PPT-Pure and Bayes -Nash Price of Anarchy for GSP

Renato Paes Leme Éva Tardos Cornell Cornell amp MSR Keyword Auctions organic search results sponsored search links Keyword Auctions Keyword Auctions Selling one Ad Slot. Price of . Anarchy Bounds via Smoothness Arguments. Tim . Roughgarden. Stanford University. 2. Price of Anarchy. Definition:. . price of anarchy (POA) . of a game (. w.r.t. . some objective . function, . Christodoulou and . Koutsoupias. ,. Roughgarden. Slides stolen/modified from Tim . Roughgarden. TexPoint fonts used in EMF. . Read the TexPoint manual before you delete this box.: . A. A. A. A. A. A. Auction Situations. Private Value. Everybody knows their own value for the object. N. obody knows other people’s values.. Common Value. The object has some ``true value’’ that it would be worth to anybody. Game Theory. Christos Papadimitriou. Econ/TCS Boot Camp. Before 1995…. A few researchers did both:. v. on Neumann N. Megiddo R. E. Stearns. . Btw: . TCS = . Theoretical Computer Science =. Econ 171. The Hawk-Dove Game. Animals meet encounter each other in the woods and must decide how to share a resource.. There are two possible strategies. . Hawk: Demand the entire resource and be prepared to fight for it.. Wyatt Earp and the Gun Slinger. A Bayesian gunslinger game. The gunfight game when the stranger is (a) a gunslinger or (b) a cowpoke. What are the strategies?. Earp. Draw. Wait. Stranger. Draw if Gunslinger, Draw if Cowpoke. . Bayes. . and. Financial . Markets. Klaus . Schredelseker. AWG Innsbruck November 2012. Reverend Bayes. 2. Can . the. . Bayes. ‘ . updating. . model. . be. . used. in . financial. . market. What’s . New here?. . Incomplete information: . Example: . Battle of the sexes . game,But. Bob . doesn’t know . what Alice wants . (i.e. her payoffs from possible outcomes). In previous examples we had “. Econ 171. First some problems. The Goblins.. Working backwards.. What if there are 100 Goblins. Todd and Steven Problem. Problem 1 p 281. How many proper . subgames. are there?. 0. 1. 2. 4. 6. The Yule Ball. 1 Nash equilibrium … in pure strategies & mixed strategies… how NE play arises from rationality … how NE play can arise from evolution 2 Nash Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium: •A set o Econ 171. The Hawk-Dove Game. Animals meet encounter each other in the woods and must decide how to share a resource.. There are two possible strategies. . Hawk: Demand the entire resource and be prepared to fight for it.. Wyatt Earp and the Gun Slinger. A Bayesian gunslinger game. The gunfight game when the stranger is (a) a gunslinger or (b) a cowpoke. What are the strategies?. Earp. Draw. Wait. Stranger. Draw if Gunslinger, Draw if Cowpoke. What’s . New here?. . Incomplete information: . Example: . Battle of the sexes . game,But. Bob . doesn’t know . what Alice wants . (i.e. her payoffs from possible outcomes). In previous examples we had “. Georgios. . Piliouras. Georgia Institute of Technology. John Hopkins University. No Regret Algorithms. in . Games. Georgios. . Piliouras. Georgia Institute of Technology. John Hopkins University. No Regret Algorithms.