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IL ITHOUT ONEY HE IGNIFICANCE OF ARTERED IL IN AND EYONDUSSIA An NCEEER Working Paper by Douglas Rogers Yale University National Council for Eurasianand East European ResearchUniversityof WashingtonBox 353650Seattle, WA 98195info@nceeer.orghttp://www.nceeer.org/ TITLE VIII PROGRAM Project Information Principal Investigator:Douglas RogersNCEEER Contract Number:Date:May 31, 2012Copyright InformationIndividual researchers retain the copyright on their work products derived from research funded through a contract or grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER). However, the NCEEER and the United States Government have the right to duplicate and disseminate, in written and electronic form, reports submitted to NCEEER to fulfill Contract or Grant Agreements either (a) for NCEEER’s own internal use, or (b) for use by the United States Government, and as follows: (1) for further dissemination to domestic, international, and foreign governments, entities and/or individuals to serve official United States Government purposes or (2) for dissemination in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act or other law or policy of the United States Government granting the public access to documents held by the United States Government. Neither NCEEER nor the United States Government nor any recipient of this Report may use it for commercial sale. The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (The SovietEast European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretations contained herein are those of the author Executive SummaryThisworkingpaperusesdatagatheredthecourseof NCEEERfunded researchthePermRegionof Russiaoutlinesomenewwaysof thinkingaboutthe exchangeandcirculationof oil.Nearlyallexistingstudies,whethertheauthor’shome disciplineof anthropologyor inneighboringsocialsciences,placeprimaryemphasison thenexusof oilandmoney.Theyconsideroilwealth,petrodollars,federalbudget allocations,oilandbanking,systemsof taxation,wayswhichmoneyenables abstractionandgeneralization,moneystateforms,andso on. However,thecaseof SovietandpostSovietoilpointsthesignificanceof barterthecirculationof oil, both inlocalcontextsandglobalscale.Theworkingpaperpointswayswhich ethnographicandhistoricalonsiderationof petrobartershouldexpandour knowledgethepoliticaleconomyof oil,especiallyby drawingattentionwayswhichvarietyof groups, atvarietyof scales,haveusedbarterframeandpursuechallengesthe nationalandinternationalsystemsthatchanneltheflowof oilandassociatedpoliticaland economicpower. �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;Introduction“Oilalmostlikemoney.”Thesearetheoftcitedwords of RobertO. Anderson, anARCO oilexecutive,as interviewedby DanielYerginhisTheize(1993:xv). Theyseemlikeso muchcommonsense.allknow somethingaboutpetrodollars. AtleasttheautomobileobsessedUnitedStates,no othercommoditypricediscussed asmuchthepriceof gasoline,or advertisedso commonlandprominentlyalongthe sideof theroad.Talkof oilandmoney’stightembraceof maylookbitdifferent elsewheretheworld,usuallytoohardfind.When,for instance,I was viewingapartmentfor rentthePermRegionof Russia,prospectivelandlady, who knewnothingof myresearchinterests,wentthroughallof thenotablefeaturesof the apartmentandconcludedby turningon thetelevision.“Itworks wellandhaslotsof channels,”shesaid.Flippingnewschannelwithcrawlthebottomof thescreen, shecontinued,“Look,you’llablefindthepriceof oilanyof thedayor night.”Money,goesalmostwithoutsaying,playscentralroleeconomists’and manypoliticalscientists’writingsoilandenergywhetheror nottheyareadherents tothe“resourcecurse”familyof approaches.perhapslesscommonlynotedthat moneyalsofeaturesprominently,ratherdifferently,anthropologists’and geographers’writingson petrostates,fromNigeriaVenezuelaSaudiArabiaand beyond.AndrewApter’sanalysisof oilNigeria,for instance,restssubstantial parton theclaimthatoil“standard[ized]therelativevaluestermsof whichother commoditieswereboughtandsoldandapproach[ed]thegeneralequivalentof moneyitself”(2005:35). In hiswonderfulTheMagicalStateaboutVenezuela, FernandoCoronilshows that,“circulatingthroughthebody politicmoney,oilceased toidentifiedmaterialsubstanceandbecamesynonymfor money… Justoil �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;cameseenabstractlymoney,thestatebecamegeneralrepresentativeof a politicalcommunityof sharedownershipof thenation’snaturalbody”(1997:390). As MichaelWattsputssuccinctlysomeof hiswork on Nigeria(1994), thehere areabstractionandgeneralization.Moneyenablescertainsocialandpoliticalimaginaries throughcapacitymakeunlikeitemsexchangeable;doesso, itservesboth integrativeanddisintegrativefunctions.Thisfamiliarprocess,allof thesetheoristsclaim inwayor another,takeson particularshapes,speeds,andprofilesthedelugeof moneythatcommonlyattendsoilboom.Followingthesescholars,mightsaythat moneykeylinkby whichparticularkindof globaloilregimeinterlacedwitha globalculturalregime.TheglobalenergyregimewhatWattscallsthe“oilcomplex” (2005) inlatetwentiethcenturyconfiguration;theglobalculturalregime,leastin theseexamples,particularkindof postcoloniality,whichrapidlycirculating petrodollarsfosterandtroublerangeof socialandculturalimaginariesmodernizing,nationalizing,developmentalist,statist,PanAfricanist,andso on.Thispowerfulandpersuasivelineof analysis,andI, too,wantfocuson the wayswhichexchangeandcirculationareaspectsof theglobaloilcomplexthatdeserve our attention.But,indicates,I alsowantdrawattentionrangeof relationshipsthatareleftthisstandardpicture,relationshipswhichthemonetizedexchangeof oilalsointerlacedwithsocial,cultural,andpoliticalimaginaries.In ordermakethisargument,I focuson theproductionandcirculationof oilpostsocialistRussia.A shiftethnographiccontextfrompostcolonialNigeriaand Venezuelatheaftermathof Sovietsocialism,antsuggest,opensus somenew waysgaintheoreticalpurchaseon theplaceof oilfarbeyondtheRussiancase. Althoughfocustodayon onlyoneof thesewayspetrobarterthisworkingpaperpartof alargerprojectthattheorizesRussiapostsocialistpetrostateand,on that basis,seeks �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;extendwholerangeof existingunderstandingsof oilandculture,so manyof whichhailfromtheEuropeanpostcolonialworldandtranslatepoorlythepostsocialistcontext(seealsoRogers2012). Theclaimof thislargerprojectthatSoviet andpostSovietoilofferopportunityjustaddanothercaseour hopper,to rethinkwholerangeof assumptionsandtheoriesaboutthemutualtransformationsoil,culture,andpowerthetwentiethandtwentyfirstcenturies.Theargumentof thispaperfollows:themonetizedexchangeof oiland oilproductsfarmorecommonthanwouldexpect,giventhefocuson oilmoney inexistingscholarshipandthepopularimagination.ThePermRegionof postsocialistRussiaprovidessomeparticularlyinstructiveexamplesof thisphenomenon, butpetrobarterneitherlimitedRussianor tothecrisisyearsof the1990s. Tobarter oil,I willultimatelyuggest,hasbeen,varioustimesandplaces:consciouslyavoid moneyandparticularize(ratherthanusethemoneyformwayabstractand generalize);fosterpoliticalimaginationsthatemphasizelocalsovereigntyandfeed localizedidentities;skirtor evenchallengeaspectsof theinternationalpetrodollar system;andthreatenparticularColdWareraconfigurationof stateandprivate corporationstheoilsector.In eachof thesecases,seetheentwiningof oiland culturenewwaysthroughthelensof petrobarter. BarterI understandbarterindicateclassof transactionswhichgoods are exchangedfor goods, withoutthedirectinterventionof monetarycurrency.FollowinganthropologistsCarolineHumphreyandStephenHughJones(1992;seealsoHumphrey1985), I preferseebarterpolytheticcategory,thatencompassesnumberof kindsof transactionsthatareneithergifts �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;nor primarilyorganizedby money:direct exchangeof goods for goods (on asingleoccasionor on multipleoccasions);offsettrade; countertrade;currencyclearingagreements;andothers.Allof thesevarietiesof exchange countfor meas typesof barter.Theyhave,historically,beenquitecommontheglobal economtheoilindustryparticular,significantportionof barterhasinvolvedthe SovietUnionand,then,Russia.Twoadditionalpointshereindicatethewaydrawingon anthropologists’richtraditionof thinkingaboutbarter.Firsandhereclassicpointof differencebetweenanthropologistsand economists:barterbestunderstoodtheprecursormonetizedexchange,a “problem”(usuallylabeledthe“doublecoincidenceof wants”)thatonlyexistsbefore,on theedgesof, or atperiodsof crisisthe“natural”moneyeconomy.Thissimplynot whatthehistoricalandcomparativeethnographicrecordteachesus (see,mostrecently, Graeber2011, andalsoHumphrey1985). Althoughbarteroftenfound inthesecases,alsofound aselementof exchangerelationshipsevencontextsthatareotherwise highlymonetized.Nor isbarteronlysmallscaleandsituational.anddoes,show below,extendfromquitelocalizedexchangesthenationalandinternational scale.Second,barterusefultopicfor investigationpartbecausetellus agreatdealaboutthesocialandpoliticalimaginationparticulartimesandplaces.Howdo objectscirculate?Whoexchangesthem?Withwhatkindsof commentary?Allof these questionspointwayswhichpersonsandcommunitiesareshapedand reshapedoftenenoughby markingdistinctionsanddifferencesbetweenbarterandthe moneyeconomy.Barterdoesactuallyhavetakingplacefor us toaskthese questions.Bartertheoreticallyfruitfulterrain,thatis,partbecausethewayswhich itrecalledandpredicted,dismissedor embraced, Therelarge,recentlyignored,literatureinternationalbarter;see,for instance, Hammond1990. Noteparticularhisclaim,“Amongcountertraderstheremaxim thattherecountertradeoil,andthenthereeverythingelse”(129). �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;championedor fearedcanvery significantthepolitical,social,andculturalimagination(see,e.g.Piot1992 andmany of thechaptersHumphreyandHughJones1992).Theremainderof thispaperdescribesandanalyzesfivesituationswhich petrobarterhasbeensignificantandproduceddifferentkindsof politicalimaginations thanthosefindthestandardscholarlytreatmentsof oilandmoneybothRussia andelsewhere.In thecontextof thisshortworkingpaper,I do notelaborateon allof theexamplesthesameextent;aimsimplyshow inquiteinitialwaythe breadthof contextswhichthinkingaboutmonetizedexchangeusefulfor our understandingsof oiltheglobaleconomy.NonapitalistOnereasonthattheoilmoneynexusso powerfulbothscholarshipandthe popularimaginationthattheoilindustryhasbeen,largely,capitalistindustry.Indeed, intheviewof someobservers,hasbeentheessentialcapitalistindustryfor wellovera centurynow. Butwhatof Sovietoil?Surelymustaccountbettewaysthando now for thefactthat,for muchof thetwentiethcentury,of theworld’slargestoil producersandexporterstheSovietUnionwasdecidedlynotcapitalist.And so myfirstcaseof petrobartercomesfromthepoliticaleconomyof socialism,specificallythePermRegionof theRussianUrals. Followingthediscoveryof oilthepostwarperiod,thePermRegionbecame known intheSovietUnionthe“secondBaku.”Sovietleadershiphopedthatthemajor newoilfieldsof theVolgaUralsbasinwouldreplacethegeopoliticallymorevulnerable andalreadyagingdepositsof Azerbaijan,whichhadbeenactivelyproductionsincethe imperialperiod.PermianoilwasthusthefirsttrulySovietoilexploration,drilling, production,refining,anddistributiontookplaceentirelywithinthesocialistmodeof production.Therewasno conceptof a“vertically �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;integrated”oilcompanythesocialist system.Entirelyseparatefederallevelministries,for instance,controlledproductionand refining.Themovementof oilfromupstreamdownstreamwassubject,on theofficial level,thedictatesof centralplanningand,on thecrucialunofficiallevel,backdoor wheelinganddealingthesecondeconomy.In neithercaseerethesetransactionsand movementsmarketizedor monetized.Oilandderivativeswereoftenexchanged directly for allmannerof othergoods andservices,andtheseexchangesoccurredthe industryandfirmlevelwelltheindividuallevel.If you knewhow todrivethe SovietUnion,you knewhow tomakedealsiphongasof someoneelse’stank. (Mostoften,thattankbelongedor truckon stateor Communistpartybusiness.)certainlytruethattheSovietUnion’sederalbudgetwholereliedheavilyespeciallythelate1970s and1980s on thehardcurrencygainedfromsellingoilon theinternationalmarket(KotkinGaidar2007). However,thefamiliarpetrostate configurationwhichthismoneythenoursedthroughlocalcircuitsof exchange, shapingculturalpracticesApter,Coronil,andWatts,discussedabove),institutionalorganizationsKarl1997), andhierarchiesof classandprestigedidobtain.In the SovietUnibarterwasking,fromtheroadsidetheregionalpartycommittees orchestratingindustrialandagriculturalproduction. Therewas,short,longhistoryof petrobarterthePermRegion,extending backtheexplorationanddiscoveryphasethe1950s. Indeed,of thechallenges for thinkingaboutthenexusof oilandsocial/culturalrelationshipstheSovietperiodis conceptualizingtheserelationshipswithoutmoney.Thishistorycontinuedthe1990s, asproduction,refining,anddistributiontheregionweregraduallyunitedunderthe controlof Lukoil,postSovietRussia’slargestprivateoilcompany.Thisleadsmy secondandthirdexamples. �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;PostSovietBarterIn 1991, inthemultifacetedcrisisthataccompaniedtheendof theSovietUnion, shortagesthePermRegionquicklybecomeacute,withfrequentdelayssalary paymentsandrationingticketsof varioussortsservingplaceof money.Oneof the primeplayersallof thiswasthePermRegion’smajorrefinery,ermneftorgsintez (PNOS). Freedof thestricturesof centralplanning,proceedsfromthesaleof itsrefined oilabroadcouldnow comedirectlytherefinery,ratherthanbeingabsorbedintothe plannedeconomy.Occasionallytheseproceedscamehighlyvaluedmoneyform,but, justoften,theyweretheoriginpointfor extensivechainsof monetizedor lightlymonetizedbarter.Considertheaccountof IrinaIvanovna,residentof thePermRegionwho had,at thatpoint,no specialrelationshipPNOS or totheoilindustrygeneral.I wasaskingher,thespringof 2011, torecallthewayswhichtheoilindustrywasor wasnot centrallifethePermRegiontheimmediateaftermathof theSovietUnion.She beganwithbarter.wasallby bartertherewasno money.Therewereno products.So theChusovoimetalfactorytradedproductfor sugaror otherthings.And thanksthatsomesugarappearedtheregion[fromsourceotherthataterations].wasn’tonlytheChusovoimetalfactory,alsoPNOS. Yes, theyalsoworkedon barter,I thinkwiththeChinese.Theyimporteddown jackets,andwellmadeones.[PNOS employees]justwentdown tothemarket andsoldthemfor crazymoneytherewasnothingwear,nothingstores.… PNOS gotthosejacketsfor theirworkers,exchangefor oilproducts.It was outrightbarter,becausetherewasno money. Here,IrinaIvanovnagivesaccountof theearlydaysof thepostSovietperiod thatwillfamiliarscholarsof theregion,whichtheendof socialismbrought withmonetized �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;marketexchangesteadilyproliferatingbarterwhatDavid Woodruffcalls“thebarterof thebankrupt”(1999). In theprimarytheoriesof oiland money,thoseI amchallengingthispaper,moneyobtainedthroughforeignexchange reentersthenationaleconomyof anoilexportingstatelocalcurrencyand,throughits circulation,accomplishesvarioussortsof transformations.Thisdynamicwascentralto theearlypostSovietPermRegion,withimportanttwist:moneywascentralto manyof theexchanges,whichwereinsteadfrequentlybasedon bartertransactions.Thisdifference,I willargueshortly,significantbecausewasfoundationalthe developmentof aregionalpoliticalimaginationthepostSovietperiod,theforgingof asenseof culturalbelongingthePermRegionthatwas,keyways,outsideand opposedthecirculationof moneyandbased,instead,on themoreintimate,restricted, nonabstractedbarterexchangeswithintheregion.Beforemakingthatpointbitmore detail,letgivethirdexampleof petrobarter.MoneyTimberApplesMoneyAllof thisbartertheveryearlypostSovietperiodwas,accordingthe theoriesandpredictionsof transitologiststhosechampionsof neoliberalmarketswho setushercapitalismtheformerSovietworldsupposedgo awayquickly. Butdidnot.Themonetizedexchangeof allmannerof goods becamebroaderand deeperthe1990s PermRegion,andoilbecamemoreandmorecentralIndeed, oil’sdualimportancebringingcertainamountof foreignexchange(monetaryor not)andalsoenablingnearlyallindustrialandagriculturalproductiontheregionmeantthatquicklybecamecentralemergentnewcircuitsof tradeandexchangeat muchlargerscalesthanthatdescribedby IrinaIvanovna. �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;ThenormtheglobaloilindustryhasbeenverticallyintegratedcompaniessinceRockefeller’sStandardOil,thiswasreallythecasethePermRegionuntilthe2000s. In the1990s, horizontalintegrationpredominated,whichfinancialindustrial groups andothervarietiesof holdingcompaniesstretchedtheiractivitiesacrosssectors, oftentakingadvantageof theirhorizontalstructureminimizemonetizedtransactions and,instead,barterenormousrangeof goods andservicesamongandoutsidetheir constituentunits.In thePermRegion,themajorplayeron thisfrontwasthePFPG, thePermGroup of FinanciersandIndustrialistsoutfitthatmight,retrospect,understandas somethingof incubatorfor regionaloligarchs.ThePFPG, founded1993 andstillin operationtoday,containedwithinitselfnumberof subcompaniesspecializingin differentaspectsof theregionaleconomy.Twoof thebiggestwereNeftsintezmarketand theUniversalTradingHouse.Neftsintezmarkettookovermarketinganddistributionof oilproductsfromtherefineryPNOS, andUniversalTradingHousesuppliedstoresand marketsacrosstheregionwithallmannerof foodstuffsandconsumergoods.Thesheersizeof theseoperations,bothwithinPFPG, rapidlymadethemof interesttheregionalstateapparatus,whichwasattemptingcopewithpervasive complaintsandborderlineunrestarisingfromtheshortageof food andfuelacrossthe entireregion.In exchangefor afavorablerelationshipwiththestate,PFPG, through Neftsintezmarket,ookon theroleof officialgovernmentcontractorfor thepurchase, refining,anddistributionof oilfor regionalstateadministrationneedsmostnotably supportfor theagriculturalsector,wherethewithdrawalof statesubsidiesfromthe socialisterafeltparticularlyacutely.Thiswas anearlyandveryimportantchapterof themarriageof “petro”and“state”thePermRegion,andLukoilacrossRussiaand itwas rootedbarterespeciallyalongandamongthetentaclesof the �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;horizontally integratedPFPG.Intothe1990s,theextensivebarterchainsthatPFPG couldassemblethrough NeftsintezmarketandtheUniversalTradingHousebecamecrucialboththelegitimacy of thestateapparatusandthefunctioningof theregionaleconomy.Themanydifferent sectorswhichPFPG hadsignificantpresenceallowedgreatdealof internalflexibilityespeciallyerawhencompanyaccountingstandardswerethemselves undermassiverevision.In oneexchangerecountedseveraltimes,for instance, PFPG barteredoilproductsabroaddirectlyfor anentirebargeof processedsugar,which hadbeenseenthePermRegionfor nearlyyear.Theshipmentwasso highly valuedthat,ratherthanhirelaborers,theofficetaffof PFPG itselfunloadedthebarge underarmedguard.Oneof myinterlouctors,formeremployeeof thePFPG, gaveanotherexample of thekindsof barterexchangesthat,said,characterizedtheirwork:Therewerelotsof longchainsof exchange.So providedfueloilthe loggingenterprisessomewhereup north[inthePermRegion],and,roughly, got[uncut]timberfromthem.processedintopackagingtimberandsent itoff totheKrasnodarRegion[intheCaucasus].And theretook not moneyapples.broughttheappleshere,soldthem,andgotmoneyfor them.That’sthekindof operationdidthefifthor sixthlink. A Permnewspaper,lookingbackon theactivitiesof Neftsintezmarketthetime, wrotethatthePFPG subsidiaryorkedandcarrieddizzyingchainsof mutual exchangesandcredits,theresultof whichwereschemeswhichwasimpossibleto understand.Unlessyou participatedthem.”And thiswasthepointoilfacilitatedall mannerof inkind,situational,networkeddeals.In manyways,thecloserelationship betweentheregionalstateandtheoil �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;industry(alongwiththeformationof anewkindof regionalelite)thePermRegionsolidifiedrighthere,longbeforethefullmonetizationoil,theregularcollectionof taxesmoney,andlongbeforetheassemblyof aregionalverticallyintegratedcompanytookplaceby thelate1990s/early2000s.Interlude:TheSignificanceof BarterWiththreeexamplesof petrobarterhand,efulpauseandconsiderwhat whatlookingpetrobartergetsus inthecaseof thepostSovietPermRegion,andhow, moreprecisely,thisdepartsfromthetheoriesof oilandmoneywithwhichI began.offertworeflections,bothof whichsituatetheexamplesabovesomeof thebroader dynamicsof thepostSovietperiod.Thefirsthasdo withthepostSovietstate.If oilmoneyhasbeencentralthe institutionsandimaginationsof thepostcolonialpetrostate,thenthepostSovietcase, petrobarterwascentraltheunimaginingof thepostSovietfederalstatethe1990s PermRegion.Oilundergirdedallmannerof directexchangesthatexpresslyavoidedthe state’smoneyand,instead,circulatedalongwithallmannerof othergoods through specificallyregionalnetworksandbarterchains.Oilheredoesaidabstractionor dreamsof globalizationsupportslocalization,thefacefacenegotiationsof barter, andthebirthof anewregionalelite.Allwithalmostno money.everalstudieshave documentedtherapidproliferationof barterandalternatecurrenciestheimmediate aftermathof socialismandtheirlinksthe“parcelizationof sovereignty”(HumphreyVerdery1996) Regions,cities,andevencompaniesissuedtheirown currenciesto their“own”people,makingbasiceconomicactivitydependedcomparativelysmallscalepoliticalorganization.OnethingI haveshown heretheextent �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;whichthose processes,leastthePermRegionreliedcruciallycombinationof localand internationalpetrobarter.Emergentpoliticalandculturalforms,thatis,wereinterlaced withandhighlydependenton themonetizedcirculationof oil. seeanotherdimensionof thiswhenturnsecpoint,whichhasto do withpostsocialistmoney.As I notedtheoutset,investigationsof theoilmoney nexusplaceslikeNigeriaandVenezuelafocusheavilyon themagicalpropertiesof money,on, for instance,apparentabilitygrow andreproduceitselfwithno effort, andtracetheimportanceof thisprocessfor theformationof particularkindsof statesthemagicalstate,Coronil’sphrasing.Moneydid,of course,circulatethepostSovietperiod,behaviorwas,mostormersocialistcitizens,quiteodd. Thiswas awhentherelativeunimportanceof money(inthesocialisteconomy)shifted rapidlyof massivepyramidschemes,precipitousboutsof inflationand deflation,andwildcurrencyspeculation(see,e.g.,Verdery1996 on Romanianpyramid schemes).Theimportanceof barteredoilthePermRegionemergedgood partin contrastthispyramidschememoney.Barteredoilwas,manyways,theotherto wild,magical,unfamiliarmoney.Oil,derivatives,andthechainsof exchangesthey enteredwereconcrete,reliable,local,tangible,generalizablepreciselyin distinctiontheunpredictablenatureof moneythebanking,salary,andstreetcorner exchangesector.thetime,thebaroqueexchangesof oilindexedlocality,regional power,andtheabilitystandup againstinternationalandnationalcentersof powerby fleeingfromthe mostfungibleof currenciesmoneyintolocalregimesof valuethat hadsometangiblemateriality,someconnectionthePermRegion. Thiskindof localexchangeof oil,identificationof oilmaterialobject circulatingwithinthePermRegion,eventhathadspecificPermianqualities,had powerfulandlong �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;lastingeffects.Notably,informedcritiqueof themoneyandpower associatedwithMoscowbasedLukoil,whichbegantakeoverbidfor thePermRegion’soilfacilitiesthe1990s.WhenLukoildidfinallymanagewincontrolof the region’soilindustry,eminentlyclearallpartiesthattheywouldhaveattendto theregionalinterestsandcoalitionsthatgrewthroughpetrobarter.Thiswasthestartingpointfor whathasbecomemajor“corporatesocialresponsibility”programin thePermRegion.Thestoryof energysectorcorporatesocialtechnologiesthePerm Regioncovered,part,Rogersregionalpetrobarteropeningchapter.TheAfterlivesof PetrobarterSo far,exampleshavecomefromthecrisisyearsof the1990s, yearsthatwouldclaimwere“normal”or even“capitalist.”Is itthecasethatallof this barterdisappearedRussia’syearsof the2000s, yearswhentheeconomywas fullymonetized?Yesandno. I certainlywoulddenythatmoneyhasincreasedin importance,massivelyso. Here,for instance,IrinaIvanonva,theformerLukoilPerm employeeI quotedearlier,recallingthe2000s:[In 1999], I startedgetrichrightbeforeown eyes.Our salariesere crazy. In boughtapartmentfor 200,000 rubles.It’shardbelievenow.200,000 rubles.In sixmonthswasworth800,000. Therewasthiscrazyincrease ineverythingthathaddo withmoney….I refurbishedtheapartmentandstarted tovacationTurkeyeveyear. ButI amskepticalof theeasyteleologyof oilmonetizationthe2000s asI am of theearlierteleologiespedaledby transitologists.In thesameverysameinterview,for instance,Irina �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;Ivanovnarefusedtaketheoilmoneynexusfor granted,preferringsee amorecyclicalhistorythatfeaturedboutsof monetizationanddemonetization,oilmoneyandoilbarter.Indeed,sheandherbrother,recallingthepasttwentyyears,often drewparallelsamongthecrisisyeaof 1991, 1998, andOn 1998:“Andallbecamepoor again”;“Andso wewereagainrakedunder, like“1991andtheyrun together.And nowthesamething… thesame thingwithmoneyit’sallflownawayagain.”On 2008“Andlook,everythingbeingdestroyedagain.Thisalreadythe secondyearI’msittingaround… well,maybetherecoveryalreadystarting.”sure,nothingwasbad1991, asinterlocutorsof allsortsoften hastenedassurebut,almostperson,theyclaimedthattheywereprimedurn todemonetizedeconomyshortorder,shouldtheneedarise.Thesecomments on thelaterperiodsindicatednecessarilythereturnthefullscalebarterof theearly1990s, butinvocation,indicationthatthememoryof theearly1990s wasstill strong.I arguethatseesignsherethatthefamiliarcycleof oilandoilbustis beingsubsumedintomucholdermodelsof historicalconsciousness.In theRussiancase, wheremonetizationhaslonglainlightlyon theland,andcrisesareoftenseenmorph intoanother,I wouldevenarguethatwe seetheextensionof cyclicityof thecrisisbegetscrisistypeidentifiedby OlgaShevchenkofor theimmediatepostSovietperiod (2008) andby otherscholarsfor earlierperiodsof Russianhistory.Barter,thatis, continuedhavepotentplacethepoliticalandhistoricalimagination.Onenever knewwhenmoneywoulddisappear,andthecyclewouldbeginagain(seealsoRogers2009 onlongerhistoriesof monetizationanddemonetization). �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;Thefactthatbarteredoilcontinuedhaveprominentrolepeople’ssensesof timeandhistory,evenmoneypouredin,wasalsotrueotherdomains.Considerthe followingexample,fromstretchof fieldwork2009. As partof itsbroadereffortsto attractinvestmentfromWesternEurope,thePermRegionalgovernmentstaged“Forum of Regions”thefallof 2009. For twodays,someof thebestandbrightestof Perm hostearrayof businessleadersandpoliticiansrepresentingsubnationalregionstheEuropeanUnion.Theforumwas,leastceremonialandplenaryparts,typically platitudinousfullof mutualadmiration,promisesof collaboration,andevocative imagerylinkingtheWesternEuropethePermRegion(“thefirstplaceEuropesee thesun rise”).A noteof publicdisagreementcreptintotheclosingplenarypanel,whenone guest,deputytheGermanBundestat,usedhisallottedissue some impassionedandtoosubtlecritiquesof PutineraRussia.“Weareall,”declared, “livinglaboratoriesof modernitylaboratorieswherenewkindsof humanityare constantlybeingcreated.”But,wenton, peoplemustfreeunleashtheiown creativityboththeeconomicandthepoliticalspheres.Peoplemustgivenchance “toparticipatetheirown future.”concludedby notingthathadbeenpresent at the HelskiniAccords1975, whentheSovietUnionsignedon tointernationalhuman rightsdeclarations.Thatpromiseof humanrights,implied,hadyetbeenrealizedRussia. Oneof thePermRegion’sprinciplehostsof theconference,AndreiKlimov,an electedrepresentativetheRussianDuma,gentlyanddiplomaticallytookthe microphoneandproceededrejecttheassumptionsof hisGermanguest.“Friends,thisstrangedeal.You [WesternEuropeans]wantour oilandgasexchangefor your democracy.So, it’skindof barter.ButI’msurethatour young peoplearegoingto agreethesetermsof exchange.” �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;wenton tosaythathadrecentlybeena roundtableof youthtalkingaboutwhatEuropewouldlike15 years,andhis opinion,theRussianswerefarmorelexibleandimaginativethantheirWestern Europeancompatriots.“Beassured,”continued,“wehavepossibilitiesthatwill developour own time,withour own customsandtraditions,stepby step.In 10years,willbetterpositionthaarenow.”Klimov’sresponsedrewapproval fromtheaudience,andseveralacquaintancescommentedon itlater.Onerephrased itslightly,keptdefianttone,“Youwantour oilandgas,giveus your democracy.Whatkindof anexchangethat?”Whatkindof exchange,indeed?Whatdidcastinginternationalrelationshere subsumingboththeenergytradeandpoliticalsystemstermsof unequalor unfair exchangeaccomplish?And how werethesethingslinkedsensesof thepastandfuture, fromtheHelsinkiAccordsRussia’syouthandthecountry’s“owntraditionsand customs”?For thiswhatwasstakethateveningPerm,whenAndreiKlimovbegan hisbrieffor adifferentpathfor Russiawithimageryof afailed,rejecteinternational barterof oilfor democracy.Petrobarter,thatis,continuedinflectthepolitical imagination.Evenwhenactualpetrobarterwasebbtidecomparedthe previousdecade,invocationcouldstillconjurevisionof alternatepaths,of local sovereignties,of atleastpartialdisconnectionfrom,or reroutingof, globalcircuits moneyTheEarlyColdI concludewithfinalexampleof thesignificanceof petrobarter,takenfroma tilllargercale,althoughearliertime.As I notedtheoutset,thetheoriesof oiland moneyagainstwhichI ampositioningmyselfarealignedon afirstworldthirdworld, largelypostcolonial,axis. �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;I believethisstorymustextendedincludetherolethe secondworld,especiallyinternationalpetrobarterinvolvingtheSovietUnion.(Bytaking up thisexamplelast,I alsointerruptthestandardteleologicalstorybarter isleftfurtherandfurtherbehind“theeconomy”becomesmoremore efficientandmonetized.)DuringtheColdWar,theSovietUnionwasmajorproducerandexporterof oil, somethingthathistoricalaccountsfocusedon theMiddleEastoftenforget.themiddle1970s, theSovietUnionhadsurpassedtheUnitedtatesthebiggestoilproducerand wasthesecondlargestoilexporterafterSaudiArabia.However,layoutsidetheprice controlsof OPECandthebasedcorporatealliancesaimedmanagingshortageand keepingprofitshealthy.Beginninghowever,theincreaseSovietoilexportmajorchallengetheseeffortsseveralways.Therewas,TimothyMitchell discusseshisrecentCarbon Democracy(2011), ageopoliticalchallenge:pipeline routesfromtheSovietUnionWesternEuropecould,for instance,havechallengedthe internationalsupremacyof themultinationaloilcompanies.But,for mypurposeshere,it is moresignificantthatwasevenclearmanytheWesthow tocompetewiththeSovietUnion,or evenmeasureimpacton theglobaloilindustry.Oneof the reasonsfor thisthat,especiallytheearlydecadesof theColdWar,theSovietUnion oftenmadebarterdealsfor oilwithclientstatesandothers,undercuttingthemarketpricesof Westernoilcompaniesoperatingthosecountriesandraisingalarmsthe Westwhereoilcompanieswerealreadydealingwithfallingpricesglobalglut of oil Theprospectof nonmonetizedSovietoilon theglobalmarketpromptedmany observerscall A fullerversionof thisargumentwilldiscusssomedetailSovietoilforugardeals withCuba,numberbarterarrangementswithIndia(e.g.Tanzer1969, ch.7 and15), and oilforrubberbarterdealsenteredintoby theSovietUnionItaly’sENIunderthefamous EnricoMattei(muchtotheconsternationof theUS andotherWestEuropeancountries). �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;for closercollaborationbetweenWesternstatesandoilcompanies, suggestingthatSovietpoliticalmeddlingtheinternationaloilindustrywarrantedstate interventionon thesideof theWestwelltheglobaloilmarketandglobaloil companiesneeded,wasargued,thepatronageof thestateorderkeeptheworld free.Thisfamiliaroilcompanyargument,sure;here,playedouton the grounds of monetizedandmonetizedexchange.Consider,for instance,partof theUnitedStatesNationalPetroleumCouncilreport from1962, on the“Impactof OilExportsformtheSovietBloc,”preparedtherequesof theUnitedStatesDepartmentof Interior.Thereport,issuedoverthesignaturesof a laundrylistof oilcompanyexecutives(prominentamongthemRobertO. Andersonof “oilalmostlikemoney”fame),emphasizedthethreattheFreeWorld(thereport’s terms)posedby barteredSovietoilexports.TheseexportswereundercuttingWestern companies’profmarginsandinterferingwiththeireffortsmanagescarcitytheir own benefit.“[B]arterdealsinvolvingsurplusproductsexchangedwithlessdeveloped countries,”thereportnoted,“areeffectivevehiclesof Sovietinfluencesincetheymake commodityproducingcountrieshighlydependenton theSovietBlocfor markets… theSovietBlochasseizedon petroleumhighlymerchantablecommoditythattheybarterfor muchneededWesternequipmentandtechnologywellfor political influence”(3536). For atime,thatis,Sovietpetrobarterseriouslytroubledinternationalsystem thatwasincreasinglyfocuseditchell(2011) againhasshownon oilandmoney. Tosure,thatarrangementitselfwasreplacedby adifferentaftertheglobalcrisis of the1970s, anarrangementwhichtheSovietUnionreliedheavilyon the internationalsaleof oilfor hardcurrency.Butthatsystem,too,faded,replacedby 1990s petrobarterof thesortsI havedescribed. �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;ConclusionanyparticularpointtheexamplesI havegiven,mightclaimedthat petrobartertransient,insignificant,or somehowlessrelevantthanthemonetary exchangeof oil.Thecumulativeevidence,however,pointssomeenduringwaysin whichbarterhaslongcomprisedtrivialaspectof theglobaloilindustry,thatis particularlysalientthecaseof Soviet/Russianoil.Therelevanceof theseexamplesmuchwider,however,thantheRussian/Soviet case,evencomesmostclearlyintofocusthatcontext.Petrobarterwithus still.It features,for instance,manyof thedealsthatPetrocaribehasoffered,andsometimes closedon, inrecentyearspartof Hugo Chavez’seffortschallengee organizationof theglobaloilindustryandsetup alternatepoliticalpossibilitiesfor theCaribbean region.Iranhasproposednumberof oilbarterdeals,notablyandrecentlywithChina andUruguay,orderduckeconomicsanctionsandtheinternationalpetrodollarsystemgeneral.Somerecentestimatesplacetheproportionsof Russianoilandgasthatbarteredinternationally,peciallywithformerSovietrepublics,highor higherthaitwastheSovietperiod(ClossenseealsoBalmaceda2008). And so on. Thesecases,alongwiththeonesfromthePermRegionI havediscussedmoredetail, point,I suggest,theimportanceof consideringmonetarymodesandpatternsof exchangeimportantelementsof globaloil.In thecurrentglobalpoliticalandeconomic climate,boththe“petro”andthe“dollar”elementsof theinternationalsystemareunder significantpressure.seems,thismoment,especiallyusefulkeepmindthatoilis NOT,leastalways,almostmoney. �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;CodaNotedpoliticalscientistMichaelRoss concludeshisrecentTheOilCurse: HowPetroleumWealthShapestheDevelopmentNations(2012) by suggestingsome wayswhichoilproducingstatesmightavoidwhatseesthecommonpolicy choicesthatlead,nearlyallcasesinevitably,highlevelsof inequalityand undemocraticoutcomes.CitingChina’srecentoilforinfrastructuredealsAfrica,Ross proposesbartertransactionsalternatepossibilitythe“curse”of oilwealth; becausetheygeneratemassiveflowsof moneythatdeformpoliticalsystems, hesuggests,bartertransactimightsurerroute“normal”developmentoilproducingstates.Ross issureaboutthisbecause,says,“thebartercontractnewphenomenonthepetroleumworld”(237).As thisworkingpaperhasshown, Ross isentirelywrong aboutthenewnessof petrobarter.Thebarterof oilhashistoryeverybitlongthemonetizedexchangeof oil(althoughthishistoryharderseetakesfor granted,Ross andmanyothersdo, thetightrelationshipof oilandmoney).Indeed,petrobarterhaslongserveddomainwhichalternatefuturesmightimaginedandpursued.Thesefutureshave frequentlyattemptedskirtor reformulateandoccasionallychallengeovertlythe inequitiesgeneratedjustanyparticularoilproducingstate(asRoss wouldhaveit), buttheentireglobal“oilcomplex”(Watts2005) writlarge.As scholarsandpolicymakersgo aboutposingsolutionswhatmanystillinsiston framingas the“recourse curse,”theymightwishattendlessabstractideasandtheoriesandmoredomains inwhichalternativestheworkingsof theglobalpoliticaleconomyof oilhavealready beenimaginedandpursued,varietyof placesandvarietyof scales.Petrobarteris onesuchdomain. �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ;BibliographyApter,A. H. (2005). ThePanAfricanNation:OilAndTheSpectacleCultureNigeriaChicago,UniversityOf ChicagoPress.Balmaceda,M. M. (1998). "Gas, OilandtheLinkagesBetweenDomesticandForeignPolicies:TheCaseof Ukraine."EuropeAsiaStudies50(2):Balmaceda,M. M. (2008). "Corruption,IntermediaryCompanies,andEnergySecurity: Lithuania'sLessonsfor CentralandEasternEurope."ProblemsOf PostCommunism55(4):osson,S. (2011). "A ComparativeAnalysison EnergySubsidiesSovietAnd RussianPolicy."CommunistAndPostCommunistStudiesCoronil,F. (1997). TheMagicalState:Nature,Money,AndModernityIn VenezuelaChicagoLondon,UniversityOf ChicagoPress.Gaidar,Y. (2007). CollapseEmpire:LessonsForModernRussiaBrookingsInstitutionPress.Graeber,D. (2011). Debt:TheFirstFiveThousand YearsBrooklyn:MelvilleHouse. Hammond,G. T.(1990). Countertrade,Offsets,and BarterInternationalPoliticalEconomyLondon,PinterPublishers.Humphrey,(1985). "BarterAnd EconomicDisintegration."Man 20(1):Humphrey,andS. HughJones.(1992). Barter,Exchange,AndValue:AnthropologicalApproachCambridgeNewYork, CambridgeUniversityPress.Humphrey,(2002). TheUnmakingSovietLife:EverydayEconomiesAfterSocialismIthaca,CornellUniversityPress. Karl,(1997). TheParadoxPlenty:OilBoomsAndPetroStatesBerkeley,Calif., UniversityOf CaliforniaPress.Kotkin,S. (2008). ArmageddonAverted:TheSovietCollapse,, OxfordUniversityPress.Mitchell,(2011). Carbon Democracy:PoliticalPowertheAgeOilLondon, Verso. �� &#x/MCI; 0 ;&#x/MCI; 0 ; &#x/MCI; 1 ;&#x/MCI; 1 ; &#x/MCI; 2 ;&#x/MCI; 2 ;NationalPetroleumCouncil(1962). TheImpactof OilExportsfromfheSovietBloc, Volume1. Washington,DC.:UnitedStatesDepartmentOf TheInterior.Piot,D. (1992). "WealthProduction,RitualConsumption,And Center/PeripheryRelationsIn A WestAfricanRegionalSystem."AmericanEthnologist19(1):Rogers,D. (2009). TheOldFaithAndTheRussianLand: AHistoricalEthnographyEthicsIn TheUralsIthaca,CornellUniversityPress.Rogers,D. (2012). "TheMaterialityOf TheCorporation:Oil,Gas, And CorporateocialTechnologiesIn TheRemakingOf A RussianRegion."AmericanEthnologist39(2):Ross, M. L.(2012). TheOilCurse:HowPetroleumWealthShapestheDevelopmentNationsPrinceton,PrincetonUniversityPress.Shevchenko,O. (2008). CrisisAndTheEverydayIn PostsocialistMoscowIndianaUniversityPress.Tanzer,M. (1969). ThePoliticalEconomyInternationalOiland theUnderdevelopedCountriesBoston,BeaconPress.Verdery,K. (1996). WhatWas Socialism,AndWhatComesNext?PrincetPrincetonUniversityPress.Watts,M. (1994). OilMoney:TheDevil’sExcrementandtheSpectacleOf BlackGold.Money,Power,AndSpaceS. Corbridge.Oxford, Blackwell:Watts,M. (2005). "RighteousOil?HumanRights,TheOilComplex,AndCorporateSocialResponsibility."AnnualReviewOf EnvironmentAndResources Woodruff,D. (1999). MoneyUnmade:BarterAndTheFateRussianCapitalismIthaca,N.Y., CornellUniversityPress.Yergin,D. (1993). ThePrize:TheEpicQuestForOil,Money,AndPowerNewYork; London,Touchstone. believethis story must be extended include the rolethe second world, especiallyinternational petrobarter involving the Soviet Union. (Bytaking up thisexamplelast,I also hope interrupt the standard teleological story barter isleftfurtherandfurther behind “theeconomy” becomesmore and more efficientand monetized.) During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a major producer and exporter of oil, something thathistoricalaccountsfocused on the Middle Eastoftenforget. the middle1970s, the Soviet Union hadsurpassed the United States the biggest oil producer and was the secondlargest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia.However,lay outside the price controlsof OPECand the basedcorporatealliancesaimed managing shortage and keepingprofitshealthy.Beginning 1958, however, the increase Soviet oil exportmajorchallengetheseeffortsseveralways.Therewas,TimothyMitchell discusses his recent book Carbon Democracy(2011), ageopoliticalchallenge:pipeline routesfrom the Soviet Union WesternEurope could, for instance,havechallengedthe international supremacy of themultinational oil companies.But,for my purposes here,it is moresignificantthatwas not evenclearmanythe Westhow tocompetewith the Soviet Union, or evenmeasureimpacton the global oil industry. Oneof the reasonsfor thisthat,especially the earlydecadesof the Cold War, the Soviet Union oftenmadebarterdealsfor oilwithclientstatesand others, undercutting the marketpricesof Western oil companies operating those countries andraisingalarmsthe Westwhere oil companies werealreadydealingwithfallingprices due a global glut of oil prospect of nonmonetized Soviet oil on the global market prompted many observerscallA fullerversionof thisargument will discusssome detail Sovietoilforugardeals withCuba, a numberbarterarrangementswithIndia(e.g.Tanzer1969, ch.7 and15), and oilforrubberbarter deals enteredintoby theSovietUnionItaly’s ENI underthefamous EnricoMattei(muchtotheconsternationof theUS andotherWestEuropeancountries). Oil Without Money 17 NationalPetroleum Council (1962). The Impactof Oil Exports fromfheSoviet Bloc, Volume 1. Washington, DC.:UnitedStatesDepartmentOf TheInterior.Piot, D. (1992). "Wealth Production, Ritual Consumption, And Center/Periphery RelationsIn A WestAfrican Regional System."American Ethnologist 19(1): 34- Rogers,D. (2009). The OldFaithAnd The Russian Land: A Historical Ethnography Ethics In The UralsIthaca,Cornell University Press.Rogers,D. (2012). "TheMaterialityOf The Corporation: Oil, Gas, And Corporate SocialTechnologiesIn The Remaking Of A Russian Region." American Ethnologist39(2): 284-296. Ross, M. L. (2012). The OilCurse:HowPetroleumWealth Shapes theDevelopment ofNations. Princeton, Princeton University Press.Shevchenko, O. (2008). CrisisAnd The Everyday In Postsocialist Moscow, Indiana University Press.Tanzer, M. (1969). The Political Economy of International Oil and the UnderdevelopedCountries. Boston, BeaconPress.Verdery, K. (1996). What Was Socialism, AndWhatComesNext?PrincetPrincetonUniversity Press.Watts, M. (1994). Oil Money: TheDevil’sExcrementand the SpectacleOf BlackGold. Money,Power,And Space. S. Corbridge. Oxford, Blackwell: 406-445. Watts, M. (2005). "Righteous Oil?HumanRights,TheOil Complex, And Corporate Social Responsibility." Annual Review Of Environment AndResources30: 373- Woodruff, D. (1999). MoneyUnmade:BarterAnd The Fate of Russian Capitalism. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.Yergin,D. (1993). The Prize: The EpicQuestForOil,Money,AndPowerNew York; London, Touchstone. Oil Without Money 22 liographyApter, A. H. (2005). The PanAfrican Nation: OilAnd The SpectacleCultureNigeriaChicago, University Of ChicagoPress.Balmaceda, M. M. (1998). "Gas, Oil and the LinkagesBetweenDomestic and ForeignPolicies:TheCaseof Ukraine."Europe-Asia Studies 50(2): 257-286. Balmaceda, M. M. (2008). "Corruption, Intermediary Companies, andEnergySecurity: Lithuania's Lessons for CentralandEastern Europe." Problems Of Post- Communism 55(4): 16-28. osson, S. (2011). "A Comparative Analysison Energy Subsidies Soviet And Russian Policy." Communist AndPost-Communist Studies 44: 343-356. Coronil, F. (1997). The Magical State: Nature, Money,And Modernity In Venezuela. Chicago ; London, University Of ChicagoPress.Gaidar, Y. (2007). Collapse Empire: Lessons For Modern Russia, Brookings InstitutionPress.Graeber, D. (2011). Debt: The FirstFive Thousand Years. Brooklyn: Melville House. Hammond, G. T. (1990). Countertrade, Offsets, and Barter International PoliticalEconomy. London, Pinter Publishers. Humphrey, (1985). "Barter And Economic Disintegration."Man 20(1): -72. Humphrey, andS. Hugh-Jones. (1992). Barter, Exchange, And Value: Anthropological Approach. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.Humphrey, (2002). The Unmaking SovietLife:Everyday Economies AfterSocialismIthaca, Cornell University Press.Karl, (1997). The Paradox Plenty:Oil Booms AndPetro-StatesBerkeley, Calif., University Of CaliforniaPress.Kotkin, S. (2008). Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000, OxfordUniversity Press.Mitchell, (2011). Carbon Democracy: PoliticalPower the Age of Oil. London, Verso. Oil Without Money 21 daNotedpoliticalscientistMichaelRoss concludes his recent book The OilCurse: HowPetroleumWealth Shapes the Development of Nations (2012) by suggestingsome wayswhichoil-producing states might avoid what he sees the common policy choicesthatlead,nearlyallcases not inevitably, highlevelsof inequalityand undemocratic outcomes. Citing China’s recent oil-forinfrastructuredealsAfrica,Ross proposesbarter transactions one alternatepossibility the “curse”of oilwealth; because they generatemassiveflowsof moneythatdeformpoliticalsystems, hesuggests,bartertransactions might be a surer route “normal”development oil- producing states.Ross is not sure about thisbecause, he says,“thebartercontract a new phenomenon the petroleum world” (237). As this working paper hasshown, Ross isentirelywrong about the newnessof petrobarter.Thebarterof oilhas a history every bit long the monetizedexchangeof oil(although this history hardersee one takesfor granted,Ross andmany others do, thetightrelationshipof oiland money). Indeed,petrobarterhas long served domain whichalternate futures might be imaginedand pursued. Thesefutureshave frequentlyattemptedskirtor reformulateandoccasionallychallengeovertlythe inequitiesgenerated not just in anyparticular oil-producing state(asRoss would have it), but the entire global “oilcomplex”(Watts2005) writlarge.As scholarsand policy- makersgo about posing solutions whatmanystillinsiston framingas the“recourse curse,” they mightwishattendlessabstractideasandtheoriesand more domains inwhichalternatives the workings of the global politicaleconomy of oil have already beenimaginedand pursued, a varietyof placesandvarietyof scales.Petrobarter is one such domain. Oil Without Money 20 onclusionanyparticular point the examplesI have given, might be claimedthat petrobartertransient,insignificant,or somehowlessrelevantthan the monetary exchangeof oil.Thecumulativeevidence,however, points some enduring waysin whichbarterhas long compriseda non-trivialaspectof the global oil industry, one thatis particularlysalient the case of Soviet/Russianoil.Therelevanceof theseexamplesmuchwider, however, thantheRussian/Soviet case,evencomes most clearlyinto focus thatcontext.Petrobarterwithus still.It features,for instance,manyof thedealsthatPetrocaribehasoffered,andsometimes closedon, inrecentyearspartof Hugo Chavez’seffortschallengee organizationof the global oil industry andsetup alternatepoliticalpossibilitiesfor theCaribbean region.Iranhas proposed a number of oil barterdeals, notably andrecentlywithChina andUruguay,order duck economic sanctions and the international petrodollar systemgeneral. Some recentestimatesplace the proportions of Russianoilandgasthatbarteredinternationally,peciallywithformer Soviet republics, highor higherthaitwas the Soviet period (Clossen 2011; seealsoBalmaceda1998; 2008). And so on. Thesecases,alongwith the ones from the PermRegionI havediscussedmoredetail, point,I suggest, the importance of considering non-monetary modes andpatternsof exchange important elementsof globaloil.In thecurrent global politicalandeconomic climate, both the “petro”and the “dollar”elementsof the international systemareunder significantpressure.seems,thismoment,especially useful keepmindthat oil is NOT,least not always,almost money. Oil Without Money 19 r closercollaborationbetweenWesternstatesand oil companies, suggestingthat Soviet political meddling the international oil industry warrantedstate interventionon the side of theWestwell—the global oil marketandglobaloil companies needed, wasargued, the patronage of thestate order keeptheworld free.This a familiar oil companyargument,be sure;here,played out on the grounds of monetized andmonetizedexchange.Consider, for instance,partof theUnitedStatesNationalPetroleum Council report from1962, on the“Impactof Oil Exports form the Soviet Bloc,” prepared the requesof theUnitedStatesDepartmentof Interior.Thereport,issued over the signaturesof a laundrylistof oilcompanyexecutives(prominent among them Robert O. Andersonof “oilalmostlike money” fame),emphasized the threat the FreeWorld(thereport’s terms) posed by bartered Soviet oil exports. These exports were undercutting Western companies’profmarginsandinterferingwiththeireffortsmanagescarcitytheir own benefit.“[B]arterdeals involving surplus products exchangedwithlessdeveloped countries,” the report noted, “areeffectivevehiclesof Sovietinfluence since they make commodity producing countries highly dependent on the Soviet Blocfor markets… theSoviet Blochasseizedon petroleum a highly merchantable commodity thatthey barterfor muchneededWestern equipment and technology wellfor political influence”(35-36). For a,thatis, Soviet petrobarter seriously troubled international system thatwasincreasinglyfocused Mitchell(2011) againhas shown—on oilandmoney. To be sure,thatarrangementitselfwasreplacedby adifferent one after the global crisis of the1970s, anarrangementwhich the Soviet Union reliedheavilyon the internationalsaleof oilfor hardcurrency.Butthatsystem, too, faded,replaced by 1990s petrobarter of the sortsI have described. Oil Without Money 18 enton tosaythathadrecentlybeena roundtableof youth talking about what Europe would be like15 years,and his opinion, the Russians werefar more flexibleandimaginativethantheirWestern Europeancompatriots.“Be assured,” continued, “we have possibilitiesthatwill developour own time,withour own customsandtraditions,stepby step.In 10-15 years,will be a better position than are now.” Klimov’s response drewapproval fromthe audience,andseveralacquaintancescommentedon itlater.Onerephrased itslightly,but kept defiant tone, “Youwantbuy our oilandgas, but giveus your democracy.Whatkind of anexchangethat?”What kind of exchange, indeed? What did castinginternationalrelationshere subsuming both the energytradeandpoliticalsystemstermsof unequalor unfair exchangeaccomplish?And how werethese things linked sensesof thepastandfuture, fromthe Helsinki AccordsRussia’s youth and the country’s “owntraditionsand customs”?For thiswhatwasstakethateveningPerm,when Andrei Klimovbegan hisbrieffor adifferentpathfor Russiawithimageryof afailed,rejecteinternational barterof oilfor democracy.Petrobarter,thatis,continued inflect the political imagination.Even a whenactualpetrobarterwasebbtidecomparedthe previousdecade, invocation could still conjure a vision of alternatepaths, of local sovereignties,of atleastpartial disconnection from,or reroutingof, globalcircuits money. TheEarlyCold WarI concludewith a finalexampleof thesignificanceof petrobarter,takenfroma tilllargercale, although earliertime.As I noted the outset, the theoriesof oiland money against whichI am positioning myselfarealignedon afirstworldthirdworld, largely postcolonial, axis. Oil Without Money 16 factthatbartered oil continued have a prominent role people’s sensesof timeand history, even money poured in, wasalsotrue other domains. Consider the followingexample,from a stretchof fieldwork2009. As partof its broader effortsto attract investment fromWestern Europe, the Perm Regional government staged a “Forum of Regions” the fall of 2009. For twodays, some of thebestand brightest of Perm hostearrayof businessleadersandpoliticiansrepresenting sub-national regions the European Union. The forumwas,leastceremonialand plenary parts,typically platitudinousfullof mutualadmiration, promises of collaboration,andevocative imagerylinking the Western Europe the PermRegion(“thefirstplace Europe see thesun rise”).A noteof publicdisagreementcreptinto the closing plenarypanel,whenone guest, a deputy the GermanBundestat,used his allottedissue some impassionedand none-too-subtle critiquesof PutineraRussia.“Weareall,” he declared, “livinglaboratoriesof modernity—laboratorieswherenew kinds of humanityare constantlybeingcreated.”But, he wenton, people must be free unleash their own creativity both the economic and the politicalspheres. People must be given a chance “toparticipatetheirown future.”concluded by notingthat he hadbeenpresent at the Helskini Accords1975, when the Soviet Union signedon to international human rightsdeclarations.That promise of humanrights, he implied,had not yetbeenrealizedRussia.Onef thePermRegion’s principle hosts of theconference, Andrei Klimov,an electedrepresentative the RussianDuma,gently and diplomatically took the microphoneandproceededreject the assumptions of hisGermanguest.“Friends,this a strange deal. You [Western Europeans] wantour oil andgasexchangefor your democracy.So, it’s a kind of barter.ButI’m not surethatour young peoplearegoingto agreethesetermsof exchange.” Oil Without Money 15 vanovna refusedtake the oil-money nexus for granted,preferringsee amorecyclicalhistory thatfeatured bouts of monetizationand demonetization, oil money and oil barter. Indeed, she andher brother, recalling the pasttwentyyears,often drewparallels among thecrisisyeaof 1991, 1998, and 2008. On 1998:“Andallbecamepoor again”;“Andso wewereagainrakedunder, like1991.” “1991 and 1998 – they run together.And now—the same thing … thesame thingwithmoney—it’sallflownawayagain.”On 2008-10: “And look, everything beingdestroyedagain.Thisalreadythe secondyearI’msitting around … well,maybetherecoveryalreadystarting.” be sure, nothing wasbad1991, asinterlocutorsof allsortsoften hastenedassure but, almost a person, they claimedthat they wereprimedurn to a demonetizedeconomy short order, should the needarise.Thesecomments on thelater periods indicated not necessarilythereturn the fullscalebarterof theearly1990s, but invocation, an indicationthat the memoryof theearly1990s wasstill strong.I arguethatseesignsherethat the familiarcycleof oil boom and oil bust is beingsubsumed intomuch older models of historical consciousness. In theRussiancase, wheremonetizationhas long lainlightlyon the land, andcrisesareoftenseenmorph into one another, I wouldevenarguethatwe see a the extensionof cyclicityof thecrisis- begetscrisistypeidentifiedby Olga Shevchenko for theimmediate post-Soviet period (2008) andby otherscholarsfor earlier periods of Russian history. Barter,thatis, continued have a potent placethe politicalandhistoricalimagination.Onenever knewwhen money woulddisappear,and the cycle would beginagain(seealsoRogers2009 on longer historiesof monetizationanddemonetization). Oil Without Money 14 stingeffects. Notably, informed a critiqueof the money andpower associatedwith Moscow-based Lukoil, which began a takeover bid for thePerm Region’s oil facilities the -1990s. When Lukoil did finallymanagewin control of the region’s oil industry, s eminentlyclearallpartiesthat they would have attendto theregionalinterestsandcoalitionsthatgrew up through petrobarter.Thiswas the starting point for whathasbecome a major“corporatesocialresponsibility” programin thePerm Region. The story of energysectorcorporatesocialtechnologies the Perm Region covered, part,Rogers 2012; regional petrobarteropening chapter.TheAfterlivesof PetrobarterSo far,examples have comefrom the crisisyearsof the1990s, yearsthatwould claimwere“normal”or even“capitalist.”Is it not the casethatallof this barterdisappearedRussia’s boom yearsof the2000s, yearswhen the economy was fully monetized? Yesandno. I certainly would not denythat money hasincreasedin importance,massively so. Here,for instance,Irina Ivanonva, the former Lukoil-Perm employeeI quotedearlier,recallingthe -2000s: [In 1999], I startedgetrichrightbeforeown eyes.Our salaries were crazy. In bought apartment for 200,000 rubles. It’shardbelieve now. 200,000 rubles.In six months wasworth800,000. Therewasthiscrazyincrease ineverythingthathaddo with money…. I refurbished the apartmentandstarted tovacation Turkey eveyear.Butmskepticalof theeasyteleologyof oilmonetization the 2000s asI am of theearlierteleologiespedaledby transitologists.In thesame very sameinterview,for instance,Irina Oil Without Money 13 or primarily organized by money:direct exchange of goods for goods (on asingleoccasion or on multipleoccasions);offsettrade; countertrade;currencyclearingagreements;and others. Allof thesevarietiesof exchange countfor meas typesof barter.Theyhave,historically,been quite common the global econom; the oil industry particular, a significant portion of barterhas involved the Soviet Union and, then, Russia.Two additional points hereindicate the waydrawingon anthropologists’richtradition of thinking about barter.Firsandhere a classic point of differencebetween anthropologists and economists:barternot best understood the precursor monetizedexchange,a “problem” (usually labeled the “double coincidenceof wants”)that only existsbefore,on theedgesof, or at periods of crisis the “natural” money economy. Thissimplynot what the historicalandcomparativeethnographic recordteachesus (see, most recently, Graeber2011, andalso Humphrey 1985). Although barteroftenfound inthesecases,alsofound aselementof exchangerelationships evencontextsthatareotherwise highly monetized. Nor isbarter only smallscaleandsituational.and does, I show below,extendfrom quite localizedexchanges the national andinternational scale.Second, barter a useful topic for investigationpartbecausetellus agreatdealabout the socialandpoliticalimaginationparticulartimesandplaces.Howdo objectscirculate? Who exchangesthem?Withwhat kinds of commentary? Allof these questions point wayswhichpersonsandcommunitiesareshapedand reshapedoften enough by markingdistinctionsanddifferencesbetweenbarterandthe money economy. Barterdoes not actuallyhave be takingplacefor us toaskthese questions.Bartertheoreticallyfruitfulterrain,thatis,partbecause the wayswhich itrecalledandpredicted,dismissedor embraced,There is a large, if recentlyignored,literatureon internationalbarter;see,for instance, Hammond1990. Note in particular his claim, “Amongcountertradersthere is a maxim thatthere is countertrade in oil, andthenthere is everythingelse”(129). Oil Without Money 4 st-Soviet BarterIn 1991, in the multifacetedcrisisthataccompanied the end of the Soviet Union, shortages the PermRegion quickly become acute,withfrequentdelayssalary paymentsandrationing ticketsof varioussorts serving placeof money.Oneof the primeplayersallof thiswas the Perm Region’s majorrefinery, Permneftorgsintez (PNOS). Freedof thestricturesof central planning, proceedsfrom the saleof itsrefined oilabroad could now comedirectlytherefinery,ratherthanbeingabsorbedintothe planned economy. Occasionallythese proceeds came highly-valued money form,but, just often, they were the origin point for extensivechains of monetizedor lightly- monetizedbarter.Consider the accountof Irina Ivanovna, a residentof thePermRegionwho had,at thatpoint, no specialrelationshipPNOS or to the oil industry general.I wasaskingher, the spring of 2011, torecall the wayswhich the oil industry wasor wasnot centrallife the PermRegion the immediateaftermath of the Soviet Union. She beganwithbarter.wasall done by bartertherewasno money.Therewereno products. So the Chusovoi metalfactorytraded product for sugaror other things. And thanksthat some sugarappeared the region[from a source other thatate rations]. wasn’t only the Chusovoi metalfactory, but alsoPNOS. Yes, theyalsoworkedon barter,I thinkwith the Chinese.They imported down jackets,andwellmade ones. [PNOS employees] just wentdown to the market and sold themfor crazy money—therewas nothing wear, nothing stores.… PNOS got those jacketsfor theirworkers,exchangefor oil products. It was outright barter,becausetherewas no money. Here,ina Ivanovna givesaccountof theearlydaysof the post-Soviet period thatwill be familiar to scholars of the region, one which the endof socialismbrought with not monetized Oil Without Money 7 ntegrated” oil company the socialist system.Entirelyseparatefederallevelministries,for instance, controlled production and refining.The movement of oilfromupstream downstream wassubject,on theofficial level, the dictatesof central planning and, on thecrucial unofficial level,backdoor wheelinganddealingthesecond economy. In neithercase werethesetransactionsand movementsmarketizedor monetized.Oilandderivativeswereoftenexchanged directly for allmannerof othergoods andservices,andtheseexchangesoccurredthe industryandfirmlevelwell the individual level.If you knewhow to drive the Soviet Union, you knewhow tomake a deal siphon gas out of someoneelse’stank. (Mostoften, thattank belonged a or truck on state or Communist party business.) certainlytruethat the Soviet Union’s federal budget a whole relied heavily - especially the late1970s and 1980s - on thehardcurrencygainedfromselling oil on theinternational market (Kotkin 2008; Gaidar2007). However, the familiarpetrostate configurationwhichthis money then coursed through localcircuitsof exchange, shapingculturalpracticesApter, Coronil, andWatts,discussed above), institutional organizations Karl1997), andhierarchiesof classand prestige did not obtain. In the SovietUnibarterwasking,from the roadside the regional partycommittees orchestrating industrial and agricultural production. Thereas, short, a long history of petrobarter the Perm Region, extending backthe exploration and discovery phase the 1950s. Indeed, one of the challenges for thinking about the nexus of oilandsocial/cultural relationships the Soviet period is conceptualizingtheserelationships without money. This history continued the 1990s, as production, refining,anddistribution the regionweregradually united under the controlof Lukoil, post-Soviet Russia’slargest private oil company. Thisleadsmy secondandthirdexamples. Oil Without Money 6 hampioned or fearedcan be very significant the political,social, and culturalimagination(see,e.g. Piot 1992 and many of thechapters Humphrey andHugh-Jones 1992). Theremainderof thispaperdescribesandanalyzesfivesituationswhich petrobarterhasbeensignificantand produced different kinds of politicalimaginations than those findthe standard scholarly treatmentsof oiland money—both Russia andelsewhere.In thecontextof this short working paper, I do notelaborateon allof theexamples the sameextent;aimsimplyshow in a quite initialwaythe breadthof contextswhich thinking about non-monetizedexchange useful for our understandings of oil the global economy.Non-CapitalistOnereasonthat the oil-money nexus so powerful both scholarship andthe popular imaginationthat the oil industry has been, largely, a capitalist industry. Indeed, in the view of some observers, hasbeen the essentialcapitalist industry for well over a centurynow. Butwhatof Sovietoil?Surely must accountbetter waysthando now for thefactthat,for muchof thetwentiethcentury, one of theworld’slargestoil producersandexporters—the Soviet Union—was decidedly not capitalist.And so myfirstcaseof petrobartercomesfrom the politicaleconomy of socialism,specifically the PermRegion of the RussianUrals.Following the discoveryof oil the postwar period, the PermRegionbecame known inthe Soviet Union the “second Baku.” Soviet leadership hoped that the major newoilfields of the VolgaUralsbasin would replacethegeopoliticallymorevulnerable andalreadyagingdeposits of Azerbaijan,whichhadbeenactively production sincethe imperial period. Permianoil was thus the firsttruly Soviet oil—exploration, drilling, production, refining,anddistributiontook placeentirelywithin the socialist mode of production.Therewasno conceptof a“vertically Oil Without Money 5 tend a whole range of existing understandings of oilandculture,so manyof whichhailfromthe European postcolonial worldandtranslate poorly the postsocialistcontext(seealsoRogers2012). Theclaimof thislargerprojectthatSoviet and post-Soviet oil offer opportunity not just add another caseour hopper, but to rethink a whole rangeof assumptionsandtheoriesabout the mutual transformations of oil,culture,and power the twentiethandtwentyfirstcenturies.Theargumentof thispaper follows: the non-monetizedexchangeof oiland oilproducts farmorecommonthan one would expect,giventhefocuson oilmoney inexisting scholarship and the popular imagination.ThePermRegionof postsocialistRussiaprovides some particularlyinstructiveexamplesof thisphenomenon, butpetrobarterneitherlimitedRussianor to the crisisyearsof the1990s. Tobarter oil,I willultimately suggest,hasbeen, various timesandplaces: consciously avoid moneyandparticularize(ratherthanuse the money form a wayabstractand generalize);fosterpoliticalimaginationsthatemphasizelocal sovereignty andfeed localizedidentities;skirtor even challenge aspectsof theinternational petrodollar system;andthreaten a particular Cold Warera configuration of stateandprivate corporations the oil sector.In eachof thesecases,seethe entwining of oil and culture newways through the lensof petrobarter.arterI understandbarterindicate a classof transactionswhichgoods are exchangedfor goods, without the direct intervention of monetary currency. Following anthropologists Caroline Humphrey andStephenHugh-Jones (1992; seealso Humphrey1985), I preferseebarter a polythetic category, one thatencompasses a number of kindsof transactionsthatareneithergifts Oil Without Money 3 be seenabstractly money, the statebecame a generalrepresentativeof a politicalcommunity of shared ownership of the nation’s natural body” (1997: 390). As MichaelWattsputs succinctly some of hiswork on Nigeria(1994), thehere areabstractionandgeneralization. Money enablescertainsocialandpoliticalimaginaries throughcapacitymake unlike itemsexchangeable; does so, itservesboth integrativeanddisintegrativefunctions. Thisfamiliarprocess,allof thesetheoristsclaim in one wayor another,takeson particularshapes,speeds,andprofiles the deluge of moneythat commonly attends oil boom. Following thesescholars,mightsaythat money a key linkby which a particular kind of global oil regimeinterlacedwitha globalculturalregime.The global energyregimewhatWattscalls the “oilcomplex” (2005) inlatetwentieth century configuration; the global culturalregime,leastin theseexamples, a particular kind of postcoloniality, one whichrapidly circulating petrodollarsfosterand trouble—a rangeof socialandculturalimaginariesmodernizing, nationalizing,developmentalist,statist,PanAfricanist,and so on. This a powerful and persuasive lineof analysis,andI, too,want focus on the wayswhichexchangeandcirculationareaspectsof the global oil complexthatdeserve our attention.But,indicates,I alsowantdrawattention a rangeof relationshipsthatareleft out thisstandardpicture, relationships which the non- monetizedexchangeof oilalsointerlacedwithsocial,cultural,andpoliticalimaginaries. In ordermakethisargument,I focuson the production andcirculationof oilpostsocialistRussia.A shift ethnographic contextfrom postcolonial Nigeriaand Venezuela the aftermathof Sovietsocialism,antsuggest,opens us somenew waysgaintheoretical purchase on theplaceof oilfar beyond the Russiancase. Althoughfocus today on only one of thesewayspetrobarterthis working paperpartof alargerprojectthattheorizesRussiapostsocialist petrostate and, on that basis,seeks Oil Without Money 2 ntroduction“Oilalmostlikemoney.”Theseare the oftcitedwords of RobertO. Anderson, anARCO oilexecutive,as interviewedby DanielYergin his book The ize(1993:xv). Theyseemlikeso much common sense.allknow something about petrodollars. Atleast the automobile-obsessedUnitedStates,no other commodity pricediscussed asmuch the priceof gasoline,or advertisedso commonly and prominently along the sideof theroad.Talkof oiland money’s tightembrace of may look a bit different elsewhere the world, but usually not too hard find. When, for instance,I was viewingapartmentfor rent the PermRegion of Russia, prospective landlady, who knew nothing of myresearchinterests,went through allof the notable featuresof the apartmentandconcludedby turningon thetelevision.“Itworks wellandhaslotsof channels,” she said. Flipping a newschannelwith a crawl the bottom of thescreen, she continued, “Look, you’ll be ablefind the priceof oilanyof thedayor night.” Money, goesalmost without saying,plays a centralrole economists’ and manypoliticalscientists’writings on oil andenergywhetheror not they areadherents to the “resourcecurse”familyof approaches. perhaps less commonly notedthat moneyalsofeatures prominently, ratherdifferently, anthropologists’ and geographers’writings on petrostates,fromNigeriaVenezuela Saudi Arabiaand beyond.AndrewApter’sanalysisof oil boom Nigeria,for instance,restssubstantial parton theclaimthat oil “standard[ized] the relativevaluestermsof whichother commoditieswere bought and sold and thus approach[ed] the general equivalent of moneyitself” (2005: 35). In his wonderful The Magical State, about Venezuela, Fernando Coronil shows that,“circulating through thebody politic money, oil ceased to be identified a material substance andbecame a synonymfor money… Justoil Oil Without Money 1 IL ITHOUT ONEY: HE IGNIFICANCE OF ARTERED IL IN AND EYONDUSSIA An NCEEER Working Paper by Douglas Rogers Yale University National Council for Eurasianand East European ResearchUniversity of Washington Box 353650Seattle, WA 98195info@nceeer.orghttp://www.nceeer.org/ TITLE VIII PROGRAM hichthose processes,least the PermRegionreliedcruciallycombinationof local and international petrobarter.Emergentpoliticaland cultural forms,thatis,wereinterlaced withandhighly dependent on the non-monetizedcirculation of oil. eeanother dimension of thiswhenturnsecond point, whichhasto do withpostsocialist money. As I noted the outset, investigationsof the oil-money nexusplaceslikeNigeriaandVenezuela focus heavilyon themagical properties of money,on, for instance,apparentabilitygrow and reproduce itselfwithno effort, andtrace the importance of thisprocessfor theformationof particular kinds of states— the magicalstate, Coronil’s phrasing. Money did, of course,circulate the post- Soviet period, but behavior was, most formersocialistcitizens, quite odd. Thiswas awhen the relative unimportance of money(in the socialist economy) shifted rapidly a of massivepyramidschemes, precipitous bouts of inflationand deflation,andwildcurrencyspeculation(see,e.g.,Verdery1996 on Romanianpyramid schemes).The importance of bartered oil the PermRegionemergedgood partin contrast thispyramidscheme money. Bartered oil was,manyways, the other to wild,magical,unfamiliarmoney.Oil,derivatives, and the chainsof exchangesthey enteredwereconcrete,reliable,local,tangible, non-generalizablepreciselyin distinction the unpredictable nature of money the banking, salary,andstreetcorner exchangesector. the time, the baroque exchangesof oilindexedlocality,regional power,and the abilitystandup againstinternational and national centersof powerby fleeingfrom the most fungible of currenciesmoney—intolocalregimesof valuethat had some tangiblemateriality,some connection the Perm Region. This kind of localexchangeof oil,identificationof oil a materialobject circulatingwithin the Perm Region, even one thathadspecificPermianqualities,had powerfuland long Oil Without Money 12 ndustry (alongwith the formationof anew kind of regionalelite) the PermRegionsolidifiedrighthere, long beforethefullmonetization of oil, the regularcollectionof taxes money, andlong before the assemblyof a regional verticallyintegratedcompany took placeby thelate1990s/early 2000s. Interlude:TheSignificanceof BarterWiththreeexamplesof petrobarter hand, useful pause and consider what whatlooking petrobarter getsus in the caseof the post-Soviet Perm Region, andhow, moreprecisely,thisdepartsfrom the theoriesof oiland money withwhichI began. I offertworeflections, both of whichsituate the examples above some of thebroader dynamicsof thepost-Soviet period. Thefirsthasdo with the post-Soviet state.If oil money hasbeencentral the institutionsandimaginationsof the postcolonial petrostate,then the post-Soviet case, petrobarter wascentral the unimagining of the post-Soviet federalstate the 1990s PermRegion. Oil undergirded allmannerof directexchangesthatexpressly avoided the state’s money and, instead,circulated along withall manner of othergoods through specifically regional networks andbarterchains.Oilheredoes not aidabstractionor dreamsof globalizationsupports localization, the faceface negotiations of barter, and the birthof anew regional elite.Allwithalmostno money. Several studies have documented the rapidproliferationof barterandalternatecurrenciestheimmediate aftermathof socialismandtheirlinks the “parcelizationof sovereignty”(Humphrey 2002; Verdery1996) Regions,cities,andevencompaniesissuedtheirown currenciesto their “own” people, making basic economic activitydepended on comparativelysmall- scalepolitical organization. One thing I haveshown here the extent Oil Without Money 11 izontally integratedPFPG.Into the -1990s, the extensivebarterchainsthatPFPG couldassemble through Neftsintezmarketand the UniversalTrading House becamecrucial both the legitimacy of thestateapparatusand the functioning of the regional economy. Themanydifferent sectorswhichPFPG had a significantpresenceallowed a greatdealof internalflexibilityespeciallyerawhencompanyaccounting standards werethemselves undermassive revision. In oneexchange recounted severaltimes,for instance, PFPG bartered oil products abroaddirectlyfor anentirebargeof processedsugar,which had not beenseen the PermRegionfor nearly a year.The shipment wasso highly valuedthat,ratherthanhirelaborers, the office staffof PFPG itself unloaded the barge underarmedguard.Oneof my interlouctors, a formeremployeeof thePFPG, gave another example of thekinds of barterexchangesthat, he said,characterizedtheirwork:Therewerelotsof longchainsof exchange. So provided fuel oil the loggingenterprises somewhere up north[in the Perm Region], and, roughly, got [uncut] timberfromthem.processedintopackagingtimberandsent itoff to the Krasnodar Region[in the Caucasus].And theretook not money but apples. brought the appleshere,sold them,andgot money for them.That’s the kind of operation did— the fifthor sixth link. A Permewspaper, looking backon theactivitiesof Neftsintezmarket the time, wrotethat the PFPG subsidiaryorked out andcarried out dizzyingchainsof mutual exchangesandcredits, the resultof whichwereschemeswhichwasimpossibleto understand.Unless you participated them.” And thiswas the point—oilfacilitatedall mannerof in kind, situational,networked deals.In manyways, the closerelationship between the regional stateand the oil Oil Without Money 10 norm the global oil industry hasbeenverticallyintegratedcompaniessinceRockefeller’sStandardOil, but thiswas not reallythecase the PermRegion until the 2000s. In the 1990s, horizontal integration predominated, whichfinancialindustrial groups and other varieties of holding companiesstretchedtheiractivitiesacrosssectors, oftentaking advantage of theirhorizontal structureminimizemonetizedtransactions and,instead,barter enormous range of goods and servicesamongand outside their constituent units. In thePerm Region, the majorplayeron this front was the PFPG, thePermGroup of FinanciersandIndustrialists outfit thatmight,retrospect, understand as somethingof incubator for regionaloligarchs.ThePFPG, founded1993 andstillin operation today, containedwithinitself a number of subcompaniesspecializingin differentaspectsof theregional economy. Twoof the biggest wereNeftsintezmarketand theUniversal Trading House. Neftsintezmarket took over marketingand distribution of oil products from the refineryPNOS, andUniversal Trading House supplied storesand marketsacrosstheregionwithallmannerof foodstuffs and consumer goods. Thesheersizeof these operations, both withinPFPG, rapidlymadethemof interest the regional stateapparatus,whichwasattempting cope withpervasive complaintsand borderline unrest arisingfrom the shortage of food andfuelacrossthe entire region. In exchangefor afavorable relationship with the state,PFPG, through Neftsintezmarket, took on theroleof officialgovernment contractor for thepurchase, refining,anddistributionof oilfor regionalstateadministrationneeds—most notably supportfor the agricultural sector,where the withdrawal of state subsidies fromthe socialistera wfeltparticularlyacutely.Thiswas anearlyand very important chapterof themarriageof “petro”and“state” the Perm Region, and Lukoil acrossRussiaand itwas rooted barterespecially along andamong the tentaclesof the Oil Without Money 9 arketexchange but steadilyproliferatingbarterwhatDavid Woodruffcalls“thebarterof thebankrupt” (1999). In theprimarytheoriesof oiland money, those I amchallengingthispaper,money obtained through foreignexchange reenters the national economy of an oil-exporting statelocalcurrency and, through its circulation,accomplishes various sortsof transformations.Thisdynamicwascentralto theearly post-Soviet Perm Region, but with important twist: money wasnot centralto manyof theexchanges,whichwereinstead frequently basedon bartertransactions.Thisdifference,I willargue shortly, significantbecausewas foundational the development of aregionalpoliticalimagination the post-Soviet period, the forgingof asenseof cultural belonging the PermRegionthatwas, key ways, outside and opposed the circulationof moneyandbased,instead,on themoreintimate,restricted, nonabstractedbarterexchangeswithin the region. Beforemakingthat point a bit more detail,letgivethirdexampleof petrobarter.MoneyTimberApplesMoneyAllof thisbarter the veryearly post-Soviet period was,accordingthe theoriesandpredictions of transitologists—those champions of neoliberalmarketswho set out usher capitalism the former Soviet world—supposed go awayquickly. But did not. The non-monetizedexchangeof allmannerof goods became broader and deeper the 1990s PermRegion, and oil becamemoreandmorecentralIndeed, oil’s dual importance—bringing a certain amount of foreignexchange(monetaryor not)andalsoenablingnearlyall industrial and agricultural production the regionmeantthat quickly becamecentralemergent new circuits of trade andexchangeat muchlargerscalesthanthatdescribedby Irina Ivanovna. Oil Without Money 8