GE S Consejo de Derechos Humanos perodo de sesiones - PDF document

GE.09-16796 (S) 131109 171109 Consejo de Derechos Humanos 13º período de sesiones Tema 3 de la agenda Promoción y protección de todos los derechos humanos, civiles, políticos, económicos, sociales y culturales, incluido el derecho al desarrollo Informe del Relator Especial sobre la promoción y protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales en la lucha contra el terrorismo, Martin Scheinin Misión a EgiptoResumen Por invitación del Gobierno, el Relator Especial sobre la promoción y la protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales en la lucha contra el terrorismo llevó a cabo una visita a Egipto del 17 al 21 de abril de 2009. En el presente informe, el Relator Especial examina la Ley de excepción, las disposiciones de derecho penal relativas a los crímenes de terrorismo y el artículo 179 de la Constitución enmendado, que constituyen el actual marco jurídico de la lucha contra el terrorismo en Egipto. El Relator Especial analiza algunas de las cuestiones y desafíos A/HRC/13/37/Add.2 GE.09-16796 Considera con preocupación el uso de instalaciones no oficiales de detención y el mayor riesgo de torturas para los sospechosos de terrorismo, así como la ausencia de investigaciones y rendición de cuentas. El Relator Especial examina el procesamiento de sospechosos de terrorismo en tribunales especiales, incluidos los tribunales de seguridad en régimen de excepción y los tribunales militares, y pide que se adopten medidas para respetar las garantías procesales. Por último, el Relator Especial toma nota del liderazgo de Egipto en la lucha internacional contra el terrorismo, particularmente en la región, y expresa su preocupación por el recurso a las entregas extrajudiciales. El Relator Especial considera que su visita contribuirá en medida importante a facilitar el compromiso del Gobierno de levantar el estado de excepción, pero advierte a las autoridades contra la utilización del artículo 179 enmendado de la Constitución como base jurídica, por sus numerosas diferencias con respecto a otras disposiciones constitucionales y su disconformidad con las normas internacionales de derechos humanos. El Relator Especial formula una serie de recomendaciones fundamentales para que Egipto pueda desarrollar un programa antiterrorista sostenible que sea eficaz y, al mismo tiempo, respete estrictamente los derechos humanos. A/HRC/13/37/Add.2 GE.09-16796 I. Introduction 1. Pursuant to his mandate, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism visited Egypt from 17 to 21 April 2009 at the invitation of the Government. During his visit the Special Rapporteur met with the Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Interior and Justice. He also met with the Chief of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, the Prosecutor General, the President of the People’s Assembly, Chairpersons of the Legal and Constitutional Committee and the Foreign and National Security Committee of Parliament, and the Vice-President of the Egyptian National Council of Human Rights. In addition, the Special Rapporteur benefited from consultations with lawyers, academics, non-governmental organizations and the international community. 2. The Special Rapporteur thanks the Government of Egypt for its invitation and cooperation during his visit. The country is of great interest to his mandate, not only because of its long experience in combating terrorism, but particularly because of the emergency law framework that is primarily used to countering terrorism in the country. The resort to exceptional powers in the prevention and investigation of terrorist crimes reflects, in the view of the Special Rapporteur, a worrying trend in which this phenomenon is perceived as an emergency triggering exceptional powers, rather than a serious crime subject to normal penal procedures. The recent commitment of the Government of Egypt to lift the country’s state of emergency and to confront the threat of terrorism through an anti-terrorism law, which at the time of the visit was still under preparation, gives the Special Rapporteur an opportunity to address the human rights risks emerging from the application of a state of emergency. The Special Rapporteur is convinced that an analysis of these measures together with an assessment of their compliance with international human rights standards can be a useful step in moving away from a culture of exceptionality. 3. The Special Rapporteur submits this mission report regretting that his first visit to Egypt in April 2009 and the constructive meetings held during that visit have not yet resulted in an invitation for a second visit, during which the Special Rapporteur could observe proceedings in terrorism-related court cases and visit places of detention, including private interviews of persons suspected of, or convicted for, terrorist crimes. The Special Rapporteur expresses his gratitude to the Government for the extensive written responses and comments he has received on the basis of a draft version of this report. These responses have been of great assistance in finalizing the current mission report. The Special Rapporteur expresses his wish that he may soon return to Egypt for a second visit, either prior to the consideration of this report by the Human Rights Council, or as a follow-up II. The emergency law and other laws currently regulating the 4. In the past Egypt has faced situations which genuinely threatened the life of the nation, thereby reaching the threshold for proclaiming a state of emergency in which a State may derogate from some of its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. On several occasions since the early 1970s Egypt has struggled with armed militants who have used a prolonged campaign of violence for the purpose of overthrowing the Government and replacing it with an Islamist State. The last time such a situation occurred was in the middle of the 1990s, when the terrorist organizations Jihad al-Islami A/HRC/13/37/Add.2 GE.09-16796 law in the country. Again he wishes to draw attention to article 4 of the International Covenant, according to which all measures derogating from the Covenant are only permissible to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, and recalls that no provision of the Covenant, however validly derogated from, will be entirely inapplicable to the behaviour of a State party.8. The President may under provisions of the Emergency Law restrict a number of rights pertaining to freedom of assembly and expression and may, in addition to crimes concerning State security, refer offences involving public demonstrations and gatherings for prosecution in so-called Emergency Supreme State Security Courts, the establishment of which is provided for by the same law. The Special Rapporteur recalls that articles 19 and 21 of the International Covenant on the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, as well as article 22 on the closely connected right to association, in themselves allow a State to introduce certain permissible restrictions, when necessary and regulated by the law, in order to protect, inter alia, national security. Limitations in accordance with these criteria should, in his view, suffice for fighting terrorism effectively, and consequently no further derogations from these rights should, in principle, be needed even under a state of emergency. While the maintenance of a democratic society is to a large extent based on the diversity of peaceful activities exercised through the enjoyment of the aforementioned rights, full compliance with the requirements of necessity and proportionality becomes crucial whenever restrictions are imposed. B. The definition of terrorist crimes in Egypt’s Penal Code 9. The Special Rapporteur in his previous reports has advocated that domestic counter-terrorism provisions should, in the absence of a comprehensive international definition of the crime of terrorism, adhere to the three-step cumulative characterization according to which an act, in order to be classified as terrorist, must have been: (a) Committed against members of the general population, or segments of it, with the intention of causing death or serious bodily injury, or the taking of hostages; (b) Committed for the purpose of provoking a state of terror, intimidating a population, or compelling a Government or international organization to do or abstain from doing any act; (c) Correspond to all elements of a serious crime as defined by the law. This approach is reflected also in Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) which provides further guidance for what crimes can be defined as terrorist ones under item (c), by referring to existing international conventions and protocols against terrorism. 10. In addition to the three requirements above, the Special Rapporteur endorses the requirement that any provision criminalizing terrorism must comply with the principle of legality, as enshrined in article 15 of the International Covenant, and consequently be formulated with sufficient precision so as to allow the individual to regulate his conduct and anticipate the elements that make an activity a terrorist crime. Any terrorist act Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Egypt (CAT/C/CR/29/4), paras. 5 (a) and 6 (a). See also concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Egypt (CCPR/CO/76/EGY), para. 6. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 29 (2001) (states of emergency, art. 4), para. 4. Articles 3 (1)–(2), Emergency Law, and Presidential Decree 1/1981 as amended by Presidential Decree 1/2004. A/HRC/13/37/Add.2 GE.09-16796 III. Current challenges and prospects for change through proposed anti-terrorism legislation A. Definitional matters 14. The promotion of an adequate and strict definition of the concept of terrorism is essential in the mandate of the Special Rapporteur. This issue constituted an important focus in his meetings with Egyptian authorities, particularly in regard to the drafting of the future anti-terrorism law. While regretting that the authorities were not willing to share with him a draft that would have allowed a more thorough assessment in this mission report, he is encouraged by having received, in principle, agreement from the side of the authorities on the three-step cumulative characterization supported in paragraph 9 above. However, on the basis of informal reports on the drafting of the proposed anti-terrorism law, he notes that the draft law appears to include in the definition of terrorism acts that do not entail physical violence against human beings, such as the occupation of the environment or buildings, or the prevention of activities or practices of religious centres or of those pertaining to legislative, executive and judicial authorities. The Special Rapporteur takes the view that the inclusion of such supplementary forms of conduct runs the risk of attaching the stigma of terrorism to separate acts which do not fall within the scope of terrorism and which should be provided for and penalized elsewhere in the law, if needed. 15. A closely connected issue relates to the matter of criminalization of a terrorist organization. The Special Rapporteur during his meetings with Egyptian authorities strongly advised against any wording in the future anti-terrorism law that would define a terrorist organization on the basis of its aimto commit any act legally characterized as terrorist, rather than on the commissionof specific acts. He also spoke against penalizing leadership of such an organization with the death penalty. He stressed that legal provisions applicable to terrorist organizations, including the criminal responsibility of its members, should essentially be based on the use of or calls for deadly or otherwise serious violence against civilians. Any criminalization of a terrorist organization that is exclusively based on the goals of the organization risks inadequately expanding the concept of terrorism. 16. Any anti-terrorism law that is not properly confined to the countering of terrorism is problematic, not only because an overly expansive scope of such a law weakens its own legitimacy and ultimately may prove to be counter-productive, but particularly because it may unjustifiably restrict the enjoyment of human rights pertaining to the exercise of peaceful activities, including dissent and political opposition, through legitimate associations. The Special Rapporteur expresses concern that practices allowed for by the Emergency Law have been frequently applied in circumstances that have no clear link to terrorist violence. He refers to the prosecution of 49 persons before an Emergency Supreme State Security Court for their involvement in violent demonstrations in Mahalla al-Kobra on 6 April 2008, as well as to the arrest and detention of a number of Internet bloggers critical of the Government, human rights activists, members of the country’s largest opposition group the Muslim Brotherhood, and journalists. Against this background, he calls upon the Government of Egypt to strictly limit all measures provided for in the proposed anti-terrorism legislation to countering terrorism alone, as well as to ensure explicit safeguards against any abuse of such measures. B. Exceptional procedures 17. A decision to lift the state of emergency would, according to some Egyptian authorities, seriously challenge their capacity to conduct in particular preventive counter- A/HRC/13/37/Add.2 GE.09-16796 detainee to contest the legality of detention, as stipulated by article 9 (4). Provisions of the ordinary penal legislation provide that persons deprived of their liberty shall within 24 hours following the moment of detention be brought before a public prosecutor, who shall within another 24 hours either order their release or extend the detention. Article 3 (1) of the Emergency Law, on the other hand, stipulates that only 30 days after the issuance of the detention order may the detainee challenge its legality before a court, which then has to decide within 15 days whether to release or detain the suspect. The Minister of the Interior can contest the release until 15 days after the decision, after which the court has another 15 days to decide on the case. The Special Rapporteur has misgivings in relation to the duration of the detention period preceding the detainee’s appearance before a court and he endorses, in line with the Human Rights Committee’s general comment No. 29 (2001) on article 4 of the International Covenant (para. 16), that the right to take proceedings before a court in order to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention is protected at all times, including during a state of emergency. 21. The Emergency Law does not define a maximum time limit for the administrative detention of an individual considered to be a national security threat, which implies that a person may be held indefinitely under this regime. Under such circumstances, the Special Rapporteur considers of little relevance the fact that administrative detainees are, in principle, granted the same rights as pretrial detainees, who are considered innocent until they receive a final conviction. With special reference to the proposed anti-terrorism law, the Special Rapporteur urges the Egyptian authorities to discontinue any use of administrative detention and to introduce a phase of transition during which each person currently held under this regime would be either tried or released, thereby securing Egypt’s compliance with its international obligations. 2. Renewal of detention orders and non-compliance with court rulings on release 22. Complaints about detention under article 3 (1) of the Emergency Law are decided by a single judge acting in the capacity of an Emergency Supreme State Security Court. Decisions issued in favour of the detainee are subject to appeal by the Ministry of the Interior before another Emergency Supreme State Security Court. In cases where this second court rejects the appeal, the detainee must be released. If the court, on the other hand, confirms the legality of the detention, the detainee is granted the right to renew his complaint after a further 30 days. 23. According to documented cases and testimonies given to the Special Rapporteur, the Ministry of the Interior often renews the detention order against a released person with the unsubstantiated justification that the person “immediately resumed suspicious activities” upon release. Of particular concern is the widespread practice that persons are not actually released after a release order is given, but are transferred by SSI officers to non-official premises or police stations where they are held illegally until a new detention order is given. As a consequence, an unspecified number of persons have been held for years, sometimes over a decade, using this mechanism. Especially worrying in this regard is the fact that prisoners who have protested against such measures and continued challenging the legality of their detention often face reprisals such as transfers to remote prisons, where the conditions are harsher, or stripping the detainee of his/her right to be visited by his/her relatives, lawyer or psychologist. The Special Rapporteur recalls that however serious a threat an individual may be perceived to pose, a state of emergency does not justify action that is in contravention of peremptory norms of international law, such as the prohibition Articles 36 and 131 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). Article 3, Emergency Law. A/HRC/13/37/Add.2 GE.09-16796 28. Despite these safeguards there is an alarming lack of judicial oversight of facilities run by SSI, which as such are not subject to any inspections of the kind referred to above. With this in mind it becomes difficult to fully ignore many reports about terrorist suspects being arrested, transferred to, and held incommunicado in what are mainly referred to as SSI secret underground cells. This is said to occur long before the official registration of their detention. Such practices would result in a situation where the detainee is beyond any protection of the law, and in some cases amount to enforced disappearance. 29. The Special Rapporteur recalls that the Human Rights Committee has recommended that provisions be made against the use of incommunicado detention and that all detainees be given prompt and regular access to lawyers and doctors in order to ensure respect for the absolute prohibition against torture, as established in article 7 of the International Covenant. However, as a prerequisite for the protection of this right, only officially recognized places of detention must be used for the detention of terrorist suspects. As consistent allegations exist of the use of other facilities for this purpose, independent, prompt and thorough investigations are needed. 2. Torture allegations 30. According to information received from the Government, in 2006–2009 five “officers” received prison sentences for torture-related allegations, while 49 persons were sentenced to deductions from their salary. While noting the existence of a small number of cases where police officers have been subject to investigations and trial following torture complaints, the Special Rapporteur is troubled that complaints against SSI officers in this regard have produced no results. The Special Rapporteur is gravely concerned about information that terrorist suspects subjected to detention by SSI officers are at particular risk of torture and that, according to the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture, “recourse to such practices appears to display a systematic pattern”. This includes, inter alia, beatings, suspension in painful positions for long periods, electric shocks including on the genitals, rape and threats to kill the victim or members of the family, all of which aim at bringing the victim into a state of complete intimidation, including compelling him to confess to any charges brought against him/her. Condemning any connivance at the crime of torture, the Special Rapporteur reminds the Government of Egypt of the obligation of the State to ensure that all perpetrators of such offences are brought to justice on the basis of prompt and independent investigations that are carried out whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that torture has been committed. E. Investigation in terrorism cases and trials before special courts 1. Special investigative powers of the prosecution 31. The Public Prosecution, which according to law is entitled to exercise the powers of an examining magistrate and thereby generally conducts pretrial investigations, may in ordinary criminal cases not detain a suspect for more than four days from the moment of arrest. Pretrial investigations relating to terrorist crimes, in contrast, are conducted by the Supreme State Security Prosecution which may detain a terrorist suspect for up to six months. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 20 (1992), para. 11. See CCPR/CO/76/EGY, para. 13 and CAT/C/CR/29/4, para. 5 (b)–(c). Article 201, CCP. Article 126 bis,CCP, as amended by Law No. 95 of 2003. A/HRC/13/37/Add.2 GE.09-16796 as established in article 14 (1) of the International Covenant, as an absolute right that is not subject to any exception. 4. Equality of arms and the right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence 36. The right to legal counsel, including for those who lack financial means, is guaranteed by article 69 of the Egyptian Constitution whereas provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibit separating the lawyer from the suspect during interrogation.However, the Special Rapporteur is concerned that terrorist suspects’ access to, including private consultation with, a lawyer of their choice, seems to be severely restricted during both the pretrial phase and the actual hearings in court. For example, none of the 13 defendants accused of involvement in the Taba and Sharm el-Sheikh bombings in October 2004 and July 2005 were assisted in securing access to a lawyer throughout the duration of pretrial detention or were allowed to communicate in private with counsel even during trial. The Special Rapporteur recalls that the right to communicate with counsel of his/her own choosing, as established in article 14 (3) (b) of the International Covenant and embodied in the principle of equality of arms, requires that the defendant enjoy prompt access to counsel and be allowed private consultations in conditions that fully respect the confidentiality of communication. The complete denial of this right can in no circumstances be compatible with international standards of a fair trial (A/63/223, para. 35). 37. The principle of equality of arms embodies the prerequisite that all parties to a case shall enjoy the same procedural rights and that the defendant, in any case, shall not be subjected to any actual disadvantages in relation to the prosecution. The Special Rapporteur is aware of Egyptian legislation and instructions aiming at ensuring the defendant’s access to the investigation file before trial, and recognizes that the criteria for what is to count as “adequate time” for the preparation of defence, as guaranteed by paragraph 3 (b) of article 14 of the International Covenant, must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. However, bearing in mind the seriousness of charges relating to terrorist offences as well as the often complex nature characterizing the investigation of crimes, the Special Rapporteur takes the view that giving access to case files or providing the exact content of the charges only during the first session in trial to lawyers defending terrorist suspects before military or emergency courts renders illusory the right of the accused to an adequate defence. 38. The Special Rapporteur wishes to highlight the role of the court in ensuring the lawfulness of all evidence presented and considered at trial, and the obligation not to consider any statements claimed to have been extracted under duress, if the contrary has not been proven. Considering in particular the difficulties posed by delayed forensic examinations and other impediments to the initiation or course of investigations into torture complaints (see paragraph 30 above), the Special Rapporteur is worried about the notable inconsistency of information, even provided by the authorities, on the procedures applied by military and emergency courts in cases where torture claims are raised at trial. He recalls the State’s obligation to ensure, including during a state of emergency, that no statements or confessions or, in principle, other evidence obtained in violation of the absolute prohibition against torture may be invoked as evidence in any proceedings covered by article 14 of the Covenant. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 19. Article 125, CCP. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007)para. 6. A/HRC/13/37/Add.2 GE.09-16796 2. Disappearances and extraordinary renditions in the context of international counter-terrorism operations 42. According to Egyptian authorities any person convicted in absentiawhen staying outside the Egyptian territory will be retried upon return to the country and any implementation of the death penalty when pronounced in absentia would always be reconsidered. Despite these assurances, the Special Rapporteur has heard troubling allegations that some persons rendered to Egypt outside the framework of formal extradition have been executed without a new trial shortly after arrival. The disappearance in 1995 of Abu Talal al-Qasimi (Talaat Fouad Qassem), a leader of Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya who was sentenced to death in his absenceby an Egyptian military tribunal in 1992, is one example. Qassem was transferred to Egypt after being interrogated by United States of America security officials in September 1995 aboard an American ship cruising the Adriatic Sea, and there are very strong indications that he was executed upon arrival. In this context the Special Rapporteur also regrets that the Government of Egypt did not reply to his questions on the fate of Egyptian ex-Guantánamo Bay detainee Reda Fadel El-Weleli (alternative spelling: Fael Roda Al Waleeli), who was transferred from Guantánamo Bay to Egypt on 1 July 2003. 43. The Special Rapporteur has previously expressed concernabout the use of so-called “extraordinary renditions” in the fight against terrorism. This practice, which refers to the secret transfer of a person to another State for the purpose of interrogation or detention, is for several reasons impermissible under international law. The removal of a person, including through “diplomatic channels”, without providing him/her with access to any legally prescribed procedures, as well as the detention without charge, or for long periods even when charged, in themselves violate articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant and may, in conjunction with incommunicado detention for long periods, amount to enforced disappearance. Such procedures, furthermore, put the person at a serious risk of torture or other ill-treatment, and are as a whole in contradiction with the principle of non-refoulement. 44. The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned about Egypt’s acknowledged involvement in the well-known CIA rendition programme, which has affirmed earlier credible indications that Egypt has been one of the most prominent countries involved in this programme. Regular access to lawyers, doctors and judicial authorities upon arrival to and during detention in Egypt are necessary to prevent any resort by security officials to torture or other ill-treatment during interrogation of such persons, whether with the purpose of charging and bringing them to trial or to extract intelligence in relation to other persons. 45. The Special Rapporteur regrets that the Government of Egypt has not started any meaningful internal investigation into any rendition case, and he is deeply concerned about its passive obstruction of investigations by other countries by refusing to cooperate with any judicial or non-judicial inquiry into this phenomenon. In this context, the Special Rapporteur regrets that the Government of Egypt did not reply to his questions concerning the whereabouts of Abu Omar between 18 February 2003 and 20 April 2004, nor to his questions about the lack of investigation into the and cases. As there are many other reports of violations of article 7 of the International Covenant during past interrogations of rendered terrorist suspects, and even ongoing violations of articles 9 and 10, the Special Rapporteur is afraid that Egypt will only be able to be a respected and reliable partner in the international fight against terrorism when it conducts thorough, The Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif during a visit to the United States in May 2005 stated on television that 60 or 70 people had been transferred to Egypt by intelligence services of the United States since September 2001. NBC News, Meet The Press, 15 May 2005. A/HRC/13/37/Add.2 GE.09-16796 terrorism programme be effective and successful in the long term, the Special Rapporteur provides below a set of recommendations. B. Recommendations 49. The Special Rapporteur urges the Government of Egypt to lift the state of emergency and repeal the Emergency Law, including all decrees issued under it, with a view to restoring the rule of law and full compliance with human rights, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As an essential step in this direction, he recommends that article 179 of the Egyptian Constitution be revised in order to secure compliance with international standards protecting personal liberty and privacy. 50. The Special Rapporteur recommends that all provisions establishing terrorist crimes, whether those established in Law No. 97 of 1992 or those being drafted for the purpose of the proposed anti-terrorism law, adhere strictly to the principle of legality. Any criminalization of terrorist activity must be formulated in explicit and precise terms that enable the individual to regulate his/her behaviour. In particular, the definitions of terrorist crimes should be confined exclusively to activities that entail or are directly related to the use of deadly or serious violence against civilians. 51. The proscription of terrorist organizations, including the application of criminal responsibility of its members, must be made on the basis of factual evidence of activities that are of a genuine terrorist nature as well as of the actual involvement of the individuals concerned. He strongly advises against criminalization based on goals or ends, which would risk targeting legitimate associations, including human rights organizations and opposition groups that should not fall within the ambit of any counter-terrorism law. 52. The Special Rapporteur recommends that any counter-terrorism measure that results in the restriction of human rights, in particular pertaining to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and association, be brought into compliance with the requirements of necessity and proportionality and applied in accordance with clearly defined legal criteria. Furthermore, he recommends the enactment and consistent implementation of explicit legal safeguards against abuse in order to prevent any deliberate use of counter-terrorism measures aiming at negatively affecting open dialogue and criticism, including against the Government.53. The Special Rapporteur urges the Government of Egypt to abolish any legal provisions allowing for administrative detention and to take effective measures to release or bring to trial all detainees currently subjected to that regime. He recommends that any detention without charge or trial be explicitly prohibited, including by provisions in the proposed anti-terrorism law, and that any exceptional detention procedures applied against terrorist suspects entail strict guarantees ensuring full compliance with articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant, including access to a judicial authority within 24 hours from the moment of arrest, in order to explicitly protect against any behaviour contrary to article 7 of the Covenant.54. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government of Egypt promptly and thoroughly investigate any claim regarding policies that through the imposition of a “declaration of repentance” would set as a condition for release the self-incrimination of administrative detainees.55. The Special Rapporteur recommends the adoption of a mechanism that provides for the mandatory conduct of independent, unrestricted and unannounced inspections at all places of detention, including SSI premises and military institutions