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The surprise exam phil  Je Speaks April    An argument for the impossibility of surprise The surprise exam phil  Je Speaks April    An argument for the impossibility of surprise

The surprise exam phil Je Speaks April An argument for the impossibility of surprise - PDF document

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Uploaded On 2014-12-06

The surprise exam phil Je Speaks April An argument for the impossibility of surprise - PPT Presentation

1 2 The announcement must be known by the class 2 3 A selfreferential version of the paradox 3 4 The knower 3 1 An argument for the impossibility ID: 21489

class announcement true day announcement class day true exam give teacher surprise knowledge paradox semester reasoning referential argument false

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Somethingiswrongwithyourlineofreasoning,sinceIcanclearlygiveyouasurpriseexam|butwhatisit?2TheannouncementmustbeknownbytheclassWeneedtobeabitcleareraboutthenatureofmyannouncementtotheclass,andaboutwhatexactlyissupposedtobeparadoxicalaboutit.A rsttryistosaythatmyannouncementtotheclassseemsasthoughitshouldbetrue;butthereasoningo eredaboveseemstoshowthatitisisfalse.Butthisisnotquiteright;thereisnoproblemwithanannouncementofthesortdescribedabovebeingtrue;iftheclassdoesnotbelievetheannouncement,thentheywillcertainlybesurprisedbytheexam!Soweneedtosupposethattheannouncementisbothtrueandknowntobetruebytheclass|onthisview,theparadoxisthatthelineofreasoningpursuedaboveshowsthattheannouncementcannotbebothtrueandknownbytheclasstobetrueoneachdayofthesemester.Isthisstillgenuinelyparadoxical?Couldwesimplyrestbysayingthattheteachercangiveasurpriseexam,butonlyifeithertheclassdoesnotknowthathewill,ortheclassfailstoseetheargumentsketchedabove?Wearen't,afterall,sayingthattheteacherhassaidsomethingwhichcannotbetrue.Doesitmakesensetosaythatsomethingcanbetruebutunknowable?Isthatrequiredtoadoptthepresentresponsetotheparadox?Aseparateresponsetothisversionoftheparadoxfocusesonaquestionablestepinthereasoningsketchedabove.WearenowimaginingthattheclassknowsthatTheteacher'sannouncementistrue.Weimaginedthattheclassreasonstotheconclusion,whichtheythenknow,thatIfweknowthattheteacher'sannouncementistrue,thentheexamcannotbeonthelastdayofthesemester.TheyarethensupposedtocombinethesetwopiecesofknowledgetogivethemtheknowledgethatTheexamcannotbeonthelastdayofthesemester.Buthowisthisstepsupposedtowork?Ordinarily,wethinkthatonecanmovefromtheknowledgethatpandtheknowledgethatifp,thenqtotheknowledgethatq.Buttheabovereasoningisnotofthatform;insteadwearemovingfromtheknowledgethatpandtheknowledgethatifIknowthat p,thenqtotheknowledgethatq.Thisseemstomakesenseonlyifweassumenotonlythattheclassknowsthattheteacher'sannouncementis2