Field Game Perspective. Jian Li. Texas A&M University. April 30. th. , 2015. Jointly with R. Bhattacharyya, S. Paul, S. . Shakkottai. and V. Subramanian. Differential Privacy. Eric Shou. Stat/CSE 598B. What is Game Theory?. Game theory. is a branch of applied mathematics that is often used in the context of . economics.. S. tudies . strategic interactions between agents. . Safeguard Mechanism. Consultation Paper. March 2015. The ERF has three key elements:. 2. Consultation . Emissions Reduction Fund Green Paper. Dec 2013. Emissions. Reduction. Fund White. Paper. Apr 2014. Jason Hartline. Northwestern University. Brendan Lucier. University of Toronto. A central authority wishes to provide service to a group of rational agents.. Each agent has a . private. value for service. . Origin to recent development. Minming Li. City University of Hong Kong. 1. Algorithmic Mechanism Design. A mechanism . M. chooses a social outcome to maximize an objective regarding the information reported by agents;. of Manipulability. Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm. Carnegie Mellon University. Computer Science Department. The revelation principle. Foundational result of mechanism design. Equivalence of . manipulable. Vasilis Syrgkanis. Microsoft Research, New England. Points of interaction. Mechanism design and analysis for learning agents. Online learning as behavioral model in auctions. Learning good mechanisms from data. Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm. Carnegie Mellon University. Computer Science Department. The revelation principle. Foundational result of mechanism design. Equivalence of . manipulable. & truthful mechanisms. Being truthful. We live in a time when lying is seems to be the norm.. It happens so often that we just expect people to lie to us.. These lies range from the “little white lies” to the “Big Whoppers”. Game theory . to analyze strategic behavior:. Given a strategic environment (a “game”), and an assumption about like behavior (e.g. Nash Equilibrium), we can predict what will happen.. Mechanism design . . A Characterization and Improvement of Approximation Ratio. Pinyan. Lu, MSR Asia. Yajun. Wang, MSR Asia. Yuan Zhou. , Carnegie Mellon University.