Lessons for human rights and humanitarian law in the war on terror - PDF document

Itisimpossibletoknowexactlywhichofthesereadingsof Hamdan was theonethattheCourthadintended.Itisevenpossiblethatthisambiguity,which isthejudgment’sgreatestweakness,wasactuallyquiteintentionalontheCourt’s part.Thereadingadoptedasamatterofcoursebymanycommentatorsisthatthe CourthasruledthattheUnitedStates’‘‘war’’withalQaedaisaglobalnon- internationalarmedconflict. 21 Indeed,thisreadinghasseeminglyalsobeen adoptedbytheUSDepartmentofDefenceinitsmemorandumregardingthe implementationof Hamdan , 22 andmostrecentlybyJohnBellinger,theLegal AdviserintheDepartmentofState. 23 Thisisinfactthetextuallymostplausible interpretationof Hamdan ,asisindicated,forexample,bytheCourt’sdiscussion ofCommonArticle3,which affordssomeminimalprotection,fallingshortoffullprotectionunderthe Conventions,toindividualsassociatedwithneitherasignatorynorevena nonsignatory‘‘Power’’whoareinvolvedinaconflict‘‘intheterritoryof’’a signatory.Thelatterkindofconflictisdistinguishablefromtheconflict describedinCommonArticle2chieflybecauseitdoesnotinvolveaclash betweennations(whethersignatoriesornot).Incontext,then,thephrase ‘‘notofaninternationalcharacter’’bearsitsliteralmeaning.Althoughthe officialcommentariesaccompanyingCommonArticle3indicatethatan importantpurposeoftheprovisionwastofurnishminimalprotectionto rebelsinvolvedinonekindof‘‘conflictnotofaninternationalcharacter,’’i.e., acivilwar,thecommentariesalsomakeclear‘‘thatthescopeoftheArticle mustbeaswideaspossible.’’Infact,limitinglanguagethatwouldhave renderedCommonArticle3applicable‘‘especially[to]casesofcivilwar, colonialconflicts,orwarsofreligion,’’wasomittedfromthefinalversionof theArticle,whichcoupledbroaderscopeofapplicationwithanarrowerrange ofrightsthandidearlierproposediterations. 24 Clearly,thispassagewouldbepointlessiftheCourtwasnotdistinguishing betweenCommonArticle2andCommonArticle3conflictspreciselyinorderto rulethatthereisindeedaCommonArticle3,non-internationalarmedconflict 21See,e.g.,thediscussionbyMartyLedermanattheGeorgetownLawFacultyBlog,‘‘Toptenmythsabout Hamdan ,Geneva,andinterrogations’’,5July2006,availableathttp://gulcfac.typepad.com/ georgetown_university_law/2006/07/top_ten_myths_a_1.html(lastvisited12May2007);GeorgeP. Fletcher,‘‘The Hamdan caseandconspiracyasawarcrime’’, JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice , Vol.4(2006),pp.442,444;HaroldHongjuKoh,‘‘Settingtheworldright’’, YaleLawJournal ,Vol.115 (2006),p.2350,atpp.2365–6. 22MemorandumontheApplicationofCommonArticle3oftheGenevaConventionstotheTreatmentof DetaineesintheDepartmentofDefense,signedon7July2006bytheDeputySecretaryofDefense, GordonEngland,availableathttp://balkin.blogspot.com/CA3.DOD.memo.pdf(lastvisited12May 2007),whichstatesthat‘‘[t]heSupremeCourthasdeterminedthatCommonArticle3totheGeneva Conventionsof1949appliesasamatteroflaw totheconflictwithAlQaeda ’’(emphasisadded). 23‘‘[T]heAdministrationreadsthe Hamdan decisiontoacceptthattheUSisinanarmedconflict–and thereforethatthelawsofwarareappropriatetoapply–butthatthearmedconflictisnotofan internationalcharacter’’.Discussionatthe OpinioJuris weblog,‘‘ArmedconflictwithalQaida:a response’’,16January2007,availableathttp://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1169001063.shtml(lastvisited 12May2007). 24 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,p.68(citationsandquotationsomitted). M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 378 militaryadvantagedirectlyanticipatedfromharmingthecombatantsand terrorists. 83 Whatissointerestinghereisthatonlythelastoftheseconditions–that is,theprincipleofproportionality–isaruleofinternationalhumanitarianlaw. Thereisnoruleofhumanitarianlawobligingstatesnottokillcombatantsifthey canbearrestedordetained–aslongasthecombatantisnot horsdecombat ,he canbelawfullykilled.Thereislikewisenoruleofhumanitarianlawmandatingan effectiveinvestigationintothecircumstancesofeveryattack,assuchanobligation existsonlyinrespectofpossiblegravebreachesoftheGenevaConventions. 84 The firstthreeconditionssetbytheCourtforthelawfulnessoftargetedkillingsare thereforedrawnsolelyfromhumanrightslaw.TheCourtindeedcitestothat effectthreejudgmentsoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,includingthe well-known McCann case. 85 Themostremarkablethingaboutthisjudgmentispreciselythisuseof humanrightslawtofurtherhumanizehumanitarianlaw.Therelationship betweenhumanrightslawandhumanitarianlawisusuallythoughtofintermsof lexspecialis , per theICJ’s NuclearWeapons AdvisoryOpinion. 86 Toillustratethis relationshiptheICJitselfgavetheexampleoftherulesofhumanitarianlaw definingwhatanarbitrarydeprivationoflifeisduringanarmedconflict,inthe contextofArticle6oftheICCPR. 87 ThisdecisionoftheICJhassometimesbeen interpretedaswarrantingastrictapproach:ifaspecificprovisionofhumanitarian lawcontradictsamoregeneralprovisionofhumanrightslaw,theprovisionof humanitarianlawmustapply.Inotherwords,itishumanitarianlawwhichhasa directimpactonhumanrightslaw,nottheotherwayaround. 88 Thesituationinthe TargetedKillings caseisexactlytheopposite,sincethe state’sdutiesunderhumanrightslawarenowreducingthefreedomofactionthe stateactuallyenjoysunderhumanitarianlaw.Thisisindeedpreciselythetypeof 83 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,paras.40–46. 84See,e.g.,Art.146(2)ofGCIV. 85 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.40,citing Ergi v. Turkey ,32EHRR388(2001), McCann v. United Kingdom ,21EHRR97(1995)and McKerr v. UnitedKingdom ,34EHRR553(2001). 86 LegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons ,AdvisoryOpinion,8July1996,ICJReports1996,para. 25. 87Ibid. 88See,e.g.,LouiseDoswald-Beck,‘‘InternationalhumanitarianlawandtheAdvisoryOpinionofthe InternationalCourtofJusticeontheLegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons’’, International ReviewoftheRedCross ,No.316(1997),p.35:‘‘Thisisaverysignificantstatement,foritmeansthat humanitarianlawistobeusedtoactuallyinterpretahumanrightsrule.Conversely,italsomeansthat, atleastinthecontextoftheconductofhostilities, humanrightslawcannotbeinterpreteddifferentlyfrom humanitarianlaw .Althoughthismakescompletesenseinthecontextofthearbitrarydeprivationoflife (avagueformulationinhumanrightslaw,whereashumanitarianlawisfullofpurpose-builtrulesto protectlifeasfaraspossibleinarmedconflict),itislessclearwhetherthisisalsoappropriateforhuman rightsrulesthatprotectpersonsinthepowerofanauthority.Thisisparticularlysowhenitisahuman rightstreatybodythatisapplyingthetextofthetreaty.Practicethusfar,inparticularoftheEuropean CommissionandCourtofHumanRights,seemstoshowthatsuchbodiesapplythehumanrightstext withinitsownterms’’(textaroundfootnotes50–2,emphasisadded).SeealsoWilliamAbresch,‘‘A humanrightslawofinternalarmedconflict:theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinChechnya’’,EJIL, Vol.16(2005),p.741,atpp.743–5. M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 390 partyfromapplyingthelawofwartoaconflicttowhichtheConventiondoes notapply. 18 Thegovernmentcitesonlyoneauthorityforthisratherremarkable propositionthatthereare,undercustomarylaw,othertypesofarmedconflict thanthoseregulatedbytheGenevaConventions:Article142(3)oftheThird GenevaConvention,whichcontainstheMartensClause.Itmustbenotedthatit certainlytakessomeaudacitytocitetheMartensClause,ofallthings,which embodiesthehumanitarianspiritofthelawsofarmedconflict,assupportforthe thesisthattherearearmedconflictswhicharegovernedbythelawofwarbutare notregulatedbyit,andallforthepurposeoftorturingsuspectedterroristsfor information.ItiscertainlytruethattheMartensClauseisfrequentlyinvoked whenthereisnostatepracticeor opiniojuris tosupporttheexistenceofa customaryrule,butthishasalwaysbeendoneforhumanitarianpurposes.Herewe havethefirstexampleoftheMartensClausebeingcitedbyagovernmentfor purposeswhichareeverythingbuthumanitarian. TheUSSupremeCourtdealtwiththegovernment’spositionthatthe ‘‘waronterror’’isaninternationalarmedconflictbysayingthatit neednotdecidethemeritsofthisargumentbecausethereisatleastone provisionoftheGenevaConventionsthatapplieshereeveniftherelevant conflictisnotonebetweensignatories.Article3,oftenreferredtoasCommon Article3because,likeArticle2,itappearsinallfourGenevaConventions, providesthatina‘‘conflictnotofaninternationalcharacteroccurringinthe territoryofoneoftheHighContractingParties,eachPartytotheconflict shallbeboundtoapply,asaminimum,’’certainprovisionsprotecting ‘‘[p]ersonstakingnoactivepartinthehostilities,includingmembersof armedforceswhohavelaiddowntheirarmsandthoseplacedhorsdecombat by…detention.’’ 19 Yet,unfortunately,theSupremeCourtdoesnotspecifyhowandwhy CommonArticle3applies.Doesitapplyasamatterofcustomarylaw,regardless ofthelegalqualificationofthearmedconflictbetweentheUnitedStatesandal Qaeda?Thisconclusion,whichiscertainlycorrectasamatteroflaw,issuspect becausetheCourtdoesnotoncementiontheword‘‘custom.’’Ordoesitapplyas treatylaweveniftheconflictisregardedasaninternationalone,areadingwhich wouldclearlybecontrarytothetextofCommonArticle3?OristheCourtsaying thatCommonArticle3appliesbecausetheconflictbetweentheUnitedStatesand alQaedaislegallyanon-internationalarmedconflict,andifso,whichone?Isthe UnitedStatesfightingalQaedainAfghanistan,asanallyoftheAfghan government,oristhisnon-internationalarmedconflictwithalQaedasomehow globalinscope? 20 18Ibid.,p.26. 19 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,p.67(citationsomitted). 20ThisisbasicallythepositiontakeninDerekJinks,‘‘September11andthelawofwar’’, YaleJournalof InternationalLaw ,Vol.28(2003),p.20. Volume89Number866June2007 377 TheIsraeliSupremeCourt,ontheotherhand,squarelydealswiththe issue:itfindsthattheseparatecategoryofunlawfulcombatantsdoesnotexist underpositivelaw,andthatininternationalarmedconflictseithertheThirdor theFourthConventionmustapply.Unlawfulcombatantsare,accordingtothe Court,civilianswhoaretakingadirectpartinhostilities,andwhoarenot protectedwhiledoingso.Insoruling,theCourthasexplicitlyaffirmedinits entiretythecustomarynatureoftheruleenshrinedinArticle51(3)ofAdditional ProtocolI,whichitdiscussedingreatdetail. 78 Humanrightsandhumanitarianlaw Butbyfarthemostinterestingpartofthe TargetedKillings judgmentistheCourt’s applicationofinternationalhumanrightslaw,andcontrastingthisdecisionto Hamdan thenbecomeslikecomparingnightandday.Ontheonehand,theUS SupremeCourt’streatmentofinternationalhumanrightslawisreducedtoa singlefootnoteina100-pageopinion,withtheCourtinvokingArticle14ofthe InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR),justlikeArticle75 ofProtocolI,onlyinordertoelaborateonthemoregeneralfairtrialprovisionsof CommonArticle3. 79 Ontheotherhand,theIsraeliSupremeCourtextensively useshumanrightslawinordertocomplementtheapplicablerulesof humanitarianlaw.TheCourtindeedfindsthatcivilianswhoaretakingadirect partinhostilitiesmaybelawfullytargeted,butonlyiffourconditionsaremet. 1.Thestatemustpossesswell-based,thoroughlyverifiedinformationregarding theidentityandactivityofthecivilianwhoisallegedlytakingpartinthe hostilities;theburdenofproofonthestateisheavy. 80 2.Aciviliantakingadirectpartinhostilitiescannotbeattackedatsuchtimeas heisdoingso,ifalessharmfulmeanscanbeemployed.Thus,ifaterrorist takingadirectpartinhostilitiescanbearrested,interrogated,andtried,those arethemeanswhichshouldbeemployed.InthewordsoftheCourt,‘‘Trialis preferabletouseofforce.Arule-of-lawstateemploys,totheextentpossible, proceduresoflawandnotproceduresofforce.’’ 81 3.Ifacivilianisindeedattacked,athoroughandindependentinvestigation mustbeconductedregardingtheprecisionoftheidentificationofthetarget andthecircumstancesoftheattack,andinappropriatecasescompensation mustbepaidforharmdonetoinnocentcivilians. 82 4.Finally,combatantsandterroristsarenottobeharmedifthedamage expectedtobecausedtonearbyinnocentciviliansisnotproportionatetothe 78TheCourtextensivelyanalysesboththeelementofdirectnessandthetemporalelementinapplying Article51(3).See TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,paras.33–40. 79 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,p.70,note66. 80 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.40. 81Ibid. 82Ibid. Volume89Number866June2007 389 drugs’’. 12 OneofthereasonsforthisrejectionoftheUSpositionwasthat, historically,warwasalwaysconsideredonlytobeaconflictbetweentwoormore states,notbetweenastateandanon-stateactor. 13 Itwasalsoasubjectivenotion, sincenotevenallinterstateconflicts defacto wereconsideredtobewars dejure . 14 AccordingtotheICRCandnumerousauthors,the‘‘globalwaronterror’’ mustbesplitintoitscomponents,suchastheongoingarmedconflictsinIraqand Afghanistan,andonlytothesespecificarmedconflicts,andnottothewhole,can thelawsofarmedconflictapply. 15 Thatarmedconflict,andnotwar,isnowthe thresholdofapplicabilityofhumanitarianlaw,hasalsobeenrecognizedbytheUS administration,whicharguedinitslegalmemoranda 16 anditssubmissionstothe SupremeCourt 17 thattheUnitedStatesisengagedinaninternationalarmed conflictwiththealQaedaterroristorganization.Sinceinternationalarmed conflictsaredefinedbyCommonArticle2ofthefourGenevaConventionsonlyas conflictsbetweenstates,theadministrationresortedtoaratherinnovative argument,claimingthattherearesomeinternationalarmedconflictswhichare beyondthematerialscopeoftheGenevaConventions,andwhicharenot regulatedbyit: Petitionersuggeststhat,iftheGenevaConventiondoesnotapplytoalQaeda, thelawofwardoesnotapplyeither.Thatsuggestionisbaseless.Thereisno fieldpre-emptionundertheGenevaConvention.TheConventionseeksto regulate theconductofwarfaretowhichitapplieswithrespecttonation- statesthathaveenteredtheConventionandagreedtoabidebyitsterms,butit doesnotpurporttoapplytoeveryarmedconflictthatmightariseortocrowd outthecommonlawofwar.Instead,asexplainedbelow,theConvention appliesonlytothoseconflictsidentifiedinArticles2and3.Ifanarmed conflict,therefore,doesnotfallwithintheConvention,theConvention simplydoesnotregulateit.NothingintheConventionprohibitsabelligerent 12SeeGaborRona,‘‘OfficialstatementonbehalfoftheICRC’’,16March2004,availableathttp:// www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5XCMNJ(lastvisited12May2007):‘‘Thereisnomorelogic toautomaticapplicationofthelawsofarmedconflicttothe‘‘waronterror’’thanthereistothe‘‘war ondrugs’’,‘‘waronpoverty’’or‘‘waroncancer’’.Thus,blanketcriticismofthelawofarmedconflictfor itsfailuretocoverterrorism,perse,isakintoassailingthespecializedlawofcorporationsforitsfailure toaddressallbusinessdisputes.’’ 13Forexample,Oppenheimdefineswaras‘‘acontentionbetweentwoormoreStatesthroughtheirarmed forces,forthepurposeofoverpoweringeachotherandimposingsuchconditionsofpeaceasthevictor pleases’’.LassaOppenheim, InternationalLaw (HerschLauterpachted.,7thed.,1952)Vol.II,p.202. 14SeegenerallyChristopherGreenwood,‘‘Theconceptofwarinmoderninternationallaw’’,ICLQ,Vol. 36(1987),p.283;fortheoppositeviewseeYoramDinstein, War,AggressionandSelf-Defence ,4thedn, CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2005,pp.14–15. 15See,e.g.,theOfficialStatementbyICRCPresidentKellenberger,14September2004,availableathttp:// www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/66EMA9(lastvisited12May2007). 16MemorandumfortheVicePresident,signedbyPresidentBushonFebruary7,2002.Summariesand textsofallrelevantmemorandaareavailableathttp://lawofwar.org/Torture_Memos_analysis.htm(last visited12May2007). 17See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ,GovernmentBriefontheMerits,availableathttp://www.hamdanvrums- feld.com/HamdanSGmeritsbrief.pdf(lastvisited12May2007),atpp.23–6. M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 376 JusticeKennedy,whoprovidedtheswingvoteforthejudgmentasawhole,not joiningthatpartoftheopinionoftheCourt. Incontrast,theIsraeliSupremeCourtwasmuchmoreforcefulinrelation tofundamentalhumanitarianguarantees.Itunequivocallyaffirmsthecustomary statusofArticle75, 72 andaddssomesubstantialrhetoricalflourish: Needlesstosay,unlawfulcombatantsarenotbeyondthelaw.Theyarenot ‘‘outlaws’’.Godcreatedthemaswellinhisimage;theirhumandignityaswell istobehonored;theyaswellenjoyandareentitledtoprotection,evenifmost minimal,bycustomaryinternationallaw. 73 Onecanonlyexpressagreementwithsuchsentiment. Whenitcomestothepreciselegalstatusofunlawfulcombatants,the ICRCandnumerousauthorshaveassertedthatpersonsnotentitledtoprotection undertheThirdConventionmustconsequentlybeentitledtoprotectionunder Articles4(1)and5oftheFourthGenevaConvention. 74 Otherauthorshavejustas ablyarguedthatunlawfulcombatantsdoindeedslipthroughthecracks,asitwere, betweenthetwoconventions,andthattheyareentitledtoprotectiononlyunder customaryhumanitarianlaw. 75 TheUSSupremeCourtdoesnotaddressthisissuein Hamdan ,although itsjudgmentisagainunclearandcontradictory.Asalreadymentioned,it ‘‘reserves’’theissueofwhetherHamdanisentitledtoprisoner-of-warstatus,even thoughitapparentlycharacterizestheunderlyingconflictasanon-international one. 76 TheCourtdoesnotseemtorealizethattheconceptsofcombatants’privilege andlawfulorunlawfulcombatancysimplyhavenoplaceinnon-internationalarmed conflicts.InCommonArticle3conflictsnobodyhastherighttotakeuparmsagainst thestate,andprisoner-of-warstatusassuchdoesnotexistatall,unlessstipulatedto thecontrarybyaspecialagreementbetweenthepartiestotheconflict. 77 72 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.25. 73Ibid. 74SeeICRCCommentaryonGCIV,abovenote28,atp.52,whichstatesthat‘‘[e]verypersoninenemy handsmusthavesomestatusunderinternationallaw:heiseitheraprisonerofwarand,assuch,covered bytheThirdConvention,aciviliancoveredbytheFourthConvention,oragain,amemberofthe medicalpersonnelofthearmedforceswhoiscoveredbytheFirstConvention.Thereisnointermediate status;nobodyinenemyhandscanbeoutsidethelaw.Wefeelthatthatisasatisfactorysolution–not onlysatisfyingtothemind,butalso,andaboveall,satisfactoryfromthehumanitarianpointofview.’’ SeealsoLuisaVierucci,‘‘Prisonersofwarorprotectedpersons qua unlawfulcombatants?Thejudicial safeguardstowhichtheGuanta ´ namodetaineesareentitled’’, JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice , Vol.1(2003),p.284;Hans-PeterGasser,‘‘Actsofterror,‘‘terrorism’’andinternationalhumanitarian law’’, InternationalReviewoftheRedCross ,Vol.84(847)(2002),p.547;KnutDo ¨ rmann,‘‘Thelegal situationof‘‘unlawful/unprivilegedcombatants’’’’, InternationalReviewoftheRedCross ,Vol.85(849) (2003),p.45;Kolb,abovenote31,pp.158–9;Cassese,abovenote58,pp.409–10. 75SeeAdamRoberts,‘‘Thelawofwarinthewaronterror’’,inWyboP.Heere,ed., Terrorismandthe Military ,2002,p.82;YoramDinstein, TheConductofHostilitiesundertheLawofInternationalArmed Conflict ,p.29;SeanD.Murphy,‘‘EvolvingGenevaConventionparadigmsinthe‘‘waronterrorism’’: applyingthecorerulestothereleaseofpersonsdeemed‘‘unprivilegedcombatants’’’’,forthcoming, GeorgeWashingtonLawReview ,Vol.75(2007),availableatSSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract 5 958380 (lastvisited12May2007). 76 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,note61. 77CommonArticle3(3). M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 388 killingsarealways,withoutexception,aviolationofhumanrightsand humanitarianlaw.Theassassinationshavealsodrawnwidespreadcondemnation intheinternationalcommunity,beinglabelledas‘‘contrarytointernational law’’bytheUNSecretary-GeneralKofiAnnan, 8 as‘‘unlawfulkillings’’bythe UKForeignSecretaryJackStraw 9 andas‘‘summaryexecution[s]thatviolate humanrights’’bythelateAnnaLindh,thentheForeignMinisterofSweden. 10 TheIsraeliSupremeCourtdisagreedwiththeabsolutepositionforwarded bythepetitioners,findingthattargetedkillingsmayindeedbelawfulundercertain restrictiveconditions,whichitthenproceededtodefine,drawingheavily,aswe shallsee,onhumanrightslaw. 11 Thesecasesfromtwocountrieswhichareamongthemostconcerned withinternationalterrorismtodayarecertainlyinstructive.Evenmoresoisthe comparisonbetweenthereasoningofthetwohighcourts.Thisarticlewillengage inpreciselythistypeofanalysis,dealing,inturn,withthreespecificissues:the thresholdsofapplicabilityofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,theconceptof unlawfulcombatancyandtherelationshipbetweenhumanrightslawand humanitarianlaw. Hamdan: anarmedconflictwithalQaeda? Asiswellknown,theUSadministrationhasbeenarguingsince2001thatitis engagedina‘‘globalwaronterror’’,inwhichtherulesofthelawofarmedconflict apply,andinwhichtheusual,criminal-lawenforcementmodelofdealingwith terrorismplaysamuchmoresubduedrole.Thislegalqualificationoftheongoing fightagainstinternationalterrorismasawaroranarmedconflicthasbeen vigorouslyresistedbymanylegalscholars,especiallyoutsidetheUnitedStates.The InternationalCommitteeoftheRe dCross(ICRC)has,amongothers, remarkedthatthe‘‘waronterror’’islegallynomoreawarthanthe‘‘waron Yemenin2002ontheorganizeroftheterroristbombingoftheUSS Cole ,andwhichrecently unsuccessfullyattemptedinSomaliatokillthemastermindofthe1996bombingsoftheUSembassies inKenyaandTanzania.Seehttp://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/01/11/somalia.ap/index.html (lastvisited29January2007). 8Seetranscriptofremarksof22March2004athttp://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid 5 564(last visited29January2007). 9MatthewTempest,‘‘UKcondemns‘‘unlawful’’Yassinkilling’’, Guardian ,22March2004,availableat http://politics.guardian.co.uk/foreignaffairs/story/0,11538,1175312,00.html(lastvisited29January 2007). 10BrianWhitakerandOliverBurkeman,‘‘Killingprobesthefrontiersofroboticsandlegality,’’ Guardian , 6November2002,availableathttp://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,834311,00.html(lastvisited 29January2007). 11ForageneraloverviewoftheIsraelipolicyoftargetedassassinations,aswellasforanexceptionally prescientanalysisoftherelevantlegalquestions,seeDavidKretzmer,‘‘Targetedkillingofsuspected terrorists:extra-judicialexecutionsorlegitimatemeansofdefence?’’,EJIL,Vol.16(2005),p.171;Orna Ben-NaftaliandKerenR.Michaeli,‘‘‘‘Wemustnotmakeascarecrowofthelaw’’:alegalanalysisofthe Israelipolicyoftargetedkillings’’, CornellInternationalLawJournal ,Vol.36(2003),p.233. Volume89Number866June2007 375 lawappliesbutprovidesnoprotectionstothosedetainedinthe‘‘waronterror’’.It hasalsoclaimedthathumanrightslawdoesnotapply,since(i)itisinapplicable intimesofwar;andsince(ii)humanrightstreatiesdonotapplyextraterritorially, asinIraq,AfghanistanorGuanta ´ namoBay. 65 Boththeseclaimshavebeenrejected byUNtreatybodies. 66 Itishardtodisputethehistoricalexistenceofthecategoryofunlawful (unprivileged)combatantsorbelligerents. 67 Thatjustbegsthequestion,however, ofhowthishistoricalcategoryfitsintotheGenevaframework,themostbasicissue beingthefundamentalhumanitarianguaranteesowedtoallparticipantsina conflict,regardlessoftheirexactlegalstatus.Ininternationalarmedconflictsthe startingpointhasusuallybeenArticle75ofProtocolI,whichhaslongbeen regardedasreflectiveofcustomarylaw. 68 Evenmoreimportantlyinthiscase,the customarystatusofArticle75hasbeenconfirmedbyatleasttwoLegalAdvisersof theUSStateDepartment. 69 YetthecurrentUSadministrationhasregrettablycast eventhispointintodoubt,anditspresentLegalAdviserhasstatedthatthe administrationis‘‘lookingat’’whetherArticle75guaranteesareapplicableinthe ‘‘waronterror’’. 70 Forallitsambiguities,the Hamdan judgmentisatleastclearonone point:thattheminimalguaranteesofCommonArticle3,includingtheprotection ofpersonaldignityandbasicfairtrialrights,areapplicabletoallterrorism detainees.TheCourtwasunfortunatelyunabletoreachthesameconclusionwith respecttoArticle75ofProtocolI,withapluralityoffourjusticesfindingthat someoftheprovisionsofArticle75areindisputablyapartofcustomarylaw 71 and therebyinformingtheCourt’sinterpretationofCommonArticle3,butwith 65See,e.g,theOpeningRemarksbyJohnBellinger,LegalAdviser,USDepartmentofState,beforetheUN CommitteeagainstTorture,May5,2006,availa bleathttp://www.us-mission.ch/Press2006/ 0505BellingerOpenCAT.htmlandtheOpeningStatementofMathewWaxman,HeadofUS DelegationbeforetheUNHumanRightsCommittee,17July2006,availableathttp://geneva.usmis- sion.gov/0717Waxman.html(lastvisited12May2007). 66SeetheConclusionsandRecommendationsoftheCommitteeagainstTorture:UnitedStatesof America,CAT/C/USA/CO/2,25July2006,paras.14and15andtheConcludingObservationsofthe HumanRightsCommittee:UnitedStatesofAmerica,CCPR/C/USA/CO/3,15September2006,para.10, availableathttp://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf(lastvisited12May2007). 67FortheclassicaltreatmentofthesubjectseeRichardR.Baxter,‘‘So-called‘‘Unprivilegedbelligerency’’: spies,guerrillasandsaboteurs’’, BritishYearBookofInternationalLaw ,Vol.28(1951),p.323.Seealso Green,abovenote47,pp.102–5,107–8. 68See,e.g,Jean-PhilippeLavoyer,‘‘Shouldinternationalhumanitarianlawbereaffirmed,clarifiedor developed?’’, IsraelYearBookonHumanRights ,Vol.34(2004),p.35,42;FaustoPocar,‘‘ProtocolI Additionaltothe1949GenevaConventionsandcustomaryinternationallaw’’, IsraelYearBookon HumanRights ,Vol.31(2001),p.145;Kolb,abovenote31,p.158;David,abovenote39,pp.483–4. 69SeeMichaelJ.Matheson,‘‘TheUnitedStates’positionontherelationofcustomaryinternationallawto the1977ProtocolsAdditionaltothe1949GenevaConventions’’, AmericanUniversityJournalof InternationalLaw&Policy ,Vol.2(1987),p.419;WilliamH.TaftIV,‘‘Thelawofarmedconflictafter9/ 11:somesalientfeatures’’, YaleJournalofInternationalLaw ,Vol.28(2003),pp.319,322. 70RemarksbyJohnBellinger,LegalAdviser,USDepartmentofState,attheRoyalInstituteof InternationalAffairs(ChathamHouse),London,9February2006.SeeAnthonyDworkin,‘‘United Statesis‘‘lookingat’’theplaceoffundamentalguaranteesinthewaronterror’’, CrimesofWarProject ,1 March2006,availableathttp://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-guarantees.html(lastvisited12May 2007). 71 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,pp.70–2. Volume89Number866June2007 387 Manyargumentshavebeenmade,bothgoodandbad,regardingtheimpacton internationalhumanitarianlawofthe‘‘globalwaronterror’’wagedbythepresent USadministration.Yettherealwayscomesatimeforthesemanydifferent argumentstobetested,andatthatinacourtoflaw.Inthatregard,thepastyear hasseentwoveryimportantjudgmentswhoserulingscanhelpustoassessthe impactofglobalterrorismonhumanitarianlaw. First,inJune2006theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesdeliveredits decisionin Hamdan v. Rumsfeld . 1 Hamdan,aself-confessedone-timedriverand bodyguardofOsamabinLaden,isnowincustodyattheUSdetentioncampat Guanta ´ namoBay,Cuba.InNovember2001,duringhostilitiesbetweentheUnited StatesandtheTaliban(whothengovernedAfghanistan),Hamdanwascaptured bymilitiaforcesandturnedovertotheUSmilitary,andwaslatertransportedto Guanta ´ namoBay.Overayearlater,theUSpresidentdeemedhimeligiblefortrial bymilitarycommissionforthenunspecifiedcrimes.Afteranotheryearhad passed,Hamdanwaschargedwithonecountofconspiracytocommitoffences triablebymilitarycommission. 2 HamdanthenproceededtochallengebeforeaUS federalcourtthevalidityofthemilitarycommissionssetouttotryhim.After winningbeforethedistrictcourt 3 andlosingbeforetheDCCircuitCourtof Appeals, 4 Hamdan’scasefinallycamebeforetheSupremeCourtoftheUnited States. TheCourtheldthatthemilitarycommissionsassetupbythepresident violatecommonArticle3ofthefourGenevaConventionsof1949, 5 towhichthe UnitedStatesisapartyandwhoserequirementsareincorporatedintoUSstatutes, sincethesecommissionsdonotprovidetothoseaccusedbeforethemtheminimal judicialguaranteesrecognizedasindispensablebycivilizedpeoples.Apluralityof theCourtalsoheldthatconspiracy,withwhichHamdancouldhavebeenlawfully charged,isnotanoffenceagainstthelawofwar. Then,inDecember2006,theIsraeliSupremeCourtrendereditslong- awaiteddecisioninthe TargetedKillings case,inanopinionbyitsoutgoing president,JudgeAharonBarak. 6 Inthiscasethepetitioners,twohumanrights NGOs,challengedtheIsraeliArmy’suseofthepolicyoftargetedkillingsor assassinations–thatis,limitedmilitaryoperationswiththepurposeofkillinga specificperson,usuallyasuspectedterrorist. 7 Thepetitionersclaimedthattargeted 1 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ,USSupremeCourt,548U.S.___(2006);126S.Ct.2749;2006U.S.LEXIS5185 (hereinafter Hamdan ).AllcitationsinthisarticlewillbetotheslipopinionoftheCourt,availableat http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf(lastvisited29January2007). 2 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,atp.1. 3344F.Supp.2d152(DC2004). 4415F.3d33(2005). 5 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,atpp.49–72. 6 ThePublicCommitteeagainstTortureinIsraeletal v. TheGovernmentofIsraeletal ,SupremeCourtof IsraelsittingastheHighCourtofJustice,Judgment,11December2006,HCJ769/02,availableathttp:// elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.HTM(lastvisited29January2007)(here- inafter TargetedKillings ). 7TheIsraeliarmedforceshaveresortedtotargetedkillingsonseveraloccasions,mostnotablyinthe 2004assassinationsofHamasleadersAhmedYassinandAbdulAzizRantisi.Targetedkillingshave alsobeenemployedbytheUnitedStatesinthe‘‘waronterror’’,whichlaunchedamissileattackin M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 374 insurgentsthemselvesarenotpurportingtofightonbehalfofanyotherstate,nor istheirstruggledirectlyrelatedtotheinitialinternationalarmedconflict. 61 Itis alsonotentirelycontradictoryforboththeFourthGenevaConventiontoregulate thebelligerentoccupationandforanon-internationalarmedconflicttobe occurringatthesametime,asboththeICJin Nicaragua 62 andtheInternational CriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY)in Tadic ´ 63 recognizedthatan internationalandanon-internationalarmedconflictcantakeplaceatthesame time,runninginparallel.Thereisnologicalreasonwhythisrulecannotalsoapply byanalogyduringanoccupation,andtheCourt,unlikeProfessorCassese,just doesnotprovideanyreasoningfortheconclusionithasultimatelyreached. Unlawfulcombatants Howeverfascinatingthediscussionofthethresholdsofapplicabilityof humanitarianlaw,orthelackthereof,inboththe Hamdan andthe Targeted Killings judgments,thereisalsothematteroftheapplicationofthesubstantive rulesofhumanitarianlawbybothhighcourts.Here,again,theparallelsbetween thetwocasesareveryinstructive. TheUSlegalargumentregardingthe‘‘globalwaronterror’’isastoryof threelacunae.Thefirstone,aswehaveseen,istheallegedgapintheapplication criteriaofthe1949GenevaConventions,sincetheUnitedStateswasarguingthat itsconflictwithalQaedaislegallyanarmedconflict,butthatitisneithera CommonArticle2noraCommonArticle3conflict.Thesecondgapcomesin evenifitisassumedthattheconflictfallswithinthematerialscopeofapplication oftheConventions,sincetheUSgovernmenthasclaimedthatalQaedaterrorists are‘‘unlawfulenemycombatants’’,whoare,inthisstrangenewtypeof internationalarmedconflict,entitledneithertotheprotectionoftheThird GenevaConvention,sincetheydonotfulfiltherequirementssetoutbyitsArticle 4,norundertheFourthGenevaConvention,sincetheyarecombatants,not civilians.Foritspart,Israelhasin2002ratheropportunisticallyenacteditsown lawontheimprisonmentofunlawfulcombatants,alsoclaimingthatunlawful combatantsarenotprotectedundereithertheThirdortheFourthGeneva Convention. 64 Finally,theUSgovernmenthasnotclaimedonlythathumanitarian 61SeealsoKretzmer,abovenote11,pp.208–211. 62 Nicaragua ,abovenote42,para.219. 63 Prosecutorv.Tadic ´ ,IT-94-1-A,AppealsChamber,Judgement,15July1999,atpara.84. 64IncarcerationofUnlawfulCombatantsLaw,5762–2002,availableinEnglishathttp://www.jewishvir- tuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/IncarcerationLaw.pdf(lastvisited12May2007).Thelawhasbeen heavilycriticized,althoughitmustbeacknowledgedthatitismuchmoremoderatewhencompared withtheextremelybroadpowersofdetentionclaimedbytheUSexecutive.SeealsoHumanRights Watch,‘‘Israel:OpportunisticLawCondemned’’,7March2002,athttp://hrw.org/english/docs/2002/03/ 07/isrlpa3787.htm(lastvisited12May2007);HillyMoodrick–EvenKhen,‘‘Unlawfulcombatantsor unlawfullegislation?AnanalysisoftheImprisonmentofUnlawfulCombatantsLaw’’,IsraelDemocracy Institute,Jerusalem,2005,availableatSSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract 5 902934(lastvisited12May 2007). M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 386 Lessonsforhuman rightsand humanitarianlawin thewaronterror: comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case MarkoMilanovic* MarkoMilanovicisLawClerktoJudgeThomasBuergenthal,InternationalCourtof Justice. Abstract Thearticleexaminesandcomparestworecentjudgmentswhichprovidesomeofthe mostvaluableexamplesofthedifficultiessurroundingtheapplicationofinternational humanitarianlawtothephenomenonofterrorism:the Hamdan judgmentofthe SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,andthe TargetedKillings judgmentofthe SupremeCourtofIsrael.Bothjudgmentsdealwiththethresholdsofapplicabilityof thelawofarmedconflict,aswellaswiththeconceptofunlawfulcombatancyandthe relationshipbetweenhumanrightslawandhumanitarianlaw.Bothjudgmentsareat timesinconsistentandlackinginanalysis,withthe Hamdan judgmentinparticular misinterpretingtherelevantinternationalauthorities,includingtheCommentarieson theGenevaConventions.Despitetheseflaws,orbecauseofthem,bothofthese judgmentsremaininstructive.Thepurposeofthisarticleistopresentthelessonsfor thefuturethatthesetwodecisionsmightbringtoongoingdebatesontheimpactof globalterrorismonthelawofarmedconflict. *m.milanovic@gmail.com Volume89Number866June2007 Selectedarticlesoninternationalhumanitarianlaw 373 international.Theroadittooktothispositionis,however,methodologicallya verydubiousone.Furthermore,theonlyauthoritythattheCourtcitesforthis propositionisthatofProfessorCassese,whoinhistextbookoninternationallaw doessaythat‘‘[a]narmedconflictwhichtakesplacebetweenanOccupyingPower andrebelorinsurgentgroups–whetherornottheyareterroristincharacter–in anoccupiedterritory,amountstoaninternationalarmedconflict.’’ 58 Onecanonly marvelathowpositivelyclevertheCourtwasincitingtheauthorityofProfessor Cassese,notonlybecauseofhisindisputableeminenceasalegalscholar,butalso becauseofhispositioninthe TargetedKillings caseasanexpertforthepetitioners. AtasinglestroketheCourtrejectedthepetitioners’argumentthatnoarmed conflictwastakingplacebyrelyingontheirownexpert,and,byseemingly handingavictorytothegovernment,madeitharderforittocomplainatany restrictionsonitsactionsitmightimposelateron,whichare,asweshallsee,quite substantial. Itis,ofcourse,fromapurelyhumanitarianstandpointdesirableforthe lawofinternationalconflictstoapply,sinceitprovidessignificantlymore protectionsthanthelawofinternalarmedconflicts.Yetitishardtoescapethe impressionthattheCourtwassomewhatinsincere,sincetheconclusionithas reachedisinnowayclearorobvious.CitingProfessorCassesedoesnotmakeit anymoreso,andcitationofanauthorityisnotasubstituteforalegalargument. Cassesehimselfactuallydoesnotrelyonanyotherauthority,butarguesthatnew armedconflictsinoccupiedterritoriesshouldbetreatedasinternationalones because(i)internalconflictsarethosebetweenacentralgovernmentandagroup ofinsurgentsbelongingtothesamestate,whichisnotthecasewithoccupied territories;(ii)theprotectionsguaranteedbyhumanitarianlawmustbeaswideas possible,andthelawofinternationalarmedconflictsprovidesformuchgreater protections;and(iii)sincethebelligerentoccupationisgovernedbytheFourth GenevaConvention,apartofthelawofinternationalarmedconflict,itwouldbe contradictorytosubjectarmedhostilitiesbetweentheoccupantstateand insurgentgroupstothelawofinternalarmedconflict. 59 Althoughthisiscertainlyawell-argued,common-senseposition,with whichthepresentauthoragreesasamatterofdesirability,itishardtosaythatitis inanywayestablishedinstatepractice,asthereisindeedverylittlestatepractice togoon. 60 Themajorhumanitariantreatiesarealsooflittlehelp,sincetheyrelate onlytotheoriginalarmedconflictduringwhichtheterritorywasoccupied,but nottoanewarmedconflictoccurringlongaftertheendoftheinitialone. Likewise,thenewarmedconflictcouldberegardedasaninternalone,since(i)the occupyingpoweristheonlystatefordecadestoexerciseexclusiveeffectivecontrol overtheterritory;(ii)nootherstateislayingclaimtotheterritory;and(iii)the 58AntonioCassese, InternationalLaw ,2ndedn,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2005,p.420,ascitedin TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.18. 59Ibid. 60Lubellhasalsoargued,albeitbriefly,thattheIsraeli–Palestinianconflictshouldbeclassifiedas international–seeNoamLubell,‘‘TheICJAdvisoryOpinionandtheseparationbarrier:atroublesome route’’, IsraelYearBookofHumanRights ,Vol.35(2005),p.283,atpp.296–7,note68. Volume89Number866June2007 385 oftheseabnormalitieshave,ofcourse,beennotedintheliterature. 52 Their relevancetothematterbeforeusissimplyinthefactthatinternationallawnever neededtoprovideananswerastowhathappenswhenprotractedviolenceand armedhostilitiesemergeinanoccupiedterritorywhicharenotdirectlyrelatedto theinitialarmedconflictduringwhichtheterritorywasoccupied. 53 Theoriginalarmedconflictcanbedistinguishedfromanysubsequent, newarmedconflictsoccurringinanoccupiedterritory.ThetwoPalestinian intifadas arenotlegallyapartoftheinternationalarmedconflictinwhichthe Palestinianterritorieswereoccupied,namelythe1967SixDayWar,whichisnow longover.ItthereforedoesnotseematallobviousthattheIsraeli–Palestinian conflictshouldberegardedasaninternational,ratherthanasanon-international one,justbecauseitistakingplace,atleastinpart,inaterritorywhichisunder belligerentoccupation.Thisisespeciallysosince,asalreadystated,onlystateshave traditionallybeenregardedaspossiblepartiestoaninternationalarmedconflict, 54 andPalestineisnotastate.WhatisevenmoreremarkableisthattheCourtseems tobedefininginternationalarmedconflictas‘‘onethatcrossesthebordersofthe state’’, 55 whenthesingledefiningcharacteristicofinternationalarmedconflictshas notbeentheircross-border,buttheirinterstate,nature. Furthermore,theIsraeliSupremeCourthasneverbeforequalifiedthis conflictasonewhichisinternationalincharacter.Inmanyofitspreviouscases, mostofthemcitedinthe TargetedKillings judgment,ithasappliedthelawof belligerentoccupationandotherrulesofhumanitarianlaw,butithasneversaid whetheritconsiderstheongoingPalestinian–Israeliconflicttobeinternationalor non-international. 56 Indeed,theCourt’s dicta hadactuallyledsomecommentators tobelievethattheCourthadcharacterizedtheongoingconflictasanon- internationalone. 57 TheCourtdoesnotinvokeanyoftheexceptionsrecognizedunder positivelawwhichallowforthe‘‘internationalisation’’oftheconflict–thatis,the applicationofthelawofinternationalarmedconflictstoaninternalconflict.Itis notsaying,forinstance,thatthePalestiniansareundertheoverallcontrolofa thirdstate,orthatbelligerencyhasbeenrecognized.NoristheCourtsaying,quite understandably,thatthePalestiniansareengagedinafightofnationalliberation againsttheIsraelioccupiers,evenifoneweretoconsidertheruleinArticle1(4)of ProtocolItobereflectiveofcustomarylaw. TheCourt’spositionthereforeappearstobethatwheneveranarmed conflictoccurswithinanoccupiedterritorythatconflictmustbeclassifiedas 52See,e.g.,AdamRoberts,‘‘Prolongedmilitaryoccupation:theIsraeli-occupiedterritoriessince1967’’, AJIL,Vol.84(1990),p.44;Benvenisti,abovenote49,pp.144–8. 53Suchascenariois,forexample,notatallcontemplatedintheICRCCommentarytotheConventions. ICRCCommentary,abovenote28,pp.18–25. 54See,e.g,Green,abovenote47,pp.54–5. 55 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.18,quotedinfullatnote45. 56See,e.g, Mara’abe v. ThePrimeMinisterofIsrael ,SupremeCourtofIsrael,HCJ7957/04,availableat http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/570/079/a14/04079570.a14.htm(lastvisited12May2007). 57SeeDavidKretzmer,‘‘TheAdvisoryOpinion:thelighttreatmentofinternationalhumanitarianlaw’’, AJIL,Vol.99(2005),p.88,atp.95,note56. M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 384 intifada inSeptember2000?Ifso,why?Thereweresomesporadicterroristattacks duringthatperiod,buttheycouldhardlyamounttoprotractedarmedviolence. TheUNInquiryCommissionhasexpresseddoubtsevenastotheprotracted natureoftheviolenceduringthesecond intifada ,thoughit(rightly)acknowl- edgedthepossibilityofanon-internationalarmedconflicttakingplace. 46 Itjust seemsinconceivable,however,toclassifytherelativelypeacefulinter- intifada periodasanon-internationalarmedconflict. Thisbringsustothesecondproblematicpoint–theCourtfindsthatthe armedconflictintheoccupiedterritoriesisinternationalincharacter.Atfirst glancethatdoesnotseemtobeatroublesomeproposition,asinternationalarmed conflictsandbelligerentoccupationgohandinhand.Unfortunately,theissueis rathermorecomplex. Naturally,aconditionofinternationalarmedconflictisindispensablefor theimpositionofabelligerentoccupationonaforeignterritory. 47 Indeed,Yoram Dinsteinhasarguedthatbelligerentoccupationcanexistonlyinsofarasthe conflictinwhichithasbeencreatedcontinuestoexist. 48 Suchapositionhasdirect bearingonIsrael’soccupationoftheWestBankandGaza,asIsraelhasconcluded peacetreatieswithbothJordanandEgypt,therebyendingbeyondanydoubtthe internationalarmedconflictsduringwhichtheseterritorieswereoccupied.The majorityview,however,isthatIsraelcontinuestobethebelligerentoccupierof thePalestinianterritories,andthatitisadditionallyboundbytheFourthGeneva Conventioninitsadministrationoftheseterritories. 49 Bothofthesequestions havenowbeenauthoritativelysettledbytheICJinits Wall AdvisoryOpinion. 50 WhatmakesIsrael’soccupationofthePalestinianterritoriessoabnormal, though,isnotjustthatthearmedconflictinwhichtheoccupationwaseffected hasended,butalsothattheoccupationhaslastedforsomuchtime,now approaching40years,andthatthereisnodisplacedsovereignwhoseinterestsare tobeconsidered,sincebothJordanandEgypthaverenouncedanyclaimstothe territoriesinfavourofthePalestinianpeople’srighttoself-determination. 51 Both 46UNCommissiononHumanRights,QuestionoftheViolationofHumanRightsintheOccupiedArab Territories,IncludingPalestine:ReportoftheHumanRightsInquiryCommission,UNDoc.E/CN.4/ 2001/121,paras.39–40,availableathttp://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id 5 2260(last visited12May2007). 47Itisaxiomaticthatastatecanneveroccupyitsownterritoryasabelligerent.See,e.g.,LeslieC.Green, TheContemporaryLawofArmedConflict ,ManchesterUniversityPress,Manchester,2ndedn,2000,p. 257. 48YoramDinstein,‘‘Theinternationallawofbelligerentoccupationandhumanrights’’, IsraelYearBookof HumanRights ,Vol.8(1978),p.105.ProfessorDinsteinapparentlystillholdsthisview–seeDinstein, abovenote14,p.169:‘‘BelligerentoccupationpositstheexistenceoftheenemyasaStateandthe continuationofthewar.’’ 49TheIsraeligovernmenthasnotdisputedthatitisthebelligerentoccupierofthePalestinianterritories, butithasdisputedtheapplicabilityoftheFourthGenevaConvention.See,e.g.,Dinstein,abovenote14, pp.106–8.SeemoreEyalBenvenisti, TheInternationalLawofOccupation ,2ndedn,Princeton UniversityPress,Princeton,2004,pp.109–12. 50 LegalConsequencesoftheConstructionofaWallintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory ,AdvisoryOpinion, 9July2004,ICJReports2004,paras.90–101(hereinafter Wall ). 51SeeBenvenisti,abovenote49,p.112. Volume89Number866June2007 383 forthetargetedkillingspolicywasthequalificationoftheallegedterroristsas combatantsinthisconflict,andthereforeaslegitimatetargets. TheIsraeliSupremeCourtdisagreedwiththepetitioners,sayingthat ‘‘[t]hegeneral,principledstartingpointisthatbetweenIsraelandthevarious terroristorganizationsactiveinJudea,Samaria,andtheGazaStrip(hereinafter ‘‘thearea’’)acontinuoussituationofarmedconflicthasexistedsincethefirst intifada .’’ 43 Theconclusionthatanarmedconflictisoccurringisnotbyitself controversial,bearinginmindtheintensityoftheviolenceanditsprotracted character. 44 YetevenmoreinterestingisthequalificationthattheCourtgaveto theconflict: ThenormativesystemwhichappliestothearmedconflictbetweenIsraeland theterroristorganizationsinthe area iscomplex.Initscentrestandsthe internationallawregardinginternationalarmedconflict.ProfessorCassese discussedtheinternationalcharacterofanarmedconflictbetweenthe occupyingstateinanareasubjecttobelligerentoccupationandtheterrorists whocomefromthesamearea,includingthearmedconflictbetweenIsrael andtheterroristorganizationsinthe area ,stating: AnarmedconflictwhichtakesplacebetweenanOccupyingPowerand rebelorinsurgentgroups–whetherornottheyareterroristincharacter–in anoccupiedterritory,amountstoaninternationalarmedconflict(A. CASSESE,INTERNATIONALLAW420(2nded.2005),hereinafter CASSESE). Thislawincludesthelawsofbelligerentoccupation.However,itisnot restrictedonlytothem.Thislawappliesinanycaseofanarmedconflictof internationalcharacter–inotherwords,onethatcrossesthebordersofthe state–whetherornottheplaceinwhichthearmedconflictoccursissubject tobelligerentoccupation.Thislawconstitutesapartof iusinbello .Fromthe humanitarianperspective,itispartofinternationalhumanitarianlaw.That humanitarianlawisthe lexspecialis whichappliesinthecaseofanarmed conflict.Whenthereisagap( lacuna )inthatlaw,itcanbesupplementedby humanrightslaw. 45 TherearetwofundamentalproblemswiththeCourt’sreasoning. First,itassertsthatacontinuousstateofarmedconflicthasexisted betweenIsraelandthevariousterroristorganisationssincethefirst intifada .Does thismeanthatanarmedconflictexistedevenafterthesigningoftheOsloAccords in1993,whichendedthefirst intifada ,andbeforethebeginningofthesecond 43 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.16. 44 Per thewell-knowndefinitionofarmedconflictinthe Tadic ´ case:‘‘anarmedconflictexistswhenever thereisaresorttoarmedforcebetweenStatesorprotractedarmedviolencebetweengovernmental authoritiesandorganizedarmedgroupsorbetweensuchgroupswithinaState’’.ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic ´ ,IT-94-1,DecisionontheDefenceMotionforInterlocutoryAppealonJurisdiction,Appeals Chamber,2October1995,para.70. 45 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.18. M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 382 commentariesforpropositionsthattheydonotsupport,butthatitdidsowithout evenbotheringtolookatthemitself. Now,itistruethatinternationallawdoesrecognizecertainanomalous typesofnon-internationalarmedconflicts,particularlythoseofthe‘‘inter- nationalized’’variety. 39 Itisquitepossibletoargue delegeferenda thatnewforms ofarmedconflictshouldevolveundercustomarylaw,orthatinternationallaw shouldadaptinsomeotherwayinordertodescribebetterthenewrealitiesofthe modernworldunderthreatoftransnationalterrorism. 40 Therecertainlyare difficultiesinapplyingthetraditionalbinaryparadigmofinternationaland internalarmedconflictsinsituationswhichinvolve,forexample,armedgroups whichoperatesimultaneouslyintwoormorestates,withhostilitiestranscending porousstateborders.The2006Israeli–Hezbollahconflictisbutoneinstancein whichthelegalqualificationoftheconflictisproblematic.Consequently,thereare someindicationsthattheICRChas,atleastinitsinternalpractice,dispensedwith thegeographicallimitationofnon-internationalarmedconflictbuiltinto CommonArticle3,althoughnoofficialstatementorpublicmemorandumexists inthatregard. 41 Itis,however,disingenuoustoarguethatthelawsofarmedconflicthave somehowalwaysrecognizedthatnon-internationalarmedconflictsarenot synonymouswithinternalconflicts,andcansomehowbetransnationalinscope, whentheoppositeistrue.ThisisparticularlysowhenalltheSupremeCourtin Hamdan neededtodoinordertoavoidtheseissueswastoapplyCommonArticle 3ascustomarylawapplicableinallkindsofarmedconflicts,asdidthe InternationalCourtofJustice(ICJ)inthe Nicaragua case, 42 regardlessofthe preciselegalqualificationoftheconflictduringwhichHamdanwascaptured. TargetedKillings: anabnormaloccupation Thepetitionersin Hamdan didnotarguethatthe‘‘globalwaronterror’’isnotan armedconflictatall,sincetheyactuallywantedCommonArticle3toapplyin ordertoprovidesomeminimumhumanitarianprotection,suchastheprohibition ontortureandbasicfairtrialrights.ThepetitionersintheIsraeli TargetedKillings case,however,diddirectlychallengethegovernment’spositionthatIsraelis engagedinanarmedconflictwithPalestinianterroristgroups,asthedirectbasis 39SeegenerallyKolb,abovenote31,pp.85–93;EricDavid, Principesdedroitdesconflitsarme ´ s ,3rdedn, 2002,pp.137–85;DietrichSchindler,‘‘ThedifferenttypesofarmedconflictsaccordingtotheGeneva ConventionsandProtocols’’, Recueildescours ,Vol.163(1979-II),p.124;Hans-PeterGasser, ‘‘Internationalizednon-internationalarmedconflicts:casestudiesofAfghanistan,Kampuchea,and Lebanon’’, AmericanUniversityLawReview ,Vol.33(1983),p.145. 40See,e.g,RoyS.Scho ¨ ndorf,‘‘Extra-statearmedconflicts:isthereaneedforanewlegalregime’’, New YorkUniversityJournalofInternationalLawandPolitics ,Vol.37(2005),p.1. 41SeeJelenaPejic,‘‘Terroristactsandgroups:aroleforinternationallaw?’’ BritishYearBookof InternationalLaw ,Vol.75(2004),p.71,atp.86,n.74. 42ICJ, MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStatesof America) ,Judgment,ICJReports1986,paras.218,219(hereinafter Nicaragua ). Volume89Number866June2007 381 anon-internationalconflictintoaninternationalone.Evenifthisconclusionis perfectlydefensible,theCourtwasstillsomewhatdisingenuousinmakingitseem asifthisconclusionwasobvious,whichitisnot,andinstatingthatthiswas alwaysitsposition,whenithadactuallyrefrainedinthepastfromqualifyingthe ongoingarmedconflicteitherasaninternationalorasanon-internationalone. Both Hamdan and,toasomewhatlesserextent,the TargetedKillings case, clearlyshowustheremarkableamountofconceptualconfusionbroughtintothe traditionalframeworkofinternationalhumanitarianlawbytheever-increasing impactofnon-stateactorswhichareabletooperateacrossstateborderswithlittle restraint.Thisdoesnotchangethefact,however,thatweare,asamatterof positivelawandforhistoricalreasons,stilltrappedinabinaryconceptualmould ofinternationalandinternalarmedconflict.Whetherthisisagoodthingorbad, andwhetherstateswillthroughtheirpracticecreatenewtypesofarmedconflict,is beyondthescopeofthisarticle.Yet,ifanychangetotheexistinglawistobemade, thatchangemustbemadeclearlyandopenly,anditmustbesupportedby adequateanalysisandreasoning. Ofcourse,nomatterhowacademicallyinterestingthisdebateonthe conceptofarmedconflictis,italsohassignificantpracticalconsequences. Qualifyingthe‘‘globalwaronterror’’asasingle,globalnon-internationalarmed conflict,insteadofsplittingitupintoitsconstitutivecomponents,suchasIraqor Afghanistan,hasrepercussionsontheissueofindefinitedetentionofthose personswhomtheUSgovernmentdesignatesasunlawfulcombatantsinthiswar, anditalsoexposesthemtopotentialtargetedassassinations.ThefactthattheUS governmentwillnotbetryingtoassassinatesuspectedterroristslivinginLondon, oratleastitsaysthatitwillnot,doesnotmeanthatitisnotclaimingthatithas legalauthoritytodoso. 96 Italso,ofcourse,doesnotmeanthatitwillnottryto exercisethissupposedauthorityinplaceslikeYemenorSomalia,asithasindeed donesointhepast. Theparadoxthatthereforeemergesfromcomparingthesetwodecisions isthat Hamdan ,theonewhichisonitsfacemorefavourabletothepetitioners, mightactuallybelesssointhelongterm.TheIsraeliSupremeCourtisclearly superiortoitsUScounterpartinapplyinghumanitarianlawtothephenomenon ofterrorism,anditisevenmoresoinitsapplicationofhumanrightslaw.This mightactuallyprovetobethemostenduringqualityofthe TargetedKillings judgment:thatitshowssoclearlyhowtherelationshipbetweenhumanrightslaw andhumanitarianlawcanbeatwo-waystreet,andhowthatrelationshipcanbe farmorecomplexthanisusuallythought. 96See,e.g.,CharlesGarraway,‘‘ArmedconflictwithalQaeda:ariposte’’, OpinioJuris weblog,15January 2006,availableathttp://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1168895161.shtml(lastvisited12May2007). Volume89Number866June2007 393 wouldtodaydenotethemuchstricterconditionsofapplicationofAdditional ProtocolII,withpartiestotheconflictcontrollingdistinctportionsofterritory andcarryingoutsustainedandconcertedmilitaryoperations.Moreover,the CommentarydoessaythatthescopeofapplicationofCommonArticle3should beaswideaspossible,butitisclearlyreferringtothemanysituationsinwhich stateshaverefusedtoacknowledgethattheinternalstrifetheyareexperiencinghas reachedthelevelofnon-internationalarmedconflictandengagedtheprotections ofCommonArticle3, 31 as,forexample,FrancedidinrespectoftheAlgerian conflict 32 andtheUnitedKingdomdidinrespectoftheconflictinNorthern Ireland,orasRussiacontinuestodoinrespectoftheconflictinChechnya. 33 This widescopeofapplicationofCommonArticle3hasnothingtodowithwhether theconflictisorisnotinternalinscope.Inreality,ontheexactsamepagethatthe Courtcites,theCommentaryexplicitlysaysthat‘‘[s]peakinggenerally,itmustbe recognizedthattheconflictsreferredtoin[Common]Article3arearmed conflicts,with‘‘armedforces’’oneithersideengagedin‘‘hostilities’’–conflicts,in short,whichareinmanyrespectssimilartoaninternationalwar, buttakeplace withintheconfinesofasinglecountry .’’ 34 AtonepointtheCourtevenmis-citesandmisquotestheCommentaryon theAdditionalProtocols, 35 quotingitassayingthat‘‘anon-internationalarmed conflictisdistinctfromaninternationalarmedconflictbecauseofthelegalstatus oftheentitiesopposingeachother,andcitingittopage1351ofthe Commentary. 36 Infact,thequotedtextislocatednotonthecitedpage,buton page1319,andthesentencequotedisnotgiveninfull,astheCommentary continuestosaythat‘‘thepartiestotheconflictarenotsovereignStates, butthe governmentofasingleStateinconflictwithoneormorearmedfactionswithinits territory ’’. 37 Thefullquoteisthereforecontrarytotheargumentthatnon- internationalarmedconflictcansomehowbetransnational,andnotinternal,as areallotherICRCauthorities.Thecitationerrorinquestionfullyreproducesthe exactsameerrorincitationinan amicus briefsubmittedtotheCourtin Hamdan , 38 whichindicatesbeyondanydoubtnotonlythattheCourtcitedthe 31See,e.g.,YvesSandoz,‘‘Internationalhumanitarianlawinthetwenty-firstcentury’’, Yearbookof InternationalHumanitarianLaw ,Vol.6(2003),pp.3,13–15;RobertKolb, Iusinbello:Ledroit internationaldesconflitsarme ´ s ,2003,p.83. 32See,e.g,EldonvanCleefGreenberg,‘‘LawandtheconductoftheAlgerianRevolution’’, HarvardJournal ofInternationalLaw ,Vol.11(1970),p.37,esp.pp.47–52. 33SeeWilliamAbresch,‘‘Ahumanrightslawofinternalarmedconflict:theEuropeanCourtofHuman RightsinChechnya’’,EJIL,Vol.16(2005),p.741,atp.754,n.44. 34ICRCCommentaryonGCIII,abovenote28,p.36(emphasisadded). 35YvesSandozetal.,eds., CommentaryontheAdditionalProtocolsof8June1977totheGenevaConventions of12August1949 ,ICRC,Geneva,1987. 36 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,p.68. 37 CommentaryontheAdditionalProtocols ,abovenote35,p.1319,para.4339,alsoavailableathttp:// www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/475-750999?OpenDocument. 38 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ,BriefofProfessorsRyanGoodman,DerekJinks,andAnne-MarieSlaughteras AmicusCuriaeSupportingReversal(Geneva–Applicability),availableathttp://hamdanvrumsfeld.com/ GoodmanJinksSlaughter-FINALHamdamAmicusBrief-Jan52006.pdf(lastvisited12May2007),atp.19. M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 380 framework. 92 WhattheCourtclearlydidfocusonastheprimarybasisforits expansiveapplicationofhumanrightslawisIsrael’scontinuingbelligerent occupationofthePalestinianterritories.Forexample,theCourtsaysthattargeted killingsmaynotbeusedagainstterroristsiftheycanbearrestedandtried,since thisis‘‘particularlypracticalundertheconditionsofbelligerentoccupation,in whichthearmycontrolstheareainwhichtheoperationtakesplace,andinwhich arrest,investigation,andtrialareattimesrealizablepossibilities’’. 93 Thisapproach oftheCourtiscommendable,anditisentirelyconsistentwiththeICJ’sposition inthe Wall case, 94 asfurtherelaboratedin Congo v. Uganda . 95 TheamountofcontroloverthePalestinianterritoriesandpeoplethat Israelhas,astheirbelligerentoccupier,givesitawidevarietyofoptionsitcanuse inordertodealwithterrorists,andthisinturnaugmentstheobligationsithas underhumanrightslaw.Ina‘‘normal’’internationalarmedconflict,withoutthe presenceofaprolongedoccupation,humanrightslawwouldpresumablynot imposesuchadditionalobligations,andthestate’srelativefreedomofaction underhumanitarianlawwouldremainunrestricted. Conclusion Atthelevelofrhetoricandtheaffirmationoftheruleoflawtheimportanceof bothofthetwojudgmentspresentedinthisarticlecannotbedenied.Bothofthem clearlystandagainstthepropositionthatlawhasnoplaceintimesofwar.And,as wehaveseen,bothofthemarefarfromperfect,althoughnotequallyso,yetthey providevaluablelessonsforthefuture. Thisappliesforemosttobothcourts’examinationofwhatqualifiesasan armedconflictininternationallaw.TheUSSupremeCourtrightlyrejectedtheUS government’spositionthatitisinvolvedinaninternationalarmedconflictwith thealQaedaterroristorganization,asinternationalarmedconflictscanonlybe interstateones.Yet,itdidsoonlytofindthatthisconflictisactuallyanon- internationalone,disregardingevidencethatnon-internationalarmedconflicts havealwaysbeenregardedassynonymouswithinternalconflict,and misinterpretingtherelevantauthoritieswhiledoingso.TheIsraeliSupreme Court,ontheotherhand,ruledthatIsraelisindeedinvolvedinaninternational armedconflictwithPalestinianterroristorganizations,inanapparentreflection oftheUSgovernment’sposition.Yetitdidsoonlyinreferenceto belligerentoccupation,basicallyholdingthattheoccupationwilltransformeven 92See,e.g.,OrnaBen-NaftaliandYuvalShany,‘‘Livingindenial:theapplicationofhumanrightsinthe occupiedterritories’’, IsraelLawReview ,Vol.37(2003),p.17;AdamRoberts,‘‘Transformativemilitary occupation:applyingthelawsofwarandhumanrights’’,AJIL,Vol.100(2006),p.580;Kretzmer,above note11. 93 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.40. 94 Wall ,abovenote50,paras.107–113. 95 ArmedActivitiesintheTerritoryoftheCongo ( Congo v. Uganda ),ICJ,Judgment,19December2005, paras.216and220. M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 392 betweentheUnitedStatesandalQaeda.Yetthisconclusioniscontradictedby theCourt’sdiscussioninfootnote61ofitsopinion,whereitsaysthat‘‘the questionwhether[Hamdan’s]potentialstatusasaprisonerofwarindependently rendersillegalhistrialbymilitarycommissionmaybereserved’’. 25 This statementwouldmakesense only ifHamdanwasstillpossiblyacombatantinan internationalarmedconflict,asprisoner-of-warstatusexistsonlyinsuch conflicts. Thejudgmentisthereforequiteremarkableinitsconceptualconfusion. TheCourtcouldsimplyhavesaidthatCommonArticle3appliesinallarmed conflictsasamatterofcustomarylawandthereforehavebeenabletoavoidthe difficultquestionofqualifyingthelegalnatureofanyconflictwithalQaeda.This stillremainsapossiblereadingofthejudgment, 26 howeverunlikely,astheCourt insteadseemstohaveappliedCommonArticle3astreatylawtoanon- internationalarmedconflict.Asthatappearstobethecase,itisevenmore remarkablehowlittlesupporttheCourtactuallyinvokesforsuchanahistorical position.Non-internationalarmedconflictshavealwaysbeenregardednotjustas conflictsbetweenastateandanon-stateactor,butasconflictswhicharebytheir scopeinternal,occurringwithinasinglestate,asmandatedbythetextof CommonArticle3itself. 27 TheCourt,ontheotherhand,hasapparentlyadoptedtheviewthatonly theformerelementmatters,andhasdonesoinawaywhichmisinterpretsthe relevantinternationalauthorities.So,forexample,theCourtcitesthePictet Commentaryonthe1949GenevaConventions 28 forthepointthatreferencesto civilwarwereomittedfromthetextofCommonArticle3,andfortheproposition that‘‘thescopeoftheArticlemustbeaswideaspossible’’. 29 Bothofthesepoints areindeedcorrect,butneitherofthemhavetheimplicationsthattheCourt assignstothem. Referencesto‘‘civilwar’’wereomittedfromthetextofCommonArticle3 notbecausethedraftershadanymisgivingsabouttheinternalnatureofthese conflicts,butbecausetheterm‘‘civilwar’’denotesaninternalconflictof particularlygraveintensity,suchastheAmericanCivilWarortheSpanishCivil War,whilethedrafterswantedCommonArticle3toapplytoallsituationsof internalarmedconflictwhichsurpassthelevelofmeredisturbances. 30 ‘‘Civilwar’’ 25Ibid.,note61. 26ThisoptionseemstobeentertainedbyJohnCerone,‘‘Statusofdetaineesinnon-internationalarmed conflict,andtheirprotectioninthecourseofcriminalproceedings:thecaseof Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ’’, ASILInsight ,14July2006,availableathttp://www.asil.org/insights/2006/insights060714.html,atPartII (lastvisited12May2007). 27Whichspeaksofa‘‘conflictnotofaninternationalcharacter occurringintheterritoryofoneoftheHigh ContractingParties ’’(emphasisadded).SeealsoLindsayMoir, TheLawofInternalArmedConflict ,2002, pp.1–2. 28JeanPictet,ed., CommentaryontheGenevaConventionsof12August1949 ,4vols., ICRC ,Geneva,1952–9 (hereinafterICRCCommentary).ThefulltextoftheCommentaryisavailableatwww.icrc.org(last visited12May2007). 29 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,p.68,quotationprovidedinfullabove,atnote24. 30See,e.g.,DavidA.Elder,‘‘ThehistoricalbackgroundofCommonArticle3oftheGenevaConventions of1949’’, CaseWesternReserveJournalofInternationalLaw ,Vol.11(1979),p.37,atpp.53,68–9. Volume89Number866June2007 379 situationthattheICJcontemplatedinits Wall AdvisoryOpinion,whereit expandedonitsownthinkingin NuclearWeapons : Asregardstherelationshipbetweeninternationalhumanitarianlawand humanrightslaw,therearethusthreepossiblesituations:somerightsmaybe exclusivelymattersofinternatio nalhumanitarianlaw;othersmaybe exclusivelymattersofhumanrightslaw;yetothersmaybemattersofboth thesebranchesofinternationallaw. 89 WhatflowsbothfromtheICJ’sopinioninthe Wall caseandthe Targeted Killings judgmentisthattherelationshipbetweenhumanrightslawand humanitarianlawcannotbeexplainedbythesimplecomparisonofthegeneral tothespecial,evenifthisrelationshipoperatesinbothdirections.Forinstance, CommonArticle3(1)(d)refers,inaverygeneralway,to‘‘judicialguarantees recognizedasindispensablebycivilizedpeoples’’.Itisthenonlynaturaltolookat humanrightslaw,amongothersources,inordertoprovidemorespecificcontent tothisgeneralformulaofhumanitarianlaw.Thisisactuallywhatwassuggestedby theexpertsgatheredatthe2003ICRCRoundTableinSanRemo 90 and,indeed, thisisexactlywhattheUSSupremeCourthasdonein Hamdan ,evenifitis referringtohumanrightslawinarathersuperficialway. In TargetedKillings theIsraeliSupremeCourtisdoingmuchmorethan that.Itisnotusingamorespecificruleofhumanrightslawtointerpretageneral ruleofhumanitarianlaw.No,theruleofhumanitarianlawisveryclear;states havequitedeliberatelyleftthemselvesthefreedomtokillcombatants,or civiliansengaginginhostilities,andareundernoobligationtocapturethemand putthemontrialinstead.TheIsraeliSupremeCourtisthereforeusingahuman rightsnormnottointerpret,buttorestricttheapplicationofthehumanitarian one. AnthonyDworkinhasrightlycriticizedtheIsraeliSupremeCourtfornot providingmorereasoningontheexactmechanicsofthisinterfacebetweenhuman rightsandhumanitarianlaw. 91 TheCourtcertainlycouldhavebeenmoreexplicit, butitisintheendforlegalscholarstoprovideanappropriatetheoretical 89 Wall ,abovenote50,para.106. 90ICRC,‘‘Internationalhumanitarianlawandotherlegalregimes:interplayinsituationsofviolence’’, XXVIIthRoundTableonCurrentProblemsofInternationalHumanitarianLaw,heldinSanRemo, Italy,inSeptember2003,summaryreportavailableathttp://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/ htmlall/5UBCVX/$File/Interplay_other_regim es_Nov_2003.pdf(lastvisited12May2007).See especiallyp.9:‘‘ashumanrightslawismoreprecisethanIHL[internationalhumanitarianlaw]in certaindomains,therelationofinterpretationmustalsobeabletooperateintheotherdirection.For example,Article3(1)(d)commontotheGenevaConventionsexplicitlyreferstothe‘‘judicialguarantees recognizedasindispensablebycivilizedpeoples’’butwithoutfurtherspecifyingthemeaningofthis expression.Itwassuggestedthat,insuchahypothesis,apartfromthecomplementaryelements containedinAdditionalProtocolIIandincustomarylaw,theinterplaybetweenthesetwobodiesoflaw permitsreferencetobemadetohumanrightslawinordertodeducethesubstantiveguarantees resultingfromthisgeneralformula.’’ 91AnthonyDworkin,‘‘Israel’sHighCourtontargetedkilling:amodelforthewaronterror?’’, Crimesof WarProject ,15December2006,availableathttp://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-highcourt.html (lastvisited12May2007). 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