PPT-Bayes-Nash equilibrium with Incomplete Information

Whats New here Incomplete information Example Battle of the sexes gameBut Bob doesnt know what Alice wants ie her payoffs from possible outcomes In previous examples we had . Milan Vojnovic. Microsoft Research. Lecture series – Contemporary Economic Issues – University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, November 10, 2014. This Talk. An . overview. of results of a model of competition-based crowdsourcing services based on . Auction Situations. Private Value. Everybody knows their own value for the object. N. obody knows other people’s values.. Common Value. The object has some ``true value’’ that it would be worth to anybody. Revision control computer program. Written by Ross Cohen with some design by Bram Cohen. Use Python. Use merging algorithm called “. Codeville. merge”. Used by . BitTorrent. , . Mosuki. Revision control. Econ 171. The Hawk-Dove Game. Animals meet encounter each other in the woods and must decide how to share a resource.. There are two possible strategies. . Hawk: Demand the entire resource and be prepared to fight for it.. Wyatt Earp and the Gun Slinger. A Bayesian gunslinger game. The gunfight game when the stranger is (a) a gunslinger or (b) a cowpoke. What are the strategies?. Earp. Draw. Wait. Stranger. Draw if Gunslinger, Draw if Cowpoke. Econ 171. First some problems. The Goblins.. Working backwards.. What if there are 100 Goblins. Todd and Steven Problem. Problem 1 p 281. How many proper . subgames. are there?. 0. 1. 2. 4. 6. The Yule Ball. Wyatt Earp and the Gun Slinger. A Bayesian gunslinger game. The gunfight game when the stranger is (a) a gunslinger or (b) a cowpoke. What are the strategies?. Earp. Draw. Wait. Stranger. Draw if Gunslinger, Draw if Cowpoke. …. A) 6. B) 5. C) 4. D) 3. E) 2. Clicker Game:. Nash Equilibrium. The real John Nash. Hollywood’s Version. Clicker Question-A Chicken Game. . 0, 0. 0,. 1. . 1, 0. . -10, -10 . What’s . New here?. . Incomplete information: . Example: . Battle of the sexes . game,But. Bob . doesn’t know . what Alice wants . (i.e. her payoffs from possible outcomes). In previous examples we had “. (. Mis. )understanding. ?. Number 3.5 page 79. Answer Key claims that: . For player 1 a strictly dominates c. For player 2, y strictly dominates w and x.. These claims are correct.. The key claims that . Renato. . Paes. . Leme. . Éva. . Tardos. Cornell. Cornell & MSR. Keyword Auctions. organic search results. sponsored search links. Keyword Auctions. Keyword Auctions. Selling one Ad Slot. solution concepts, and . Refinements of NASH Equilibrium. Tuomas Sandholm. The heart of the problem. In a 1-agent setting, agent. ’. s expected utility maximizing strategy is well-defined. But in a multiagent system, the outcome may depend on others. competitiON. P.V. Viswanath. FIN 663, . Financial Strategy and Business Decisions. Why Game Theory?. equilibria. We saw previously (in the module on Capital Structure and Stockholder Incentives) that the existence of debt could cause debt overhang... solution concepts, and . Refinements of NASH Equilibrium. Tuomas Sandholm. The heart of the problem. In a 1-agent setting, agent. ’. s expected utility maximizing strategy is well-defined. But in a multiagent system, the outcome may depend on...