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In Proceedings AISB  Symposium on Integrative Approach In Proceedings AISB  Symposium on Integrative Approach

In Proceedings AISB Symposium on Integrative Approach - PDF document

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In Proceedings AISB Symposium on Integrative Approach - PPT Presentation

mshanahanimperialacuk Abstract This paper offers a preliminary sketch for an account of reflexive consciousness based on an im plemented architecture that combines a global workspace architecture with an internally closed sensorimotor loop The propo ID: 50257

mshanahanimperialacuk Abstract This paper

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with an internally closedsensorimotor loop. The proposed account extends the theoretical framework of the imposition to it but 1997; 2002), of consciously proc-essed information is that it is broadcast (via aÒglobal workspaceÓ) and made available to the entireset of these specialists. The upshot is that con-sciously processed information is cognitively effica-cious in ways that non-consciously processed infor- computation, yet it integrates the results of mas-sively parallel computation, sifting out relevantcontributions from the irrelevant (Shanahan & Baars,2005).However, one feature of conscious humanthought not accounted for by global workspace the-ory in its other conscious states. (By contrast, so-calledhigher-order thought (HOT) theories of conscious-ness take reflexivity as their primary datum (Rosen-thal, 1986).) If consciously processed information is,as global workspace theory maintains, cognitivelyefficacious, then reflexively conscious informationprocessing is workspace architecture, which comprises a set ofspecialist brain processes plus a global workspace.Information processing within the architecture con-sists of periods of competition interleaved withperiods of broadcast. On the left of the figure, we (or coalition the right of the figure. The global workspaceitself is, in essence, nothing more than the infra-structure of a communications network that permitssignals generated within localised neuronal popula-tions instantiates such an architecture, and information. But by augmenting the basic globalworkspace architecture with an internally closed is internally reconciles global workspace theorywith simulating the expected outcomes of itsactions using an internal sensorimotor loop, asdepicted in Figure 3. Moreover, a the robotÕs +1th article, and canbe found in (Shanahan, 2006).Fig.!2: External and Internal Sensorimotor LoopsMotorcortexAffectWORLDInner sensorimotor loop 3Context and TemporalStructureAccording to the account of reflexive conscious-ness proposed by this paper, the flow of informationthrough the global workspace is divided into distinct,but possibly nested or overlapping, episodes at vari-ous timescales. Beginnings and ends of consciousepisodes are triggered by events (contextual switches)Ð such as entering and leaving a room, or meetingand parting from a friend Ð which wake up or send tosleep relevant specialist processes, whose job it is the processes depicted are dormant, the set of active proc-esses can be thought of as reflecting the currentcontext, a conception which is broadly in line withthe notion of context of contextual switches, falls under thejurisdiction of a particular process, a process thatshould be relevant in the current context. Intuitively,temporal context is a richly structured, hierarchicalconcept. The context of a lunchtime falls within thelarger context of a day, while the context of a con-versation can overlap the context sleep in response to contextual cues gives another.This could occur either when the referring episode ofconscious thought falls entirely within the episode itis referring to (Fig. 4, conscious) episode might offersome judgement on the (non-reflexively conscious)episode it is referring to, such as tion has a focus / fringe structure (Mangan, 1993;2001). The fringe contains hints of material that hasthe potential of imminence at any given moment. ... This isthe fundamental trick that lets consciousness finesseits severely limited capacity ...Ó.The contention of this paper is that this is by a different active process. To see this,consider Figure 4 one conscious episode can refer to another,wherein the referring episode is in focal conscious-ness while fringe consciousness retains a trace of thereferred-to episode. But to see how this might berealised more concretely we need to zoom in andexamine the evolving contents of (competition) during which it got nudged out of apreviously stable attractor and taken into a new one.During the periods of competition, it was sometimesobserved that faint hints of competing attractorswould become temporarily attractor pulses conscious epi-sodes. The process currently supplying the content without having dimensionality of a solid object can be cashed out in vast majority of these specialists will be irrele-vant to Y. But any that the cognitive power of (non-reflexive) awareness (ofsolid objects, for example), and the fringe-borne forwards then back-wards gets you back where you started) and the cycliccharacter of certain trajectories (eg: turning an objectFig.!5: Focus-Fringe Reference by Temporal Synchrony2.52.62.7 ofmost interest relates to the way the content of theindividualÕs consciousness such as its unity, its identity with a fringe-borneawareness of the laws governing the way (2002). Conscious Thought as Simulationof Seriously:The ÒFringeÓ and its Implications for Cognitive Re-search. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (2),89Ð108.Mangan, B. (2001). SensationÕs Ghost: The Non-Sensory ÒFringeÓ of Consciousness. PSYCHE 7 (18),http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v7/psyche-7-18-mangan.html.Rosenthal, D. (1986). Two