/
House Research DepartmentAugust 1999Unicameral or Bicameral State Legi House Research DepartmentAugust 1999Unicameral or Bicameral State Legi

House Research DepartmentAugust 1999Unicameral or Bicameral State Legi - PDF document

trish-goza
trish-goza . @trish-goza
Follow
394 views
Uploaded On 2015-11-26

House Research DepartmentAugust 1999Unicameral or Bicameral State Legi - PPT Presentation

Representation and ResponsivenessWhich legislative system provides better more responsive representation For whom Unicameralists say that two houses no longer serve a representational purpose in s ID: 205701

Representation and ResponsivenessWhich legislative system

Share:

Link:

Embed:

Download Presentation from below link

Download Pdf The PPT/PDF document "House Research DepartmentAugust 1999Unic..." is the property of its rightful owner. Permission is granted to download and print the materials on this web site for personal, non-commercial use only, and to display it on your personal computer provided you do not modify the materials and that you retain all copyright notices contained in the materials. By downloading content from our website, you accept the terms of this agreement.


Presentation Transcript

House Research DepartmentAugust 1999Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures: The Policy DebatePage 2 Representation and ResponsivenessWhich legislative system provides better, more responsive representation? For whom? Unicameralists say that two houses no longer serve a representational purpose in statelegislatures, because the members of both houses are elected by and serve the sameconstituencies. Bicameralists say that a larger, two-house legislature is more complexlyrepresentative of the multiplicity of interests in diverse societies. Both sides assert that theirfavored structure is more responsive to the people and less susceptible to control by powerfulminorities.Dual representation. Bicameral state legislatures areno longer necessary for representational purposes,because the courts now require that the members of bothhouses be elected from equal population districts. Inearlier times, bicameral state legislatures may haveserved a representational purpose: during the period ofthe American revolution, in some states the two housesrepresented somewhat different socio-economic groups;50 years ago, members of the two houses of statelegislatures represented somewhat different politicalcommunities (e.g., counties, cities, city wards). The twohouses of Congress continue to represent differentconstituencies (state districts and population districts). But in state legislatures today, the members elected tothe two houses are essentially duplicate representativesof the same population districts. Therefore, bicameralstate legislatures can no longer be justified onrepresentational grounds. Dual representation. A citizen in Nebraska has onerepresentative in the state legislature; a citizen inMinnesota has two. Dual representation increases theprobability that legislators and constituents will havedirect contact and that citizens or communities petitioningfor legislative action will get a hearing from asympathetic representative or one with helpfulconnections. Further, members of the two houses provideimportant and useful variations in representation, eventhough all are elected from population districts. Housemembers represent smaller, more cohesive constituencies,while senators represent larger, more diverse districts. Also, the senator and the representatives from alegislative district are not like peas in a pod: they servedifferent terms of office, sit on different committees, aredifferently situated, employed, and connected within thedistrict, and may belong to different political parties.Responsiveness to the majority. The unicameralsystem favors rule by the majority. Because theunicameral legislative structure and process are simple,straightforward, and open, a unicameral legislature ismore likely to represent and respond to the preferencesof the unorganized mass public.Responsiveness to the majority. The founders adoptedthe bicameral structure deliberately to frustrate simplemajority rule. Double representation in a bicamerallegislature fosters the balanced representation of rivalinterests, a more just and inclusive goal than meremajority rule.Responsiveness to diverse and minority interests. What counts in responding to diverse and minorityinterests is not the number of legislative bodies, but agood electoral system and the use of methodical, time-consuming legislative practices to ensure that allinterests are heard and all viewpoints carefullyconsidered. Because its decision-making process isrelatively simple and efficient, a unicameral legislaturehas the time to provide a fuller and fairer hearing to allResponsiveness to diverse and minority interests. Thebicameral structure is more complexly responsive to themultiplicity of public interests in diverse societies. Twolegislative bodies—with different membership, terms ofoffice, perspectives, leadership, and customs—bring avaluable diversity of outlook to legislative decisions. Themembers and committees of one house often afford afuller or fairer hearing of a particular bill, issue, or pointof view than the other house. As a result, the bicameral House Research DepartmentAugust 1999Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures: The Policy DebatePage 4 U districts, without destabilizing the legislature. There islittle reason to suppose that a unicameral legislature, sochosen, is more volatile or erratic than a bicameral one.early national period, even as both houses of statelegislatures were coming to represent the sameconstituencies. It is still valid.Balancing responsiveness and stability. Nebraska’s legislature illustrates how a unicameral legislature canbalance the virtues of responsiveness to the people andstability in the law. Legislators in Nebraska serve four-year, overlapping terms of office. Therefore, duringeach biennial legislative session, half of the members ofthe Nebraska legislature know that they will face thevoters at the next election, while the other half, whoseterms continue, tend to bring a longer view to the samedecisions. With the terms of its members overlapped inthis way, Nebraska’s unicameral legislature can beresponsive to the concerns of the citizenry at eachelection without excessive mutability either ofmembership or policy.Balancing responsiveness and stability. In Minnesota’sbicameral system, members of the House, all accountableto the people in small districts statewide every two years,tend to respond quickly to changing popular sentiment,while senators, who serve a four-year term of office andlarger districts, tend to bring a longer and wider view tothe same decisions. This natural balance ofresponsiveness and restraint is not possible in aunicameral legislature, because overlapping four-yearterms (as in Nebraska) disenfranchises half the state atevery election, while universal two-year termsdestabilizes the legislature, making it more vulnerable tocontrol by a succession of transient majorities.Accountability of LegislatorsWhich legislative system better enables voters to hold their elected representatives toaccount for legislative actions? Unicameralists say that a unicameral legislature would bemore accountable to the electorate, because the simplicity and transparency of the unicamerallegislative process permits voters to better fix the responsibility of individual legislators forlegislative actions. Bicameralists say that the bicameral legislative process is actually moreopen to public view and public accountability, and that a unicameral legislature would notnecessarily remedy, and might actually worsen, the real accountability problem—allowing afew legislators to impose legislative decisions on the general membership.UAccountability and procedural simplicity. Legislatorsin a unicameral system are more accountable to theelectorate, because the simplicity and directness of theunicameral legislative process encourages citizens topay attention to legislative activity and permits them tobetter follow and understand the actions of theirrepresentatives. Knowing that they are under more andbetter scrutiny back home, unicameral legislatorsnaturally feel more accountable and alert to constituentconcerns and interests. In a bicameral legislature, onthe other hand, accountability is weak, because theAccountability and procedural simplicity. Observationdoes not support the unicameralist’s belief thatprocedural simplicity enhances the accountability ofelected officials by fostering citizen vigilance andcomprehension. The citizenry of Nebraska is notnoticeably more mindful or informed of legislativeactivity than the citizenry of bicameral states likeMinnesota; and Nebraska legislators are not known to bemore alert to constituent interests than Minnesotalegislators. Accountability would benefit more fromcontinuing efforts to clarify and streamline the bicameral House Research DepartmentAugust 1999Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures: The Policy DebatePage 6 U of time constraints, even reject them), the decisions ofconference committees are effectively final. Consequently, rank-and-file legislators who do not serveon important conference committees are able to disclaimresponsibility for legislative decisions by blaming themon conference committees. In a unicameral legislature,members cannot hide behind conference committeedecisions. Each member is fully responsible for votingon bills on the floor and can be held to account for thoseactions by the voters.unicameral legislature, with more pernicious results. Theaccountability of individual legislators can be enhanced,if need be, within the bicameral structure, simply byreducing the authority of conference committees (e.g., byusing joint committees more and conference committeesless; changing legislative rules on conference committeeappointments, authority, and procedures; and imposingdeadlines and lie-over requirements on conferencecommittee reports).Authority of the LegislatureWhich legislative system gives greater authority and effect to the decisions of thelegislature and individual legislators? Could the legislature be too authoritative? Unicameralists say that eliminating friction, rivalry, and contention between the two houseswould give the legislature and individual legislators greater prestige, independence, andauthority and permit more decisive and effective legislative action. Bicameralists say that alarger, two-house legislature inherently possesses more capacity and expertise, and thereforegreater independence and authority, and that a unicameral legislature would unwiselyconcentrate the state’s governmental power. ULegislative authority. The bicameral system divideslegislative authority between two houses with competingsets of members, committees, and leaders. Partitioningthe legislature in this way diminishes its authority andeffectiveness in dealing with the executive branch ofstate government and with the federal government. Theunicameral structure, by concentrating legislative powerin the members and leaders of one house, enhances theprestige, independence, and authority of the legislature. A strong legislature is able to deal more effectively withthe governor and the executive branch and to representthe interests of the state more forcefully on the nationallevel.Legislative authority. Because a bicameral legislaturehas more legislators, committees, and leaders, itpossesses inherently more capacity and expertise, andtherefore greater authority and independence in relationswith the governor and other agencies of government. Aunicameral legislature is weaker, because it has fewerlegislators and committees available to acquire and applyspecialized knowledge, oversee the executive, and servethe same number of citizens. Nebraska’s legislature isnot a uniquely prestigious or influential force in stategovernment, compared with bicameral state legislatures;and some evidence (e.g., pay, authority, turnover)suggests the contrary. House Research DepartmentAugust 1999Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures: The Policy DebatePage 8 1 The following western democracies have national unicameral legislatures: Finland, Israel, Luxembourg,Denmark, Sweden, and New Zealand. The latter three have converted from bicameral to unicameral structuressince World War II. Other jurisdictions, like Iceland and Norway, have legislatures that are elected on aunicameral basis but divide into two houses after election for purposes of processing legislation. Others, likeCanada and Britain, have bicameral national legislatures, but practical legislative power is heavily concentrated inone house. Canada’s provinces all have unicameral legislatures. Concentration of Power within the LegislatureDoes either legislative system bring about an undesirable concentration of power insidethe legislature? Bicameralists say that a single-house legislature would concentrate thelawmaking power in the hands of fewer legislators and eliminate essential constitutionalrestraints on the concentration of power within the legislature. Unicameralists say that thebicameral structure concentrates power in the handful of members who serve on importantconference committees and the leaders who appoint them, and that unicameral legislatureselsewhere do not over-concentrate power within the legislature. UConcentration of legislative power. The bicameralsystem concentrates decision-making power in the handsof a few members—those who serve on importantconference committees and the leaders who appointthem. Because the legislature as a whole cannot amendthe reports of conference committees (nor usually,because of time constraints, even reject them), thebicameral system permits a few well-placed legislatorsto impose their views on the membership of both houses. Concentration of legislative power. The unicameralsystem concentrates decision-making power in onehouse—where bill authors, committee chairs, and leaderspossess singular power, unchecked by co-equals inanother house. In a unicameral legislature—perhapsespecially in a large one—power and policy can fall moreeasily under the unrestrained hand of a single strongleader, committee chair, caucus, or group of legislators.Internal constraints on power. The members of thelegislature choose their leaders, and they also adopt therules of procedure that allocate power to those leaders. Therefore, the members of a unicameral legislature canreadily compensate for the absence of countervailingpowers in a second house by choosing leaders carefullyand by adopting rules of procedure that limit theauthority and influence of leaders and committee chairs.Internal constraints on power. The bicameral systemdisperses power among legislators constitutionally, ratherthan relying on legislators themselves to limit theauthority of their leaders. As for conference committees,a bicameral legislature can reduce their sway, if it wishes,by changing the legislative rules and practices governingconference committee appointments, procedures, scope ofauthority, and deadlines.Experience elsewhere. The unicameral system doesnot over-concentrate the legislative power in Nebraskaor in democratic nations that have single-houselegislatures. In Nebraska’s unicameral legislature, onthe contrary, power is more dispersed than in the typicalbicameral legislature. Leadership authority in theNebraska legislature is divided among several legislatorsand committees, and the general membership elects notonly the leaders but the chairs of committees as well. Experience elsewhere. The dispersion of power inNebraska’s unicameral legislature is the result of uniqueconditions there—the small number of legislators (49),entrenched decentralist legislative customs and traditions,and the absence of political party caucuses and caucusleaders. These conditions do not apply in more populousstates with larger, partisan legislatures accustomed tooperating with strong political caucuses and caucusleaders. As for the unicameral systems in other nations, House Research DepartmentAugust 1999Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures: The Policy DebatePage 10 U Despite the fast-track procedures used by bicamerallegislatures, most bills still bog down in inter-housewrangling. As a result, decisions are not made until thevery end of the session, when the most complex andimportant measures are shuttled rapidly from house tohouse with little time for comprehension or carefulconsideration.The end-of-session crush of legislation is caused not bythe bicameral structure so much as by the practice ofconcentrating most decisions in a few bills brought outfor passage late in the session—a practice that could justas well afflict a unicameral legislature, at even greatercost to the deliberative process.Quality assurance and the second house. Experiencedoes not support the bicameralist assertion that onehouse checks and corrects the actions of the other house. On the contrary, the presence of a second houseencourages and enables legislative carelessness—aswhen one house hastily accepts the actions of the otherhouse on faith, without independent evaluation, orpasses ill-conceived legislation, relying on the otherhouse to correct or reject it. Quality assurance and the second house. In abicameral system, every proposed law must be approvedby separate groups of lawmakers with differentperspectives and insights. This reciprocal oversightfosters a quality product, because two groups of decision-makers do not come readily into each other’s opinionswithout good reason. The system is imperfect, of course,but experience shows that the second house often detectsand corrects mistakes and improves the work of theinitiating house.A single-house legislature, in contrast, knowing that itsdecisions are final, acts only with great care anddiligence. Nebraska’s unicameral legislature is knownfor its methodical, repeated consideration and inspectionof every bill before final passage.Repeated consideration of a bill or issue by the samegroup of people in a unicameral legislature cannot replacethe discipline created by requiring one group to gain theapproval of another group before imposing a law on thecitizenry.Quality assurance and the conference committee. The conference committee system breeds legislativeerror. The two houses tend to take less care on billsinitially, trusting to conference committees to fixmistakes. Conference committees themselves are proneto error—consisting, as they do, of a few interestedmembers making decisions on complex matters underenormous time pressure in relative obscurity. Andfinally, the blunders made by conference committees areimposed on the rest of the legislature, which cannotamend conference committee reports (nor usually,because of time constraints, even reject them). Byeliminating conference committees, the unicameralstructure enhances the probability of quality legislation.Quality assurance and the conference committee.Conference committees often improve legislation after itsinitial passage by forcing key legislators to listen to theircritics, re-examine their positions, and considercompromise with other views before final action. Ineffect, a conference committee is a concluding debate onthe pivotal issues in a bill among the legislators with thegreatest expertise and involvement in it. Conferencecommittees also regularly repair mistakes made duringthe hurly-burly of Minnesota’s traditional process of openfloor debate and amendment. Without conferencecommittees, a unicameral legislature might find itnecessary to limit the scope and complexity ofamendments permitted on the floor.Citizen participation. The unicameral legislativeprocess encourages broad public participation inlegislative decisions and provides members with moreinformation to use in making decisions, because itallows citizens and organizations to channel theirenergies more effectively on the activities of one house. Citizen participation. The bicameral legislative processencourages broad public participation in legislativedecisions and provides members with more information touse in making decisions, because it offers more forumswhere interested citizens and organizations canparticipate. When bills must go through committee House Research DepartmentAugust 1999Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures: The Policy DebatePage 12 U The bicameral legislature will not make the radicalchanges from within that are required to reduce its costsby this much.Changes in the bicameral system, like joint staff officesand joint committees, could reduce the cost of thebicameral system without giving up its benefits. Nebraska’s first unicameral legislature in 1937 reducedthe cost of legislative operations by about one-half. Today, the operating cost of the Nebraska legislature isabout one-third that of the Minnesota legislature. Theunicameral system in Nebraska allows that state to holddown the cost of legislative operations withoutcompromising the capability of the legislature or theresources available to individual legislators: thus,despite its relatively low total operating cost,Nebraska’s unicameral legislature still spends moremoney and provides more staff per legislator than doesMinnesota’s bicameral legislature.The low cost of the Nebraska legislature is a consequenceof many factors besides unicameralism—the smallnumber of members (49), poor compensation, the absenceof partisan political caucuses, etc. By some accountings,the unicameral system could actually increase costs: on aper capita basis, Nebraska’s unicameral legislaturespends more on itself than the bicameral legislatures ofneighboring states; and as compared to Minnesota,Nebraska spends more per legislator and only 20 percentless per capita. Thus, a large, partisan unicamerallegislature in a state with energetic governmentaltraditions might not be a bargain.Custom and PrecedentIs a unicameral legislature a radical departure from the fundamental institutions andtraditions of American government? Bicameralists say that the unicameral legislativestructure is a radical departure from 200 years of American governmental experience,practice, and tradition. Unicameralists say that unicameral legislatures are an established andproven form of state, local, and private governance in the United States and other democraticnations.United States. The unicameral system is not a radicalexperiment in government. Two colonies had unicamerallegislatures (Delaware and Pennsylvania), as did threestates in the revolutionary and early national period(Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Vermont). The ContinentalCongress was a unicameral body. The state ofNebraska has been satisfied with its unicamerallegislature for more than 60 years.United States. Unicameralism is a radical departurefrom 200 years of American political and governmentalpractice. Except in Nebraska’s small, nonpartisanlegislature, the system is untested in modern stategovernment. The experience in Nebraska has littlepredictive value about the character and effects ofunicameralism in more populous states with larger,partisan legislatures and different governmental customsand traditions. Local government. Local governments in the UnitedStates all have unicameral governing bodies. This wasnot always so: bicameral governing boards at the locallevel were once common in this country. Who nowwould argue that each city, county, and town shouldhave two governing bodies?Local government. Local legislative functions are, infact, usually divided among several elected boards(school, park, city/town, county, watershed, etc.). Anyway, the local government analogy is not persuasive,because local governments are not sovereign but rathercreatures of the state.