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Equality of What? Equality of What?

Equality of What? - PDF document

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Equality of What? - PPT Presentation

AMARTYA SEN Inequality in moral a wide menu the question equality this lecture three particular types of utility equality argue that all three have serious limitations be constructed on the Towa ID: 165680

AMARTYA SEN Inequality moral

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Equality of What? AMARTYA SEN Inequality, in moral a wide menu the question: equality this lecture three particular types of utility equality, argue that all three have serious limitations, be constructed on the Towards the equality which deal more attention than it propaganda on methodological question. allegation? There checking its moral intuition. the principle the results can be seen in a rather stark these implications against our intuition. casecritiquthe prinabstract level, frequently take the form some very procedures. For could be reasonably assumed to have been chosen under the as if 198 state in decide on to adopt are going one of the persons in the community. Or what rules would satisfy with “giving equal weights the equal occupants of all the roles.” I shall call a critique based on such an approach critique. Both approaches can be used in assessing the moral each type will indeed be Utilitarian equality the utilitarian a group of persons.Each person gets more utility the larger his his utility the amount share goes up. utility irrespective equality of the utility of everyone — marginal utilityincremental utility get from Journal R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952); ‘Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism’, in H. D. Lewis, ed., Contemporary British Philosophy (London: Allen and pp. 116–17. [SEN] Equality of What? 199 tional unit of According to one interpretation, this equality utility embodies equal treatment interests.the total But even utility sum requires the point the marginal the transfer of the It is in this wider context that the special type of equality insisted becomes assertively dishas claimed “giving equal weight the equal all the parties” would “lead to principle requirement Similarly, John Harsanyi shoots down the non- athis lecturer, I hasten utilitarianism an person’s equally moral importance the notion had several occasions to dispute it in the past, I shall not shy away no 200 The Tanner Lectures Human Valuesgetutili-tarian equality without — for the time being — questioning thewhenasutilityimportance.characteristicseveryoneasaretaken to have no descriptive content, then this can indeed bethought to be a natural approach. No matter how the relativeattributedto each person would then simply reflect these values. This can bedone explicitly by appropriate interpersonal scaling, or implicitiysituationsas uncertainty associated with the “original position” underequalprobability of being This is not the occasion to go intoitutilitysocialbutprob-argu-Urgency’,Hammond,IncomeEconomicsYaari,examined’,and EN] the moment are taken utilitarians have traditionally be conflicts between these descriptive utilities priately scaled, essentially normative, utilities utilitarianism through personal scaling, examining the traditional utilitakes utilities have interpersonally moral importance should relate these descriptive can be the priorprinciple perangle. John criticism as a preliminary the priorthat in the postulated situation of as if ignorance people wouldto our have reasserted taking the “scaling” route, critique. But the lure the “original position” distinctly resistible seems very also far from obvious that prudential choice under as uncer- tainty provides an adequate moral judgment original, i.e., real-life, positions.12 But I believe with the utilities, it 202 Tanner utilitarianism would in general little comfort. Even the minutest gain in total utility sumoutweigh distributional inequalities problem would certain assumpcase in has the In the pure distribution problem, with this assumption uti1ities.l3 has the same utility accidental result the marginal tail importantly, the variations between then the utilithe fundamental in fact, the utilitarian but others are identical, then the priorin the equal weight to the all parties” one interpretathe equal treatment with equal one interpretation their overall interests equally the two pull in opposite and it “giving equal weight [SEN] Equality of What? 203 a related critique, and have tried to present such critique else- For example, if person cripple gets half theSince this example has been discussed certain amount, Iutility cripple) any given level of income must 2 04 over the claim arising from high marginal system thata telling [SEN] Equality of What? 205 with distributional questions except be judged entirely This is a less demanding view than utilitarianism in that ittheir sumtotal. Utilitarianism in this special case it. Another judging the a state uses social goods rather the minimal element. ing the to total less close while we to treat the and the total counter-factual the additional had one more be observed else were different: in one unit greater. inherently counter 206 Valuesbeing totalled. are taken observed facts, observation, whereas requires hypotheses things would have fact that essentially a conutility equality as specified utility equality absolute equality. dealing with equal distributions, something more has many different the maximin rule, Difference Principle, but interpreted two states have the utility, then the states second worston. And two utility distributions all the best off, convention established social choice theory, I call this In what utility equality this when analysis closely parallels the recent axiomatic derivations of [SEN] Equality the Difference Principle several authors. Consider four utility(bthe corresponding element in the other distribution.19 208 The Tanner Lectures Values vis-à-vis (b, discussed earlier, and let (b, ) stand for Utility equality preference would assert the superiority of 2) over (as well as (4, 1Indeed, it would not dis- by spelling out its rather austere implications in [SEN] Equality of What? 209 indifferent persons, leximin in That is, given these regularity conditions,how same 210 different sides. innumeracy begets the nature these critiques the two should not its unconcern distribution, and gains and the numbers choose some the longthe relation between utility moral worth they respectively tion, both share an exclusive concern utility considerations have role in either approach, in the determination still be general approach except indirectly, are for. tions; we about their how their satisfaction would affect the total of well-being. . men take certain pleasure in discriminating against one another, in a lesser their selfmust be weighed in or whatever, along with other desires. . . In justice as fairness, onthe other hand, their more ticular ends. . An individual who finds that he enjoys seeing EN] Equality of What? 211 others in claim whatever this enjoyment. in other’s itself: it satisfaction which requires would agree easily seen against the moral judgments thus, an attack Second, it taken “in other’s deprivation” were itself, but then the pleasures were arising from other issue—one source utility and another.requires theshared intuition and one a bit from thisbut also be relatively intensities, irrespective an appeal to the moral rightness with prudential the original all other information 30–31.Liberty 212 Values relevance dominance.moral judgments 25moral judgments exclusively 25 EN] Equality same in social other wellbeing. But, 3. 214 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 26These are “things that every rational man is presumed the priority of liberty, but with that question shall not be con Rawls [SEN] What? of utility, which get from all, but expensive tastes person’s responsibility cripple with disadvantage, whom him more income in distribution problem. Utilitarianism, complained, will give him will give him neither more nor on grounds his being utility disadvantage will Difference Principle. cases” can people distant or to guarantee that And the end with goods approach take little note utility functions, then the utilitarian would push simultaneously also in the more attractive really were corresponding remark made about people were basically very in fact, people different needs with health, longevity, climatic conditions, location, 216 inadequate [SEN] we not would now to argue believe this too informationally short. This can, of course, easily be asserted claims arising from con-mate. Nondiscrimination, requires fully captured either brought in beyond concern personal wellbeing only. But these concepts. the information a caseagain with marginal do nothing to the physically fit. will leave his physical preferential treatment under leximin, and more generally, level of utility was claim. But that he utility terms be because a jolly sees a in the rewarded in afterhe takes past incarnation. leximin— other notion equality focussing on total 218 Tanner Human in a capability equality.” EN] Equality of What? to what do to human judging advantage focussing on than on what “social bases than on itself, and mattered a deal, but there that the person subfrom the “basic capability equality.” particular, the problem problem comparable with the indexing technical issues in such an indexing, partial ordering can be broad uniformity personal preferences certain established conventions rather cultureespecially in equality has the both culturedependent and avoids fetishism, dependent. Indeed, capability equality approach in I end with three final remarks. First, capability equality can be the moral one thing 220 The Tanner Lectures Human Values be used in a enhancing magnitude Last, the bulk this lecture has been concerned with reject- claim that this gap can be narrowed the idea basic capa-