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HYPERINTENSIONAL TRUTH CONDITIONS HYPERINTENSIONAL TRUTH CONDITIONS

HYPERINTENSIONAL TRUTH CONDITIONS - PowerPoint Presentation

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HYPERINTENSIONAL TRUTH CONDITIONS - PPT Presentation

Gary Kemp University of Glasgow Joint session Cambridge 12 th July 2014 6 df B is true p B is a belief that p p 7 s B is a belief that ID: 513860

belief true act snow true belief snow act davidson content quine denied white white

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Slide1

HYPERINTENSIONAL TRUTH CONDITIONS

Gary Kemp,

University of Glasgow

Joint session, Cambridge,

12

th

July, 2014Slide2

(6) df:

B is true  (p

)(B is a belief that p  p)(7) (

s

)(

B

is a belief that

s

s

)

(8)

B

is a belief that ‘Snow is white’ and ‘Snow is white’.

(9)

B

is a belief that S and S.

(10)

B

is a belief that snow is white and snow is white.

 Slide3

Davidson denied some things that Quine said.

  

(p)(Davidson denied that p

Quine said that

p

).  Slide4

… s …

… s*… (11) (p

)(that p is true  p). (12) (

x

)(

p

)[x is a belief

the content of

x

is that

p

(

x

is true

that

p

is true)].

(13) (

A

,

c)(True (

A

,

c

)

(

p

) (Say (

A

,

c

,

p

)

p

))

(14) (

A

,

c

)(

(

A

,

c

)

p

(Say (

A

,

c

,

p

))

 Slide5

He’s a’ not.

He’s a fool.Slide6

Atsa’ true.

What you are about to say is true.Slide7

(15) This is true.

(16) This is not true.(17) This either fails to express a proposition or is not true.

 He introduces a distinction between ordinary negation ‘¬’ and a notion of ‘false or does not express a proposition’, symbolised ‘—‘ . He writes: ‘By writing down ─A, one simply performs the speech act of rejecting A as untrue—an act one may well wish to perform when A itself fails to say anything.’ (p. 22); ‘I do not suppose that ─A expresses any propositional content when A does not’; and ‘a negatively signed formula ─A is correct if and only if A is untrue’ (pp. 21-2). 

(18) This speech-act is not correct.