Lessons for human rights and humanitarian law in the war on terror - PDF document

Lessons for human rights and humanitarian law in the war on terror
Lessons for human rights and humanitarian law in the war on terror

Lessons for human rights and humanitarian law in the war on terror - Description


The article examines and compares two recent judgments which provide some of thebrmost valuable examples of the difficulties surrounding the application of internationalbrhumanitarian law to the phenomenon of terrorism the Hamdan judgment of thebrSupreme Court of the United States and the Ta ID: 907390 Download Pdf

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Itisimpossibletoknowexactlywhichofthesereadingsof Hamdan was theonethattheCourthadintended.Itisevenpossiblethatthisambiguity,which isthejudgment’sgreatestweakness,wasactuallyquiteintentionalontheCourt’s part.Thereadingadoptedasamatterofcoursebymanycommentatorsisthatthe CourthasruledthattheUnitedStates’‘‘war’’withalQaedaisaglobalnon- internationalarmedconflict. 21 Indeed,thisreadinghasseeminglyalsobeen adoptedbytheUSDepartmentofDefenceinitsmemorandumregardingthe implementationof Hamdan , 22 andmostrecentlybyJohnBellinger,theLegal AdviserintheDepartmentofState. 23 Thisisinfactthetextuallymostplausible interpretationof Hamdan ,asisindicated,forexample,bytheCourt’sdiscussion ofCommonArticle3,which affordssomeminimalprotection,fallingshortoffullprotectionunderthe Conventions,toindividualsassociatedwithneitherasignatorynorevena nonsignatory‘‘Power’’whoareinvolvedinaconflict‘‘intheterritoryof’’a signatory.Thelatterkindofconflictisdistinguishablefromtheconflict describedinCommonArticle2chieflybecauseitdoesnotinvolveaclash betweennations(whethersignatoriesornot).Incontext,then,thephrase ‘‘notofaninternationalcharacter’’bearsitsliteralmeaning.Althoughthe officialcommentariesaccompanyingCommonArticle3indicatethatan importantpurposeoftheprovisionwastofurnishminimalprotectionto rebelsinvolvedinonekindof‘‘conflictnotofaninternationalcharacter,’’i.e., acivilwar,thecommentariesalsomakeclear‘‘thatthescopeoftheArticle mustbeaswideaspossible.’’Infact,limitinglanguagethatwouldhave renderedCommonArticle3applicable‘‘especially[to]casesofcivilwar, colonialconflicts,orwarsofreligion,’’wasomittedfromthefinalversionof theArticle,whichcoupledbroaderscopeofapplicationwithanarrowerrange ofrightsthandidearlierproposediterations. 24 Clearly,thispassagewouldbepointlessiftheCourtwasnotdistinguishing betweenCommonArticle2andCommonArticle3conflictspreciselyinorderto rulethatthereisindeedaCommonArticle3,non-internationalarmedconflict 21See,e.g.,thediscussionbyMartyLedermanattheGeorgetownLawFacultyBlog,‘‘Toptenmythsabout Hamdan ,Geneva,andinterrogations’’,5July2006,availableathttp://gulcfac.typepad.com/ georgetown_university_law/2006/07/top_ten_myths_a_1.html(lastvisited12May2007);GeorgeP. Fletcher,‘‘The Hamdan caseandconspiracyasawarcrime’’, JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice , Vol.4(2006),pp.442,444;HaroldHongjuKoh,‘‘Settingtheworldright’’, YaleLawJournal ,Vol.115 (2006),p.2350,atpp.2365–6. 22MemorandumontheApplicationofCommonArticle3oftheGenevaConventionstotheTreatmentof DetaineesintheDepartmentofDefense,signedon7July2006bytheDeputySecretaryofDefense, GordonEngland,availableathttp://balkin.blogspot.com/CA3.DOD.memo.pdf(lastvisited12May 2007),whichstatesthat‘‘[t]heSupremeCourthasdeterminedthatCommonArticle3totheGeneva Conventionsof1949appliesasamatteroflaw totheconflictwithAlQaeda ’’(emphasisadded). 23‘‘[T]heAdministrationreadsthe Hamdan decisiontoacceptthattheUSisinanarmedconflict–and thereforethatthelawsofwarareappropriatetoapply–butthatthearmedconflictisnotofan internationalcharacter’’.Discussionatthe OpinioJuris weblog,‘‘ArmedconflictwithalQaida:a response’’,16January2007,availableathttp://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1169001063.shtml(lastvisited 12May2007). 24 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,p.68(citationsandquotationsomitted). M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 378 militaryadvantagedirectlyanticipatedfromharmingthecombatantsand terrorists. 83 Whatissointerestinghereisthatonlythelastoftheseconditions–that is,theprincipleofproportionality–isaruleofinternationalhumanitarianlaw. Thereisnoruleofhumanitarianlawobligingstatesnottokillcombatantsifthey canbearrestedordetained–aslongasthecombatantisnot horsdecombat ,he canbelawfullykilled.Thereislikewisenoruleofhumanitarianlawmandatingan effectiveinvestigationintothecircumstancesofeveryattack,assuchanobligation existsonlyinrespectofpossiblegravebreachesoftheGenevaConventions. 84 The firstthreeconditionssetbytheCourtforthelawfulnessoftargetedkillingsare thereforedrawnsolelyfromhumanrightslaw.TheCourtindeedcitestothat effectthreejudgmentsoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,includingthe well-known McCann case. 85 Themostremarkablethingaboutthisjudgmentispreciselythisuseof humanrightslawtofurtherhumanizehumanitarianlaw.Therelationship betweenhumanrightslawandhumanitarianlawisusuallythoughtofintermsof lexspecialis , per theICJ’s NuclearWeapons AdvisoryOpinion. 86 Toillustratethis relationshiptheICJitselfgavetheexampleoftherulesofhumanitarianlaw definingwhatanarbitrarydeprivationoflifeisduringanarmedconflict,inthe contextofArticle6oftheICCPR. 87 ThisdecisionoftheICJhassometimesbeen interpretedaswarrantingastrictapproach:ifaspecificprovisionofhumanitarian lawcontradictsamoregeneralprovisionofhumanrightslaw,theprovisionof humanitarianlawmustapply.Inotherwords,itishumanitarianlawwhichhasa directimpactonhumanrightslaw,nottheotherwayaround. 88 Thesituationinthe TargetedKillings caseisexactlytheopposite,sincethe state’sdutiesunderhumanrightslawarenowreducingthefreedomofactionthe stateactuallyenjoysunderhumanitarianlaw.Thisisindeedpreciselythetypeof 83 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,paras.40–46. 84See,e.g.,Art.146(2)ofGCIV. 85 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.40,citing Ergi v. Turkey ,32EHRR388(2001), McCann v. United Kingdom ,21EHRR97(1995)and McKerr v. UnitedKingdom ,34EHRR553(2001). 86 LegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons ,AdvisoryOpinion,8July1996,ICJReports1996,para. 25. 87Ibid. 88See,e.g.,LouiseDoswald-Beck,‘‘InternationalhumanitarianlawandtheAdvisoryOpinionofthe InternationalCourtofJusticeontheLegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons’’, International ReviewoftheRedCross ,No.316(1997),p.35:‘‘Thisisaverysignificantstatement,foritmeansthat humanitarianlawistobeusedtoactuallyinterpretahumanrightsrule.Conversely,italsomeansthat, atleastinthecontextoftheconductofhostilities, humanrightslawcannotbeinterpreteddifferentlyfrom humanitarianlaw .Althoughthismakescompletesenseinthecontextofthearbitrarydeprivationoflife (avagueformulationinhumanrightslaw,whereashumanitarianlawisfullofpurpose-builtrulesto protectlifeasfaraspossibleinarmedconflict),itislessclearwhetherthisisalsoappropriateforhuman rightsrulesthatprotectpersonsinthepowerofanauthority.Thisisparticularlysowhenitisahuman rightstreatybodythatisapplyingthetextofthetreaty.Practicethusfar,inparticularoftheEuropean CommissionandCourtofHumanRights,seemstoshowthatsuchbodiesapplythehumanrightstext withinitsownterms’’(textaroundfootnotes50–2,emphasisadded).SeealsoWilliamAbresch,‘‘A humanrightslawofinternalarmedconflict:theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinChechnya’’,EJIL, Vol.16(2005),p.741,atpp.743–5. M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 390 partyfromapplyingthelawofwartoaconflicttowhichtheConventiondoes notapply. 18 Thegovernmentcitesonlyoneauthorityforthisratherremarkable propositionthatthereare,undercustomarylaw,othertypesofarmedconflict thanthoseregulatedbytheGenevaConventions:Article142(3)oftheThird GenevaConvention,whichcontainstheMartensClause.Itmustbenotedthatit certainlytakessomeaudacitytocitetheMartensClause,ofallthings,which embodiesthehumanitarianspiritofthelawsofarmedconflict,assupportforthe thesisthattherearearmedconflictswhicharegovernedbythelawofwarbutare notregulatedbyit,andallforthepurposeoftorturingsuspectedterroristsfor information.ItiscertainlytruethattheMartensClauseisfrequentlyinvoked whenthereisnostatepracticeor opiniojuris tosupporttheexistenceofa customaryrule,butthishasalwaysbeendoneforhumanitarianpurposes.Herewe havethefirstexampleoftheMartensClausebeingcitedbyagovernmentfor purposeswhichareeverythingbuthumanitarian. TheUSSupremeCourtdealtwiththegovernment’spositionthatthe ‘‘waronterror’’isaninternationalarmedconflictbysayingthatit neednotdecidethemeritsofthisargumentbecausethereisatleastone provisionoftheGenevaConventionsthatapplieshereeveniftherelevant conflictisnotonebetweensignatories.Article3,oftenreferredtoasCommon Article3because,likeArticle2,itappearsinallfourGenevaConventions, providesthatina‘‘conflictnotofaninternationalcharacteroccurringinthe territoryofoneoftheHighContractingParties,eachPartytotheconflict shallbeboundtoapply,asaminimum,’’certainprovisionsprotecting ‘‘[p]ersonstakingnoactivepartinthehostilities,includingmembersof armedforceswhohavelaiddowntheirarmsandthoseplacedhorsdecombat by…detention.’’ 19 Yet,unfortunately,theSupremeCourtdoesnotspecifyhowandwhy CommonArticle3applies.Doesitapplyasamatterofcustomarylaw,regardless ofthelegalqualificationofthearmedconflictbetweentheUnitedStatesandal Qaeda?Thisconclusion,whichiscertainlycorrectasamatteroflaw,issuspect becausetheCourtdoesnotoncementiontheword‘‘custom.’’Ordoesitapplyas treatylaweveniftheconflictisregardedasaninternationalone,areadingwhich wouldclearlybecontrarytothetextofCommonArticle3?OristheCourtsaying thatCommonArticle3appliesbecausetheconflictbetweentheUnitedStatesand alQaedaislegallyanon-internationalarmedconflict,andifso,whichone?Isthe UnitedStatesfightingalQaedainAfghanistan,asanallyoftheAfghan government,oristhisnon-internationalarmedconflictwithalQaedasomehow globalinscope? 20 18Ibid.,p.26. 19 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,p.67(citationsomitted). 20ThisisbasicallythepositiontakeninDerekJinks,‘‘September11andthelawofwar’’, YaleJournalof InternationalLaw ,Vol.28(2003),p.20. Volume89Number866June2007 377 TheIsraeliSupremeCourt,ontheotherhand,squarelydealswiththe issue:itfindsthattheseparatecategoryofunlawfulcombatantsdoesnotexist underpositivelaw,andthatininternationalarmedconflictseithertheThirdor theFourthConventionmustapply.Unlawfulcombatantsare,accordingtothe Court,civilianswhoaretakingadirectpartinhostilities,andwhoarenot protectedwhiledoingso.Insoruling,theCourthasexplicitlyaffirmedinits entiretythecustomarynatureoftheruleenshrinedinArticle51(3)ofAdditional ProtocolI,whichitdiscussedingreatdetail. 78 Humanrightsandhumanitarianlaw Butbyfarthemostinterestingpartofthe TargetedKillings judgmentistheCourt’s applicationofinternationalhumanrightslaw,andcontrastingthisdecisionto Hamdan thenbecomeslikecomparingnightandday.Ontheonehand,theUS SupremeCourt’streatmentofinternationalhumanrightslawisreducedtoa singlefootnoteina100-pageopinion,withtheCourtinvokingArticle14ofthe InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR),justlikeArticle75 ofProtocolI,onlyinordertoelaborateonthemoregeneralfairtrialprovisionsof CommonArticle3. 79 Ontheotherhand,theIsraeliSupremeCourtextensively useshumanrightslawinordertocomplementtheapplicablerulesof humanitarianlaw.TheCourtindeedfindsthatcivilianswhoaretakingadirect partinhostilitiesmaybelawfullytargeted,butonlyiffourconditionsaremet. 1.Thestatemustpossesswell-based,thoroughlyverifiedinformationregarding theidentityandactivityofthecivilianwhoisallegedlytakingpartinthe hostilities;theburdenofproofonthestateisheavy. 80 2.Aciviliantakingadirectpartinhostilitiescannotbeattackedatsuchtimeas heisdoingso,ifalessharmfulmeanscanbeemployed.Thus,ifaterrorist takingadirectpartinhostilitiescanbearrested,interrogated,andtried,those arethemeanswhichshouldbeemployed.InthewordsoftheCourt,‘‘Trialis preferabletouseofforce.Arule-of-lawstateemploys,totheextentpossible, proceduresoflawandnotproceduresofforce.’’ 81 3.Ifacivilianisindeedattacked,athoroughandindependentinvestigation mustbeconductedregardingtheprecisionoftheidentificationofthetarget andthecircumstancesoftheattack,andinappropriatecasescompensation mustbepaidforharmdonetoinnocentcivilians. 82 4.Finally,combatantsandterroristsarenottobeharmedifthedamage expectedtobecausedtonearbyinnocentciviliansisnotproportionatetothe 78TheCourtextensivelyanalysesboththeelementofdirectnessandthetemporalelementinapplying Article51(3).See TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,paras.33–40. 79 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,p.70,note66. 80 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.40. 81Ibid. 82Ibid. Volume89Number866June2007 389 drugs’’. 12 OneofthereasonsforthisrejectionoftheUSpositionwasthat, historically,warwasalwaysconsideredonlytobeaconflictbetweentwoormore states,notbetweenastateandanon-stateactor. 13 Itwasalsoasubjectivenotion, sincenotevenallinterstateconflicts defacto wereconsideredtobewars dejure . 14 AccordingtotheICRCandnumerousauthors,the‘‘globalwaronterror’’ mustbesplitintoitscomponents,suchastheongoingarmedconflictsinIraqand Afghanistan,andonlytothesespecificarmedconflicts,andnottothewhole,can thelawsofarmedconflictapply. 15 Thatarmedconflict,andnotwar,isnowthe thresholdofapplicabilityofhumanitarianlaw,hasalsobeenrecognizedbytheUS administration,whicharguedinitslegalmemoranda 16 anditssubmissionstothe SupremeCourt 17 thattheUnitedStatesisengagedinaninternationalarmed conflictwiththealQaedaterroristorganization.Sinceinternationalarmed conflictsaredefinedbyCommonArticle2ofthefourGenevaConventionsonlyas conflictsbetweenstates,theadministrationresortedtoaratherinnovative argument,claimingthattherearesomeinternationalarmedconflictswhichare beyondthematerialscopeoftheGenevaConventions,andwhicharenot regulatedbyit: Petitionersuggeststhat,iftheGenevaConventiondoesnotapplytoalQaeda, thelawofwardoesnotapplyeither.Thatsuggestionisbaseless.Thereisno fieldpre-emptionundertheGenevaConvention.TheConventionseeksto regulate theconductofwarfaretowhichitapplieswithrespecttonation- statesthathaveenteredtheConventionandagreedtoabidebyitsterms,butit doesnotpurporttoapplytoeveryarmedconflictthatmightariseortocrowd outthecommonlawofwar.Instead,asexplainedbelow,theConvention appliesonlytothoseconflictsidentifiedinArticles2and3.Ifanarmed conflict,therefore,doesnotfallwithintheConvention,theConvention simplydoesnotregulateit.NothingintheConventionprohibitsabelligerent 12SeeGaborRona,‘‘OfficialstatementonbehalfoftheICRC’’,16March2004,availableathttp:// www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5XCMNJ(lastvisited12May2007):‘‘Thereisnomorelogic toautomaticapplicationofthelawsofarmedconflicttothe‘‘waronterror’’thanthereistothe‘‘war ondrugs’’,‘‘waronpoverty’’or‘‘waroncancer’’.Thus,blanketcriticismofthelawofarmedconflictfor itsfailuretocoverterrorism,perse,isakintoassailingthespecializedlawofcorporationsforitsfailure toaddressallbusinessdisputes.’’ 13Forexample,Oppenheimdefineswaras‘‘acontentionbetweentwoormoreStatesthroughtheirarmed forces,forthepurposeofoverpoweringeachotherandimposingsuchconditionsofpeaceasthevictor pleases’’.LassaOppenheim, InternationalLaw (HerschLauterpachted.,7thed.,1952)Vol.II,p.202. 14SeegenerallyChristopherGreenwood,‘‘Theconceptofwarinmoderninternationallaw’’,ICLQ,Vol. 36(1987),p.283;fortheoppositeviewseeYoramDinstein, War,AggressionandSelf-Defence ,4thedn, CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2005,pp.14–15. 15See,e.g.,theOfficialStatementbyICRCPresidentKellenberger,14September2004,availableathttp:// www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/66EMA9(lastvisited12May2007). 16MemorandumfortheVicePresident,signedbyPresidentBushonFebruary7,2002.Summariesand textsofallrelevantmemorandaareavailableathttp://lawofwar.org/Torture_Memos_analysis.htm(last visited12May2007). 17See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ,GovernmentBriefontheMerits,availableathttp://www.hamdanvrums- feld.com/HamdanSGmeritsbrief.pdf(lastvisited12May2007),atpp.23–6. M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 376 JusticeKennedy,whoprovidedtheswingvoteforthejudgmentasawhole,not joiningthatpartoftheopinionoftheCourt. Incontrast,theIsraeliSupremeCourtwasmuchmoreforcefulinrelation tofundamentalhumanitarianguarantees.Itunequivocallyaffirmsthecustomary statusofArticle75, 72 andaddssomesubstantialrhetoricalflourish: Needlesstosay,unlawfulcombatantsarenotbeyondthelaw.Theyarenot ‘‘outlaws’’.Godcreatedthemaswellinhisimage;theirhumandignityaswell istobehonored;theyaswellenjoyandareentitledtoprotection,evenifmost minimal,bycustomaryinternationallaw. 73 Onecanonlyexpressagreementwithsuchsentiment. Whenitcomestothepreciselegalstatusofunlawfulcombatants,the ICRCandnumerousauthorshaveassertedthatpersonsnotentitledtoprotection undertheThirdConventionmustconsequentlybeentitledtoprotectionunder Articles4(1)and5oftheFourthGenevaConvention. 74 Otherauthorshavejustas ablyarguedthatunlawfulcombatantsdoindeedslipthroughthecracks,asitwere, betweenthetwoconventions,andthattheyareentitledtoprotectiononlyunder customaryhumanitarianlaw. 75 TheUSSupremeCourtdoesnotaddressthisissuein Hamdan ,although itsjudgmentisagainunclearandcontradictory.Asalreadymentioned,it ‘‘reserves’’theissueofwhetherHamdanisentitledtoprisoner-of-warstatus,even thoughitapparentlycharacterizestheunderlyingconflictasanon-international one. 76 TheCourtdoesnotseemtorealizethattheconceptsofcombatants’privilege andlawfulorunlawfulcombatancysimplyhavenoplaceinnon-internationalarmed conflicts.InCommonArticle3conflictsnobodyhastherighttotakeuparmsagainst thestate,andprisoner-of-warstatusassuchdoesnotexistatall,unlessstipulatedto thecontrarybyaspecialagreementbetweenthepartiestotheconflict. 77 72 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.25. 73Ibid. 74SeeICRCCommentaryonGCIV,abovenote28,atp.52,whichstatesthat‘‘[e]verypersoninenemy handsmusthavesomestatusunderinternationallaw:heiseitheraprisonerofwarand,assuch,covered bytheThirdConvention,aciviliancoveredbytheFourthConvention,oragain,amemberofthe medicalpersonnelofthearmedforceswhoiscoveredbytheFirstConvention.Thereisnointermediate status;nobodyinenemyhandscanbeoutsidethelaw.Wefeelthatthatisasatisfactorysolution–not onlysatisfyingtothemind,butalso,andaboveall,satisfactoryfromthehumanitarianpointofview.’’ SeealsoLuisaVierucci,‘‘Prisonersofwarorprotectedpersons qua unlawfulcombatants?Thejudicial safeguardstowhichtheGuanta ´ namodetaineesareentitled’’, JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice , Vol.1(2003),p.284;Hans-PeterGasser,‘‘Actsofterror,‘‘terrorism’’andinternationalhumanitarian law’’, InternationalReviewoftheRedCross ,Vol.84(847)(2002),p.547;KnutDo ¨ rmann,‘‘Thelegal situationof‘‘unlawful/unprivilegedcombatants’’’’, InternationalReviewoftheRedCross ,Vol.85(849) (2003),p.45;Kolb,abovenote31,pp.158–9;Cassese,abovenote58,pp.409–10. 75SeeAdamRoberts,‘‘Thelawofwarinthewaronterror’’,inWyboP.Heere,ed., Terrorismandthe Military ,2002,p.82;YoramDinstein, TheConductofHostilitiesundertheLawofInternationalArmed Conflict ,p.29;SeanD.Murphy,‘‘EvolvingGenevaConventionparadigmsinthe‘‘waronterrorism’’: applyingthecorerulestothereleaseofpersonsdeemed‘‘unprivilegedcombatants’’’’,forthcoming, GeorgeWashingtonLawReview ,Vol.75(2007),availableatSSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract 5 958380 (lastvisited12May2007). 76 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,note61. 77CommonArticle3(3). M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 388 killingsarealways,withoutexception,aviolationofhumanrightsand humanitarianlaw.Theassassinationshavealsodrawnwidespreadcondemnation intheinternationalcommunity,beinglabelledas‘‘contrarytointernational law’’bytheUNSecretary-GeneralKofiAnnan, 8 as‘‘unlawfulkillings’’bythe UKForeignSecretaryJackStraw 9 andas‘‘summaryexecution[s]thatviolate humanrights’’bythelateAnnaLindh,thentheForeignMinisterofSweden. 10 TheIsraeliSupremeCourtdisagreedwiththeabsolutepositionforwarded bythepetitioners,findingthattargetedkillingsmayindeedbelawfulundercertain restrictiveconditions,whichitthenproceededtodefine,drawingheavily,aswe shallsee,onhumanrightslaw. 11 Thesecasesfromtwocountrieswhichareamongthemostconcerned withinternationalterrorismtodayarecertainlyinstructive.Evenmoresoisthe comparisonbetweenthereasoningofthetwohighcourts.Thisarticlewillengage inpreciselythistypeofanalysis,dealing,inturn,withthreespecificissues:the thresholdsofapplicabilityofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,theconceptof unlawfulcombatancyandtherelationshipbetweenhumanrightslawand humanitarianlaw. Hamdan: anarmedconflictwithalQaeda? Asiswellknown,theUSadministrationhasbeenarguingsince2001thatitis engagedina‘‘globalwaronterror’’,inwhichtherulesofthelawofarmedconflict apply,andinwhichtheusual,criminal-lawenforcementmodelofdealingwith terrorismplaysamuchmoresubduedrole.Thislegalqualificationoftheongoing fightagainstinternationalterrorismasawaroranarmedconflicthasbeen vigorouslyresistedbymanylegalscholars,especiallyoutsidetheUnitedStates.The InternationalCommitteeoftheRe dCross(ICRC)has,amongothers, remarkedthatthe‘‘waronterror’’islegallynomoreawarthanthe‘‘waron Yemenin2002ontheorganizeroftheterroristbombingoftheUSS Cole ,andwhichrecently unsuccessfullyattemptedinSomaliatokillthemastermindofthe1996bombingsoftheUSembassies inKenyaandTanzania.Seehttp://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/01/11/somalia.ap/index.html (lastvisited29January2007). 8Seetranscriptofremarksof22March2004athttp://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid 5 564(last visited29January2007). 9MatthewTempest,‘‘UKcondemns‘‘unlawful’’Yassinkilling’’, Guardian ,22March2004,availableat http://politics.guardian.co.uk/foreignaffairs/story/0,11538,1175312,00.html(lastvisited29January 2007). 10BrianWhitakerandOliverBurkeman,‘‘Killingprobesthefrontiersofroboticsandlegality,’’ Guardian , 6November2002,availableathttp://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,834311,00.html(lastvisited 29January2007). 11ForageneraloverviewoftheIsraelipolicyoftargetedassassinations,aswellasforanexceptionally prescientanalysisoftherelevantlegalquestions,seeDavidKretzmer,‘‘Targetedkillingofsuspected terrorists:extra-judicialexecutionsorlegitimatemeansofdefence?’’,EJIL,Vol.16(2005),p.171;Orna Ben-NaftaliandKerenR.Michaeli,‘‘‘‘Wemustnotmakeascarecrowofthelaw’’:alegalanalysisofthe Israelipolicyoftargetedkillings’’, CornellInternationalLawJournal ,Vol.36(2003),p.233. Volume89Number866June2007 375 lawappliesbutprovidesnoprotectionstothosedetainedinthe‘‘waronterror’’.It hasalsoclaimedthathumanrightslawdoesnotapply,since(i)itisinapplicable intimesofwar;andsince(ii)humanrightstreatiesdonotapplyextraterritorially, asinIraq,AfghanistanorGuanta ´ namoBay. 65 Boththeseclaimshavebeenrejected byUNtreatybodies. 66 Itishardtodisputethehistoricalexistenceofthecategoryofunlawful (unprivileged)combatantsorbelligerents. 67 Thatjustbegsthequestion,however, ofhowthishistoricalcategoryfitsintotheGenevaframework,themostbasicissue beingthefundamentalhumanitarianguaranteesowedtoallparticipantsina conflict,regardlessoftheirexactlegalstatus.Ininternationalarmedconflictsthe startingpointhasusuallybeenArticle75ofProtocolI,whichhaslongbeen regardedasreflectiveofcustomarylaw. 68 Evenmoreimportantlyinthiscase,the customarystatusofArticle75hasbeenconfirmedbyatleasttwoLegalAdvisersof theUSStateDepartment. 69 YetthecurrentUSadministrationhasregrettablycast eventhispointintodoubt,anditspresentLegalAdviserhasstatedthatthe administrationis‘‘lookingat’’whetherArticle75guaranteesareapplicableinthe ‘‘waronterror’’. 70 Forallitsambiguities,the Hamdan judgmentisatleastclearonone point:thattheminimalguaranteesofCommonArticle3,includingtheprotection ofpersonaldignityandbasicfairtrialrights,areapplicabletoallterrorism detainees.TheCourtwasunfortunatelyunabletoreachthesameconclusionwith respecttoArticle75ofProtocolI,withapluralityoffourjusticesfindingthat someoftheprovisionsofArticle75areindisputablyapartofcustomarylaw 71 and therebyinformingtheCourt’sinterpretationofCommonArticle3,butwith 65See,e.g,theOpeningRemarksbyJohnBellinger,LegalAdviser,USDepartmentofState,beforetheUN CommitteeagainstTorture,May5,2006,availa bleathttp://www.us-mission.ch/Press2006/ 0505BellingerOpenCAT.htmlandtheOpeningStatementofMathewWaxman,HeadofUS DelegationbeforetheUNHumanRightsCommittee,17July2006,availableathttp://geneva.usmis- sion.gov/0717Waxman.html(lastvisited12May2007). 66SeetheConclusionsandRecommendationsoftheCommitteeagainstTorture:UnitedStatesof America,CAT/C/USA/CO/2,25July2006,paras.14and15andtheConcludingObservationsofthe HumanRightsCommittee:UnitedStatesofAmerica,CCPR/C/USA/CO/3,15September2006,para.10, availableathttp://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf(lastvisited12May2007). 67FortheclassicaltreatmentofthesubjectseeRichardR.Baxter,‘‘So-called‘‘Unprivilegedbelligerency’’: spies,guerrillasandsaboteurs’’, BritishYearBookofInternationalLaw ,Vol.28(1951),p.323.Seealso Green,abovenote47,pp.102–5,107–8. 68See,e.g,Jean-PhilippeLavoyer,‘‘Shouldinternationalhumanitarianlawbereaffirmed,clarifiedor developed?’’, IsraelYearBookonHumanRights ,Vol.34(2004),p.35,42;FaustoPocar,‘‘ProtocolI Additionaltothe1949GenevaConventionsandcustomaryinternationallaw’’, IsraelYearBookon HumanRights ,Vol.31(2001),p.145;Kolb,abovenote31,p.158;David,abovenote39,pp.483–4. 69SeeMichaelJ.Matheson,‘‘TheUnitedStates’positionontherelationofcustomaryinternationallawto the1977ProtocolsAdditionaltothe1949GenevaConventions’’, AmericanUniversityJournalof InternationalLaw&Policy ,Vol.2(1987),p.419;WilliamH.TaftIV,‘‘Thelawofarmedconflictafter9/ 11:somesalientfeatures’’, YaleJournalofInternationalLaw ,Vol.28(2003),pp.319,322. 70RemarksbyJohnBellinger,LegalAdviser,USDepartmentofState,attheRoyalInstituteof InternationalAffairs(ChathamHouse),London,9February2006.SeeAnthonyDworkin,‘‘United Statesis‘‘lookingat’’theplaceoffundamentalguaranteesinthewaronterror’’, CrimesofWarProject ,1 March2006,availableathttp://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-guarantees.html(lastvisited12May 2007). 71 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,pp.70–2. Volume89Number866June2007 387 Manyargumentshavebeenmade,bothgoodandbad,regardingtheimpacton internationalhumanitarianlawofthe‘‘globalwaronterror’’wagedbythepresent USadministration.Yettherealwayscomesatimeforthesemanydifferent argumentstobetested,andatthatinacourtoflaw.Inthatregard,thepastyear hasseentwoveryimportantjudgmentswhoserulingscanhelpustoassessthe impactofglobalterrorismonhumanitarianlaw. First,inJune2006theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesdeliveredits decisionin Hamdan v. Rumsfeld . 1 Hamdan,aself-confessedone-timedriverand bodyguardofOsamabinLaden,isnowincustodyattheUSdetentioncampat Guanta ´ namoBay,Cuba.InNovember2001,duringhostilitiesbetweentheUnited StatesandtheTaliban(whothengovernedAfghanistan),Hamdanwascaptured bymilitiaforcesandturnedovertotheUSmilitary,andwaslatertransportedto Guanta ´ namoBay.Overayearlater,theUSpresidentdeemedhimeligiblefortrial bymilitarycommissionforthenunspecifiedcrimes.Afteranotheryearhad passed,Hamdanwaschargedwithonecountofconspiracytocommitoffences triablebymilitarycommission. 2 HamdanthenproceededtochallengebeforeaUS federalcourtthevalidityofthemilitarycommissionssetouttotryhim.After winningbeforethedistrictcourt 3 andlosingbeforetheDCCircuitCourtof Appeals, 4 Hamdan’scasefinallycamebeforetheSupremeCourtoftheUnited States. TheCourtheldthatthemilitarycommissionsassetupbythepresident violatecommonArticle3ofthefourGenevaConventionsof1949, 5 towhichthe UnitedStatesisapartyandwhoserequirementsareincorporatedintoUSstatutes, sincethesecommissionsdonotprovidetothoseaccusedbeforethemtheminimal judicialguaranteesrecognizedasindispensablebycivilizedpeoples.Apluralityof theCourtalsoheldthatconspiracy,withwhichHamdancouldhavebeenlawfully charged,isnotanoffenceagainstthelawofwar. Then,inDecember2006,theIsraeliSupremeCourtrendereditslong- awaiteddecisioninthe TargetedKillings case,inanopinionbyitsoutgoing president,JudgeAharonBarak. 6 Inthiscasethepetitioners,twohumanrights NGOs,challengedtheIsraeliArmy’suseofthepolicyoftargetedkillingsor assassinations–thatis,limitedmilitaryoperationswiththepurposeofkillinga specificperson,usuallyasuspectedterrorist. 7 Thepetitionersclaimedthattargeted 1 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ,USSupremeCourt,548U.S.___(2006);126S.Ct.2749;2006U.S.LEXIS5185 (hereinafter Hamdan ).AllcitationsinthisarticlewillbetotheslipopinionoftheCourt,availableat http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf(lastvisited29January2007). 2 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,atp.1. 3344F.Supp.2d152(DC2004). 4415F.3d33(2005). 5 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,atpp.49–72. 6 ThePublicCommitteeagainstTortureinIsraeletal v. TheGovernmentofIsraeletal ,SupremeCourtof IsraelsittingastheHighCourtofJustice,Judgment,11December2006,HCJ769/02,availableathttp:// elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.HTM(lastvisited29January2007)(here- inafter TargetedKillings ). 7TheIsraeliarmedforceshaveresortedtotargetedkillingsonseveraloccasions,mostnotablyinthe 2004assassinationsofHamasleadersAhmedYassinandAbdulAzizRantisi.Targetedkillingshave alsobeenemployedbytheUnitedStatesinthe‘‘waronterror’’,whichlaunchedamissileattackin M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 374 insurgentsthemselvesarenotpurportingtofightonbehalfofanyotherstate,nor istheirstruggledirectlyrelatedtotheinitialinternationalarmedconflict. 61 Itis alsonotentirelycontradictoryforboththeFourthGenevaConventiontoregulate thebelligerentoccupationandforanon-internationalarmedconflicttobe occurringatthesametime,asboththeICJin Nicaragua 62 andtheInternational CriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY)in Tadic ´ 63 recognizedthatan internationalandanon-internationalarmedconflictcantakeplaceatthesame time,runninginparallel.Thereisnologicalreasonwhythisrulecannotalsoapply byanalogyduringanoccupation,andtheCourt,unlikeProfessorCassese,just doesnotprovideanyreasoningfortheconclusionithasultimatelyreached. Unlawfulcombatants Howeverfascinatingthediscussionofthethresholdsofapplicabilityof humanitarianlaw,orthelackthereof,inboththe Hamdan andthe Targeted Killings judgments,thereisalsothematteroftheapplicationofthesubstantive rulesofhumanitarianlawbybothhighcourts.Here,again,theparallelsbetween thetwocasesareveryinstructive. TheUSlegalargumentregardingthe‘‘globalwaronterror’’isastoryof threelacunae.Thefirstone,aswehaveseen,istheallegedgapintheapplication criteriaofthe1949GenevaConventions,sincetheUnitedStateswasarguingthat itsconflictwithalQaedaislegallyanarmedconflict,butthatitisneithera CommonArticle2noraCommonArticle3conflict.Thesecondgapcomesin evenifitisassumedthattheconflictfallswithinthematerialscopeofapplication oftheConventions,sincetheUSgovernmenthasclaimedthatalQaedaterrorists are‘‘unlawfulenemycombatants’’,whoare,inthisstrangenewtypeof internationalarmedconflict,entitledneithertotheprotectionoftheThird GenevaConvention,sincetheydonotfulfiltherequirementssetoutbyitsArticle 4,norundertheFourthGenevaConvention,sincetheyarecombatants,not civilians.Foritspart,Israelhasin2002ratheropportunisticallyenacteditsown lawontheimprisonmentofunlawfulcombatants,alsoclaimingthatunlawful combatantsarenotprotectedundereithertheThirdortheFourthGeneva Convention. 64 Finally,theUSgovernmenthasnotclaimedonlythathumanitarian 61SeealsoKretzmer,abovenote11,pp.208–211. 62 Nicaragua ,abovenote42,para.219. 63 Prosecutorv.Tadic ´ ,IT-94-1-A,AppealsChamber,Judgement,15July1999,atpara.84. 64IncarcerationofUnlawfulCombatantsLaw,5762–2002,availableinEnglishathttp://www.jewishvir- tuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/IncarcerationLaw.pdf(lastvisited12May2007).Thelawhasbeen heavilycriticized,althoughitmustbeacknowledgedthatitismuchmoremoderatewhencompared withtheextremelybroadpowersofdetentionclaimedbytheUSexecutive.SeealsoHumanRights Watch,‘‘Israel:OpportunisticLawCondemned’’,7March2002,athttp://hrw.org/english/docs/2002/03/ 07/isrlpa3787.htm(lastvisited12May2007);HillyMoodrick–EvenKhen,‘‘Unlawfulcombatantsor unlawfullegislation?AnanalysisoftheImprisonmentofUnlawfulCombatantsLaw’’,IsraelDemocracy Institute,Jerusalem,2005,availableatSSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract 5 902934(lastvisited12May 2007). M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 386 Lessonsforhuman rightsand humanitarianlawin thewaronterror: comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case MarkoMilanovic* MarkoMilanovicisLawClerktoJudgeThomasBuergenthal,InternationalCourtof Justice. Abstract Thearticleexaminesandcomparestworecentjudgmentswhichprovidesomeofthe mostvaluableexamplesofthedifficultiessurroundingtheapplicationofinternational humanitarianlawtothephenomenonofterrorism:the Hamdan judgmentofthe SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,andthe TargetedKillings judgmentofthe SupremeCourtofIsrael.Bothjudgmentsdealwiththethresholdsofapplicabilityof thelawofarmedconflict,aswellaswiththeconceptofunlawfulcombatancyandthe relationshipbetweenhumanrightslawandhumanitarianlaw.Bothjudgmentsareat timesinconsistentandlackinginanalysis,withthe Hamdan judgmentinparticular misinterpretingtherelevantinternationalauthorities,includingtheCommentarieson theGenevaConventions.Despitetheseflaws,orbecauseofthem,bothofthese judgmentsremaininstructive.Thepurposeofthisarticleistopresentthelessonsfor thefuturethatthesetwodecisionsmightbringtoongoingdebatesontheimpactof globalterrorismonthelawofarmedconflict. *m.milanovic@gmail.com Volume89Number866June2007 Selectedarticlesoninternationalhumanitarianlaw 373 international.Theroadittooktothispositionis,however,methodologicallya verydubiousone.Furthermore,theonlyauthoritythattheCourtcitesforthis propositionisthatofProfessorCassese,whoinhistextbookoninternationallaw doessaythat‘‘[a]narmedconflictwhichtakesplacebetweenanOccupyingPower andrebelorinsurgentgroups–whetherornottheyareterroristincharacter–in anoccupiedterritory,amountstoaninternationalarmedconflict.’’ 58 Onecanonly marvelathowpositivelyclevertheCourtwasincitingtheauthorityofProfessor Cassese,notonlybecauseofhisindisputableeminenceasalegalscholar,butalso becauseofhispositioninthe TargetedKillings caseasanexpertforthepetitioners. AtasinglestroketheCourtrejectedthepetitioners’argumentthatnoarmed conflictwastakingplacebyrelyingontheirownexpert,and,byseemingly handingavictorytothegovernment,madeitharderforittocomplainatany restrictionsonitsactionsitmightimposelateron,whichare,asweshallsee,quite substantial. Itis,ofcourse,fromapurelyhumanitarianstandpointdesirableforthe lawofinternationalconflictstoapply,sinceitprovidessignificantlymore protectionsthanthelawofinternalarmedconflicts.Yetitishardtoescapethe impressionthattheCourtwassomewhatinsincere,sincetheconclusionithas reachedisinnowayclearorobvious.CitingProfessorCassesedoesnotmakeit anymoreso,andcitationofanauthorityisnotasubstituteforalegalargument. Cassesehimselfactuallydoesnotrelyonanyotherauthority,butarguesthatnew armedconflictsinoccupiedterritoriesshouldbetreatedasinternationalones because(i)internalconflictsarethosebetweenacentralgovernmentandagroup ofinsurgentsbelongingtothesamestate,whichisnotthecasewithoccupied territories;(ii)theprotectionsguaranteedbyhumanitarianlawmustbeaswideas possible,andthelawofinternationalarmedconflictsprovidesformuchgreater protections;and(iii)sincethebelligerentoccupationisgovernedbytheFourth GenevaConvention,apartofthelawofinternationalarmedconflict,itwouldbe contradictorytosubjectarmedhostilitiesbetweentheoccupantstateand insurgentgroupstothelawofinternalarmedconflict. 59 Althoughthisiscertainlyawell-argued,common-senseposition,with whichthepresentauthoragreesasamatterofdesirability,itishardtosaythatitis inanywayestablishedinstatepractice,asthereisindeedverylittlestatepractice togoon. 60 Themajorhumanitariantreatiesarealsooflittlehelp,sincetheyrelate onlytotheoriginalarmedconflictduringwhichtheterritorywasoccupied,but nottoanewarmedconflictoccurringlongaftertheendoftheinitialone. Likewise,thenewarmedconflictcouldberegardedasaninternalone,since(i)the occupyingpoweristheonlystatefordecadestoexerciseexclusiveeffectivecontrol overtheterritory;(ii)nootherstateislayingclaimtotheterritory;and(iii)the 58AntonioCassese, InternationalLaw ,2ndedn,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2005,p.420,ascitedin TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.18. 59Ibid. 60Lubellhasalsoargued,albeitbriefly,thattheIsraeli–Palestinianconflictshouldbeclassifiedas international–seeNoamLubell,‘‘TheICJAdvisoryOpinionandtheseparationbarrier:atroublesome route’’, IsraelYearBookofHumanRights ,Vol.35(2005),p.283,atpp.296–7,note68. Volume89Number866June2007 385 oftheseabnormalitieshave,ofcourse,beennotedintheliterature. 52 Their relevancetothematterbeforeusissimplyinthefactthatinternationallawnever neededtoprovideananswerastowhathappenswhenprotractedviolenceand armedhostilitiesemergeinanoccupiedterritorywhicharenotdirectlyrelatedto theinitialarmedconflictduringwhichtheterritorywasoccupied. 53 Theoriginalarmedconflictcanbedistinguishedfromanysubsequent, newarmedconflictsoccurringinanoccupiedterritory.ThetwoPalestinian intifadas arenotlegallyapartoftheinternationalarmedconflictinwhichthe Palestinianterritorieswereoccupied,namelythe1967SixDayWar,whichisnow longover.ItthereforedoesnotseematallobviousthattheIsraeli–Palestinian conflictshouldberegardedasaninternational,ratherthanasanon-international one,justbecauseitistakingplace,atleastinpart,inaterritorywhichisunder belligerentoccupation.Thisisespeciallysosince,asalreadystated,onlystateshave traditionallybeenregardedaspossiblepartiestoaninternationalarmedconflict, 54 andPalestineisnotastate.WhatisevenmoreremarkableisthattheCourtseems tobedefininginternationalarmedconflictas‘‘onethatcrossesthebordersofthe state’’, 55 whenthesingledefiningcharacteristicofinternationalarmedconflictshas notbeentheircross-border,buttheirinterstate,nature. Furthermore,theIsraeliSupremeCourthasneverbeforequalifiedthis conflictasonewhichisinternationalincharacter.Inmanyofitspreviouscases, mostofthemcitedinthe TargetedKillings judgment,ithasappliedthelawof belligerentoccupationandotherrulesofhumanitarianlaw,butithasneversaid whetheritconsiderstheongoingPalestinian–Israeliconflicttobeinternationalor non-international. 56 Indeed,theCourt’s dicta hadactuallyledsomecommentators tobelievethattheCourthadcharacterizedtheongoingconflictasanon- internationalone. 57 TheCourtdoesnotinvokeanyoftheexceptionsrecognizedunder positivelawwhichallowforthe‘‘internationalisation’’oftheconflict–thatis,the applicationofthelawofinternationalarmedconflictstoaninternalconflict.Itis notsaying,forinstance,thatthePalestiniansareundertheoverallcontrolofa thirdstate,orthatbelligerencyhasbeenrecognized.NoristheCourtsaying,quite understandably,thatthePalestiniansareengagedinafightofnationalliberation againsttheIsraelioccupiers,evenifoneweretoconsidertheruleinArticle1(4)of ProtocolItobereflectiveofcustomarylaw. TheCourt’spositionthereforeappearstobethatwheneveranarmed conflictoccurswithinanoccupiedterritorythatconflictmustbeclassifiedas 52See,e.g.,AdamRoberts,‘‘Prolongedmilitaryoccupation:theIsraeli-occupiedterritoriessince1967’’, AJIL,Vol.84(1990),p.44;Benvenisti,abovenote49,pp.144–8. 53Suchascenariois,forexample,notatallcontemplatedintheICRCCommentarytotheConventions. ICRCCommentary,abovenote28,pp.18–25. 54See,e.g,Green,abovenote47,pp.54–5. 55 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.18,quotedinfullatnote45. 56See,e.g, Mara’abe v. ThePrimeMinisterofIsrael ,SupremeCourtofIsrael,HCJ7957/04,availableat http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/570/079/a14/04079570.a14.htm(lastvisited12May2007). 57SeeDavidKretzmer,‘‘TheAdvisoryOpinion:thelighttreatmentofinternationalhumanitarianlaw’’, AJIL,Vol.99(2005),p.88,atp.95,note56. M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 384 intifada inSeptember2000?Ifso,why?Thereweresomesporadicterroristattacks duringthatperiod,buttheycouldhardlyamounttoprotractedarmedviolence. TheUNInquiryCommissionhasexpresseddoubtsevenastotheprotracted natureoftheviolenceduringthesecond intifada ,thoughit(rightly)acknowl- edgedthepossibilityofanon-internationalarmedconflicttakingplace. 46 Itjust seemsinconceivable,however,toclassifytherelativelypeacefulinter- intifada periodasanon-internationalarmedconflict. Thisbringsustothesecondproblematicpoint–theCourtfindsthatthe armedconflictintheoccupiedterritoriesisinternationalincharacter.Atfirst glancethatdoesnotseemtobeatroublesomeproposition,asinternationalarmed conflictsandbelligerentoccupationgohandinhand.Unfortunately,theissueis rathermorecomplex. Naturally,aconditionofinternationalarmedconflictisindispensablefor theimpositionofabelligerentoccupationonaforeignterritory. 47 Indeed,Yoram Dinsteinhasarguedthatbelligerentoccupationcanexistonlyinsofarasthe conflictinwhichithasbeencreatedcontinuestoexist. 48 Suchapositionhasdirect bearingonIsrael’soccupationoftheWestBankandGaza,asIsraelhasconcluded peacetreatieswithbothJordanandEgypt,therebyendingbeyondanydoubtthe internationalarmedconflictsduringwhichtheseterritorieswereoccupied.The majorityview,however,isthatIsraelcontinuestobethebelligerentoccupierof thePalestinianterritories,andthatitisadditionallyboundbytheFourthGeneva Conventioninitsadministrationoftheseterritories. 49 Bothofthesequestions havenowbeenauthoritativelysettledbytheICJinits Wall AdvisoryOpinion. 50 WhatmakesIsrael’soccupationofthePalestinianterritoriessoabnormal, though,isnotjustthatthearmedconflictinwhichtheoccupationwaseffected hasended,butalsothattheoccupationhaslastedforsomuchtime,now approaching40years,andthatthereisnodisplacedsovereignwhoseinterestsare tobeconsidered,sincebothJordanandEgypthaverenouncedanyclaimstothe territoriesinfavourofthePalestinianpeople’srighttoself-determination. 51 Both 46UNCommissiononHumanRights,QuestionoftheViolationofHumanRightsintheOccupiedArab Territories,IncludingPalestine:ReportoftheHumanRightsInquiryCommission,UNDoc.E/CN.4/ 2001/121,paras.39–40,availableathttp://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id 5 2260(last visited12May2007). 47Itisaxiomaticthatastatecanneveroccupyitsownterritoryasabelligerent.See,e.g.,LeslieC.Green, TheContemporaryLawofArmedConflict ,ManchesterUniversityPress,Manchester,2ndedn,2000,p. 257. 48YoramDinstein,‘‘Theinternationallawofbelligerentoccupationandhumanrights’’, IsraelYearBookof HumanRights ,Vol.8(1978),p.105.ProfessorDinsteinapparentlystillholdsthisview–seeDinstein, abovenote14,p.169:‘‘BelligerentoccupationpositstheexistenceoftheenemyasaStateandthe continuationofthewar.’’ 49TheIsraeligovernmenthasnotdisputedthatitisthebelligerentoccupierofthePalestinianterritories, butithasdisputedtheapplicabilityoftheFourthGenevaConvention.See,e.g.,Dinstein,abovenote14, pp.106–8.SeemoreEyalBenvenisti, TheInternationalLawofOccupation ,2ndedn,Princeton UniversityPress,Princeton,2004,pp.109–12. 50 LegalConsequencesoftheConstructionofaWallintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory ,AdvisoryOpinion, 9July2004,ICJReports2004,paras.90–101(hereinafter Wall ). 51SeeBenvenisti,abovenote49,p.112. Volume89Number866June2007 383 forthetargetedkillingspolicywasthequalificationoftheallegedterroristsas combatantsinthisconflict,andthereforeaslegitimatetargets. TheIsraeliSupremeCourtdisagreedwiththepetitioners,sayingthat ‘‘[t]hegeneral,principledstartingpointisthatbetweenIsraelandthevarious terroristorganizationsactiveinJudea,Samaria,andtheGazaStrip(hereinafter ‘‘thearea’’)acontinuoussituationofarmedconflicthasexistedsincethefirst intifada .’’ 43 Theconclusionthatanarmedconflictisoccurringisnotbyitself controversial,bearinginmindtheintensityoftheviolenceanditsprotracted character. 44 YetevenmoreinterestingisthequalificationthattheCourtgaveto theconflict: ThenormativesystemwhichappliestothearmedconflictbetweenIsraeland theterroristorganizationsinthe area iscomplex.Initscentrestandsthe internationallawregardinginternationalarmedconflict.ProfessorCassese discussedtheinternationalcharacterofanarmedconflictbetweenthe occupyingstateinanareasubjecttobelligerentoccupationandtheterrorists whocomefromthesamearea,includingthearmedconflictbetweenIsrael andtheterroristorganizationsinthe area ,stating: AnarmedconflictwhichtakesplacebetweenanOccupyingPowerand rebelorinsurgentgroups–whetherornottheyareterroristincharacter–in anoccupiedterritory,amountstoaninternationalarmedconflict(A. CASSESE,INTERNATIONALLAW420(2nded.2005),hereinafter CASSESE). Thislawincludesthelawsofbelligerentoccupation.However,itisnot restrictedonlytothem.Thislawappliesinanycaseofanarmedconflictof internationalcharacter–inotherwords,onethatcrossesthebordersofthe state–whetherornottheplaceinwhichthearmedconflictoccursissubject tobelligerentoccupation.Thislawconstitutesapartof iusinbello .Fromthe humanitarianperspective,itispartofinternationalhumanitarianlaw.That humanitarianlawisthe lexspecialis whichappliesinthecaseofanarmed conflict.Whenthereisagap( lacuna )inthatlaw,itcanbesupplementedby humanrightslaw. 45 TherearetwofundamentalproblemswiththeCourt’sreasoning. First,itassertsthatacontinuousstateofarmedconflicthasexisted betweenIsraelandthevariousterroristorganisationssincethefirst intifada .Does thismeanthatanarmedconflictexistedevenafterthesigningoftheOsloAccords in1993,whichendedthefirst intifada ,andbeforethebeginningofthesecond 43 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.16. 44 Per thewell-knowndefinitionofarmedconflictinthe Tadic ´ case:‘‘anarmedconflictexistswhenever thereisaresorttoarmedforcebetweenStatesorprotractedarmedviolencebetweengovernmental authoritiesandorganizedarmedgroupsorbetweensuchgroupswithinaState’’.ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic ´ ,IT-94-1,DecisionontheDefenceMotionforInterlocutoryAppealonJurisdiction,Appeals Chamber,2October1995,para.70. 45 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.18. M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 382 commentariesforpropositionsthattheydonotsupport,butthatitdidsowithout evenbotheringtolookatthemitself. Now,itistruethatinternationallawdoesrecognizecertainanomalous typesofnon-internationalarmedconflicts,particularlythoseofthe‘‘inter- nationalized’’variety. 39 Itisquitepossibletoargue delegeferenda thatnewforms ofarmedconflictshouldevolveundercustomarylaw,orthatinternationallaw shouldadaptinsomeotherwayinordertodescribebetterthenewrealitiesofthe modernworldunderthreatoftransnationalterrorism. 40 Therecertainlyare difficultiesinapplyingthetraditionalbinaryparadigmofinternationaland internalarmedconflictsinsituationswhichinvolve,forexample,armedgroups whichoperatesimultaneouslyintwoormorestates,withhostilitiestranscending porousstateborders.The2006Israeli–Hezbollahconflictisbutoneinstancein whichthelegalqualificationoftheconflictisproblematic.Consequently,thereare someindicationsthattheICRChas,atleastinitsinternalpractice,dispensedwith thegeographicallimitationofnon-internationalarmedconflictbuiltinto CommonArticle3,althoughnoofficialstatementorpublicmemorandumexists inthatregard. 41 Itis,however,disingenuoustoarguethatthelawsofarmedconflicthave somehowalwaysrecognizedthatnon-internationalarmedconflictsarenot synonymouswithinternalconflicts,andcansomehowbetransnationalinscope, whentheoppositeistrue.ThisisparticularlysowhenalltheSupremeCourtin Hamdan neededtodoinordertoavoidtheseissueswastoapplyCommonArticle 3ascustomarylawapplicableinallkindsofarmedconflicts,asdidthe InternationalCourtofJustice(ICJ)inthe Nicaragua case, 42 regardlessofthe preciselegalqualificationoftheconflictduringwhichHamdanwascaptured. TargetedKillings: anabnormaloccupation Thepetitionersin Hamdan didnotarguethatthe‘‘globalwaronterror’’isnotan armedconflictatall,sincetheyactuallywantedCommonArticle3toapplyin ordertoprovidesomeminimumhumanitarianprotection,suchastheprohibition ontortureandbasicfairtrialrights.ThepetitionersintheIsraeli TargetedKillings case,however,diddirectlychallengethegovernment’spositionthatIsraelis engagedinanarmedconflictwithPalestinianterroristgroups,asthedirectbasis 39SeegenerallyKolb,abovenote31,pp.85–93;EricDavid, Principesdedroitdesconflitsarme ´ s ,3rdedn, 2002,pp.137–85;DietrichSchindler,‘‘ThedifferenttypesofarmedconflictsaccordingtotheGeneva ConventionsandProtocols’’, Recueildescours ,Vol.163(1979-II),p.124;Hans-PeterGasser, ‘‘Internationalizednon-internationalarmedconflicts:casestudiesofAfghanistan,Kampuchea,and Lebanon’’, AmericanUniversityLawReview ,Vol.33(1983),p.145. 40See,e.g,RoyS.Scho ¨ ndorf,‘‘Extra-statearmedconflicts:isthereaneedforanewlegalregime’’, New YorkUniversityJournalofInternationalLawandPolitics ,Vol.37(2005),p.1. 41SeeJelenaPejic,‘‘Terroristactsandgroups:aroleforinternationallaw?’’ BritishYearBookof InternationalLaw ,Vol.75(2004),p.71,atp.86,n.74. 42ICJ, MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStatesof America) ,Judgment,ICJReports1986,paras.218,219(hereinafter Nicaragua ). Volume89Number866June2007 381 anon-internationalconflictintoaninternationalone.Evenifthisconclusionis perfectlydefensible,theCourtwasstillsomewhatdisingenuousinmakingitseem asifthisconclusionwasobvious,whichitisnot,andinstatingthatthiswas alwaysitsposition,whenithadactuallyrefrainedinthepastfromqualifyingthe ongoingarmedconflicteitherasaninternationalorasanon-internationalone. Both Hamdan and,toasomewhatlesserextent,the TargetedKillings case, clearlyshowustheremarkableamountofconceptualconfusionbroughtintothe traditionalframeworkofinternationalhumanitarianlawbytheever-increasing impactofnon-stateactorswhichareabletooperateacrossstateborderswithlittle restraint.Thisdoesnotchangethefact,however,thatweare,asamatterof positivelawandforhistoricalreasons,stilltrappedinabinaryconceptualmould ofinternationalandinternalarmedconflict.Whetherthisisagoodthingorbad, andwhetherstateswillthroughtheirpracticecreatenewtypesofarmedconflict,is beyondthescopeofthisarticle.Yet,ifanychangetotheexistinglawistobemade, thatchangemustbemadeclearlyandopenly,anditmustbesupportedby adequateanalysisandreasoning. Ofcourse,nomatterhowacademicallyinterestingthisdebateonthe conceptofarmedconflictis,italsohassignificantpracticalconsequences. Qualifyingthe‘‘globalwaronterror’’asasingle,globalnon-internationalarmed conflict,insteadofsplittingitupintoitsconstitutivecomponents,suchasIraqor Afghanistan,hasrepercussionsontheissueofindefinitedetentionofthose personswhomtheUSgovernmentdesignatesasunlawfulcombatantsinthiswar, anditalsoexposesthemtopotentialtargetedassassinations.ThefactthattheUS governmentwillnotbetryingtoassassinatesuspectedterroristslivinginLondon, oratleastitsaysthatitwillnot,doesnotmeanthatitisnotclaimingthatithas legalauthoritytodoso. 96 Italso,ofcourse,doesnotmeanthatitwillnottryto exercisethissupposedauthorityinplaceslikeYemenorSomalia,asithasindeed donesointhepast. Theparadoxthatthereforeemergesfromcomparingthesetwodecisions isthat Hamdan ,theonewhichisonitsfacemorefavourabletothepetitioners, mightactuallybelesssointhelongterm.TheIsraeliSupremeCourtisclearly superiortoitsUScounterpartinapplyinghumanitarianlawtothephenomenon ofterrorism,anditisevenmoresoinitsapplicationofhumanrightslaw.This mightactuallyprovetobethemostenduringqualityofthe TargetedKillings judgment:thatitshowssoclearlyhowtherelationshipbetweenhumanrightslaw andhumanitarianlawcanbeatwo-waystreet,andhowthatrelationshipcanbe farmorecomplexthanisusuallythought. 96See,e.g.,CharlesGarraway,‘‘ArmedconflictwithalQaeda:ariposte’’, OpinioJuris weblog,15January 2006,availableathttp://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1168895161.shtml(lastvisited12May2007). Volume89Number866June2007 393 wouldtodaydenotethemuchstricterconditionsofapplicationofAdditional ProtocolII,withpartiestotheconflictcontrollingdistinctportionsofterritory andcarryingoutsustainedandconcertedmilitaryoperations.Moreover,the CommentarydoessaythatthescopeofapplicationofCommonArticle3should beaswideaspossible,butitisclearlyreferringtothemanysituationsinwhich stateshaverefusedtoacknowledgethattheinternalstrifetheyareexperiencinghas reachedthelevelofnon-internationalarmedconflictandengagedtheprotections ofCommonArticle3, 31 as,forexample,FrancedidinrespectoftheAlgerian conflict 32 andtheUnitedKingdomdidinrespectoftheconflictinNorthern Ireland,orasRussiacontinuestodoinrespectoftheconflictinChechnya. 33 This widescopeofapplicationofCommonArticle3hasnothingtodowithwhether theconflictisorisnotinternalinscope.Inreality,ontheexactsamepagethatthe Courtcites,theCommentaryexplicitlysaysthat‘‘[s]peakinggenerally,itmustbe recognizedthattheconflictsreferredtoin[Common]Article3arearmed conflicts,with‘‘armedforces’’oneithersideengagedin‘‘hostilities’’–conflicts,in short,whichareinmanyrespectssimilartoaninternationalwar, buttakeplace withintheconfinesofasinglecountry .’’ 34 AtonepointtheCourtevenmis-citesandmisquotestheCommentaryon theAdditionalProtocols, 35 quotingitassayingthat‘‘anon-internationalarmed conflictisdistinctfromaninternationalarmedconflictbecauseofthelegalstatus oftheentitiesopposingeachother,andcitingittopage1351ofthe Commentary. 36 Infact,thequotedtextislocatednotonthecitedpage,buton page1319,andthesentencequotedisnotgiveninfull,astheCommentary continuestosaythat‘‘thepartiestotheconflictarenotsovereignStates, butthe governmentofasingleStateinconflictwithoneormorearmedfactionswithinits territory ’’. 37 Thefullquoteisthereforecontrarytotheargumentthatnon- internationalarmedconflictcansomehowbetransnational,andnotinternal,as areallotherICRCauthorities.Thecitationerrorinquestionfullyreproducesthe exactsameerrorincitationinan amicus briefsubmittedtotheCourtin Hamdan , 38 whichindicatesbeyondanydoubtnotonlythattheCourtcitedthe 31See,e.g.,YvesSandoz,‘‘Internationalhumanitarianlawinthetwenty-firstcentury’’, Yearbookof InternationalHumanitarianLaw ,Vol.6(2003),pp.3,13–15;RobertKolb, Iusinbello:Ledroit internationaldesconflitsarme ´ s ,2003,p.83. 32See,e.g,EldonvanCleefGreenberg,‘‘LawandtheconductoftheAlgerianRevolution’’, HarvardJournal ofInternationalLaw ,Vol.11(1970),p.37,esp.pp.47–52. 33SeeWilliamAbresch,‘‘Ahumanrightslawofinternalarmedconflict:theEuropeanCourtofHuman RightsinChechnya’’,EJIL,Vol.16(2005),p.741,atp.754,n.44. 34ICRCCommentaryonGCIII,abovenote28,p.36(emphasisadded). 35YvesSandozetal.,eds., CommentaryontheAdditionalProtocolsof8June1977totheGenevaConventions of12August1949 ,ICRC,Geneva,1987. 36 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,p.68. 37 CommentaryontheAdditionalProtocols ,abovenote35,p.1319,para.4339,alsoavailableathttp:// www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/475-750999?OpenDocument. 38 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ,BriefofProfessorsRyanGoodman,DerekJinks,andAnne-MarieSlaughteras AmicusCuriaeSupportingReversal(Geneva–Applicability),availableathttp://hamdanvrumsfeld.com/ GoodmanJinksSlaughter-FINALHamdamAmicusBrief-Jan52006.pdf(lastvisited12May2007),atp.19. M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 380 framework. 92 WhattheCourtclearlydidfocusonastheprimarybasisforits expansiveapplicationofhumanrightslawisIsrael’scontinuingbelligerent occupationofthePalestinianterritories.Forexample,theCourtsaysthattargeted killingsmaynotbeusedagainstterroristsiftheycanbearrestedandtried,since thisis‘‘particularlypracticalundertheconditionsofbelligerentoccupation,in whichthearmycontrolstheareainwhichtheoperationtakesplace,andinwhich arrest,investigation,andtrialareattimesrealizablepossibilities’’. 93 Thisapproach oftheCourtiscommendable,anditisentirelyconsistentwiththeICJ’sposition inthe Wall case, 94 asfurtherelaboratedin Congo v. Uganda . 95 TheamountofcontroloverthePalestinianterritoriesandpeoplethat Israelhas,astheirbelligerentoccupier,givesitawidevarietyofoptionsitcanuse inordertodealwithterrorists,andthisinturnaugmentstheobligationsithas underhumanrightslaw.Ina‘‘normal’’internationalarmedconflict,withoutthe presenceofaprolongedoccupation,humanrightslawwouldpresumablynot imposesuchadditionalobligations,andthestate’srelativefreedomofaction underhumanitarianlawwouldremainunrestricted. Conclusion Atthelevelofrhetoricandtheaffirmationoftheruleoflawtheimportanceof bothofthetwojudgmentspresentedinthisarticlecannotbedenied.Bothofthem clearlystandagainstthepropositionthatlawhasnoplaceintimesofwar.And,as wehaveseen,bothofthemarefarfromperfect,althoughnotequallyso,yetthey providevaluablelessonsforthefuture. Thisappliesforemosttobothcourts’examinationofwhatqualifiesasan armedconflictininternationallaw.TheUSSupremeCourtrightlyrejectedtheUS government’spositionthatitisinvolvedinaninternationalarmedconflictwith thealQaedaterroristorganization,asinternationalarmedconflictscanonlybe interstateones.Yet,itdidsoonlytofindthatthisconflictisactuallyanon- internationalone,disregardingevidencethatnon-internationalarmedconflicts havealwaysbeenregardedassynonymouswithinternalconflict,and misinterpretingtherelevantauthoritieswhiledoingso.TheIsraeliSupreme Court,ontheotherhand,ruledthatIsraelisindeedinvolvedinaninternational armedconflictwithPalestinianterroristorganizations,inanapparentreflection oftheUSgovernment’sposition.Yetitdidsoonlyinreferenceto belligerentoccupation,basicallyholdingthattheoccupationwilltransformeven 92See,e.g.,OrnaBen-NaftaliandYuvalShany,‘‘Livingindenial:theapplicationofhumanrightsinthe occupiedterritories’’, IsraelLawReview ,Vol.37(2003),p.17;AdamRoberts,‘‘Transformativemilitary occupation:applyingthelawsofwarandhumanrights’’,AJIL,Vol.100(2006),p.580;Kretzmer,above note11. 93 TargetedKillings ,abovenote6,para.40. 94 Wall ,abovenote50,paras.107–113. 95 ArmedActivitiesintheTerritoryoftheCongo ( Congo v. Uganda ),ICJ,Judgment,19December2005, paras.216and220. M.Milanovic–Lessonsforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinthewaronterror:comparing Hamdan andtheIsraeli TargetedKillings case 392 betweentheUnitedStatesandalQaeda.Yetthisconclusioniscontradictedby theCourt’sdiscussioninfootnote61ofitsopinion,whereitsaysthat‘‘the questionwhether[Hamdan’s]potentialstatusasaprisonerofwarindependently rendersillegalhistrialbymilitarycommissionmaybereserved’’. 25 This statementwouldmakesense only ifHamdanwasstillpossiblyacombatantinan internationalarmedconflict,asprisoner-of-warstatusexistsonlyinsuch conflicts. Thejudgmentisthereforequiteremarkableinitsconceptualconfusion. TheCourtcouldsimplyhavesaidthatCommonArticle3appliesinallarmed conflictsasamatterofcustomarylawandthereforehavebeenabletoavoidthe difficultquestionofqualifyingthelegalnatureofanyconflictwithalQaeda.This stillremainsapossiblereadingofthejudgment, 26 howeverunlikely,astheCourt insteadseemstohaveappliedCommonArticle3astreatylawtoanon- internationalarmedconflict.Asthatappearstobethecase,itisevenmore remarkablehowlittlesupporttheCourtactuallyinvokesforsuchanahistorical position.Non-internationalarmedconflictshavealwaysbeenregardednotjustas conflictsbetweenastateandanon-stateactor,butasconflictswhicharebytheir scopeinternal,occurringwithinasinglestate,asmandatedbythetextof CommonArticle3itself. 27 TheCourt,ontheotherhand,hasapparentlyadoptedtheviewthatonly theformerelementmatters,andhasdonesoinawaywhichmisinterpretsthe relevantinternationalauthorities.So,forexample,theCourtcitesthePictet Commentaryonthe1949GenevaConventions 28 forthepointthatreferencesto civilwarwereomittedfromthetextofCommonArticle3,andfortheproposition that‘‘thescopeoftheArticlemustbeaswideaspossible’’. 29 Bothofthesepoints areindeedcorrect,butneitherofthemhavetheimplicationsthattheCourt assignstothem. Referencesto‘‘civilwar’’wereomittedfromthetextofCommonArticle3 notbecausethedraftershadanymisgivingsabouttheinternalnatureofthese conflicts,butbecausetheterm‘‘civilwar’’denotesaninternalconflictof particularlygraveintensity,suchastheAmericanCivilWarortheSpanishCivil War,whilethedrafterswantedCommonArticle3toapplytoallsituationsof internalarmedconflictwhichsurpassthelevelofmeredisturbances. 30 ‘‘Civilwar’’ 25Ibid.,note61. 26ThisoptionseemstobeentertainedbyJohnCerone,‘‘Statusofdetaineesinnon-internationalarmed conflict,andtheirprotectioninthecourseofcriminalproceedings:thecaseof Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ’’, ASILInsight ,14July2006,availableathttp://www.asil.org/insights/2006/insights060714.html,atPartII (lastvisited12May2007). 27Whichspeaksofa‘‘conflictnotofaninternationalcharacter occurringintheterritoryofoneoftheHigh ContractingParties ’’(emphasisadded).SeealsoLindsayMoir, TheLawofInternalArmedConflict ,2002, pp.1–2. 28JeanPictet,ed., CommentaryontheGenevaConventionsof12August1949 ,4vols., ICRC ,Geneva,1952–9 (hereinafterICRCCommentary).ThefulltextoftheCommentaryisavailableatwww.icrc.org(last visited12May2007). 29 Hamdan ,abovenote1,OpinionoftheCourt,p.68,quotationprovidedinfullabove,atnote24. 30See,e.g.,DavidA.Elder,‘‘ThehistoricalbackgroundofCommonArticle3oftheGenevaConventions of1949’’, CaseWesternReserveJournalofInternationalLaw ,Vol.11(1979),p.37,atpp.53,68–9. Volume89Number866June2007 379 situationthattheICJcontemplatedinits Wall AdvisoryOpinion,whereit expandedonitsownthinkingin NuclearWeapons : Asregardstherelationshipbetweeninternationalhumanitarianlawand humanrightslaw,therearethusthreepossiblesituations:somerightsmaybe exclusivelymattersofinternatio nalhumanitarianlaw;othersmaybe exclusivelymattersofhumanrightslaw;yetothersmaybemattersofboth thesebranchesofinternationallaw. 89 WhatflowsbothfromtheICJ’sopinioninthe Wall caseandthe Targeted Killings judgmentisthattherelationshipbetweenhumanrightslawand humanitarianlawcannotbeexplainedbythesimplecomparisonofthegeneral tothespecial,evenifthisrelationshipoperatesinbothdirections.Forinstance, CommonArticle3(1)(d)refers,inaverygeneralway,to‘‘judicialguarantees recognizedasindispensablebycivilizedpeoples’’.Itisthenonlynaturaltolookat humanrightslaw,amongothersources,inordertoprovidemorespecificcontent tothisgeneralformulaofhumanitarianlaw.Thisisactuallywhatwassuggestedby theexpertsgatheredatthe2003ICRCRoundTableinSanRemo 90 and,indeed, thisisexactlywhattheUSSupremeCourthasdonein Hamdan ,evenifitis referringtohumanrightslawinarathersuperficialway. In TargetedKillings theIsraeliSupremeCourtisdoingmuchmorethan that.Itisnotusingamorespecificruleofhumanrightslawtointerpretageneral ruleofhumanitarianlaw.No,theruleofhumanitarianlawisveryclear;states havequitedeliberatelyleftthemselvesthefreedomtokillcombatants,or civiliansengaginginhostilities,andareundernoobligationtocapturethemand putthemontrialinstead.TheIsraeliSupremeCourtisthereforeusingahuman rightsnormnottointerpret,buttorestricttheapplicationofthehumanitarian one. AnthonyDworkinhasrightlycriticizedtheIsraeliSupremeCourtfornot providingmorereasoningontheexactmechanicsofthisinterfacebetweenhuman rightsandhumanitarianlaw. 91 TheCourtcertainlycouldhavebeenmoreexplicit, butitisintheendforlegalscholarstoprovideanappropriatetheoretical 89 Wall ,abovenote50,para.106. 90ICRC,‘‘Internationalhumanitarianlawandotherlegalregimes:interplayinsituationsofviolence’’, XXVIIthRoundTableonCurrentProblemsofInternationalHumanitarianLaw,heldinSanRemo, Italy,inSeptember2003,summaryreportavailableathttp://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/ htmlall/5UBCVX/$File/Interplay_other_regim es_Nov_2003.pdf(lastvisited12May2007).See especiallyp.9:‘‘ashumanrightslawismoreprecisethanIHL[internationalhumanitarianlaw]in certaindomains,therelationofinterpretationmustalsobeabletooperateintheotherdirection.For example,Article3(1)(d)commontotheGenevaConventionsexplicitlyreferstothe‘‘judicialguarantees recognizedasindispensablebycivilizedpeoples’’butwithoutfurtherspecifyingthemeaningofthis expression.Itwassuggestedthat,insuchahypothesis,apartfromthecomplementaryelements containedinAdditionalProtocolIIandincustomarylaw,theinterplaybetweenthesetwobodiesoflaw permitsreferencetobemadetohumanrightslawinordertodeducethesubstantiveguarantees resultingfromthisgeneralformula.’’ 91AnthonyDworkin,‘‘Israel’sHighCourtontargetedkilling:amodelforthewaronterror?’’, Crimesof WarProject ,15December2006,availableathttp://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-highcourt.html (lastvisited12May2007). Volume89Number866June2007 391

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