Davide Fiammenghi - PowerPoint Presentation

Slide1

Davide FiammenghiAlma Mater Studiorum│University of BolognaSchool of Political Science

Introduction to

International RelationsSlide2

Antecedents of realist thinking

Slide3

Thucydides Athenian historian and general (ca. 460 – 400 BC)

Histories, better known as “History of the Peloponnesian War”

Quest for objectivity

Rejection of the mythical and the preternatural

Influenced by Sophist thought Slide4

Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC)Athens and the Delian league vs. Sparta and the Peloponnesian League.Archidamian War 431-421 BC

Peace of Nicias 421 BC

Sicilian Expedition 415-413 BC

Athens surrenders 404 BC

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1) Political considerations trump ethical, legal, moral considerationsPericles to his fellow citizens: “for by this time the empire you hold is a tyranny, which it may seem wrong to have assumed, but which certainly it is

dangerous to let go” (II, 63).Slide6

Athenians to the Melians: “[…W]hat is just is arrived at in human arguments only when the necessity on both sides is equal […T]he powerful exact what they can, while the weak yield what they must” (V, 89)Slide7

Athenians to the Lacedaemonians (Spartans): “[…I]t has ever been an established rule that the weaker is kept down by the stronger. […No] one, when opportunity offered of securing something by main strength, ever yet put [justice] before force and abstained from taking advantage” (I, 76, 2).Slide8

2) Actors’ goals in IRAthenians to the Lacedaemonians: “It was under the compulsion of circumstances that we were driven at first to advance our empire to its present state, influenced chiefly by fear, then by honour also, and lastly by self-interest as well” (I, 75, 3-4).

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Fear, honor, and self-interest (or simply ‘interest,’ depending on the translation) are in order of importance.‘Fear’ translates the Greek word déos (δέους

), which means: intellectual fear, rational apprehension

The term

phobos

means irrational fear Slide10

Key point to bear in mind: for T., the actors’ goals in int’l politics are, in order of importance:fear, honor, and interest.Or, in Italian:

il timore,

l’onore

e l’utile.Slide11

3) Defensive measures trigger fear and hostilityAthens’ decision to build the Long Walls (a

defensive measure) sparked fears among

other city states

This nicely captures John Herz’s “security

dilemma.”

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In ancient times it was hard to take a fortified city

by military means. The Long Walls were exten-

ded to Athens’ port (the Piraeus). This means that

Sparta could ravage Atthica, but not force Athens

to capitulate, for, as long as Athens dominated the

seas, it had acces to supplies from

its maritime empire.

So the Long Walls

where a key strategic

assett for Athens

in the event of a

future war.

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For more, see A.J. Holladay, Athenian Strategy in the Archidamian War, in «Historia», Vol. 27, No. 3 (1978), pp. 399-427Slide14

4) Immediatevs.underlying

causes of warSlide15

Prophasis (πρóφασιζ): “scientific cause” (Jaeger), “underlying cause” (David Greene) Aitia

(α

ἰτί

α):

“accusation,” “complaint,” “grievance”

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The truest reason (prophasis): “As to why they broke [the thirty years' peace], I have first set down the grievances (aitiai) and disputes (diaphorai) […] The truest reason (alethestate prophasis), though most concealed in word, I believe to be that the Athenians became powerful, filled the Spartans with fear and drove them to war” (I, 23)Slide17

T’s “truest reason” is similar to Organski’s power transition theoryGilpin’s hegemonic war theoryT. has anticipated the notion that the

underlying cause of war is related to power

transitions that change the ranking of nations.Slide18

5) Power vs. securityPericles → for Athens, military expansion can only lead to disaster:

“Many other considerations also lead me to hope that we shall prove superior, if you will consent not to attempt to extend your empire while you are at war and not to burden yourselves needlessly with dangers of your own choosing” (I, 144, 1)Slide19

For Alcibiades, unlimited expansion is the route to security: “And it is not possible for us to exercise a careful stewardship of the limits we would set to our empire; but, since we are placed in this position, it is necessary to plot against some and not let go our hold upon others, because there is a danger of coming ourselves under the empire of others, should we not ourselves hold empire over other peoples” (VI, 18, 3)Slide20

How much power does a state need to be secure? Even today, scholars struggle with this question:defensive realists

offensive realistsSlide21

6) Athens vs. Sparta as a bipolar system

Many see the ancient Greek system as a bipolar system

Many have observed that the

Athens-Sparta

rivalry resembles the US-USSR rivalry during the Cold WarSlide22

Three analogies:In both cases, there are two powers on top that behave confrontationally.Sparta → oligarchic city state; USSR → authoritarian state.

Athens

→democratic city state;

US → liberal democracy.

Sparta and USSR → land powers.

Athens and the US → martitime powers.Slide23

7) Delian League vs. Pel. League as a two-block multipolar systemRaymond Aron dubbs the Greek system as

bipolar, but he apparently means a two-

bloc multipolar system —Dealian League

vs. Peloponnesian League

Slide24

Athens’ and Sparta’s military superiority was not so great that they could ignore their allies – a fact that calls into question whether the Greek system was bipolar Slide25

Athens intervenes to help Corcyra in the conflict between Corcyra and Corinth. Why? “There are three navies which count in Greece, that of Athens, of Corcyra, and of Corinth. [...] Athens did not possess such superiority that she could scorn the Corcyran contribution” (Aron, 1962; english trans. 1966, 143)Slide26

Fittingly, Aron draws parallels between the Peloponnesian War and WWI (or WWI and WWII taken together)Not between the Peloponnesian war and the Cold WarSlide27

KauṭilyaIndian economist, jurist, strategist, and political advisor (end IV- beginning III century BC)He is thought to be Chanakya, Minister to

Chandragupta (321-296 B.C.), founder of the

Mauryan

empire

Arthashastra, often translated as “Science of Politics”Slide28

“…in the popular sense of that word, is classically expressed in Indian literature in the Arthashastra of Kautilya […C]ompared to it, Machiavelli's The Prince is harmless” (Weber, Politics as a Vocation, 1919)

Truly radical ‘Machiavellianism’...Slide29

Mandala (circle of states)Vijigishu → ambitious kingAri → the vijigishu’s neighbor; he is vijigishu’s enemy becaue of geographical proximityAri’s neighbor → by the same logic, he is ari’s enemy and a friend (mitra) of the vijigishuMitra’s neighbor → he is ari’s friend and vijigishu’s enemySlide30

Kauṭilya’s mandala is the earliest known formulation of the maxim: “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” Kauṭilya made the point in georaphical termsthe king who is close to us is an enemy, while distant kings are our enemy’s enemies, hence our potential friends Slide31

As Doyle notes, Kauṭilyas mandala is similar to the ancient Chinese doctrine: “befriending those far away and attacking those nearby” Doyle, Balancing Power Classically, in Downs, ed., Collective Security beyond the Cold War, 1994, 136Slide32

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527)M. is appointed Second Chancellor of the Republic, June 1498; and Secretary to the Council of Ten, July 1498During the Italian Wars, M. serves in diplomatic

missions, 1498-1511

Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy, 1494.

The Medici are expelled from Florence

Execution of Savonarola, May 1498

Florence surrenders, and the

Medici returns to power, 1512Slide33

M. is imprisoned and tortured, February 1513; after his release, he retires to his country estateM. interrupts the composition of the Discourses and writes De Principatibus (On Principlities), known as The Prince, 1513Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy (1517; published in 1531)

The Art of War (1519-1520; published in 1521)Slide34

Discourse vs. The PrinceDiscourses

The Prince

A strong state requires a Republican government

A strong state requires a ruthless prince, ready to use coercive methods if necessary

?

?Slide35

Machiavelli’s Discourses

Aristotle’s typology of forms of government

(Politics, III, vii; VI, ii)

IV Century BC

Polybius (a greek historian) turns Aristotle’s typology into a dynamic model

II Century BC

In the Discourses, Machiavelli reads

books 1-10 of Livy’s History of Rome (Ab Urbe Condita) through the lenses of Polybius’ theory

Titus Livius, or Livy, was

a Roman historian,

I Century BCSlide36

Aristotle’s typology of forms of government

Monarchy/oligarchy/politeia → pure forms

Tyranny/aristocracy/democracy → corrupt forms

In whose interests

is rule exercized?

General interests

Interests of

the ruler(s)

How many

rulers?

One

Monarchy

Tyranny

Few

Oligarchy

Aristocracy

Many

Politeia

DemocracySlide37

Polybius’ anacyclosis

Monarchy

Tyranny

Aristocracy

Oligarchy

Democracy*

Ochlocracy

Pure type

Corrupt form

Pure type

Corrupt form

Pure type

Corrupt form

* Here, “democracy” is a pure form, while the corrupt form is called “ochlocracy”Slide38

Why was Rome so strong?

Pure forms degenerate into corrupt forms, and become vulnerable to externale threats. But Rome was NOT a pure form

Rome’s “mixed “government

(miktè politeia)

Monarchy (Roman consuls)

Aristocracy (Roman senate)

Democracy (Tribunes of the Plebs)

+

+Slide39

Anacyclosis → states become weak and fall prey of their neighborsRome’s mixed government allowed it to escape Polybius’ cycleThis is why Rome became the ancient (Western) world’s hegemonIn the Discourses, Machiavelli applied Polybius’ reasoning to XV Century ItalySlide40

In a Republic, the “tumulti virtuosi” (can be translated as: “virtuous uprisings,” “virtuous conflicts”) among the three elements, and particularly between the democratic and aristocratic ones, create good lawsTumulti → good lawsSlide41

“[...I]n every republic there are two opposed factions, that of the people and that of the rich [...A]ll the laws made in favor of liberty result from their discord. […] For anyone who will properly examine their outcome will not find that they produced any exile or violence damaging to the common good, but rather laws and institutions conducive to public liberty”(Discourses, XXXIV)Slide42

Discord → good laws → public liberty A free populum is a strong populum, which is able to take up arms and to fight to protect and expand the RepublicThis was a tremendously counterintuitive and original insightSlide43

Machiavelli’s “republicanism” in the Discourses is thus to be seen in relation to foreign affairsHis preference for a republican model stems from the idea (borrowed from Polybius) that a republican government is stronger and therefore able to assert itself vis-à-vis external threatsSlide44

The Prince “ [...] For a man who always wishes to profess goodness will inevitably come to ruin amongst so many who are evil. A prince, therefore, who desires to maintain himself must learn not to be good, but to be so or not as necessity requires (Prince, XV)Slide45

Beloved or feared? (Prince, XVII)For a Prince, it would be better to be both, but it’s difficult be both loved and fearedM. concludes that it’s safer to be fearedFear, however, should not degenerate into hatredSlide46

Lion and fox (Prince, XVIII)Lion → “cannot escape the traps laid for him”Fox → “cannot defend himself against the wolves” “A prince should be a fox, to know the traps and snares; and a lion, to be able to frigthen the wolves; for those who simply hold to the nature of the lion do not understand how things go”Slide47

Neutrality (Prince, XXI) “[…I]t will always be better for you to declare yourself openly and make fair war […] For the conqueror will want no doubtful friends who do not stand by him in time of trial; and the vanquished will not help you because you have not been willing, with arms in hand, to take the chance of his fortunes. […]Slide48

Irresolute princes, for the sake of avoiding immediate danger, adopt most frequently the course of neutrality, and most frequently come to ruin in consequence.”Neutrality (Prince, XXI)Slide49

Powerful allies (Prince, XXI) [...A] prince ought carefully to avoid making common cause with anyone more powerful than himself for the purpose of attacking another power, unless he should be compelled to do so by necessity […]. For if [the more powerful ally] is victorious, then you are at his mercy; and princes should avoid placing themselves in such a position as much as possible”Slide50

Fortune and VirtùVirtù: “[…A]n extraordinary will and determination, a superior energy, an exceptional ability, thanks to which human beings try to face Fortune” (Cesa, 2014, 6)Fortune: 1) a destructive force that virtù ought to resist; 2) the source of opportunities that virtù must exploitSlide51

Fortune and Virtù (Prince, XXV) “Fortune to the extent of one half is the arbiter of our actions, but [...] she permits us to direct the other half or so ourselves [...F]ortune [...] displays her power where there is no organized virtù to resist her and directs her blows where she knows that there are no walls or dikes to contain her [...]”Slide52

Hobbes translates Thucydides’ Histories in English (1628)Elements of Law, Natural and Politic written in 1640;

published as two distinct treaties in 1650:

Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy

De

Corpore

Politico, or the Elements of Law, Moral and Politic

Petition of Right, 1628

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)

Long Parliament, 1640

;

Hobbes flees to FranceSlide53

Elementorum philosophiae sectio tertia de cive

First private ed.1642;

second ed.1647, including notes in response to

objections

Leviathan, or the Matter,

Forme, and Power of a

Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil (1651)

Charles I is behaded, 1649

Leviathan not well received in France;

Hobbes goes back to London Slide54

A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student

of the Common Laws of England (ca. 1666,

unfinished; published posthumously in1681)

Behemoth: the History of the Causes of the Civil

Wars of England, etc. (1668; published

posthumously In 1681)

Restoration, 1660. Charles II was H.’s

former student and protected him from

the charge of atheism and blasphemy.

Yet H. could not publish his last worksSlide55

The notion that Kings and Queens have a divine right to rule was called into questionHobbes sought to demonstrate that obedience to authority is the best choice.Privately an atheist → he could not rely on arguments from religion He put forth a logical-deductive systemSlide56

Three “principal causes of quarrel” rooted in human nature:Competition makes men invade for gainDiffidence makes men invade for safetyGlory makes men invade for reputation

These terms are similar to Thucydides’:

Competition/gain →Thucydides’ interest;

Diffidence/safety →Thucydides’ fear;

Glory/reputation →Thucydides’ honor.Slide57

Cupiditas naturalis → Ius omnium in omnia → Bellum omnium contra omnes (war of all against all)Ratio naturalis → Fear of violent death

Two postulates that stem

from human nature (De Cive)Slide58

Men’s life in the state of nature (Lev.) «[…] no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare

, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary,

poore

, nasty, brutish, and short».Slide59

The state of nature is NOT a state of constant warFor Hobbes, in the state of nature war is an ever present possibility, and human relations are characterized by constant tensionSlide60

How do people get out of the state of nature? Constractualists → two pacts

Pactum

Societatis

the “multitudo” (a crowd, a multitude of men) becomes “populum” (the people, a community or society)

Pactum

Subiectionis

the “populum” makes a deal with the “princeps” (the Prince) and becomes subject to his authoritySlide61

Hobbes was uncomfortable with the contractualist solution, for it implied that people can break the pact with the Prince if they think he is a despot: it is

precisely the thesis which Hobbes

sought to refute

!Slide62

Hobbes objected that men in the state of nature cannot make a deal among themselves, for they can’t trust each others’ words:

“

Covenants, without the sword, are but

words and of no strength to secure a man at all» (Lev., XVII)”Slide63

Pactum unionisTo escape from the state of nature, men makeone, and only one, pactpactum

unionis

→ men, at the same time, become “people” and create a sovereign authority to which they are subject (the Leviathan)Slide64

Pactum

Societatis

Pactum

subiectionis

+

Pactum

Unionis

people give all the rights they had in the state of nature,

but

the right to survive, to the Leviathan

consequently, Hobbes maintains that the people can rebel only if the Leviathan threatens their livesSlide65

See: Norberto Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993 (translated by Daniela Gobetti), pp. 48-51Slide66

Why is H. Important for IR theory?Classical, pessimistic view about the perspectives for cooperation in a decentralized setting Hobbes noted the analogy between men’s condition in the state of nature and states’ condition in anarchySlide67

Why don’t states form a global Leviathan, and escape the state of nature?For men, life in the state of nature is unbearable; men’s life within states is not so horrible, even if states are themselves in a state of nature vis-à-vis each other (Lev., XIII)Slide68

IR scholars often refer to: «Hobbesian fear» (Butterfield), «Hobbesian competition», «Hobbesian world», states who adopt «the posture of gladiators» (a Hobbesian expression: Lev. XIII) Slide69

Hobbes made the key point that, when there are incentives to violate pacts, actors in a decentralized setting will have trouble making self-enforcing agreements (the “covenants without the sword” argument)Slide70

Hobbes’ “covenants without the sword” argument anticipates what IR scholars call “commitment problems”The point was made by James Fearon (1995) and later applied to a variety of topics