The Changing Nature of Collective Employment Relations - PowerPoint Presentation

Slide1

The Changing Nature of Collective Employment Relations

Paul Marginson

Manchester IR Society 50

th

Anniversary Conference,

21 November

2014Slide2

A changed landscape

Lerner et al (1969) Workshop Wage Determination

a world of national, multi-employer agreements which shaped wage structures in most large, and determined them in many smaller, firms

f

ocus on relationship increasingly widespread plant-level agreements in larger companies and national (sector-wide) agreements

echoed Donovan Commission’s call for formalisation of plant-level bargaining, within a two-tier bargaining structure

‘Possibly the most remarkable feature of the period after 1980 in Britain was the collapse of collectivism as the main way of regulating employment.’

(Brown et al, 2009: 22)

What happened? Why? Slide3

What happened? Why?

Four feature of collective ER [focus on private sector]

c

ollective representation and organisation

c

ollective bargaining coverage and structure

s

cope (agenda) of collective bargaining

j

oint consultation arrangements

[collective conflict → John Kelly]

Three underlying

processes

‘

marketisation

’: shift from an industrial / occupational frame to an enterprise frame in collective ER

rise of ‘micro-corporatism’: increased focus on common interests of collective actors with an enterprise frame

changing nature of voluntarism

a

ttempts at legally-induced or legislatively-prompted voluntarism → meagre outcomes

‘asymmetric’ voluntarism: management decisions increasingly predominant in determining ‘fact’ and trajectory of collective ERSlide4

Collective representation and organisation (1)

Trade union membership and density

rose from mid-1960s (43%) to 1979 peak (55%)

sharp decline to 1990 (38%), less steep to 2000 (29%), slowed further since (25% in 2014)

Changing demography of trade unionism

numbers of unions declined: 454 (1979), 218 (2000), 162 (2014)

l

argely due to mergers, resulting in concentration of membership in a few large unions

d

ecline of occupationally- and industrially-specific

unions

and rise of the

conglomerate

Employers’ associations

l

ack of data on membership: some decline during 2000s in employment density of CBI member companies from 42% to 35% Slide5

Collective representation and organisation (2)

n

umbers of EAs declined: 375 (1983), 2003 (178), 2014 (97)

d

issolutions (e.g. clearing banks) as well as mergers

(relative)

eclipse of EA in many sectors by individual companies → explosion of number of bargaining units during 1970s and 1980s [‘

marketisation

’]

Two dogs that have whimpered rather than barked …

s

tatutory union recognition procedure (2000) → after initial surge, number of new recognition agreements fell back to 1.5 times mid-90s levels by 2005 (Gall)

n

on-union forms of representation in the workplace in the face of a growing ‘representation gap’

WERS 2004 and 2011: just 7% of non-union workplaces (5+ employees) reported non-union reps

Implication: employers less willing to engage with collective representation

and

unions less able to pressure them to do so [asymmetric voluntarism], but where they do union-based arrangements continue to predominate Slide6

Collective bargaining coverage and structure (1)

Three main developments:

decentralisation (towards company and plant level),

(from 1960s onwards)

c

ontraction of

CB coverage

, only became apparent after 1990

move to ‘single table’ bargaining arrangements

(late 1980s onwards)

Collective bargaining coverage

d

eclined from estimated 70% (1980) to 36% (2000) and 30% (2013) [LFS, whole economy]

WERS (private sector workplaces 25+ employees): 52% of employees (1984), 32% (1998), 25% (2004 and 2011)

Collective bargaining structure (decentralisation)

s

hift from multi- to single-employer bargaining

[‘

marketisation

’]

1960s, 70s: company/plant negotiations within framework of ME agreements (Donovan’s two systems: formal and informal)

1980s onwards: demise of most multi-employer agreements in the private sector; determined pay for almost 1 in 2 workplaces covered by CB (WERS 1984), only 1 in 6 (WERS 1998)

as

a result, many smaller employers, not well organised by unions, fell out of CB coverage altogether [changes in structure and coverage linked

] Slide7

Collective bargaining coverage and structure (2)

Collective bargaining structure (enterprise-level integration)

spread of single union deals and ‘single table bargaining’ arrangements, in place of previous multiple bargaining units, indicates rise of ‘micro-corporatism’ under single-employer bargaining

WERS 1980, 1984, 1990 designed on the assumption that separate bargaining arrangements along occupational lines (manual, non-manual) [also found fragmentation amongst these two groups]

CBI 1979 survey of pay bargaining structures: only 22 / 1250 manufacturing establishments had a common (single table) pay bargaining arrangement

extent of single union deals: WERS 1998: 43% of workplaces recognising unions had a single union, rising to 50% by 2004 → four out of every ten the result of a formal agreement

s

pread of single table bargaining: five out of every ten workplaces recognising 2+ unions in WERS 1998, rising to 6 out of every ten in WERS 2004 Slide8

What accounts for the ‘remarkable’ decline?

structural changes to the economy? → relatively marginal (Brown et al, 2009)

toughening competitive conditions, including internationalisation of markets? → evidence patchy and inconclusive (and UK not unique)

role of foreign-owned MNCs, whose employment share steadily increased? → clear preference for SEB over MEB, but not less likely to recognise unions

l

egal intervention? → Conservative legislation of 1980s, 90s had an impact, but probably secondary (Brown et al, 2009)

UK legal framework always provided weaker support to MEB than in continental western Europe → MEB more vulnerable to changing preferences of collective actors

s

trategic choices?

→

from 1970s onwards large companies chose to break away from ME agreements rather than elaborating / formalising second-tier bargaining within an ME framework; TUs prioritised local negotiations Slide9

Scope of collective bargaining (1)

Two main features h

ollowing out of collective bargaining agenda

g

rowth in micro-corporatism → shift from a productivity- to a competition- oriented agenda

managerial relations largely

disappeared

from the CB agenda, and market relations narrowing to focus on pay only

WERS 1990: aspects of managerial relations (e.g. staffing levels, redeployment) s.t negotiation in >50% workplaces recognising unions; declined to

approx

10% by 1998

WERS 2011: ‘significant diminution in the scope of negotiations’ [over market relations] since 2004; pay the only majority issue, no longer also hours, holidaysSlide10

Scope of collective bargaining (2)

1960s: rise of productivity bargaining (

Fawley

refinery (Flanders), chemical and engineering sectors (Lerner et al

))

f

ormalisation of plant-level bargaining intended to secure basis for productivity bargaining

wages the general equivalent against which other issues (specific working and employment practices) traded off

negotiations integrative,

positive sum, with

gains for both sides (Walton

and

McKersie

)

1990s: shift to competitiveness bargaining, and increased emphasis on common interests between local management and workforce (micro-corporatism)

g

rowing focus on flexibility, internal and external; also on employment and employability, and trade-offs between these

wages increasingly perceived by

mgt

as a cost, cf. productivity-enhancing, factor

e

mployment increasingly a negotiating objective for unions → a second general equivalent against which other issues (enhanced flexibility, cost savings) traded off

n

egotiations integrative, but positive sum outcome less clear cutSlide11

Scope of collective bargaining (3)

spread of ‘pacts for employment and competitiveness’ (PECs

), amongst internationally integrated MNCs in manufacturing (e.g. automotive) to secure production and employment at particular sites

‘reverse’ example: Hoover’s 1993 relocation from Dijon to

Cambuslang

(Scotland)

extent to which employment become a second general equivalent in negotiations underlined by crisis-induced agreements amongst manufacturing companies in 2009, 2010

p

ay freezes and shortened working time in order to maintain employment and retain skillsSlide12

Joint consultation

Traditionally viewed as the poor relation to collective negotiation.

1960s (Donovan): ‘Consultation was almost completely overshadowed by CB in practice and fashionable academic discourse about industrial relations’ (Hall and Purcell, 2013: 15)

Have consultation arrangements become more widespread as CB coverage declines?

1960s, 70s: minority phenomenon but not uncommon (

MacInnes

); Warwick workplace survey (1977-78), 42% of manufacturing workplaces with 50+

employees

l

ate 70s/early 80s a high water mark:

incidence

of consultative

cttes

at workplaces (25+ employees), 34% (WERS 1980, 1984), 28% (WERS 1998), 24% (WERS 2011)

j

oint consultation not filled the gap left by the shrinkage of CB coverage: proportion of workplaces (25+ employees) without either union recognition or consultative

ctte

risen from 34% (1984) to 62% (2004)

2004 ICE regulations – another ‘whimpering’ dog

a

t best, halted decline: workplace consultative

ctte

at 13% of workplaces in

orgns

>50 employees (2011) cf. 14% (2004) Slide13

Quality of consultation

Cressey et al (1985): poverty of the consultation agenda in six company case studies, ‘consultation was a marginal and unstable exercise’ (

MacInnes

1985, 103)

focus in 1990s and 2000s more on direct employee communication and involvement than joint consultation per se (e.g.

Marchington

)

Hall and Purcell (2013): minority of ‘active consulters’ amongst 21 case company case studies, with majority of ‘communicators’

k

ey differences: consultation before the event (options-based); strategic business decisions with impacts on workforce consulted over; management policy towards

consultation

ICE Regulations: a benchmark against which to assess quality of consultation

i

nformation in good time, and sufficient to enable employee reps to prepare for consultation

WERS: for workplaces in

orgns

with >50 employees, with consultative

ctte

, options-based consultation in 40% (2004 and 2011) according to

mgrs

, down from 50% (2004) to 26% (2011) according to employee reps

‘a clear indication that managers were more restrictive in 2011 in the way they approached consultation’ (van

Wanrooy

et al, 2013: 63) Slide14

Final thoughts

marketisation

of collective ER transformed collective agreements from public goods with inclusive regulatory coverage of industrial / occupational workforces, to private goods with exclusive regulatory coverage within those enterprises where unions still recognised

c

ollective bargaining coverage converging on union density

m

icro-corporatism and shift towards a competitiveness-oriented agenda blurring the distinction between negotiation and consultation

c

onsultation arrangements not filling the representation gap, and little evidence that quality improving where arrangements in place

management in the driving seat in developing, or not, collective ER → asymmetric voluntarism

is legally-induced voluntarism doomed to fail?

critiques of ‘light touch’, ineffective framing of SUR procedure (Gall) and ICE

regs

(Hall and Purcell)

c

ounter-example of consultation over collective redundancies regulations