Fall 2002 Clayton Act Newsletter Vol III No Nonstructural Remedies in Hightechnology Markets Scott A Sher Associate Wilson Sonsini Goodrich Rosati PC The antitrust laws traditionally favor divesti ID: 884975
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1 Reproduced by permission. All rights re
Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. Fall 2002 Clayton Act Newsletter Vol. I
2 II, No. Non-structural Remedies in High
II, No. Non-structural Remedies in High-technology Markets Scott A. Sher Associate, Wi
3 lson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, PC The a
lson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, PC The antitrust laws traditionally favor divesti- ture
4 Overview of Available Merger Remedies
Overview of Available Merger Remedies The debate over whether antitrust law applies to
5 high-technology mergers is over. It is
high-technology mergers is over. It is clear today that traditional antitrust analysis
6 will re- solve merger investigations eve
will re- solve merger investigations even in rapidly changing high-tech markets. Even so
7 , the agencies recognize that high-tech
, the agencies recognize that high-tech portfolio of intellectual property and less on
8 the transfer and accumulation of physica
the transfer and accumulation of physical as- sets, and require an analysis of whether p
9 ost- merger power in a market is durable
ost- merger power in a market is durable or merely transitory.3 On the other hand, it cl
10 ear that the rules gov- erning remedies
ear that the rules gov- erning remedies in high-tech markets must be different than thos