Collaborative Attacks on Routing Protocols in - PowerPoint Presentation

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Collaborative Attacks on Routing Protocols in - PPT Presentation

Ad hoc Networks Neelima Gupta University of Delhi India Neelima Gupta Dept of Computer Sc University of Delhi ATTACKS on Routing Protocols in ADHOC NETWORKS Black Hole Wormhole Rushing Attack ID: 272334

neelima rreq gupta delhi rreq neelima delhi gupta university dept computer rrep attack packets collaborative hole black data malicious bh1 node nodes

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Slide1

Collaborative Attacks on Routing Protocols in Ad hoc Networks

Neelima

Gupta

University of Delhi

IndiaSlide2

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiATTACKS on Routing Protocols in AD-HOC NETWORKS

Black

Hole

Wormhole

Rushing Attack

Many more AttacksSlide3

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiBlack Hole Attack:

RREQ

RREP

RREQ

DSlide4

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiWorm Hole Attack:

Malicious nodes eavesdrops the packets, tunnel them to another location in the network and retransmit them at the other end.

DSlide5

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiRushing Attack

Forward ROUTE Requests more quickly than legitimate nodes can do so, increase the probability that routes that include the attacker will be discovered,

Attack against all currently proposed on-demand ad hoc network routing protocols.Slide6

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCollaborative Attacks

Informal definition:

“Collaborative attacks (CA) occur when more than one attacker

synchronize

their actions to disturb a target network”Slide7

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiDifferent Models of Collaborative AttackCollaborative Black hole attack

Collaborative Black hole and Wormhole attack

Collaborative Black hole and Rushing Attack Slide8

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCollaborative Black Hole Attack

3Slide9

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of Delhi

RREQ

RREP

RREQSlide10

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of Delhi

BH2

BH1

Collaborative Black Hole Attack (cont.)Slide11

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of Delhi

BH2

BH1

Collaborative Black Hole Attack (cont.)Slide12

Existing ApproachesCross Validation from neighbours (especially Next Hop Neighbours) will fail

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiSlide13

Dr. Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of Delhi

RREQ

RREP

RREQSlide14

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of Delhi

BH2

BH1

Collaborative Black Hole Attack (cont.)Slide15

Existing ApproachesNeighbour monitoringM1 will escapeNeelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiSlide16

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCollaborative Black hole and Wormhole attack

WH2

WH1

BH1

RREQ

RREP

Out-of-Band Channel

RREQ

RREP

RREQ

RREP

RREPSlide17

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCollaborative Black hole and Wormhole attack (cont.)

WH2

WH1

BH1

a2Slide18

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCollaborative Black hole and Rushing Attack

BH1

b2Slide19

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCollaborative Black hole and Rushing Attack (cont.)

BH1

RREQ

RREP

RREQ

RREP

RREQ

RREP

RREQ

RREP

RREPSlide20

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCollaborative Black hole and Rushing Attack (cont.)

BH1

b2Slide21

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCurrent Proposed Solutions to handle collaborative black hole attack

Collacorative

Monitoring:

Collaborative security architecture for black hole attack prevention in mobile ad hoc networks , A

Patcha

and A

Mishra

, Proceedings of RAWCON ’03

Recursive Validation: Sanjay Ramaswamy, Huirong Fu, Manohar Sreekantaradhya, John Dixon and Kendall

Nygard. Prevention of Cooperative Black Hole Attack in wireless Ad-Hoc Networks, Intl Conference on wireless netwroks, 2003Slide22

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCollaborative Black Hole Attack

M1Slide23

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiConsider this scenario-

RREQ

RREP

Tell W1 to monitor M1Slide24

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCase 1: M1 itself drops packets

Data

Packets

Buffer of sent packets to M1

Packets are not forwarded; M1 is MaliciousSlide25

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCase 2: M1 forwards but does not inform watchdog to monitor M2

Data

Packets

Buffer of sent packets to M1

Overhear the packets but does not know the next hop id; increments SUSPECT_NODE counter ->M1 is Malicious

Does not send SEND_DATA signalSlide26

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCase 3: M1 forwards and informs but M2 drops..will be caught by W2

Data

Packets

Buffer of sent packets to M1Slide27

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of Delhi

Buffer of sent packets to M1

Packets are not forwarded; M2 is Malicious

SEND_DATA signalSlide28

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiAnalysisProblem with this

appraoch

Monitoring is done during data transmission => loss of data packets. The current solutions does not specify

if and how

the lost

data is

re-transmitted

Solution : Some dummy packets may be sent before sending the data packets. Slide29

Data Packets

M does not have a route to D, so forward to 3 (not in route)

Data Packets

NULL or NON-NULL Node

Neighbor List : M

Neighbor List : 3

WSlide30

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiAnother ProblemMalicious Nodes acting together can alternately drop packets to keep their individual SUSPECT_NODE counter less than SUSPECT_THRESHOLD, each time a route is established through them.Malicious nodes would not be detected.

Data packets are permanently lost.Slide31

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiRecursive neighbor validation

RREQ

RREP

Intermediate Node, IN

Next Hop Node, NHN

RREP

RREPSlide32

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiCurrent Proposed Solution to handle collaborative attack

Weichao Wang, Bharat Bhargava, Yi Lu, and Xiaoxin Wu. Defending against wormhole attacks in mobile ad hoc networks. In Wiley Journal Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing (WCMC), volume 6, pages 483 –503. Wiley, 2006.Slide33

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiMonitoring /characterizing

Defense

Classification

No anomaly

anomaly

Negligible anomaly

Attack handled

Attack detectedSlide34

ChallengesTwo much of overhead in monitoring even if no attack is present. in isolating the malicious nodes recursively.We propose:

Get a count of the packets received from the destination.

If the count is less than a threshold then monitor.

If a node drops more than a certain threshold, declare it to be malicious. If more than one node drops packet, their sum is compared against the threshold. If greater, both the nodes are

delcared

to be malicious

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiSlide35

NEED TO THINK DIFFERENTLYNeelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiSlide36

Neelima Gupta, Dept. of Computer Sc., University of DelhiThank You!!!