Steve Keen Kingston University London IDEAeconomics Minsky Open Source System Dynamics wwwdebtdeflationcomblogs When the economic history of our epoch is written There will be at least 3 themes ID: 425024
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Slide1
Debt, Inequality and Crisis
Steve KeenKingston University LondonIDEAeconomicsMinsky Open Source System Dynamicswww.debtdeflation.com/blogsSlide2
When the economic history of our epoch is written…There will be at least 3 themes:Period of apparently increasing tranquillity (“Great Moderation”)Sudden transition crisis (“Great Recession”)
Rising inequalityThere should be (at least) a 4th:Rising private debtBecause all three go together and explain each otherMainstream (Neoclassical) macro omits both inequality & debtAccording to its indicatorsPeriod of stable growth a permanent improvement in economyPrivate debt
macroeconomically
irrelevant
Inequality simply a product of relative productivity
No longer maintained post-Piketty
But explanation limited to “r>g”
Statistical rather than causal explanation
“Great Moderation” a sign of policy success…Slide3
Mystery confluence: Great Moderation & Recession“the past two decades has seen not only significant improvements in economic growth and productivity but also a marked reduction in economic volatility… dubbed ‘the Great Moderation’.” (Bernanke 2004)
Unemployment
Deflation
Then “without warning”
Inflation &
Unemployment
FallingSlide4
Mystery confluence: Great Moderation & RecessionPost-crisis, see Moderation & Recession as 2 separate phenomena1st due to good economic policy, 2
nd to exogenous shock…“Standard macroeconomic models, such as the workhorse new-Keynesian model, did not predict the crisis, nor did they incorporate very easily the effects of financial instability.Do these failures of standard macroeconomic models mean that they are irrelevant or at least significantly flawed? I think the answer is a qualified no. Economic models are useful only in the context for which they are designed. Most of the time, including during recessions, serious financial instability is not an issue.The standard models were designed for these non-crisis periods, and they have proven quite useful in that context.Notably, they were part of the intellectual framework that helped deliver low inflation and macroeconomic stability in most industrial countries during the two decades that began in the mid-1980s
.”
Bernanke 2010 “
Implications of the Financial Crisis for Economics
”
What utter, self-serving, bollocks!Slide5
Behaviorism vs StructuralismNeoclassical DSGE models failed to anticipate crisisModels use “behavior of rational agents” as basis of modelingSince “Lucas Critique”, have asserted must capture “deep parameters” of individual behaviour for model to be valid
Post Keynesians have used “structure of economy” as basis“Behaviour under fundamental uncertainty” consideredBut behavioural concepts secondary to economic structureMy work combines this tradition with complex systems approachEssence of complex systems: “simple system, complex behavior”Sophisticated agent behaviour unnecessary to capture essential features of last 30 years of macroeconomics that Neoclassical models completely missed
Period of apparent diminishing cycles in employment & inflation
Rising private debt
Rising inequality as wages share falls, bankers’ share rises
Eventual crisisSlide6
Simple rules, complex
behaviour
My 1995 Minsky
model
can be stated as strict identities:
The
employment rate
will rise if
economic growth
exceeds the sum of
growth in
labor
productivity
and
population
growth
;
The
wages share of output
will rise if
wage demands
exceed the
growth in
labor
productivity
; and
The
private debt to GDP ratio
will rise if
private
debt
growth
exceeds
the
rate of economic
growthIn equations:Slide7
Simple rules, complex
behaviour
Equations are simply expansions of definitions
When put into simplest possible model
Generates
both “Great Moderation” & Great
Recession
Rising private debt
R
ising inequality
Simplest possible model:
Output Y
R
a linear function of capital K
R
Investment I
R
a linear function of profit rate
p
r
& depreciation
Employment a linear function of output
Wage change a linear function of employment rate
Change in debt equal to investment minus profitsNo government sector, no Ponzi
Finance, no bankruptcySlide8
Simple rules, complex
behaviour
Generates deceptively simple model:
3 variables
9 parameters (including
r
)
But complex behaviour…
Equilibria not the same as variables
Variables employment rate, debt ratio, wages share of output
Equilibria
employment rate, debt ratio,
profit
share of
output
Wages share a residual directly negatively related to debt service share (
r.d
)
Workers pay for rising debt via lower income share
Even without borrowing by workers in the model…Slide9
Simple rules, complex behaviour“Good” equilibrium is:
Two possible outcomes depending on parameter values
Equilibrium stable
Cyclical convergence to
positive employment rate, profit share, finite debt
ratio over time…
Lower growth means higher equilibrium debt level
And makes equilibrium more unstableSlide10
Simple rules, complex behaviourNot what we have experienced in the real worldSlide11
Simple rules, complex behaviourEquilibrium unstable: rising debt, rising inequality, moderation then breakdown:
Similar to what we have experienced in the real world…
Falling then rising cycles
Cyclically Rising Private Debt RatioSlide12
Simple rules, complex behaviourModel follows Pomeau-Manneville “inverse-tangent route to chaos”
First seen in transition from laminar to turbulent flow in fluidsModeled as Poincare Map in y-coordinate of Lorenz system where system bounces between a curve and a line:
Dynamics of system determined by whether line intersects
curve
For intersection
No
fluid
turbulence
Economic stability
For non-intersection
Turbulence
Instability
preceded by diminishing cyclesSlide13
Simple rules, complex behaviourDynamics of system determined by whether line intersects curveIf it does, stable equilibrium; cycles diminish to zero
If it doesn’t,
Unstable equilibrium
Cycles diminish at first and then increase
“Great Moderation” followed by “Great Recession”
N
ot 2 separate events but
two stages in the same process
…Slide14
Simple rules, complex behaviourWeakness of model: even-handed nature of crisis—booms & bustsReal world experience: apparent moderation then bust onlyGenerated by generalizing earlier identities to include inflation:
The employment rate will rise if real economic growth exceeds the sum of population growth and growth in labor productivity;The wages share of output will rise if money wage demands exceed the sum of inflation and growth in labor productivity; and
The private debt to GDP ratio will rise if the rate of growth of private debt exceeds the
sum of inflation plus the rate of economic growth
.
Additional equations needed for
Rate of inflation
Variable nominal interest rate
Simplest relationships used again:
Lagged convergence to equilibrium prices in monetary economyLagged inflation premium to base interest rate if inflation > 0Slide15
Simple rules, complex behaviourInflation formula derived from monetary flow logicDepends on wages share of output & firms’ markup
…
Inflation-adjusted nominal interest
rate
1
st
order time lag determines inflation
Inflation affects wages
share
Inflation affects debt growth
Lagged interest rate reaction
to inflationSlide16
Simple rules, complex behaviour4D model, so formal stability analysis much more challengingEmpirical appears to yield fundamental instability. Linear functions…Slide17
Simple rules, complex behaviourNonlinear functions:
Without recent financial crisis, model could be dismissed as “just a mathematical
curiousity
”
But real world actually followed pattern in this stylized, simple model
Apparent period of tranquillity “Great Moderation”
Then sudden crisis “Great Recession”…Slide18
Simple rules, complex behaviourIncome distribution dynamics of model:Profit share cycles around equilibrium level (before collapse)Declining workers share offsets rising bankers
shareFalling workers’ share signals approaching crisis (& causes deflation)
Average profit below equilibriu
m with nonlinear behaviour
Equilibriu
m profit rateSlide19
“no significant macro-economic effects”Simple non-equilibrium, nonlinear model with simple behavioural modelling captures what mainstream failed to anticipate
Why did mainstream economists ignore debt (& not see crisis coming)?Conventional macro: private debt is macroeconomically irrelevant:“The idea of debt-deflation goes back to Irving Fisher (1933).Fisher envisioned a dynamic process in which falling asset and commodity prices created pressure on nominal debtors, forcing them into distress sales of assets, which in turn led to further price declines and financial difficulties…Fisher's idea was less influential in academic circles, though, because of the counterargument that
debt-deflation represented no more than a redistribution from one group (debtors) to another (creditors).
Absent implausibly large differences in marginal spending propensities among the groups, it was
suggested,
pure
redistributions should have no significant macro-economic effects
…” (Bernanke 2000,
Essays on the Great Depression
, p. 24)Slide20
Bernanke’s view versus realityIn the data…
In my simulation of Minsky…
Crisis only inexplicable if you ignore “3
rd
dimension” of private debt
Private debt conspicuously absent from mainstream macro…Slide21
What is the mainstream missing?Role of banking sector in creating new money, demand and income“banking is where left and right meet.
Both Austrians … and Minskyites view banks as institutions that are somehow outside the rules that apply to the rest of the economy, as having unique powers for good and/or evil…I guess I don't see it that way.Banks don't create demand out of thin air any more than anyone does by choosing to spend more; and banks are just one channel linking lenders to borrowers…” (Krugman, “
Banking Mysticism
”)
Essence
of opposition is “Loanable Funds” model of
debt:
“Think of it this way:
when debt is rising, it’s not the economy as a whole borrowing more money
.It is, rather, a case of less patient people—people who for whatever reason want to spend sooner rather than later—borrowing from more patient people.” (Krugman 2012, End this Depression Now! , p 147)IF this model described reality, THEN debt would indeed not matter…Slide22
Analyzing this with system dynamic modellingMost Neoclassical models ignore banks, debt and moneyThose that do treat banks as “mere intermediaries” that arrange loans between savers and borrowersBanks themselves don’t lend in Neoclassical models
E.g., Eggertsson & Krugman 2012:Patient Consumer agent lends to impatient Investment agentInvestment agent pays interest to consumer agentBank charges “intermediation fee” for arranging loanBoth hire workersBuy output from each otherSell to workers & bankInvesting agent changes borrowing and repayment rates
Does debt matter? No…Slide23
The conventional “Loanable Funds” vision of lendingFull model: Bank arranges loan from Consumer sector (Patient) to investment (Impatient) sector & charges intermediation feeWorkers hired, output produced & sold, investment…
Bank Balance
Sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Equity
Flows\Stocks
Reserves
I
D
C
D
W
D
B
E
Initial Conditions
100
-20
-60
-15
-5
Lending
-Lend
Lend
Debt Repayment
Repay-Repay
Interest Payments
int-int
Bank Fee
Fee
-FeeHire Workers (C)
W
C-W
C
Hire Workers (I)
WI
-WI
Purchases (I)
IC-I
C
Purchases (C)
-CI
C
I
Workers Consumption
-CW
CW
Bankers Consumption
-C
B
C
B
Bankers Investment
-I
B
I
B
Debt doesn’t appear here: Asset of Consumer Sector…Slide24
The conventional “Loanable Funds” vision of lendingConsumer Sector “Godley Table”
Assets
Equity
Flows\Stocks
C
D
D
C
NW
Initial Conditions
60
10
-70
Lending
-Lend
Lend
Debt Repayment
Repay
-Repay
Interest Payments
int
-int
Bank Fee
-Fee
Fee
Hire Workers (C)-WC
WC
Bankers ConsumptionCB
-CBPurchases (I)
CI
-C
IWorkers ConsumptionCW -C
WPurchases (C)
-IC
IC
Lending reduces Consumer Sector’s Asset of Cash at the Bank
Increases Consumer Sector’s Asset of Loan to Investment Sector
Consumer Sector’s does without Cash for duration of LoanSlide25
The conventional “Loanable Funds” vision of lending
Simulated, Krugman/Bernanke correct: debt doesn’t matter…
But a radical thought: what if—
just maybe
—banks lend money???Slide26
Varying lending & repayment in Endogenous MoneyChanging debt matters: change in money supply causes change in GDP
Logic behind this: aggregate demand
& income
include change in debtSlide27
Loanable Funds, aggregate demand & incomeConsider 3 sector model with sectors S1,
S2, S3Expenditure not debt-financed shown by CAPITAL LETTERSDebt financed expenditure shown by lowercase letters3 situations consideredBorrowing not possible
Borrowing from other sectors possible (“Loanable Funds”)
Borrowing from banks possible (“Endogenous Money”)
First case “Say’s Law” (actually “demand creates its own supply”)
Activity
Net Income
Sector
Sector
1
Sector 2
Sector 3
Expenditure
(Exp.)
Sector
1
-(A
+
B)
A
B
Sector
2
C
-(C+D)
D
Sector
3
E
F
-(E+F)
Negative sum of diagonal elements is aggregate demand
Sum of off-diagonal elements is aggregate incomeSlide28
Loanable Funds, aggregate demand & incomeClearly Expenditure Income:
Loanable Funds: Sector 1 borrows
b
from Sector 2 to spend on Sector 3
Sector 1’s funds for spending increase by
b
Sector 2’s funds fall by
b
(split 50:50 between S1 & S3 for simplicity)
Activity
Net Income
Sector
Sector
1
Sector 2
Sector 3
Expenditure
(Exp.)
Sector
1
-(A
+
B+b
)
A
B+b
Sector
2
C-b/2
-(C+D-b)
D-b/2
Sector
3
EF
-(E+F)
Aggregate outcome clearly the same as without borrowing
But what if a bank lends to Sector 1?
Assets & liabilities of banking sector rise equally; and…Increased spending power for Sector 1 not offset by fall in Sector 2Slide29
Endogenous money, aggregate demand & incomeRise in Sector 1’s spending, and incomes of Sectors 2 & 3
Activity
Net Income
Sector
Sector
1
Sector 2
Sector 3
Expenditure
Sector
1
-(A
+
B+b
)
A
B+b
Sector
2
C
-(C+D)
D
Sector
3
E
F
-(E+F)
Aggregate outcome greater (if b>0) than without borrowing
Increase in debt causes equivalent increase in expenditure and income
Aggregate demand
and
income are
Demand¦Income
from turnover of existing money;Plus Demand¦Income from newly created moneyGeneralises to flow of new lending (
dD/dt: change in debt per year)Consider flow of expenditure from existing money stocks S1…S3 plus expenditure from flow of new debt-created money dD/dt…Slide30
Bank Accounts
New Debt
Turnover of existing
money
Gross finance
Endogenous money, aggregate demand & income
S
1
to S
3
now represent deposit account of relevant sector
Rate of spending per year by S
A
on S
B
shown as
v
AB
Bank equity account B
E
added
to record interest payments…
I.e.,
Both aggregate expenditure and aggregate income
are
Non-debt financed Expenditure (i.e. turnover of existing money)
Plus the change in debt (creation of new money & demand-income)
Plus gross financial transactionsSlide31
New Debt
Debt change & acceleration
Gross financial
Endogenous money, aggregate demand & income
Leads to dynamic, non-equilibrium, endogenous money Monetarism versus Friedman’s static, equilibrium, exogenous (“Helicopter Money”) Quantity Theory
So a monetary vision of capitalism is
essential
(with finance since most debt money created for asset purchases)
Private debt
a huge “omitted
variable error” in mainstream
economics
This is why they didn’t see the crisis coming
Not because unpredictable
B
ut because their models exclude the forces that caused the crisis:
Rate of change and acceleration of private
debt…
Static Friedman:
Dynamic monetary:
Change in GDP:Slide32
Level when
I began to warn of crisis (2006)
Level when
Godley began to warn of crisis (1998)
US Aggregate debt levels
Ignoring private debt has led us into biggest debt trap in history…Slide33
Global aggregate debt levelsTrend to excessive private debt common across the globeSlide34
Dramatic fall in credit growth post-crisisSlide35
Credit growth dictates economic growthSlide36
Whole world has “turned Japanese”Slide37
Debt dynamics dominate asset marketsAccording to Modigliani-Miller, these should be uncorrelated…
Correlation 0.96 (
unexpected
)Slide38
Debt dynamics dominate asset marketsAccording to Modigliani-Miller, these should be uncorrelated…
Correlation 0.69 (unexpected)Slide39
Debt dynamics dominate asset marketsAccording to Modigliani-Miller, these should be uncorrelated…
Correlation 0.53 (expected)Slide40
Debt dynamics dominate asset marketsAccording to Modigliani-Miller, these should be uncorrelated…
Correlation 0.77Slide41
Turning JapaneseJapan’s past 18 years gives us best case scenario projection for OECD…Slide42
China credit
growth now collapsing…
Dramatic fall in credit growth post-crisis
Decades of anaemic credit growth lie ahead…Slide43
The China CrisisChina has done in 6 years what took 17 in USA & Japan:Slide44
The China CrisisChina undergoing 2nd stock market crash, but first with high leverage
Margin debt 0.000014% of GDP
Margin debt >2% of GDPSlide45
The China CrisisAcceleration of margin debt key driver/indicator of market
Correlation 0.69 since 2014; 0.87 since 2015Slide46
Solution? Modern Debt JubileeOnly effective solution to debt-deflation is private debt reductionCould be done by “Quantitative Easing for the People”
CB direct injections into private bank accountsThose in debt must cancel debtThose not in debt get cash injectionRebase money system to more fiat, less credit-based moneyRestructure banking toReduce appeal of Ponzi lending (mortgages, margin loans)“PILL”: Property Income Limited LeverageMaximum loan factor (say 10 times) estimated income of property being bought
Meld venture capital with banking
“EEL”: Entrepreneurial Equity Loans
Banks get equity stake in loans to entrepreneurs
Alternative is continuous stagnation—as with Japan since 1990
Main barrier? Misplaced moral perception of debtSlide47
Solution? Modern Debt JubileeMoral responsibility of debtor product of interpersonal view of debtPerson to person loan—lender has to do without what he lends
Bank Balance
Sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Equity
Flows\Stocks
Reserves
I
D
C
D
W
D
B
E
Initial Conditions
100
-20
-60
-15
-5
Lending
-Lend
Lend
Debt Repayment
Repay-Repay
Interest Payments
int-
int
But bank loans are creation of money & debt “out of nothing”
Bank Balance
Sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Equity
Flows\Stocks
Reserves
Loans
ID
C
DWDB
EInitial Conditions
100
-20
-60
-15
-5Lending
Lend
-Lend
Debt Repayment
-Repay
Repay
Interest Payments
int
-
int
Bank doesn’t lose pre-existing money if loan not repaid
Instead bank over-produced money & debt—should write them offSlide48
Solution? Modern Debt JubileeStop falsely thinking of banks as warehouses (“Loanable Fund” view)Start thinking of them as “money factories”Can over-produce money and debt
Write-off of excess production should be routineEspecially since recent production socially counterproductiveAsset bubbles caused by leverageMortgage acceleration drives house price changeMargin acceleration drives share price changeEffectively funding Ponzi Schemes…Slide49
ConclusionTheoretical: getting structure of economy (including finance) right more important than accurately modelling agent behaviourRevised realistic view of banking essential to understand where the crisis came from & work out how to escape it
Monetary complex systems macro needed in theory and policyPractical: current situation inevitably will give rise to political conflictModern politics dominated not by Eisenhower’s “military-industrial complex” but Minsky’s “politico-financial complex”Conventional “Ordo-Liberal” response to crisis (as in Greece) compounds basic weaknesses of capitalismModern Debt Jubilee needed to save capitalism from its own dynamics
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