No On File Sharing with Indirect Network Effects Between Concert Ticket Sales and Music - PDF document

Concert Ticket Sales and Ralf Dewenter, Tobias Wenzel July 2011 HeinrichHeine Normann OnFileSharingwithIndirectNetworkEectsBetweenConcertTicketSalesandMusicRecordingsRalfDewenteryJustusHaucapzTobiasWenzelxAbstractThispaperanalysestheinterdependencybetweenthemarketformusicrecordingsandconcerttickets,assumingthattherearepositiveindirectnetworkeectsbothfromtherecordmarkettoticketsalesforliveperformancesandviceversa.Inamodelwithtwointerre-latedHotellinglinespricesinbothmarketsarecorrecteddownwardswhencomparedtothestandardHotellingmodel.Also,lesharinghasambiguouseectsonrms'protability.Aslesharingcanindi-rectlyincreasedemandforliveperformancesoverallprotscaneitherincreaseordecrease,dependingonthestrengthofindirectnetworkeects.Finally,lesharingmayinducermstoswitchfromthetraditionalbusinessmodelwithtwoseparatermstoanintegratedbusinessmodelwhereoneagencymarketsbothrecordsandconcerts(so-called360degreedeals).JEL-Classication:L13,L82,Z10. Wewouldliketothankthreeanonymousreferees,theeditoraswellasseminarpar-ticipantsinNuernbergfortheirhelpfulcomments.yDuesseldorfInstituteforCompetitionEconomics(DICE),UniversityofDuesseldorf,Universitaetsstr.1,40225Duesseldorf.Email:ralf.dewenter@dice.uni-duesseldorf.dezDuesseldorfInstituteforCompetitionEconomics(DICE),UniversityofDuesseldorf,Universitaetsstr.1,40225Duesseldorf.Email:justus.haucap@dice.uni-duesseldorf.dexDuesseldorfInstituteforCompetitionEconomics(DICE),UniversityofDuesseldorf,Universitaetsstr.1,40225Duesseldorf.Email:tobias.wenzel@dice.uni-duesseldorf.de1 Keywords:MusicIndustry,IndirectNetworkEects,FileSharing,Piracy,RecordSales,ConcertTickets.1IntroductionThemusicindustryisgoing,onceagain,throughaphaseofrapidtechno-logicalchange.Thedigitalisationofmusichasmadecopyrightenforcementmuchmoredicultandcostly,andthereisaheatedandverycontroversialdebateabouttheeectsoflesharingpossibilities(see,e.g.,Oberholzer-GeeandStrumpf(2007);Liebowitz(2007)).Mostofthedebatefocusesonthequestionhowle-sharingaectsrecordsales,rms'protsandmusicdistri-butionsystems(see,e.g.,Alexander(2002);PeitzandWaelbroeck(2006))aswellasverticalproductdierentiation(quality)(e.g,Bayaan(2004)).Whilethereisalsoalimitedliteraturethataddressestheeectsonconcertticketsales(inparticularCurienandMoreau(2009);GayerandShy(2003,2006)),thisliteratureonlyanalyseshowrecordsalesaectthedemandforliveper-formances,ignoringthefactthatliveperformancesmayalsoalsoaectthedemandformusicrecordings.Whileourpaperbuildsonthisresearch,weexplorehowle-sharing,recordsales,andthedemandforconcertticketsareinterrelatedin(imperfectly)competitivemarketswithdierentiatedgoodswhererecordandticketsalesareinterrelated.Hence,thekeydierencesbetweenCurienandMoreau(2009),GayerandShy(2003,2006)andourpaperare(a)thatweanalysean(imperfectly)competitivemarketinsteadofamonopolyand(b)ourmodeldoesnotonlyanalyseeectsfromrecordtoticketsalesbutalsofeedbackeectsfromtickettorecordsales.ForthispurposeourpaperanalysesamodelwithtwoHotellinglines(Hotelling,1929)wheredemandforagivenproductintheonemarket(e.g.,2 therecordmarket)aectsproductdemandintheothermarket(e.g.,concerttickets)andviceversa.Putdierently,weassumethat-asmusicconsump-tionisalsoasocialphenomenon,asmanyindividualstendtopartiallydenethemselvesthroughtheirmusicconsumption-thedemandforconcertsisin-creasinginrecordsaleswhilethedemandforrecordsitselfisalsoincreasinginconcertticketsales.Whileourpaperaimsathelpingtoexplainandunderstandsomerecenttrendsinthethemusicindustry,anotherexamplewhichtsourframeworkmaybetherelationshipbetweenbooksandmovies(basedonthesebooks).Forexample,HarryPotterbooksandmoviesmaybecomplementsandex-hibitindirectnetworkeects.ThereadingofaHarryPotterbookmayprovideahigherutilityifmorepeoplealsowatchthemovie,whileatthesametimethemovieisthemoreattractivethemorebooksaresold.Inprin-ciple,anycomplementaryproductsthatexhibitthesesocialnetworkeectsmayserveasexamples.Asthereareindirectnetworkeectspresentbetweenthetwoproducts,ourmodelmaybeinterpretedasaparticularexampleofatwo-sidedmar-ketmodelinthesenseofArmstrong(2006),RochetandTirole(2006)orBelle ammeandPeitz(2010).Intwo-sidedmarketsthereistypicallyonein-termediarywhopromotestransactionsbetweendierenttypesofconsumersinthepresenceofindirectnetworkeects.Incontrast,inourmodelthereisonlyonegroupofconsumerswhodemandsseveraltypesofproductsbetweenwhichindirectnetworkeectsexist.Thus,wecontributetothetwo-sidedmarketliteraturebyconsideringtheimpactofpiracyinsuchmarkets.1Wealsoanalyse(insection4)thecaseofseparatedrmssellingrecordsandconcertticketsindependentfromeachother,somethingthatisdicultto 1SeealsoRaschandWenzel(2011)foracomplementarystudyofpiracyinatwo-sidedmarket,albeitinthecontextofthesoftwareindustry.3 conceiveifwedealwithtypicalplatformsintwo-sidedmarkets.2Theremainderofthepaperisnoworganisedasfollows:Thenextsec-tionintroducesandanalysesthemodelbeforesection3extendsthemodeltoillegallesharing(i.e.,piracy).Section4thenanalysesthecaseofnon-integratedbusinessmodelswhereonermsellsthemusicrecordwhilean-otherorganisestoursandsellsconcerttickets,asithasbeentraditionallythecaseinthemusicindustrybeforeso-called360degreedealsbecamefash-ionable.Ourmainresultsandconclusionsarenallysummarisedinsection5.2TheModelLetusconsiderthemarketforrecords(orotherformsofmusicrecording)ontheonehandandthemarketformusicshowsandperformancesontheotherhand.ForbothmarketsweassumethatconsumersarelocateduniformlyalongaHotellinglinewithtwodierentbandsorbrands-locatedattheendpointsoftheselines-managedbytwoindependentrms.Inthissection,weassumethatoneintegratedrmmarketsbothrecordsandshowticketsor,putdierently,weassumethatartistssignso-called360degreedeals.Undera360degreedeal,onecompanyisresponsibleforhandlingbothanartist'srecordsalesaswellastouringandticketsales.Whiletraditionallyanartist'srecordsalesandconcertsweremanagedbydierentagents(acasewhichwillbeanalysedinsection4ofourpaper),360degreedealshavebecomemoreandmorestandardinthemusicindustryinrecentyears(see,e.g.,Kasubian 2Ourmodelisalsosomewhatrelatedtothesocalledmultichannelsalesliteraturewhichanalyseshowsalesinonechannel(for,e.g.,onlinemarkets)aectsalesinothermarkets(e.g.,traditional\oine"markets)fromamanagementandmarketingperspective.Seee.g.Danaheretal.(2010)foranempiricalanalysisonpiracyandmultichannelsales.4 (2009)).Weassumethattherearetwotypesofconsumers.WhilethereareNcon-sumers(calledmusiclovers)thatreceiveutilityfrombothmusicalrecordingsandlivemusicshows(concerts),therearealsoMconsumerswhichdonotliketoattendshows,butonlyreceiveutilityfromrecordings.Thelattergroupwillbecalledlisteners.Agivenmusicloverkisassumedtoreceivethefollowingutilityfrombuyingamusicrecordingofbandi:UkR=VR�tlk+si�pi,wherelkdenotesk'sdistancefrombandi,whiletmeasurestheassociated"transportation"costs.Thenumberofliveconcertsofbandiisdenotedbysi,i.e.weassumethatamusiclover'sutilityfromagivenmusicrecordingiisincreasedbysiiftherearealsosiliveconcertsassociatedwiththeband'salbum.3Inourmodel,sicorrespondstotheshareofmusicloversthatattendaconcertofbandi.4Incontrast,isassumedtobezeroforsimplemusiclisteners,i.e.,theydonotreceiveanyadditionalutilityfromliveconcerts.Hence,thenumberofliveperformancesisutilityenhancingformusicloversandatoolofverticalproductdierentiationforthemwhileitisnotrelevantfortheMmusiclisteners(i.e,=0formusiclisteners,while�0formusiclovers).Therecordprice,pi,isdeductedfromconsumers'utility.Thegrossutilityfromconsumingrecordedmusic,VR,isassumedtobesucientlyhightoensurethatallmusicloversandlistenersbuyrecords. 3Tofocusonnetworkeectsacrossmarketsweneglectpossiblenetworkeectswithinmarkets.Seee.g.GayerandShy(2006)foramodelthatconsidersnetworkeectswithinamarket.4Notethattheindirectnetworkeectdependsonlyontheshareofmusicloversthatattendtheconcertbybandi.Thus,thestrengthoftheindirectnetworkeectisinde-pendentofthemarketsizeandthepresenceofmusiclisteners.Thesameappliestotheindirectnetworkeectfrommusicrecordingsontheconcertmarket.5 Nowletthemusiclovers'utilityfromattendingaliveconcertbegivenbyUkC=VC�dlk+qi�wi,whereVCisthegrossutilityofattendingaconcert,lkdenotes,asbefore,k'sdistancefrombandi,whiledmeasurestheassociatedtransportationcostsintheliveconcertmarket.Thereisagainacomplementaritybetweenrecordsandliveconcertssothattheutilityfromliveconcertsisenhancedbyafactorofthemorerecordsaresold.Thevariableqidenotestheshareofmusicloversthatbuyrecordsofbandi.Hence,thereareindirectnetworkeectsfromboththerecordmarkettotheliveconcertmarket(thestrengthofwhichismeasuredby)whilethestrengthoftheindirectnetworkeectsfromtheliveconcertmarkettotherecordmarketismeasuredby.Theticketpriceperliveconcertofbandiisdenotedbywi.Toensureequilibriumexistence,weassumethatthedegreeofproductdierentiationinthemarketsforrecordsandconcertsissucientlylargecomparedtothenetworkeectsbetweenthetwomarkets:5Assumption14td(N+M)�N(+)2+4M.Theindierentmusiclover(qm)andmusiclistener(xm)inthemusicrecordmarketandthemarginalconsumerintheliveconcertmarket(sm)aregivenbyVR�tqm+s1�p1=VR�t(1�qm)+s2�p2;VR�txm�p1=VR�t(1�xm)�p2;VC�dsm+q1�w1=VC�d(1�sm)+q2�w2. 5ThedetailsareprovidedintheAppendix.6 Hence,therespectivedemandsforbandiaregivenby:qi=1 2+(pj�pi)+(si�sj) 2t;(1)xi=1 2+(pj�pi) 2t;(2)si=1 2+(wj�wi)+(qi�qj) 2t:(3)Takingintoaccounttheinterdependenciesbetweenqiandsi,wecanreformulatethetworespectivedemandfunctionsasqi=1 2+(wj�wi)+d(pj�pi) 2(dt�);(4)andsi=1 2+(pj�pi)+t(wj�wi) 2(dt�).(5)Asweassume,inthissection,thatbandssign360degreedealssothatoneintegratedrmmanagesallaspectsoftheband(recordsalesandtouring),theprotofbandicannowbewrittenasfollows:6i(pi;wi)=Npiqi+Mpixi+Nwisi.(6)Solvingtherst-orderconditionsyieldsthefollowingequilibriumpricesleadingtoanequilibriumwhereeachbandattractshalfofthemarket: 6Noticethatwehavenormalizedallpossiblecosts(e.g.,producingandmarketingrecords,organisingconcerts,...)tozero.Duetoourassumptionofinelasticdemandintroducinglinearvariablecostswouldnotaectourresults.Introducingxedcostswouldalsonotaectourresultsaslongthesecostsarenottoohighsothatbothrmscanearnpositiveprotsinequilibrium.7 p=t�N M+N,(7)w=d�1+ tM N+M:(8)NotethattheresultingpricesarelowerthaninthesimpleHotellingmodel.IfweignorethemusiclistenersandsetM=0,sothatweonlyfocusonthetwointerdependentdemandfunctionsqiandsiwecanrewritethetwopricesasp=t�;(9)andw=d�.(10)Thatmeansthatbothpricesarecorrecteddownwards.Thisresultcon-trastswithothermodelsoftwo-sidedmarketsorcomplementaryproductswhereusuallythepriceforonegoodorserviceislowerwhilethepricesfortheotherproductorserviceincreaseswhencomparedtoareferencemodelwithoutcomplementaritiesorindirectnetworkeects(Wright,2004;ParkerandvanAlstyne,2005).InourmodeloftwointerdependentHotellinglines,thischangesbecause,incontrasttoothermodels,thereisnomarketexpan-sion,butonlyabusinessstealingeect.Hence,labelscompeteaggressivelyinordertowincustomers.Themoreconsumers'utilityofliveconcertsand,therefore,theirdemandforthemisaectedbyrecordsales(asmeasuredby)theloweristhepriceforrecordsandviceversa.Iftheindirectnetworkeectsfromonemarkettotheotherareverystrong,onepricemayeventurnnegative,inprinciple.Obviously,thedownwardcorrectionoftherecordpriceisthelowerthefewercustomersareinterestedinconcerts.Ifthefractionofmusicloversin8 thepopulation,asmeasuredbyN=(M+N),becomessmaller,thedownwardbiasoftherecordprice,p,isalsoreduced.Similarly,thedownwardcorrectionoftheconcertticketprice,w,isthemoreseverethemoremusiclistenersthereare(i.e.,thehigherM=(M+N)).Theintuitionisasfollows:Themoremusiclisteners(whoarenotinterestedinconcerts)thereare,thehigheristheopportunitycost(intermsofforegonerevenues)ofloweringtherecordprice(asitonlystimulatesdemandformusicconcertsforafractionofthepopulation).Hence,withmanymusiclistenersrmsratherkeeprecordpricesupandstimulaterecordsalestomusicloversby"cross-subsidising"ticketprices.Insertingequilibriumpricesintotheprotfunction,weobtainequilibriumprotsofeachlabel:=(N+M) 2t�N M+N+N 2d�1+ tM N+M:Thenetworkeectshaveanegativeimpactonprotability.Thehigherand,theloweristhelabel'sprot.Thereasonistheaforementioneddownwardpressureonpricesforrecordsandconcertsduetotheinterrelateddemandsforthetwoproducts.Concerningthedegreeofproductdierentia-tion,measuredbydandt,themodeldeliversthestandardpredictions.Thehigherthetransportationcosts,thehigherarethemusiclabels'prots.3FileSharingLetusnowanalysehow(illegal)lesharingorpiracyaectstheequilibrium.ForthispurposeweassumethatonlyafractionofthecustomermassesofNandMisactuallypayingforrecordedmusicwhilethefraction(1�9 )isengaginginpiracyor(illegal)unpaidlesharing.Labeli'sprotmaximisationproblemnowbecomesi=Npiqi+Mpixi+Nwisi.Ourrestrictiononparametervaluestoguaranteeequilibriumexistencemodiesasfollows:Assumption24td(N+M)�N(+)2+4M.Derivingtherst-orderconditionsandsolvingyieldsthefollowingequi-libriumvalues^p=t� N M+N;and^w=d�+ tM N+M.Filesharinghasoppositeeectsonthepricesforrecordsandconcerts.Itdecreasesthepriceforrecords,butincreasesthepriceforliveconcerts.Notethatthiseectoflesharingreliesonthepresenceofcomplementaritiesbetweenthetwomarkets.Tounderstandourresults,supposerstthattherearenocomplementar-ities,thatis,==0.Then,equilibriumpriceswouldnotbeaectedbylesharing,butlesharingwouldonlyaectlabelsbyreducedprotabilityinthemarketforrecords,asonlyaproportionofconsumerswouldac-tuallypayforrecords.Themarketforliveconcertswouldnotbeaectedatall.Nextsupposethat�0,butstill=0,i.e.,thereisonlyaposi-tivecomplementarityfromrecordsalesontheutilityfromconcerts.Then,increasedlesharingreducestheequilibriumpricepforrecords,butleaves10 theticketpricewforconcertsunchanged.Theintuitionisasfollows:Asshownabove,apositiveinducesrmstolowertheirpriceinthemarketforrecordstoattractadditionalcustomersinthemarketforlivemusic.Anincreaseinlesharingdecreasestheopportunitycostsofloweringthepriceforrecords,asonlyafractionactuallypaysforrecordedmusic.Thus,inequilibriumthepriceforrecordsisreduced.Nowsupposethatthereisad-ditionallyapositivecomplementarityfromconcertvisitsontorecordsales.DuetothecomplementaritypricesforconcertsarelowerthaninastandardHotellingmodel.However,thisdownwardcorrectiondependsonthedegreeofle-sharing.Themorele-sharingthelowertheincentivestoreducethepriceforconcertstoattractsalesintherecordmarket,asthebenetintherecordmarketisreducedwithmorele-sharing.Insertingequilibriumpricesintoprotsgives^=(N+M) 2t�N M+N+N 2d�+ tM N+M:Comparativestaticsconcerningthedegreeofproductdierentiationandthesizeofthenetworkeectsyieldthesameresultsaswithoutleshar-ing.Moreinterestingly,howdoeslesharingaectthelabels'protability?Dierentiatingprotswithrespecttoyields@^ @=(M+N)t�N 2:(11)Thisexpressioncaneitherbepositiveornegative.Protsincreasewithlesharing,thatis@ @0,if&#x]TJ/;༗ ;.9;Ւ ;&#xTf 1;.91;
0 ;&#xTd [;tN+M M.Hence,lesharingcanhaveapositiveimpactonprotsifthestimulatingeectfromconcertsonrecordsalesissucientlystrong.Asseenabove,increasedlesharinghasapositive11 eectonconcertpricesbutanegativeeectonrecordprices.Thus,theoveralleectdependsonthesizeofthesetwoeects.Iftishigh,recordsalesmakeupforalargeproportionofprots.Then,lesharing(i.e.,alowervalueof)hasadetrimentaleectonlabels'prots.However,iftisrelativelylow,incomefromrecordsalesisrelativelyunimportantandlesharinghasapositiveimpactonprots.Notethattheeconomicliteraturehasshownseveralavenuesbywhichle-sharingmayincreaseprots:PeitzandWaelbroeck(2006)showthatduetosamplingeectsrecordcompaniesmaygainfromdownloading.Freesamplesinformconsumersaboutavailableproductsandcanincreasetheirwillingnesstopay.InGayerandShy(2006)dierentplayersinthemusicindustryareaecteddierentlybylesharing.Whilerecordcompanieslosefromlesharing,artistsmaygainduetocross-eectsontothemarketforconcertsandothermerchandising.Networkexternalitieswithinthemarketforrecordsmayalsomakerecordcompaniesbenetfrompiracy(ConnerandRummelt,1991;ShyandThisse,1999).Ifdemandforlegalcopiesriseswiththeamountofillegalcopiesprotsmayincrease.Weaddtotheseresultsbyhighlightingafurtheravenue.Ifnetworkeectsfromconcertattendanceonrecordsalesaresignicant,thenlesharingcanbepositiveforalabel'sprotaslabelscompeteandpricelessaggressivelyintheconcertticketmarketbecausestimulatingrecordsalesislessrewarding.Notethatthisresultisobtainedeventhoughthereisnomarketexpansioneectpresentinourmodel.7Thedrivingforceinourmodelisthereducedbusinessstealingeectduetolesharing. 7DuetotheHotellingsetup,eachconsumerdemandsasingleunitofaproductand,hence,totaldemandisconstant.12 4Thenon-integratedbusinessmodelSofarwehavestudiedabusinessmodeloftheindustrywherermsareintegratedandoerbothrecordsandconcertsofabandi.Thissectionstudiesanalternativebusinessmodelthathastraditionallybeenappliedinthemusicindustry,namelythatrmsarenotintegrated,andrecordsandconcertsofbandiaresoldbyseparateentities.Thepurposeofthissectionistostudywhethertheextentoflesharingmayaectaband'schoiceofthebusinessmodel.Forsimplicityandwithoutlossofgenerality,wefocusonthecasewithonlymusic-lovers(M=0).Theprotofarecordcompanyandaconcertpromoter,respectively,isthenr=Npiqi;(12)andc=Nwisi:(13)Pricesforconcertticketsandrecordsarechosenindependentlyleadingtothefollowingequilibriumvalues: p=t� d;(14)and w=d� t:(15)Notethatpiracydoesnotaectequilibriumprices,astheleveloflesharingisexogenousandisnotaectedbyrecordpricesinourmodel.Toanalyzelabels'preferencefororagainstthisbusinessmodel,wereportthe13 jointprotsoftherecordcompanyandthecorrespondingconcertorganiser: =1 2Nt� d+1 2Nd� t:(16)Itfollowsthatlesharinghasanegativeimpactontheprotabilityofrecordcompaniesduetoalowernumberoflegalsales,buthasnoeectontheconcertindustry.Jointindustryprotsdecreasewithle-sharing.Thisisincontrasttothemarketstructurewithintegratedrmswherele-sharingcan-undercertaincircumstances-actuallyincreaseprots.Wecanconcludethatincreasedlesharingmayinducethemusicindustrytoalteritsbusinessmodeltowardsanintegrationofrecordandconcertmanagement,ashashappenedindeedwiththegrowingintroductionof360degreedealsinrecenttimes.Formally,theintegratedbusinessmodelsleadstohigherprotsiftheproblemoflesharingissucientlysevere,thatis,iflegalsalesaresucientlyunimportant:d(�t) t(d�):(17)5SummaryandConclusionsThispaperhasanalysedtheinterdependencybetweenthemarketformusicrecordingsandconcerttickets,assumingthattherearepositiveindirectnet-workeectsbothfromtherecordmarkettoticketsalesforliveperformancesandviceversa.UsingamodelwithtwointerrelatedHotellinglineswehaveshownthatpricesinbothmarketsarecorrecteddownwardswhencomparedtothestandardHotellingmodel.Furthermore,wehaveshownthattheef-fectsoflesharingonlabels'protabilityareambiguous.Filesharingcanactuallyleadtohigherprotsthroughincreasedconcertticketdemandif14 indirectnetworkeectsaresucientlystrong.Inaddition,wehaveshownthatanintegratedbusinessmodelcanbemoreprotablethanthetraditionalmodelofseparatedrecordandtourmanage-mentiflesharingissucientlystrongor,putdierently,oncetheleveloflegalrecordsalesbecomessucientlyunimportant.Giventhatprotsmayevenincreasethroughlesharingonemayspec-ulatethatvarietymayincreaseinamoregeneralmodelwithmarketentry.Whilewehavetoleavethisquestionopenatthispoint,weconsideritaninterestingtopicforfutureresearchtoanalysehowmarketentryandproductvarietyareaectedthroughlesharingifdemandsforshowticketsandmusicrecordingsareinterrelated.Similarly,wehavenotendogenisedtheamountoflesharinginourmodelbutrathertakenitasanexogenouslygivenfact.Arichermodelmayalsoendogenisethelesharingdecision,whichweleaveforfutureresearch.AppendixFortheequilibriumtoexistthesecondorderconditionsmusthold.Wecon-siderthemoregeneralcasewithle-sharing.TheHessianoftheoptimisationproblemofrmiwithle-sharingisH=0B@�Nd td��M t�N(+) 2(td�)�N(+) 2(td�)�Nt 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Gender Differences in Real Effort Dictator Games, June 2011. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 23 Sapi, Geza and Suleymanova, Irina, Technology Licensing by Advertising Supported Media Platforms: An Application to Internet Search Engines, June 2011. Published in: The B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy.22 Buccirossi, Paolo, Ciari, Lorenzo, Duso, Tomaso, Spagnolo Giancarlo and Vitale, May 2011. 21 Karaçuka, Mehmet and Catik, A. Nazif, A Spatial Approach to Measure Productivity Spillovers of Foreign Affiliated Firms in Turkish Manufacturing Industries, May 2011. Forthcoming in: The Journal of Developing Areas. 20 Catik, A. Nazif and Karaçuka, Mehmet, A Comparative Analysis of Alternative Univariate Time Series Models in Forecasting Turkish Inflation, May 2011. Forthcoming in: Journal of Business Economics.19 Normann, Hans-Theo and Wallace, Brian, The Impact of the Termination Rule on Cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiment, May 2011. Forthcoming in: International Journal of Game Theory. 18 Baake, Pio and von Schlippenbach, Vanessa, Distortions in Vertical Relations, April 2011. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economics. 17 Haucap, Justus and Schwalbe, Ulrich, Economic Principles of State Aid Control, April 2011. 16 Haucap, Justus and Heimeshoff, Ulrich, Consumer Behavior towards On-net/Off-net Price Differentiation, January 2011. Published in: Telecommunication Policy 35 (2011), pp. 325-332. 15 Duso, Tomaso, Gugler, Klaus, Yurtoglu, Burcin B., How Effective is European Merger Control? January 2011. Forthcoming in: European Economic Review. 14 Haigner, Stefan D., Jenewein, Stefan, Müller, Hans Christian and Wakolbinger, Florian, The First shall be Last: Serial Position Effects in the Case Contestants evaluate Each Other, December 2010. Published in: Economics Bulletin (2010), Volume 30, Issue 4, pp. 3170-3176. 13 Suleymanova, Irina and Wey, Christian, On the Role of Consumer Expectations in Markets with Network Effects, November 2010 (first version July 2010). Forthcoming in: Journal of Economics.12 Haucap, Justus, Heimeshoff, Ulrich and Karacuka, Mehmet, Competition in the Turkish Mobile Telecommunications Market: Price Elasticities and Network Substitution, November 2010. Published in: Telecommunications Policy 35 (2011), pp. 202-210. 11 Dewenter, Ralf, Haucap, Justus and Wenzel, Tobias, Semi-Collusion in Media Markets, November 2010. Forthcoming in: International Review of Law and Economics. 10 Dewenter, Ralf and Kruse, Jörn, Calling Party Pays or Receiving Party Pays? The Diffusion of Mobile Telephony with Endogenous Regulation, October 2010. Published in: Information Economics and Policy 23 (2011), pp. 107-117. 09 Hauck, Achim and Neyer, Ulrike, The Euro Area Interbank Market and the Liquidity Management of the Eurosystem in the Financial Crisis, September 2010. 08 Haucap, Justus, Heimeshoff, Ulrich and Luis Manuel Schultz, Legal and Illegal Cartels in Germany between 1958 and 2004, September 2010. Published in: H. J. Ramser & M. Stadler (eds.), Marktmacht. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Seminar Ottobeuren, Volume 39, Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen 2010, pp. 71-94. 07 Herr, Annika, Quality and Welfare in a Mixed Duopoly with Regulated Prices: The Case of a Public and a Private Hospital, September 2010. Forthcoming in: German Economic Review. 06 Blanco, Mariana, Engelmann, Dirk and Normann, Hans-Theo, A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences, September 2010. Forthcoming in: Games and Economic Behavior. 05 Normann, Hans-Theo, Vertical Mergers, Foreclosure and Raising Rivals’ Costs – Experimental Evidence, September 2010. Forthcoming in: The Journal of Industrial Economics. 04 Gu, Yiquan and Wenzel, Tobias, Transparency, Price-Dependent Demand and Product Variety, September 2010. Published in: Economics Letters 110 (2011), pp. 216-219. 03 Wenzel, Tobias, Deregulation of Shopping Hours: The Impact on Independent Retailers and Chain Stores, September 2010. Published in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics 113 (2011), pp. 145-166. 02 Stühmeier, Torben and Wenzel, Tobias, Getting Beer During Commercials: Adverse Effects of Ad-Avoidance, September 2010. Published in: Information Economics and Policy 23 (2011), pp. 98-106. 01 Inderst, Roman and Wey, Christian, Countervailing Power and Dynamic Efficiency, September 2010. Forthcoming in: Journal of the European Economic Association, August 2011. ISSN 2190-9938 (online) ISBN 978-3-86304-027-7