Autumn 1995The Devil Was in the DetailsD.M. GIANGRECOorld War II ended - PDF document

Autumn 1995The Devil Was in the DetailsD.M. GIANGRECOorld War II ended with the dropping of Òthe bombÓAmericans slated to invade JapanÕs Home Islands including Tokyo it-self. The invasion forces were not only to come from the Pacific;First Army, which had pummelled its way from Normandy to theheart of Germany, and Eighth Air Force, which was based in Eng-land, were on the way. Morale was not good among veterans of the[knowing] that he very likely had survived this faronly to fall dead in the dirt of JapanÕs Home Islands, hardly bears JFQ Giangreco Pgs 10/8/96 1:35 PM Page 86 Report Documentation PageForm ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering andmaintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 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But while his book is a windfall for any-one interested in the final days of the war, ahistory. Skates states, for instance, that Òthe last. Skates states, for instance, that Òthe lastsions that drove the war into extremes of vio-lenceÓ with Òpassion, hatred, and frustrationmoving almost beyond rational limits.Ó Debateover how many casualties might have resultedwith gusto. He uses contradictory figures ascribedto various civilian and military leaders with os-tensibly self-serving motives. That they mightceived from General Douglas MacArthur.exceeding 100,000 casualties for the first threeKyushu which Skates contrasts with PresidentHarry TrumanÕs post-war statement that Marshallhad said that the casualties from invadingand TokyoÑcould range from 250,000 toceed those which Marshall received fromMacArthur, asserting that Òthere is no substantia-tion beyond TrumanÕs own memory.Ó He addsbeen out of character for Marshall, whose state-truth, and that the numbers given were indeedMarshallÕs Òcareful and measuredÓ opinion.When Marshall briefed Truman prior to thesession on July 25at the Potsdam conference, hewas under no obligation to portray MacArthurÕs10,000 American dead and missing in the Mari-ways emerged victorious, operations often wereto the capture of Tokyo, a preliminary operationto create a huge staging area. Today, we can recallPhilippines. But what Truman and Marshall knewhave eight fighter and bomber groups strikinghowever, only a fraction of that airpower was op-erational because of unexpected terrain condi-fighting on the ground gone as planned. TheJapanese even briefly isolated Fifth Air Forcesustained in Europe. But while the naval side ofthe Pacific War displayed the broad, sweepingparatively low in northwest Europe. The closestcombat which was the stock and trade of Armylonged fighting in NormandyÕs hedgerows andHuertgen ForestÑclose-in, infantry-intensive D.M. Giangreco serves on the editorial staff of. Among his publications are JFQ Giangreco Pgs 10/8/96 1:35 PM Page 87 Provisional Order of Battle for Invasion of Japan (August 1945)Source: General Headquarters, U.S. Forces in the Pacific, Operation Coronet Staff Study. OPERATION DOWNFALLAutumn 1995 DATELINE: MAINLAND JAPAN U.S. forces land onfrom kamikazes andshore batteries. JFQ Giangreco Pgs 10/8/96 1:35 PM Page 88 GiangrecoAutumn 1995Potsdam, Truman and Marshall knew that totalU.S. casualties were approaching the 1,230,000having occurred in just the previous year.Marshall had MacArthurÕs figures on July 25,1945, and had seen countless other well-inten-soldier. An artillery commander from the Meuse-Argonne battles of World War I would ask a manThere were plenty of estimates that confi-tory, as well as those supporting them, could onlystay poised for so long. Leaders in both Washing-ton and Tokyo knew this just as well as the the-shu if Tokyo was not forced to the surrenderbomb is that Truman and his advisors knew thatder. The reality in 1945 was vastly different andTokyo the hard way. Construction of the massivesupport forces invading Honshu had a priorityproduced the bomb. Stateside hospitals wereSkates takes Truman and his contemporariesmate of a ÒtolerableÓ total of no more thanwar report by Colonel Riley Ennis of the Opera-tions Division of the War Department on how theEnnis, a newly-promoted colonel, was tasked toa hurry by someone whose heart was not in it. Ina way, though, it actually does not differ muchfrom numerous other documents produced afterthe war in that it was not based on original re-search and analysis but patched together fromvarious sources that tended to be liberally saltedwith hindsight unavailable six months earlier. JFQ Giangreco Pgs 10/8/96 1:35 PM Page 89 sentially lifting MacArthurÕs original estimatesand merging them with post-war sources such aslow the tendency to build scenarios or conclu-sions around the Japanese defensive strength ofmid-August when pitted against U.S. offensivestrength amassed in November. As with otherTruman-know-and-when-did-he-know-it case isthe author is aware that four days after MarshallÕsbriefing came the July 29change to an earlier re-set alarm bells ringing in MacArthurÕs headquar-ters as well as Washington because it statedbluntly that the Japanese were rapidly reinforcingFinally, it warned that Japanese efforts weresharply.Ó While the dramatic no end in sightures were ominous enough for Marshall to pon-still the best option available. With this in mind,Japan: Alternative to theBomb?The authorÕs re-forces as they existed 75 daysÑand, as will beshape facts that support the thesis that U.S. forcesinvasion, and that Tokyo was ready to throw inCoronet) as March 1, 1946. To lessen casualties OPERATION DOWNFALLAutumn 1995 DATELINE: AT SEAMarch 24, 1946.Fires swept being refueled nearthe stern. [U.S.Navy photo] MAINLAND JAPAN March 1, 1946.U.S. forces hit the JFQ Giangreco Pgs 10/8/96 1:35 PM Page 90 GiangrecoAutumn 1995pushing XXX Corps up a single road through theKanto Plain was not secured for mobile warfareMarch offered the best chance of success, with thesituation deteriorating as the month progressed.With good luck, relatively free movementApril. Unfortunately, this assumed that the snowtions did not reveal any plans to systematicallydeluge low-lying areas, a quick thrust up thearea capable of taking vehicles over 12 tons. Everylogistical considerations and the sequence of fol-not land until Y+10. This would provide time forthe defenders to observe that the U.S. infantryÕsready flooded rice fields and would certainly sug- The Inundation of the Tokyo PlainÑAreas of natural flooding in the wet season (shaded brown) and tem-form obstacles at right which indicate full impact of both natural and man-made barriers. Source: Military Intelligence Section, General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific. JFQ Giangreco Pgs 10/8/96 1:35 PM Page 91 can forces to fight their way up flood plains thatwere only dry during certain times of the year butthat could be suddenly inundated by the enemy.encountered in Vietnam, less the helicopters,where convoys moved on roads above paddyfields. Unfortunately, foul weather would haveEngineer planning for Coronet envisionedBomb and fuel storage, roads, wharves, and basetial operating facilities, but that minimum grew.line early to support ground operations onKyushu, but lengthy strips and support facilitiesclear that when the Joint Chiefs set the targetfor December 1, 1945 and March 1, 1946, respec-tively, it was apparent that the three-month pe-riod between X-Day (Olympic) and Y-Day (Coro-net) would not be sufficient. Weather ultimatelydetermined which operation to reschedule be-risking serious restrictions on the ground cam-March to early April. MacArthur proposed mov-Yet these best-laid plans would not have un-not been dropped and the Soviet entry into thePacific War had not frustrated TokyoÕs last hopeof reaching a settlement short of unconditionalsurrender (a Versailles-type outcome was unac-ceptable to Truman and many of his contempo-raries because it was seen as an incomplete vic-tory that would require the next generation toa bloody campaign in which pre-invasion casu-alty estimates rapidly became meaningless be-typhoon destroyed a foreign invasion force head-ing for Japan in 1281, and it was for this stormthat Japanese suicide aircraft of World War II were OPERATION DOWNFALLAutumn 1995 DATELINE: KAGOSHIMA,JAPAN Soldiers from the U.S.120-mile front in JFQ Giangreco Pgs 10/8/96 1:35 PM Page 92 GiangrecoAutumn 1995packing 140-mile per hour winds struck thealysts estimated that the storm would haveber 1. The point that goes begging, however, isTokyo also had attempted to hold out for an ex-Okinawa. Moreover, they would know what itwhich they predicted as accurately as the inva-sion of Kyushu. Even with the storm delay andment Y-Day as early in April as possible. But thethe Pacific, this one striking the northernmostPhilippine island of Luzon on the following day,inflicting only moderate damage before movingtoward Taiwan. Coming almost a year after thewar, it was of no particular concern. But if Japanwatched weather cell in history. Would it move tonortheast as the October typhoon? Would slow,the Philippines where loading operations wouldto Japan, would they reach KyushuÕs shelteredgoing to occur, one that First and Eighth Armycould ill afford and that Japanese militaristswould see as another sign that they were rightone treading this same flat, dry Òtank countryÓ in1946 would, in reality, have been up to theirworth emphasizing: U.S. intelligence turned outthe time of the surrender, but turned out to be JFQ Giangreco Pgs 10/8/96 1:35 PM Page 93 short by some 3,300 in light of the armada ofTo bolster his case, Skates gives unusualTruman and Marshall, his argument appears to besources: ÒThe postwar analysts were certainly cor-have been necessary.Ó That sort of overstatementoccurs with unnerving frequency, although theunwary reader likely accepts this documentationSkates makes occasional obligatory acknowl-of Okinawa.Ó Even if one appeals to the remark-from the air, it is reasonable to assume that if Tru-war, many of the same people who today decryhim for needlessly expending thousands of Ameri-Military professionals will pick up on theing the bomb, however, will find its flawed con-want to hear, but the fact remains that Truman200,000 (or ÒjustÓ 20,000) American dead to as-JFQ The photographs reproduced in this article depict the followingactual events of the World War II: page 88, firing salvo at Imperial Japanese Iron Works in Kamaishi (U.S. Navy) and under a protective smoke screen American forces make a landing somewhere in the South Pacific, 1944attack (U.S. Army); page 91, a flame-throwing tank of the U.S.Army pouring it on a Japanese entrenchment on (U.S. Marine Corps/Thomas D. Barnett, Jr.) and flight deck of(U.S. Navy); page 93, Coast Guardsmen and troopsCoast Guard); page 94, discharged Japanese soldiers on boardtrain (U.S. Navy/Wayne Miller) and members of the 151Infantry Regiment advancing under enemy fire on Carabao in OPERATION DOWNFALLAutumn 1995 DATELINE: captured by the 86Hyogo Province en-route to POW camp.[U.S.Army Signal Corps photo] JFQ Giangreco Pgs 10/8/96 1:36 PM Page 94