When Disaster Strikes What Can Government Do Lesson 3 Hurricane Katrina 2005 Institutions the rule of law Public Goods Incentives amp Information San Francisco Earthquake 1906 ID: 477567
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bnjQ3cV4x1ISlide2
When Disaster Strikes, What Can Government Do?
Lesson 3:
Hurricane Katrina
2005
Institutions:
the rule of law
Public Goods
Incentives & Information
San Francisco
Earthquake 1906Slide3Slide4Slide5Slide6
Presidio Refugee Camp, 1906Slide7
Gov. George Pardee
Mayor Eugene SchmitzSlide8
1906, Congress: $2.5 million for San Francisco1950, Congress: Presidential declaration of “disaster area” (made at the request of state governor) triggers eligibility for federal funds to be used to repair and reconstruct infrastructure and public buildings 1969, Congress: Disaster Relief Act made federal aid available to individuals buildings.1979, Executive Order: President Jimmy Carter created FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Administration2008 FEMA budget = $8.2 billion.2015 FEMA budget request $10.38 billionFederal Disaster SpendingSlide9
Select the alternative with the greatest excess of benefits over costsThe rule applies in the public sector just as it does in the private sector.Review/Reminder: Rule of Rational Choice?
Question:
For what activities do the benefits of government action in disasters outweigh the costs, and why?Slide10
For what types of activities are governmental institutions well-suited?Maintaining and enforcing the rule of lawSlide11
Looting Isn’t NewSlide12
Maintaining Law & Order in ChicagoSlide13
Law & Order key to quick recovery. . .
Chicago 1872
Chicago 1890
Chicago, 1907Slide14
. . . Or not:Slide15
Law & Order Facilitates Disaster Recovery
Reducing uncertainty facilitates individual decision-making.Slide16
Businesses are less likely to return and rebuild if instability and uncertainty persist.
Law & Order Facilitates Disaster RecoverySlide17
Civic order and dependable rule of law attract other social institutions to return to the community.
Law & Order Facilitates Disaster RecoverySlide18
Government Shapes the Rules of the Game
Changing the rules of the game can aid disaster recovery
when those changes facilitate adaptation to specific conditions created by the disaster and when there is a reasonable expectation that the changes are temporary accommodations that will speed up the return to normalcy.
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When disaster strikes, what can government do?Re-establish order, maintain and enforce the rule of lawProvide public goodsSlide20
Public goodsNon-exclusiveNon-rivalrousFor what types of activities are governmental institutions well-suited?Publicly-provided goods
Paid for by tax revenue
Will You Pay?
Free-rider problemSlide21
Public goodsNon-exclusiveNon-rivalrousFor what types of activities are governmental institutions well-suited?Publicly-provided goods
Paid for by tax revenue
Free-rider problemSlide22
Providing public goodsNon-exclusiveNon-rivalrous
For what types of activities are governmental institutions well-suited?Slide23
Public goods & servicesNon-exclusiveNon-rivalrous(Publicly-provided goods are not always public goodsPaid for with tax revenue)For what types of activities are governmental institutions well-suited?
emergency rescue
debris clean-up
bridge & highway repair
public order & safety
protecting property
housing victims
feeding victims
recovery planning
Public
or
Publicly-Provided ?Slide24
The Disaster of Government Disaster Mitigation
“The slow and seemingly inept responses of government at all levels both in preparation for and recovery from [Hurricane Katrina] infuriated Americans.”
Emily Chamlee-Wright & Daniel Rothschild: “Disastrous Uncertainty. . . “
Questions:
Is someone to blame?
The problem of
expected
benefits and
expected costsPerhaps our expectations should be re-examinedSlide25
Information & Incentives
Proposition:
Governments’ poor performance in disaster relief is best explained not by reference to lack of compassion or to venal and/or incompetent officials, but instead by the centralized nature and the incentives that accompany government decision-making.
What we shouldn’t ask government to do, and why.
Note to Self:
Check the incentives
created by the
rules of the gameSlide26
Problem: Information Transfer in Centralized Institutions
No effective mechanism (like price in markets) to gather and transmit fragmented, chaotic, and dispersed information from the disaster area to the decision-makers
People familiar with local conditions, needs, and available resources are not likely to be involved in the decision-making
FEMA Note to Self:
When Disaster
Strikes,
Turn On TV ! ! ! Slide27
Problem: Information Transfer in Centralized Institutions
Bureaucratic institutional structure is characterized by detailed procedures, strict protocols, and line-of-command decision-making.
effective mechanism for institutions without the motivating incentive of profit.
create incentives for employees to contribute to the task of the agency.
Those who follow procedures accrue benefits and those who do not bear costs.
(James Buchanan, Public Choice Theory)Slide28
Problem: Information Transfer in Centralized Institutions
The political process lacks a feedback loop from the victims to the decision-makers responsible for allocating resources in disasters.
FEMA trailers
the Ice fiasco . . .
goes on and on and on . . .
HERE!
Slide29
Problem: Incentives
Incentives for elected and appointed government workers encourage poor resource use
Moral Hazard
Exists when people are shielded from the full costs of risk
Exists in both the private and public sectors
Insurance, for example
Private sector has incentive to mitigate; public sector does not
Example:
1998 Am Geophysical Union study: from 1970-98 drastic rise in disaster relief costs : people moving
into
high risk regions
NOT a
character
indictmentSlide30
Problem: Incentives
Incentives for elected and appointed government workers encourage poor resource use
Good Samaritan Effects
The distortion in decision-making that occurs when people come to expect generous disaster assistance
Exists in both public and private (non-profit charities) sector
(charity hazard)
NFIP – National Flood Insurance Program – federal program for homeowners in river flood-plains or flood-prone coastal areas
Voluntary, 13% purchase
Can buy after the fact
1/3 total payments to 3% claimants
NOT a
character
indictmentSlide31
DebbieSlide32
When Disaster Strikes, What Can We Do?
Lesson 4:
Comparative advantage
Competition & non-profits
Institutions:
personal
v.
impersonal
(commercial) interactions Money
Role of banks and the FEDSlide33
Non-profits: Comparative Advantage
Decentralized: Effective transmitter of signals between interested 3
rd
parties who want to help and individuals and small groups wanting assistance
Evidence:
For profit companies channel their charitable
contributions through established relief organizations
Indonesian Tsunami relief: $700 million private-sector corporate donations funneled through Red Cross, UNICEF & other established organizations
Wal-Mart: $20m to Red Cross & Salvation Army, in-kind donations through established shelters
Salvation Army representative of advantages:
Already present in communitiesDaily experience with people in distressPremium on training people in advanceSlide34
card
A Tale of Two Debit CardsSlide35
Non-profits Operate in a Market-Like Atmosphere
Charities compete for donations
Not as strong as pure profit & loss, but stronger than gov’t
Competition is facilitated by feedback similar to markets
Donors’ self-interest: I want my money to be used well
Competition for donations is heightened by modern communication technology,
BBB Wise Giving Alliance
CharityWatch.org
Charity Navigator
Bernadine Healy
"Forced Out"Slide36
The Best Way for Individuals to Help
Channel assistance through established organizations with good records
Send money !
the Second
Disaster !Slide37
$$$ The Power of Money $$$
Relief professionals can purchase the “right stuff”
Remember:
You didn’t know about the elephants and the turkey roasting pans. The local culture and environment matters.
Money is a magnet; it will draw in goods and services
Money donations don’t use resources like transportation and storage
Pumping cash back into disaster-stricken areas facilitates economic recovery
Yes, money is impersonal – and that’s its chief virtue!