Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, orCan the Skeptic Win? in the words - PDF document

Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, orCan the Skeptic Win? in the words of the late David Lewis, is ‘one of those things that we We know a lot…We have all sorts of everyday knowledge, and we have it inneeded in order to hold on to this fundamental commitment. Simply put, we should build 2 In proceeding in this way, Lewis is far from alone among prominent contemporary philosophers. Compare David Armstrong on the proposition that Things move: It is a very fundamental part of the Moorean corpus that there is motion. Things move. Perhaps we have still not, after two and a half thousand years, got to the full bottom of Zeno’s brilliant arguments against the existence of motion…But certainly Zeno should not persuade us that things do not move. Neither should anybody else (1999: 79).Elsewhere, Armstrong suggests that since the belief thatinductive inference is rationalsimilarly enjoys the status of ‘Moorean knowledge’, Hume’s formidable argument to the contrary is powerless to show otherwise. Indeed, Armstrong insists that the fundamental rationality of inductive inference can legitimately be taken as a datum such a belief could be rationally undermined by particular courses of experience or by the philosophical argument then, is a reflection not only of the epistemic standing that is In so far then, as, the pretensions of philosophy to provide a world view rest upon itsparadigm case arguments or even practitioners of an essentiallyconservative Strawsonian descriptive metaphysics. Rather, all three stand squarelyin the venerable tradition of nevertheless pay homage to Moore does as much as anything to bolster the credibility of traction on us? To what extent, if at all,does one’s starting point constrain the kinds of one justified in refusing to be swayed by an argument which is flawless as far as one can his conclusion—that, after all, might be a matter of mere psychological stubbornness on Moore has taken up the burden of proof, a burden that he candischarge only by providinganti-skeptical argument that fulfills the criteria of argumentative goodness (whatever presentation is, in the vocabulary of Scott Soames (2003a: 23), ‘ironic’: Moore is really those which he himself employs. Whether or not this is ultimately correct as a matter of Although I depart from bothLycan and Soames in important respects in what follows, the 2.Predictions and Policiescan do neither.What then? As we have seen, Fine suggests that, in such circumstances, simply retain our original beliefs. But how can a stubborn refusal to be moved by an argument. Alternatively, it might be that the argument is in fact flawed, and one’s failure 7appears to be flawless, one is in effect in the position of performing an inference to the best explanation, where the explanandum is one’s inability to identify any flaw despite having attempted to do so. If the better explanation of this fact is the flawlessness of the argument, then one should come to believe its conclusion and revise one’s other beliefs accordingly. If, on the other hand, the better explanation of one’s failure is one’s own cognitive limitations, then one should remain unmoved in the face of the argument. We can view the Moorean as someone who holds that, for arguments aimed at overturning Moorean facts, ‘hidden flaw’ explanations will inevitably trump ‘no flaw’ explanations. Notice that, if this is dogmatism, there is a respect in which it is an unusually modest variety. For when one reasons in this way, one’s refusal to change one’s beliefs is due tothe weight that one gives to one’s own cognitive limitations. In marked contrast, the skeptic will insist that one treat the fact that his argument seems or appears to be flawless as a reliable indication that it is flawless. Here--but not elsewhere--the skeptic will insist that one treat appearances as a reliable guide to reality. Still, this does nothing to answer the question of why Moorean facts might have the relevant status. I’ll consider some answers to this question in the next section. But first, I want to further explore some related Moorean themes. Recall Lewis’ informal gloss of a Moorean fact as ‘one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary’. This gloss admits of weaker and stronger readings. A relatively weak reading is the following: a Moorean fact is one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary which has yet been offered. On this reading, to declare that F is a Moorean fact is to declare that none of the known philosophical even the likelihood, that there is some compelling argument which we have yet to One who declares that F is a Moorean fact is not simply making a claim about the relationship between F and those arguments for not-F that have been offered thus far, I alsobe construed as the conclusion of an inductive inference. Consider the claim that We an estimation of the relevant inductive base, one might naturally infer that we will not evaluating arguments: any argument that has as its conclusion not-F In general, one’s judgement as to the probative force of a given argument is not one takes oneself to have strong reasons to believe that F is true, then one will take understood as making a prediction or as endorsing a policy? I believe that they are bestunderstood as doing both. On the one hand, they are endorsing a policy of evaluating willingness to endorse such a policy is independent of one’s willingness to predict that skeptical argument, it is not obvious why one would want to endorse any general policy thinks that one is more likely to make mistakes in particular cases if one judges each that a central intrapersonal functionof adopting general policies is the role that doing so Nozick 1993:17-18). One’s considered, reflective judgement is that it is best to do A1 against local temptations that ought to be ignored. Applied to the present case, the confidently predicts that one will never encounter a compelling skeptical argument; argument in the future, one would surely be making a mistake in doing so. One thus ingenious skeptic in the future. It is, rather, a trivial consequence of the correct In the mouth of the conventionalist, of course, be correct? I turn to this question next. 3.Some Norms of Belief Revision Suppose that I believe that F is true. Attempting to convince me otherwise, you offer unwillingness to abandon my belief in the face of your arguments is the uniquely mightthink that it is simply a fundamental epistemic norm that 15 MOORE One should never abandon one’s belief in a Moorean fact on the basis of a philosophical argument.One way of thinking about Moorean facts then, would be this: Moorean facts make up a class of special, privileged propositions, and it is simply a fundamental norm of belief revision that one should never stop believing a member of this class in response to a philosophical argument. This approach involves reifying the notion of a Moorean fact in a particularly strong way. Moorean facts make up a category of epistemically special entities, things to which the normal rules do not apply. Of course, much of the history of epistemology involves such reification: Cartesian foundations, empiricist sense data reports, Kantian synthetic a priori principles, Carnapian linguistic rulesand Wittgenstinian hinge propositions were But there is an alternative—and, I think, preferable-way to attempt to make sense of the when that beliefis known better than (at least one of ) the premises of the argument. dissatisfaction with this norm is not so much a conviction that it is false but rather that it —which, presumably, is not what is at issue here. We plausible than the kinds of principles that are typically employedby the skeptic in understand ‘plausibility’ in its literal sense. Forstrictly speaking, the plausibility of a worthiness of belief, or its worthiness of belief upon preliminary Perhaps the most popular candidate for the relevant dimension among Mooreans has know that this is a pencil and that you are (1983:53-54). Some Mooreans suggest that it is psychological certainty which is the key notion. The instead to deny one or more of the premises (1999:6-7).Consider, for example, the interpretation offered by Soames: of what we take ourselves to know (2003a:8-9). MORE CONFIDENT In resolving conflicts among one’s beliefs, one should always favor those beliefs ofwhich one is more confident over those beliefs of which one is The suggestion that, in revising one’s beliefs, one should resolve conflicts in favor of Indeed, the suggestion that one should favor those beliefs of which one is more confident might seem to be simply common sense. (Might one claim that this suggestion is itself a Despite its plausibility, I don’t believe that MORE CONFIDENT withstands scrutiny. understanding this norm and argue that, on neither interpretation is it a good candidate for skeptic has thus succeeded in at least this much: he has succeeded in identifying a abandon one’s belief inwhichever proposition one was least confident of immediatelyprior to becoming aware of the conflict. 23am extremely confident that something is true, I also think that, if someone were to argue that it is not in fact true, he or she wouldn’t get very far. For example, I am extremely in the United States does not have a deterrent effect on crime. My relative diffidence should retain my belief that p in these circumstances? It does not follow. For the subsequently presented with a formidable argument for not-p, I in effect come into rely solely on how confident I was that various propositionsare true before I came into MORE CONFIDENT (2): In resolving conflicts among one’s beliefs, one should abandon one’s belief inwhichever proposition one is least confident of once oneconflicts among one’s beliefs. For consider again my situation, immediately after a to being presented with the argument’--is at leastapplicable be after the dust settles, for what is at issue in one’s deliberations is precisely how the to settle. my beliefs, what, exactly, am I attempting to figure out? Simply this: which of the been presented. That is, the true norm here, I think, is simply this: always favor those beliefs thatit is more reasonable for one to think are true given the totality of evidence andarguments to which one has been exposed. certain’ is evidential certainty, not psychological certainty. We can view potentially conflict. However, if the arguments provided above are sound, none of the other norms the discarded norm MORE CONFIDENT is instructive. On the picture suggested by andthese are the facts which determine how one ought to respond to the conflict. This, at more reasonable to do’. But this, of course, is a mere restatement of the Moorean thesis. skeptic is ultimately undermined by a correct appreciation of philosophical method. This [Moore’s] position regarding the propositions of common sense is that they constitutefor philosophy would render itas such immune to being subsequently overturned on the philosophical inquiry, the qualifications for being a proper starting point are sufficiently facto subsequently overturned. At the other end of the spectrum, Harman (1999), following skeptic is implicitly committed to a methodology for philosophical theorizing that does excellence of a particularist. this or that particular case should be retained if and only ifthe judgements in question Strictly speaking, particularism is not inconsistent with radical forms of skepticism theory will not seems clear that there is a further alternative. For one might hold that neither type of reflective equilibrium methodism, andreflective equilibrium. Even this enriched picture of our options, hopelessly gerrymandered andad hoc is not an attractive view, and I doubt whether it can be charitably attributed to anyone. Of course, the more weight a particularist is willing to give her judgements about substantial weight to our judgements aboutcases in assessing which principles it is reasonable for us to accept. Again, given that the claims of the skeptic areex hypothesi Cartesian skeptic, for example, advocates anabandonment of all of our positive attributions of knowledge of the external world. The reflective equilibrium theorist, substantial weight in our deliberations about which philosophical principles to accept and which to reject. Because of this, the method of reflective equilibrium will militate against the kind of sweeping revisionism that the skeptic envisions.In this respect, the method of reflective equilibrium seems to be an inherently conservative one. Given thispresupposing some perhaps idiosyncratic conception that has been left off-stage. reasoning. Stitch (1983, ch.4) takes the conservative character of reflective equilibrium either with those who see the apparent conservatism of reflective equilibrium as a virtue orwith those who see it as a vice. My point is rather that, unless each of these . Rather, against the Moorean,theCartesianskeptic will maintain the following: there are nojudgements attributing relativelystrong metaphilosophical claim. Indeed, for the skeptic to insist that we and methodism could only be made by begging the question (1973:37). Perhaps that’s for theorizing about knowledge when skepticism is not at issue. Thus, Gettier (1963) was with our judgements about those cases. If hyper-methodism is the correct methodology, universalreaction to Gettier was simply a mistake.For if For the sake of further comparison, consider also the history of the logical positivists’ with judgements about cases was taken as a sufficient reason to abandona general A traditional complaint against the skeptic is that he is guilty of importing artificially Moorean’smethodological commitments while underestimating those of the skeptic. One who appeals to Moorean facts does not thereby incur a commitment to particularism. judgements inconsistency with which suffices to undermine the credibility of a general methodism. On the contrary: it is not the Moorean but rather the skeptic who seemsordinarily taken to warrant rejection of general principles. In this respect, it is the 41BibliographyAinslie, George (1975). “Specious Reward: A Behavorial Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse Control” in the Psychological Bulletin 82: 463-496.Ainslie, George (1986). “Beyond Microeconomics”. In The Multiple Self , edited by Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 133-178.Armstrong, David (1983). What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University American Philosophical Association , vol.73, No.2.Ayer, A.J. (1952). Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover).BonJour, Laurence (1986). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge . (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).BonJour, Laurence (2002). Epistemology . (Oxford, England: Rowman and Littlefield 38, 299-325.Cassell, Paul (2004). “In Defense of the Death Penalty”. In Debating the Death Penalty : Should America Have Capital Punishment? The Experts on Both Sides Make Their Best Case . Edited by Hugo Adam Bedau and Paul G. Cassell (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Chisholm, Roderick (1973). The Problem of the Criterion . (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press).Cohen, Stewart (1988). “How to Be a Fallibilist” in James Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 2 (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company).Conee, Earl (2001). “Comments on Bill Lycan’s Moore Against the New Skeptics”, Philosophical Studies Theory”, in D. Copp and M. Zimmerman (eds.)Morality, Reason, and Truth . (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld): 141-169.Daniels, Norman (1996). Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and 42 Practice . (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge , (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 321-361.Davies, Martin (2000). “Externalism and Armchair Knowledge”, in Boghossian, Paul and Peacocke, Christopher (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 384-414.Davies, Martin (2003). “The Problem of Armchair Knowledge”, in Nuccetelli, Susana (ed.) News Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge . (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press): 23-55.Davies, Martin (2004). “Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission, and Easy Knowledge”, Aristotelian Society Supplement DeRose, Keith (1995). “Solving the Skeptical Problem”Philosophical Review 104: 1-52.Donellan, Keith (1967). “The Paradigm Case Argument”, in Paul Edwards (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Edwards, Paul (1951). “Bertrand Russell’s Doubts About Induction”, in Antony Flew (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Feldman, Richard. “Contextualism and Skepticism” in Philosophical Perspectives 13: 91-114.Fine, Kit (2001). “The Question of Realism”. The Philosophers’ Imprint vol.1, no.1.Gettier, Edmund. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23: 121-123.Goodman, Nelson (1953). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast . (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Hanfling, Oswald (1991). “What is Wrong with the Paradigm Case Argument?” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society vol.91: 21-38.Harman, Gilbert (1973). Thought . (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).Harman, Gilbert (1986). Change in View . (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press).Harman, Gilbert (1994). “Epistemology and the Diet Revolution”, in Michaelis Michael and John O’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind . (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers). 43Harman, Gilbert (1999). Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind . (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Harman, Gilbert (2003). “Skepticism and Foundations”, in Steven Luper (ed.) The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays . (Ashgate: Aldershot): 1-11.Harman, Gilbert (2004). “Three Trends in Moral and Political Philosophy” in Value Inquiry , 37.3.Hetherington, Stephen (2001). Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge . (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Hirsch, Eli (2002). “Against Revisionary Ontology” in Philosophical Topics vol.30, no.1.Kagan, Shelly (1989). The Limits of Morality . (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Lemos, Noah (2004). Common Sense . (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Lewis, David (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds (Blackwell Publishers: Cambridge, MA).Lewis, David (1999) “Elusive Knowledge”, reprinted in his collection Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 418- 445.Lycan, William (2001). “Moore against the New Skeptics”. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):35-53.Malcolm, Norman (1942). “Moore and Ordinary Language”, in The Philosophy of G.E . Moore , vol.I, ed. P.A. Schilpp (La Salle, IL: Open Court) 343-368.Moore, G.E. (1942). “Replies” in The Philosophy of G.E. Moore , vol.I ed. P.A. Schilpp . Edited by Thomas Baldwin. (London: Routledge).Moore, G.E. (2000). “Four Forms of Skepticism”. Reprinted in Kim and Sosa (eds.) Epistemology: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers): 27-29.Nolan, Daniel (2005). David Lewis . (McGill: Queen’s University Press).Nozick, Robert (1981). Philosophical Explanations . (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 44Nozick, Robert (1993). The Nature of Rationality . (Princeton: Princeton University (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield).Pryor, James (1996). How to be a Reasonable Dogmatist dissertation.Princeton University, 1996. 34: 517-549.Pryor, James (2004). “What’s Wrong With Moore’s Argument?” in Philosophical Issues 14.Rawls, John (1972). A Theory of Justice . (Cambridge, MA: Belnkap)Rosen, Gideon (1994). “Objectivity and Modern Idealism: What is the Question?” in Michaelis Michael and John O’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind . (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers): 277-319Scanlon, Thomas (2002). “Rawls on Justification” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls , edited by Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 139-167.Singer, Peter (1974). “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium” in the Monist 58: 490-517.Singer, Peter (1995). Rethinking Life and Death: the Collapse of our Traditional Ethics (New York: St. Martin’s Press). Dawn of Analysis . (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).Soames, Scott (2003b). Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. Volume 2: The Age of Meaning . (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).Stitch, Stephen (1983). The Fragmentation of Reason (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press).Strawson, P.F. (1985). Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties . (New York: Columbia University Press).Stroud, Barry (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism . (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Unger, Peter (1975). Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Weatherson, Brian (2003). “What Good Are Counterexamples?”Philosophical Studies 15: 1-31.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1972). On Certainty . Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. (New York: Harper and Row) Wright, Crispin (1985). “Facts and Certainty”, Proceedings of the British Academy 71: 429-472.Wright, Crispin (2000). “Cogency and Question-begging: Some reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof” in Philosophical Issues 10: 140-163.Wright, Crispin (2002). “(Anti)skeptics simple and subtle: Moore and McDowell”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Wright, Crispin (2003). “Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference”, in Nuccetelli, Susana (ed.)New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press): 57-77.Wright, Crispin (2004). “Warrant for Nothing (and foundations for free)? Aristotelian Society Supplement . 46 extremely demanding standards for knowing in a given conversational context. The We know a lotWe know a lotattributions of knowledge is more fundamental than his commitment to those aspects of ranks of prominent contemporary Mooreans. Finally, the usual allures of historical revisionism notwithstanding, I believe that Moore (1993) himself was a Moorean in the arising from common sense, science, and other areas of inquiry about which the theory 47 Analytic philosophers are, of course, not the only philosophers to have recognized this; classicus justified in believing things even if one is not adept at playing offense. According to the do the same. At least at first pass then, the kind of dogmatism at issue here would seem class of propositions enjoys an epistemically privileged role runs counter to one of the many of the objects of traditional epistemological concern (Cartesian foundations, 48 incorrigibility) that were typically claimed for such foundations by their classical insufficiently appreciative of this point. Of course, it would be completely contrary to the PLAUSIBLE yields a norm equivalentto the norm MORE REASONABLE, which I On the other hand, ‘Is it, in fact, as certain…?’ seems to read more naturally as 49 Compare pages xv-xvi of Soames (2003b) where the starting point idea seems to recur.philosophers, I don’t think that this is an especially strong argument compared to others within her rights to simply decline to accept it.. Rather, I think that the relevant claim 50 (i.e., views that depart in radical ways from ‘common sense morality’) are often best from Bentham to Kagan (1989)and Singer (1995). Association; I am grateful to the audiences present on those occasions. In addition, I Johnston, Jonathan Vogel, Jim Pryor, Kelly Jolley, Shelly Goldstein, Roger White, and