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Sabrin Beg Home Address Office Address  Mansfield Street Department of Economics Apt Sabrin Beg Home Address Office Address  Mansfield Street Department of Economics Apt

Sabrin Beg Home Address Office Address Mansfield Street Department of Economics Apt - PDF document

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Sabrin Beg Home Address Office Address Mansfield Street Department of Economics Apt - PPT Presentation

beggmailcom Website wwwsabrinbegcom Citizenship Pakistan Canadian Resident US F1 Visa Fields of Concentration Development Political Economy Desired Teaching Devel opment Political Economy Comprehensive Examinations Completed 201 1 Oral Development P ID: 38192

beggmailcom Website wwwsabrinbegcom Citizenship

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Sabrin BegHome Address:Office Address:125 Mansfield Street Department of EconomicsApt #2 Websitewww.sabrinbeg.com Associate Professor Nancy Qian Assistant. Professor Daniel KenistonExpected Completion Date: May 201 B.A., Economics and Mathematics,Magna cum LaudeWellesley College, 2007 Fellowships, Honors and Awards: Georg W. Leitner Program in International and Comparative Political Economy Award, 2014 Sasakawa Research Award, 2014 RyoichiSasakawaYoungLeadersFellowship,2012 Yale University Fellowship, 20092015Teaching Experience:Yale University, Teaching FellowIntroductory Microeconomics, Fall 2013 Research and Work Experience:Research Assistant toDavid Atkin, Yale University, 2010Working Papers:Political Economy of Land Institutions, Tenures and Agricultural Productivity”, (August), Job Market Paper“A Theory of Clientelism in a Developing Economy” Inflation Expectations in a Developing Country Setting” with Hassan Abbas and Ali ChoudharyApril 2014Works In Progress: Effect of ColonialLand Distributionon Contemporary OutcomesPolitician Incentives for Public School ProvisionSeminar and Conference Presentations:NEUDC, Boston University, November 2014EconCon, Princeton University, August 2014ECSAS, University of Zurich, July Languages: Urdu(native), English(fluent), French(fluent) References: Mark RosenzweigYale UniversityDepartment of Economics PO Box 208269 New Haven, CT 06520 Phone: mark.rosenzweig@yale.edu Christopher UdryYale UniversityDepartment of Economics PO Box 208269 New Haven, CT 06520 Phone: christopher.udry@yale.edu Daniel KenistonYale UniversityDepartment of Economics PO Box 208269 New Haven, CT 06520 Phone: daniel.keniston@yale.edu Nancy Qian (on leave 2014Yale UniversityDepartment of Economics PO Box 208269 New Haven, CT 06520 Phone: (203) 832 nancy.qian@yale.edu Dissertation AbstractIn my dissertation I study the persistence of institutions and their political economy implications. The impact of institutions on electoral outcomes, public goods allocation and individual behavior is considered. The contribution includes a uses rich data from various sources, including historical sources, and careful empirical analysis to test the microfoundations underlying the longterm effects of institutions. Chapter 1: Political Economy of Land Institutions. Tenures and Agricultural Productivity[Job Market Paper]Unequal initial asset distribution can shape the identity and incentives of elites, which in turn affect public goods and development. Economic growth can in turn reinforce or undermine the power of these elites. I study the effect of land inequality and presence of landed elites on electoral competition and public goods provision in the context of Pakistan. I alsoconsider the relationship between land distribution and political power responds tochanges in development, by looking at the effect of technical change in agriculture. The papercontributes to a key question in development economics and political economy about the performance of democracy across levels of development; developing countries are commonly believed to have corrupt politicians who target funds and efforts to narrow groups of voters, undermining the provision of broad public goods. I show that development itself can affect elite capture and clientelism. The paper is also the first to lay microfoundations for a longstanding question in economics:the economic and political exchanges between traditional rural patrons and peasants (Scott 1972, 1976)I show that when land concentration is high landowners can transfer utility to sharecropping tenants by offering them concessions on input costs; this is cheaper for the landlord to do so relative to offering a lump sum transfer. I incorporate this ability of landlords into an election model where candidates can be landowners and offer both private transfers and public goods to voters. I find that a landlord politician will capture a greater vote share, and will offer a greater quantity of the public good that benefits landowners. The sharecropping contract entails lower input intensity and output due to moral hazard; technical change shifts the optimal contract away from sharecropping. Having fewer sharecropping tenants attenuates landlord's electoral advantage, and thus her probability of win. This contrasts with a 'wealth story' through which technical change should improve the landowners’ wealth and thus ability to make transfers, making it more likely or landlords to acquire political influence. I test my model using household and constituency level data from Pakistan. I exploit the introduction of an election in 2002, preceded by a military regime to study landlord politicians and their contracts with tenants. Using a differencedifference specification with tenant fixed effects, I show that after the election landlord politicians offer sharecropping contracts which make the tenant relatively better off. Thereby, I establish that landlord politicians make transfers to their tenants to accumulate votes. To test the effect of technical change I exploit the plausibly exogenous technology of high yielding variety (HYV) seeds, which can have varying effects on level of productivity depending on exogenous agroclimactic conditions of areas. These characteristics coupled with the timevarying availability of HYV (a foreign technology) provide a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the land productivity across areas and over time. Firstly, I show that the rate of sharecropping tenancy goes down with technical change. Next using colonial land distribution to proxy for current land concentration, I show that technical change resulted in shifting poweraway from the landlords. The results show that electoral competition improves and public goods composition shifts with the technical change. Public goods favored by landowners shiftdown relative to other public goods. Chapter 2: A Theory of Clientelismin a Developing Economy I considerthe overlap of agriculturaland electoral markets. When land concentration is high, the land market consists of a small proportion of large landowners interacting with a relatively larger population of landless agricultural workers or smallholders. In the absence of nonagricultural opportunities, tenancy will be high in this environment. I focus on a particular type of contract, in which landlords and tenants share the output. The contract is modeled in a principalagent framework with risk averse tenants (agent) and risk neutral landlord (principal). The sharecropping contract allows risk pooling (if tenants are risk averse) as well as interlinkage of the land credit and input markets. Landowner and tenants share the output; tenants supply labor, while landowners can provide credit, or share input costs. Using insights from the literature on contractual choice in agriculture, I show that interlinked share cropping contracts allow the landowners to raise the utility of tenants by offering them access to inputs and cheap agricultural credit. The landlord pays a cost for supplying inputs or credit, butby doing so also incentivizes the tenant to exert more effort. The landlord shares the resulting increase in output. Hence the interlinked contract allows the landlord to make the tenant better off, at a lower cost than transferring a lump sum. This feature of the sharecropping contract is incorporated into a model of redistributive politics. Candidates promise private and public goods. Landowners will face a lower cost of delivering transfers to tenants, resulting in an ability to convert transfers into votes “cheaply”. This will have implications for the tenure, electoral competition and public goods allocation. When the landproductivity shifts, the incentives for contractual choice and political office shift; the implications for agricultural choices, and electoral outcomes is considered in response to technical change in agriculture. Chapter 3: Inflation Expectations in a Developing Country (with Hassan Abbas and Ali Choudhary)We study inflation expectations at the household level for a developing economy using a novel dataset on 19744 householdfor the 20112013 period. We find inflation expectations are systematically exaggerated and this biasedness is entrenched for lowincome, less educated, female and younger respondents. This may explain unusually high inflation persistence in Pakistan. We also find that recent fuel and energy prices announcements play an important role in determining perceptions of inflationwhich suggests that these commodities play an anchor role for inflationary expectations. This result may also support the observation that these are popular news items as well important CPI basket commodities. These results cast doubt on the adequacy of rational expectations hypothesis in Pakistan.