/
International  Law,  Military Effectiveness, International  Law,  Military Effectiveness,

International Law, Military Effectiveness, - PowerPoint Presentation

eleanor
eleanor . @eleanor
Follow
27 views
Uploaded On 2024-02-02

International Law, Military Effectiveness, - PPT Presentation

and Public Support for Drone Strikes Sarah Kreps Cornell University Sarahkrepscornelledu Surveys and Human Rights CIDE Mexico City Research Question Q How does international law affect support for drone strikes ID: 1043525

strikes public law international public strikes international law drones drone 2013 support united violate government human legal effectiveness policy

Share:

Link:

Embed:

Download Presentation from below link

Download Presentation The PPT/PDF document "International Law, Military Effectiven..." is the property of its rightful owner. Permission is granted to download and print the materials on this web site for personal, non-commercial use only, and to display it on your personal computer provided you do not modify the materials and that you retain all copyright notices contained in the materials. By downloading content from our website, you accept the terms of this agreement.


Presentation Transcript

1. International Law, Military Effectiveness, and Public Support for Drone StrikesSarah KrepsCornell UniversitySarah.kreps@cornell.eduSurveys and Human RightsCIDE, Mexico City

2. Research QuestionQ: How does international law affect support for drone strikes?A: Public is more responsive to international law than military effectiveness

3. BackgroundOngoing debates about the relationship between international law and domestic politicsSecond image accounts: how domestic groups shape IL (Slaughter 2000)Second image reversed accounts: how IL is channeled through particular domestic groups (Dai 2007; Simmons 2009)

4. Public Opinion and ILResearch on whether the public cares about IL still nascent but two emerging campsYes: Public moved by IL commitments (Tomz 2008; Wallace 2013)No: Public driven by instrumental calculations (Press et al 2013; Sagan and Valentino 2015)

5. Reconciling Perspectives on IL, Use of Force, Public OpinionWallace 2013“Neutral stance on effectiveness of torture” implies no tradeoffs; why not express commitment to IL if it comes at no cost?Press et al 2013One-off attack on suspected Al-Qaeda atomic bomb labNot congruent with theoretical conditions that would require contemporaneous consent (Reiter and Stam 2002)Based on soft norm of non-use rather than established IL

6. The Drone DebateIssue of high politicsInvolves tradeoffs between effectiveness and international lawPolicymakers attentive to public sentiments

7. High PoliticsDrone strikes a “key feature of the administration’s foreign policy” (Singer 2013)500 strikes between 2002-2014Pakistan (388)Yemen (95)Somalia (17)Estimated fatalities:3,674 (473 civilians)Should therefore represent a hard case for effect of IL (Katzenstein 1996)

8. TradeoffsMilitary Effectiveness(+) Drones have killed Al Qaeda militants and enhanced American security (Byman 2013; Johnston 2012; Johnston and Sarbahi 2015)(-) Decapitation strategies have limited impact on organizational effectiveness (Jordan 2009)Martyrdom effects create more terrorists than they kill (Cronin 2013)

9. International Legal QuestionsInternational legal authorization on recourse to force (jus ad bellum)(+)Authorized under Article 51 of the UN Charter, self-defense (Brennan 2012)(-)Early Afghanistan (until 2002) legal, post -2002 not legalAt the least, drone strikes outside of “hot zones” such as Afghanistan extralegal (O’Connell 2010-2011)

10. International Legal Questions (2)Jus in bello: conduct in conflict (distinction)(+)“Principle of distinction and proportionality that the US applies are not just recited at meetings.” (Koh 2010)The use of drones and PGMs reduces “collateral damage”Drones create fewer casualties than alternatives(-)Targeting policies incompatible with distinctionDesignation of combatant as military-aged malePolicy of “signature strikes”FOIA response to casualties data: “no information that can be provided at the unclassified level.”

11. Attentiveness to Public SentimentsLeaders must generate consent for ongoing military campaigns (Reiter and Stam 2002; Larson and Savych 2005)Former CIA Director Hayden: “No president can do something repeatedly over a long term without that broad popular support.” (2013) “One offs” possible; government cannot sustain policy in face of opposition over the long-term

12. The ApproachUse of drones to study effect of international law on public support (Chilton and Tingley 2013)Competing valuesInternational Humanitarian LawEffectiveness Competing voicesGovernmentUnited Nations (IO)Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)

13. Voices in the Drones Debate: IOsInternational Organizations (UN)Unlawful: “Highly problematic blurring and expansion of the boundaries of the applicable legal frameworks . . . [and] a tendency to expand who may permissibly be targeted and under what conditions.” (UN 2010)Ineffective:"We find the use of drones to be totally counterproductive in terms of succeeding in the war against terror. It leads to greater levels of terror rather than reducing them.” (UN 2013)

14. Voices in the Drones Debate: NGOsUnlawful: “United States targeted airstrikes against alleged terrorists…have killed civilians in violation of international law...(HRW 2013) Ineffective:“The strikes, often using armed drones, are creating a public backlash that undermines US efforts against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” (HRW 2013)

15. Voices in the Drones Debate: USGLegal:“U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war.” (Harold Koh, 2010)Effective: “Our actions are effective…Simply put, these strikes have saved lives.” (Obama 2013)

16. Empirical Test #1Survey experiment embedded within a US national survey in July 2013Data collected by Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences, NSF Grant SES-0818839 3x3 design with pro/con frames for idea and source

17. ResultsInitial support for logic of appropriateness: Jus ad bellum and in bello references decrease support by 6-8%

18. Who is credible?Government seen as most credible on all issues (~70+%)Highest levels reserved for military effectivenessUN matches government closely on sovereignty (68% vs 72%NGO viewed as least credibleYet indeterminate re public support for drones

19. Credibility of Sources

20. Probing the MechanismsIs instrumentalism masquerading as appropriateness?Follow-up to mediate between two proposed causal paths: appropriateness and consequences

21. Empirical Test #2Survey experiment based on online convenience sampleFocus on civilian deaths as most common norms-based frame in contemporary debateSource: generic “human rights group”

22. The InstrumentBaseline support for dronesTreatment group: drone strikes may harm civiliansRespondents asked series of follow-up questions2 normsDrones morally wrongHurt America’s image in the world2 effectivenessDrones counterproductive, recruit new militantsDrones mean we don’t need to use special forces that will kill more Americans

23. Results

24. A ParadoxOn credibilityGovernment sources seen as credible but have little impact on public attitudesNGOs and UN seen as comparatively less credible but have more of an impact on attitudesPredominance of government voice may mean public has incorporated official stance as baselineNGOs and IOs providing new information that is therefore influential (Page et al 1987)

25. Empirical Test #3Separate issue frames from source, ensure findings not driven by particular sourceTreatment #1 (Issue Frame): International Law Civilian ProtectionEffectiveness of Strikes in Eliminating MilitantsTreatment #2 (Position): Pro – compliance with international law; strikes are effectiveCon – violation of international law; strikes are ineffective

26. Support for Drone Strikes by Issue Frame

27. Summary of Results1) Outside criticisms from IOs and NGOs can affect public attitudes2) Arguments likely to resonate most when focusing on legal issues versus effectiveness

28. Implications for TheoryEven in hard case of national security, arguments about norms affect public attitudesCounterterrorism policy as consequential a security issue as there isSource credibility neither necessary nor sufficient for affecting public attitudesLargely because of priors from exposure to messages

29. Implications for PolicyPublic relations campaigns by IOs and NGOs likely to have an impact on public opinionEspecially when message focuses on norms rather than effectiveness Dampening public support will make drone strikes less sustainable political decision

30. Summary of ImplicationsSources of public support for drone strikesRole of source credibility in foreign policy attitudesEffect of NGO/IO efforts to discredit policyVulnerability of policy over time

31. Thank you!

32. Drone Strikes Per Country Per Year

33. Drone Strikes Per Country Per Year

34. Baseline and Treatments (Jus ad bellum)There has been a lot of recent discussion about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as drones, by the United States to target suspected militants.IO Violate: The United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism has indicated that these strikes violate international law because they break the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country where the attack takes place.NGO Violate: The non-governmental organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch has indicated that these strikes violate international law because they break the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country where the attack takes place.U.S. Government ComplyThe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has indicated that these strikes do not violate international law because they are an act of self-defense against individuals plotting attacks against Americans.

35. Baseline and Treatments (effectiveness)There has been a lot of recent discussion about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as drones, by the United States to target suspected militants.IO Ineffective: The United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism has indicated that the strikes trigger anti-US sentiment and help militants recruit new members, making Americans less safe.NGO Ineffective: The non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch has indicated that the strikes trigger anti-US sentiment and help militants recruit new members, making Americans less safe.U.S. Government ComplyThe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has indicated that the strikes have been instrumental in killing suspected militants and making Americans safer.

36. Partisanship and Credibility

37. Respondent Beliefs Regarding Likely Source of Issue Frame

38. Issue Frames and Support for Drone Strikes

39. Baseline and Treatments (Jus in bello/civilian treatment)There has been a lot of recent discussion about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as drones, by the United States to target suspected militants.IO Violate: The United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism has indicated that these strikes violate international law because they do not take necessary measures to prevent the death of civilians.NGO Violate: The non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch has indicated that these strikes violate international law because they do not take necessary measures to prevent the death of civilians.U.S. Government Comply:The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has indicated that these strikes do not violate international law because they take necessary measures to prevent the death of civilians.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47. Meta study of civilian casualties

48. Drone Coverage by All Newspapers

49. Chronicle of Outside Challenges2009: UN warns about indiscriminate use of drone strikes“My concern is that these drones — these predators — are being operated in a framework which may well violate international humanitarian law.”"We need the United States to be more up front… otherwise you have the really problematic bottom line that the CIA is running a program that is killing significant numbers of people and there is absolutely no accountability in terms of the relevant international laws.”"The onus is on the government of the United States to reveal more about the ways in which it makes sure arbitrary extrajudicial executions aren't in fact being carried out through the use of these weapons.” Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions

50. Subsequent Challenges2009: Investigative Report by Jane Mayer2010: UN Report Special Rapporteur2013 (April/Dec): Joint Letter to Obama regarding US targeted killing policy2013 (October): Amnesty, Will I Be Next, HRW Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda2013 (October): UN Special Rapporteur Reports2014 (Feb): Human Rights Watch “A Wedding that Became a Funeral”

51. Co-Optation2010: Harold Koh’s speech to ASIL:“Recently, a number of legal objections have been raised against U.S. targeting practices.”April 2012 Counterterrorism Adviser John Brennan, Wilson Center:“Yes, in full accordance with the law, and in order to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States and to save American lives, the United States Government conducts targeted strikes against specific al-Qaida terrorists, sometimes using remotely piloted aircraft, often referred to publicly as drones. And I’m here today because President Obama has instructed us to be more open with the American people about these efforts.”Memo on targeting Americans incorporating opinions from legal blogFebruary 2013 John Brennan confirmation hearing:“Any actions we take fully comport with the law and meet the standards that I think this Committee and the American people expect of us, as far as taking actions we need to protect the American people.”May 2013 Obama speech at NDU:“As was true in previous armed conflicts, this new technology raises profound questions — about who is targeted, and why; about civilian casualties, and the risk of creating new enemies; about the legality of such strikes under U.S. and international law; about accountability and morality.  So let me address these questions…our actions are effective…America’s actions are legal.”

52. Potential for Direct Impact of Public OpinionHigh levels of congruence between direction of change in opinion and direction of change in policy (Page and Shapiro 1983)Evidence that public opinion importantCuban Missile CrisisConflicts ranging from Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, AfghanistanStrong relationship between public opinion and military spending (Bartels 1991; Hartley and Russett 1992)Effect especially strong on issues where public is informed and polled (Powlick and Katz 1998)Consistently 60-65% of Americans report that they have heard a lot or some about drones

53. JFK Cuban Missile Crisis ExampleCuban Missile Crisis: Blockade decisionJFK: There wasn't any choice.  If he's going to get this mean on this one, in our part of the world [unclear], no choice.  I don't think there was a choice RFK:  Well, there isn't any choice.  I mean, you would have been, you would have been impeached. JFK:  Well, I think I would have been impeached. If there had been a move to impeach, I would have been under [unclear], on the grounds that I said they wouldn't do it.

54. Support for Drone Strikes, 2011-2014

55. Potential for Indirect Impact of Public OpinionPublic less influential than key foreign policy leaders (Jacobs and Page 2005)Public may have latent attitudes about foreign policy (Mueller 1973; Powlick and Katz 1998)“Ingrained sets of values, criteria for judgment, attitudes, preferences, dislikes—that come into play when a relevant action, event, or proposal arises.” (Key 1964)Potential for expression when activated by message or eventLatent until policies stay within range of acceptability“The very precision of drone strikes and the necessary secrecy often involved in such actions can end up shielding our government from the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites.” (Obama 2013)

56. Leaders Preempt ActivationLeaders most concerned about activated opinion/oppositionMore likely with active debate among foreign policy elites, the opinion makers and shapersLeaders pre-empt by seeking to reach and co-opt these elites

57. Policy ActionNo public reactionPublic SupportPublicOppositionModify PolicyContinue policyLimited Media CoverageMedia CoverageQuiescent publicContinue policyElite ConsensusElite DissensusOpposition ActivatedCo-Opt OpinionLeadersSupportive Public Activated