Innovation Standards and IPRs Brussels 17 December 2019 In cooperation with Co opetition in 5G Markets DEEPIN Policy Research Antonio Manganelli Managing Director DEEPIN Type ID: 814765
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Slide1
Co-opetition in 5G Markets
Innovation, Standards and IPRs
Brussels
, 17
December
2019
In cooperation with
Slide2Co-opetition in 5G Markets
DEEP-IN Policy Research
Antonio Manganelli
Managing
Director DEEP-IN
Slide3Type
of
competition
SBC
Competition
limited to services
at
downstream
level
Gradual
investments and
infrastructuring
for a more intense downstream
competition
LADDER OF INVESTMENTS
Vertical
structure
of companies
FBC
AI
VULA –
SLU - ULL
BITSTREAM
WLR
Integration
Separation
A COMPLEX ECOSYSTEM
Slide4WHOLESALE ONLY
Type
of
competition
SBC
Upstream
Competition
Gradual investments and
infrastructuring
for a more intense downstream competition
LADDER OF INVESTMENTS
Vertical
structure
of competitors
FBC
Integration
Separation
AI
VULA –
SLU - ULL
BITSTREAM
WLR
CO-INVESTMENTS
Competition
limited to services
at
downstream
level
5G
A COMPLEX ECOSYSTEM
COOPERATION
Type
of
COMPETITION
Slide5Co-
opetition
WHERE SHOULD WE GO
Type
of
COMPETITION
COOPERATION
5G
Slide6Light-handed regulation for the definition of boundaries for competition and cooperation
HarmonisationSpectrum and Infrastructure SharingCo-investments Club useInteroperability
Open Standardisation and effective governancePatents balanced licensing
environments
Co-
opetition
WHERE SHOULD WE GO
Type
of
COMPETITION
COOPERATION
5G
Slide7SDOs AND SEPs IN THE 5G ECOSYSTEM
LICENSING LEVEL, Device level v component level :
under a theoretical economic perspective the value of the investment to be recovered, as reflected in the FRAND price levels to be paid, is independent on the specific level of the license.
PRICING LEVEL:
In the context of the cooperative process of standard-setting, a core problem is deciding the “right” distribution of rewards among innovators, and between innovators and implementers The large majority of SDOs have chosen to adopt some form of FRAND licensing which are naturally affected by “contractual incompleteness” and high intensity of litigation
TRANSFER OF COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS INTO SDOs AND SEPs:
strategic and opportunistic behaviours, hold-up vs hold-out
Slide8SDOs AND SEPs IN THE 5G ECOSYSTEM
SDOs GOVERNANCE
Problems afflicting SEP licensing stems from the lack of contractual or
organisational
solutions provided by SDOs which exacerbates the risk of strategic behaviors. By focusing the crucial position of SDOs, some policy recommendations can be put forward to curb the economic frictions affecting SEP licensing.
USE OF ANTITRUST LAW:
The schism between hold-up and reverse hold-up theories has fueled the debate about the antitrust relevance of FRAND commitments
there is no convincing reason for laying down an exceptional antitrust treatment for FRAND-encumbered patents. / GL on horizntal cooperation agreements
PATENT POOLS:
Patent pools have been viewed as a potential mechanism to create efficiencies by bringing together multiple patent owners with complementary technologies
Slide9Thanks!
a.manganelli@deep-in.network
Slide10Co-opetition in 5G Markets
Innovation, Standards and IPRs
Brussels
, 17
December
2019
In cooperation with
Slide11TODAY’S DISCUSSION
Morning Session:
Chair:
Sandro
Mendonça
– Board member, ANACOM /Professor of Economics
11.25
Co-opetition, innovation and standardization: 5G and IPRs
Maarit Palovirta
Director of Regulatory Affairs, ETNO
Emilio Davila Gonzalez
Head of Sector ICT Standardisation, European Commission
Rosario Baratta
Head of Competition Law, GSMA
Michael Meyer
Research Manager, Ericsson
Eurolab
, Ericsson
Wassim
Chourbaji
Senior Vice President, Government Affairs, Qualcomm
Slide12TODAY’S DISCUSSION
Afternoon Session
Chair:
Antonio Nicita
– Commissioner, AGCOM / Professor of Economic Policy
14.10
Competition and cooperation in the “new” ICT markets
Rita
Wezenbeek
Head of Unit Antitrust Telecoms – DG Competition, EU Commission
Jennifer Dixton
Special Counsel for Policy & Intellectual Property, Antitrust Division, U.S.
DoJ
14.50
Beyond Patent Hold-Up and Hold-out: antitrust, regulation or contracts?
Amaryllis Verhoeven
Chair of the EU Commission Expert Group on Licensing and Valuation of SEPs
Damien
Geradin
Professor of Competition Law & Economics, Tilburg University
George Padilla
Head of Compass Lexecon Europe Eric BrousseauScientific Director, Chair Gouvernance and Regulation, University Paris-Dauphine