JUC PAC Annual Conference 2021 How Place Matters?
Description: JUC PAC Annual Conference 2021 How Place Matters? Leadership, Governance and Public Administration De Montfort University Leicester 7th-8th September 2021 The governments proposals for reform of Fire and Rescue Services in England Pete
Related Topics
Download Presentation
"JUC PAC Annual Conference 2021 How Place Matters?" is the property of its rightful owner. Permission is granted to download and print the materials on this website for personal, non-commercial use only, and to display it on your personal computer provided you do not modify the materials and that you retain all copyright notices contained in the materials. By downloading content from our website, you accept the terms of this agreement.
Presentation Transcript
slide1. JUC PAC Annual Conference 2021 How Place Matters? Leadership, Governance and Public Administration De Montfort University Leicester 7th-8th September 2021 The government’s proposals for reform of Fire and Rescue Services in England Pete Murphy and Katarzyna Lakoma<br>
slide2. Introduction and Background 2010-2015 Coalition Government replaced Police Authorities with directly elected individuals responsible for police forces in England and Wales (originally a Labour idea, PCCs were included in 2010 manifesto’s of both Conservatives and Liberal Democrats).
Introduced by Home Secretary (Mrs May) in Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011
1st election in Nov 2012 had historically low electoral turnout with a number of independents appointed
2nd election in May 2016 coincided with local government elections for 40 of 43 territorial police forces - London (Met and City) and Greater Manchester
A popular policy within the Tory party clearly associated with Mrs May<br>
slide3. 2015- 2021 The 2015 Conservative Manifesto (but not Lib Dems or Labour) included a proposal to extend PCCs’ control to all fire services (PFCCs)
2016 replacement of some PCCs with directly elected mayors (in July 2016 Mrs May becomes Prime Minister).
2017 Policing and Crime Act facilitated PCCs taking responsibility for FRS subject to a ‘local case’ being made.
2021 election of 39 PCCs, 4 were PFCCs all in England (Essex, Staffs, Northants and North Yorkshire)
London, Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire - mayoral models<br>
slide4. Fire Service Reform<br>
slide5. Home Secretary’s proposals for governance (March 2021) Consultations on whether to mandate the transfer of FRS functions to PFCCs across England. Practical limitations - the government will now be consulting on “coterminosity (sic) challenges” in the South West, Thames Valley, Sussex, West Mercia and Tyne and Wear. Rather than mandating PFCC everywhere.
Operational independence for Chief Fire Officers which also has the potential to clearly separate and delineate strategic and operational planning for F&R and separate budgets in the PFCC model (Winsor reviews also highlighted).
Clarify some of the legal entities which anticipates some changes in legal entities as between PCCs/PFCCs and local authorities (the Redmond Review has also highlighted).<br>
slide6. Governance - ‘evidence’ relating to the new PFCC model<br>
slide7. Have PFCCs improved accountability in practice? (some emerging evidence) New accountability arrangements are significantly more complex than the traditional arrangements.
The expanded powers of PFCCs are reflected in more structured and detailed meetings, boards, and panels relating to public accountability, transparency, governance, performance, ethics, and assurance.
Mixed views on whether the PFCC improve accountability to local communities.
Personal dynamics between CFOs and PFCCs have an important role in developing accountability relationships (in some cases, where roles and responsibilities are not clear, and communication and trust are not apparent, the possibility of goal divergence and conflict is high).
Clearer separation of responsibility between strategic governance by PFCCs and operational decision-making by CFOs is being called for in the sector<br>
slide8. People and Professionalism Sir Tom Winsor’s called for ‘fundamental reform’ of the national terms and conditions negotiating machinery in both his 1st and 2nd ‘State of Fire’ reports.
Winsor includes this within the six national recommendations (identified in 2019 report) which involve ‘major structural aspects’ which have been delayed by the pandemic and for some “work is still in its infancy, or hasn’t begun” by the end of 2020.
While progress in service delivery has been made by local F&RS the national reforms identified by Winsor have not (this reflects the NAO findings in 2016).<br>
slide9. Winsor’s 6 issues to be addressed by the sector<br>
slide10. Omission 1: Funding and Resources The question of short and long-term resources and the policies of austerity are predictably, but regrettably, absent from the Home Secretary’s Statement.
Winsor also ducked this issue and marked as ‘completed’ the national priority from his first annual report of ensuring “the sector has sufficient capacity and capability to bring about change”, not whether FRSs have the resources to do the job.
Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic allowed the government to kick these issues into the long grass but no one has yet come up with an acceptable plan for the reform of Local Government Finance.
The emergence of ‘financial sustainability’ and ‘financial resilience’ has been embraced by HMT, the NAO (in its new Code of Audit Practice), and government for inclusion in the post-Redmond Local Audit regime<br>
slide11. Omission 2: Data and Intelligence Improved accountability, resilience, legitimacy, and scrutiny all rely on adequate data and intelligence.
While piecemeal improvements have been made, (by NFCC and HMICFRS) the three recent reports investigating the FRS contribution during the pandemic from the NFCC, HMICFRS and the C19 National Foresight Group highlight the continuing inadequacy of the data and intelligence for national and local decision making (Lewin 2020, HMICFRS, 2021, Hill 2021).
No mention of Integrated Risk Management Planning
Policy making in FRS is being undertaken in a (at least partial) evidential vacuum<br>
slide12. Is this a case of benign or malign neglect? Will a White Paper actually emerge? Watch this space! Questions?<br>
slide2. Introduction and Background 2010-2015 Coalition Government replaced Police Authorities with directly elected individuals responsible for police forces in England and Wales (originally a Labour idea, PCCs were included in 2010 manifesto’s of both Conservatives and Liberal Democrats).
Introduced by Home Secretary (Mrs May) in Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011
1st election in Nov 2012 had historically low electoral turnout with a number of independents appointed
2nd election in May 2016 coincided with local government elections for 40 of 43 territorial police forces - London (Met and City) and Greater Manchester
A popular policy within the Tory party clearly associated with Mrs May<br>
slide3. 2015- 2021 The 2015 Conservative Manifesto (but not Lib Dems or Labour) included a proposal to extend PCCs’ control to all fire services (PFCCs)
2016 replacement of some PCCs with directly elected mayors (in July 2016 Mrs May becomes Prime Minister).
2017 Policing and Crime Act facilitated PCCs taking responsibility for FRS subject to a ‘local case’ being made.
2021 election of 39 PCCs, 4 were PFCCs all in England (Essex, Staffs, Northants and North Yorkshire)
London, Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire - mayoral models<br>
slide4. Fire Service Reform<br>
slide5. Home Secretary’s proposals for governance (March 2021) Consultations on whether to mandate the transfer of FRS functions to PFCCs across England. Practical limitations - the government will now be consulting on “coterminosity (sic) challenges” in the South West, Thames Valley, Sussex, West Mercia and Tyne and Wear. Rather than mandating PFCC everywhere.
Operational independence for Chief Fire Officers which also has the potential to clearly separate and delineate strategic and operational planning for F&R and separate budgets in the PFCC model (Winsor reviews also highlighted).
Clarify some of the legal entities which anticipates some changes in legal entities as between PCCs/PFCCs and local authorities (the Redmond Review has also highlighted).<br>
slide6. Governance - ‘evidence’ relating to the new PFCC model<br>
slide7. Have PFCCs improved accountability in practice? (some emerging evidence) New accountability arrangements are significantly more complex than the traditional arrangements.
The expanded powers of PFCCs are reflected in more structured and detailed meetings, boards, and panels relating to public accountability, transparency, governance, performance, ethics, and assurance.
Mixed views on whether the PFCC improve accountability to local communities.
Personal dynamics between CFOs and PFCCs have an important role in developing accountability relationships (in some cases, where roles and responsibilities are not clear, and communication and trust are not apparent, the possibility of goal divergence and conflict is high).
Clearer separation of responsibility between strategic governance by PFCCs and operational decision-making by CFOs is being called for in the sector<br>
slide8. People and Professionalism Sir Tom Winsor’s called for ‘fundamental reform’ of the national terms and conditions negotiating machinery in both his 1st and 2nd ‘State of Fire’ reports.
Winsor includes this within the six national recommendations (identified in 2019 report) which involve ‘major structural aspects’ which have been delayed by the pandemic and for some “work is still in its infancy, or hasn’t begun” by the end of 2020.
While progress in service delivery has been made by local F&RS the national reforms identified by Winsor have not (this reflects the NAO findings in 2016).<br>
slide9. Winsor’s 6 issues to be addressed by the sector<br>
slide10. Omission 1: Funding and Resources The question of short and long-term resources and the policies of austerity are predictably, but regrettably, absent from the Home Secretary’s Statement.
Winsor also ducked this issue and marked as ‘completed’ the national priority from his first annual report of ensuring “the sector has sufficient capacity and capability to bring about change”, not whether FRSs have the resources to do the job.
Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic allowed the government to kick these issues into the long grass but no one has yet come up with an acceptable plan for the reform of Local Government Finance.
The emergence of ‘financial sustainability’ and ‘financial resilience’ has been embraced by HMT, the NAO (in its new Code of Audit Practice), and government for inclusion in the post-Redmond Local Audit regime<br>
slide11. Omission 2: Data and Intelligence Improved accountability, resilience, legitimacy, and scrutiny all rely on adequate data and intelligence.
While piecemeal improvements have been made, (by NFCC and HMICFRS) the three recent reports investigating the FRS contribution during the pandemic from the NFCC, HMICFRS and the C19 National Foresight Group highlight the continuing inadequacy of the data and intelligence for national and local decision making (Lewin 2020, HMICFRS, 2021, Hill 2021).
No mention of Integrated Risk Management Planning
Policy making in FRS is being undertaken in a (at least partial) evidential vacuum<br>
slide12. Is this a case of benign or malign neglect? Will a White Paper actually emerge? Watch this space! Questions?<br>