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Modeling and Analysis of Attacks and Counter Defense Mechan Modeling and Analysis of Attacks and Counter Defense Mechan

Modeling and Analysis of Attacks and Counter Defense Mechan - PowerPoint Presentation

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Uploaded On 2017-03-16

Modeling and Analysis of Attacks and Counter Defense Mechan - PPT Presentation

Authors R Mitchell I R Chen Presenter Nikhil Muralidhar 1 Outline Definitions Types of Devices Failures Attackers Countermeasures SPN Model System Initialization Construction Parametrization ID: 524989

spn nodes failure control nodes spn control failure compromised system model data node actuators physical contd uncompromised ids sensor

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Presentation Transcript

Slide1

Modeling and Analysis of Attacks and Counter Defense Mechanisms for Cyber Physical Systems

Zongtao Lin & Shuqi Zhao

1Slide2

Abstract

Cyber Physical System: modernized electrical grid

Types of failures: attrition, pervasion, and exfiltration

Optimal design conditions: intrusion detection interval, redundancy level

Tradeoff between 3 types of failuresUse redundancy to improve overall system reliability

2Slide3

Introduction

2 lines of research in modeling and analysis of CPSs

Formalized safety and functional requirements utilizing formal modeling and analysis tools

Mathematical model for analyzing the system's response behavior in the presence of malicious nodes performing various attacks

3Slide4

Introduction

Introduce attacks and countermeasures on the survivability of CPSs

Illustrate attrition, pervasion, and exfiltration failure on a modernized electrical grid

Use redundancy to improve the overall system reliability

4Slide5

System Model - System Description

5Slide6

System Model - System Failure Definition

Attrition

Sensors are not affected by attrition because

If a sensor is evicted, the short-term impact is minimal

If a sensor is compromised, it can do little more than send illegitimate data to control nodes

Pervasion

Sensor is not considered in pervasion failure

No means to directly or indirectly attack the CPS

Exfiltration

Sensor and control nodes are considered in the exfiltration failure analysis

6Slide7

System Model - Attacker Behavior Modeling

Surveilling attacker: targets sensor, results in exfiltration failure

Destructive attacker: targets actuator and control nodes, leads to attrition and pervasion failure

7Slide8

System Model - Countermeasures

Intrusion Detection: Pervasion

Connection nodes and actuators.

False Negative Probability

False positive Probability

Data Leak Rate Control: exfiltration

Sensor and connection nodes.

Limits the data upload speed

Limits the data leak by decrease the sensing time interval

Redundancy: Attrition

The connection nodes and actuators will gradually fail because of reaching their life cycle.

8Slide9

Performance Model

SPN model

9Slide10

Performance Model

Fig. 3

10Slide11

Performance Model

Fig. 4

11Slide12

Performance Model

Fig. 5

12Slide13

Performance Model

Fig. 6

13Slide14

Performance Model

Fig. 7

14Slide15

Performance Model

Fig. 8

15Slide16

Performance Analysis - Results

Fig. 9

16Slide17

Performance Analysis - Results

Fig. 10

17Slide18

Performance Analysis - Results

Fig. 11

18Slide19

Performance Analysis - Results

Fig. 12

19Slide20

Conclusion

With this analytical model, the authors was able to find relationships between the CPS’s maximal MTTF with 4 parameters (intrusion detection interval, the probability of false positive and false negative, and the redundancy level).

Note that by increasing redundancy level, there is some tradeoff between exfiltration failure with other failures.

20