SANDF: Force Design Defence planning is simple in

Transcript:SANDF: Force Design Defence planning is simple in:
SANDF: Force Design Defence planning is simple in time of war or imminent war – the enemy and his intentions are known, and there is usually a reasonably clear idea of his doctrine and therefore how his forces are likely to operate. Defence planning is vastly more difficult in time of peace when there is no clear enemy on which to base plans and force strength and composition. Most countries meet this challenge by trying to maintain forces adequate and appropriate to counter existing and predictable threats, and with the adaptability, flexibility and agility to meet unexpected threats. That is sometimes termed the ‘minimum required force’. nan SANDF: Minimum Required Force The force design of the SANDF must be based on providing and maintaining the capabilities required to: Execute existing missions; Deal with existing challenges; Deal with existing threats; Deal with foreseeable threats; and Deal with foreseeable risks. The personnel strength required for the combat services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Forces) will be determined by this. Overall personnel strength will then depend on the organisation of the defence force and its supporting services and divisions. The SANDF is, in fact, too weak to meet that standard – short of combat units, short of deployable personnel and with some key capability gaps. SANDF: Personnel Strength and Costs The SANDF is not massively over-staffed for its roles and missions. What has actually happened is that it is caught between declining funding on the one hand and expanding missions and salary inflation on the other. This is aggravated by: Ageing personnel in junior ranks who are, by virtue of seniority and having families, extremely expensive compared to the cost of younger soldiers; A surplus of administrative and management bodies that add little value but are over-staffed and over-ranked. Rank inflation, in part dating from the previous SADF and in part a result of the integration process after 1994; SANDF: 40:30:30 It is unfortunate that the 40:30:30 formula was put into into the Defence Review. The ratio of personnel costs to operating costs and capital funding is not something that can be set to a formula. It depends on the nature of the defence force which, in turn, depends on its mission sets. The SANDF, for good reasons, is Army-heavy and the Army is for equally good reasons Infantry-heavy. The result is a higher personnel cost component than for a more technology-intensive defence