Did de Gaulle he asks actually haveagranddesignthatistosayanoverarchingandambitiousvisiontore shape international affairs Or was he engaged in mere posturing the only real purpose of which was to enhance French prestige That question lies at the hea ID: 46129
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ThedeGaueProThedeGaulleProblemMarcTrachtenbergeneralCharlesdeGaulle,presidentoftheFrenchRepublicfrom1958to1969,wascertainlyanextraordinaryªgure,butwhatarewetomakeofhispolicies?IntheconcludingessayinGlobalizingdeGaulle,GarretMartinputshisªngeronthekeyproblem.DiddeGaulle,heasks,actuallyhaveagranddesign,thatistosayanoverarchingandambitiousvisiontoreshapeinternationalaffairsŽ?Orwasheengagedinmereposturing,ŽtheonlyrealpurposeofwhichwastoenhanceFrenchprestige?ThatquestionliesattheheartofwhatmightbecalledthedeGaulleproblemŽ„thewholeproblemofhowthedeGaullephenomenon,especiallydeGaullesforeignpolicy,istobeinterpreted„andMartinanswersitinaverydirectway.DeGaulle,hethinks,didhaveanambitiousgranddesigntoovercometheColdWarbipolarorder.ŽFromtheoutsetdeGaulleknewwhathewantedtodo:TheGeneral,ŽMartinsays,returnedtopowerin1958withalong-termblueprintforrelationswiththeSovietUnionandforEuro-peansecurity.ŽAndMartingivesthatstrategyfairlyhighgrades.EvenontheGermanquestion,thecentralissueingreat-powerpoliticsduringthisperiod,MartincontendsthatdeGaulleofferedacompellinglong-termvisionforaEuropeansolutionŽtothatproblem.Otherobserversseethingsdifferently,butMartinsviewissharedbymanyscholars.Indeed,theprevailingviewtodayisthatdeGaullespolicydidmakesenseonitsownterms„thatdeGaullehadacoherentprogram,andthathisvisionprovidesuswiththekeytounderstandingwhathewasdoingattheoperationallevel.Butdoesthatviewholdupinthelightoftheevidence?Togetatthatis1.GarretMartin,Conclusion:AGaullistGrandStrategy?,ŽinChristianNuenlist,AnnaLocher,andGarretMartin,eds.,GlobalizingdeGaulle:InternationalPerspectivesonFrenchForeignPolicies,1958to(Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littleªeld,2010),p.291.2.Ibid.,pp.304,298…299.3.Seeesp.thepassageinanarticlecitedbyMartinonp.307n.65:Georges-HenriSoutou,LadécisionfrançaisedequitterlecommandementintégrédelOTAN(1966),ŽinHans-JoachimHarder,VonTrumanbisHarmel:DieBundesrepublikDeutschlandimSpannungsfeldvonNATOundeuropäischerIntegration(Munich:Oldenbourg,2000),esp.p.195.Notealsothebasicthrustofthear JournalofColdWarStudiesVol.14,No.1,Winter2012,pp.81…92©2012bythePresidentandFellowsofHarvardCollegeandtheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology sue,theªrststepistolookatthefundamentalconceptthatlayattheheartofdeGaullesapproachtoforeignpolicy,hisbasicnotionofaEuropeanEurope.ŽWhatexactlydiddeGaullehaveinmindwhenheusedthatterm?Heinfactusedthetermintwodistinctandsomewhatcontradictoryways.Sometimes,especiallyinthemid-1960s,theconceptofaEuropeanEuropeŽwastiedtothenotionofaEuropefromtheAtlantictotheUrals.ŽThebasicideaherewasthatthetwohegemonicpowers,theUnitedStatesandRussia(asdeGaullelikedtocalltheUSSR),wouldgraduallyloosentheirgripovertheirrespectivespheresofinºuenceinEurope,andtheEuropeanpeopleswouldrecovertheirindependenceandworkoutasettlementtheyallcouldlivewith.ThatsettlementwouldprovideforareuniªedGermanstate„astatethatwouldhavenonuclearweaponsandwouldhavetoacceptthe1945borders.TheSovietUnion,asaEuropeanpower,wouldbeincludedinthisprocess,buttheUnitedStateswouldbetreatedessentiallyasanoutsider.TheAmericanswouldbeaskedonlytoguaranteethesettlementtheEuropeanshadworkedoutamongthemselves.Wasthispan-EuropeanvisionconsistentwithdeGaullesphilosophyofinternationalpolitics?Oneofhismostfundamentalassumptionswasthatgreatnationsstriveforrealcontrolovertheirowndestinies,whichmeantthattheyneededtobeabletodefendthemselves.Inhisview,ofcourse,Franceinparticularcouldbetrulyindependentonlyifitpossesseditsownnuclearforce.ButwhywouldthesamelogicnotapplytotheFederalRepublicofGermany(FRG)?DeGaullesometimesseemedtothinkthattheFRG,likeFrance,wouldsoonerorlaterinsistonbecomingafullysovereignpower.ButdidntthismeanthattheGermanswouldhavetoacquireanuclearcapability?ItwasinfactonthebasisofthiskindofthinkingthatdeGaulleintheearly1960sseemedtobelievethatnomatterhowdistastefultheprospectwas,aWestGermannuclearcapabilitywasmoreorlessinevitable.Whateverwedoorsay,ŽhetoldU.S.SecretaryofStateDeanRuskinApril1963,thedaywillcomewhen[theGermans]willdoastheyplease[inthenucleararea],andneitheryounorwewillbeabletopreventthemfromdoingso.ŽBy1964,however,hehadturnedwithgreatforceagainsttheideathattheFRGcouldeverbeallowedtobecomeanuclearpower.Heassumedthat 82 TrachtenberggumentinwhatisprobablythemostimportantscholarlystudyofdeGaullesforeignpolicy,MauriceVaïsse,Lagrandeur:PolitiqueétrangèredugénéraldeGaulle,1958…1969(Paris:Fayard,1998).4.See,forexample,deGaullesremarksinameetingwithformerWestGermanchancellorKonradAdenauer,10March1966,inDocumentsdiplomatiquesfrançais,1966,Vol.1,p.423(henceforthcitedasDDFwithyearandvol.no.)5.Rusk…deGaullemeeting,8April1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.1,p.378.SeealsodeGaulle…Bohlenmeeting,4January1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.1,p.21;anddeGaulle…Adenauermeeting,21January1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.1,pp.95…96. otherpowers„aboveall,theSovietUnionandFrance„wouldbeabletopreventWestGermanyfromgoingnuclear.Buthow,insuchasystem,couldtheproblemofSovietpowerbedealtwith?EvenifSovietpolicyweretoloseitsideologicaledge(asheforesaw),animbalanceofpowerbetweentheUSSRandtheFRGwouldalmostcertainlycreateproblems.JustasAmericasenormouspowerledtheUnitedStates,indeGaullesview,topursueadomineeringpolicynomatterwhatitsintentions,sotheabsenceofaneffectivecounterweighttoSovietpowerinEuropecouldeasilyleadtoanoverlyassertiveSovietpolicy.HeunderstoodthatFrancealonecouldnotprovidethatcounterweight.AFrench-dominatedWesternEurope,however,mightbeabletoprovideit,anddeGaulleseemedtobeaimingatthatkindofsystem.ButwhywouldWestGermanygoalongwithsuchanarrangement?TheideathattheFRGwouldacceptsuchasubordinatepositionwasscarcelyinkeepingwithdeGaullesownpoliticalphilosophy:soonerorlatertheGermanswouldwanttopursueapolicyoftheirown.ItwasperhapsbecausehesensedthatapurelyEuropeansystemmightnotbeperfectlystablethathethoughttheUnitedStateswouldstillhavetoplayacertainroleinunderwritingthesys-temtheEuropeanshadworkedoutforthemselves.ButiftheAmericanswerepushedtothemarginsofEuropeanpoliticallife,whywouldtheyprovidease-curityguarantee?DeGaulle,however,wasnotparticularlyinterestedinquestionsofthatsort.WhenhespokeofaEuropefromtheAtlantictotheUrals,Žhewaslay-ingoutnotsomuchapoliticalprogramasavisionofhowthingsmightde-velopinthefairlydistantfuture„avisionofaEuropefreedfromthetwohe-gemonies,Žfreetosettleitsownaffairs.Bywordanddeed,hecouldsetanexamplethatothersinbothpartsofEuropemightfollow.Buthecertainlyunderstoodthatintheªnalanalysishisabilitytomovethingsinthatdirectionwasquitelimited.Hewasdescribingahistoricalprocess,aprocessrootedessentiallyincertainfundamentallong-termchangesthatweretakingplaceintheCommunistworldanddidnotdependinanyfundamentalwayontheparticularpolicytheFrenchgovernmentsoughttopursue.Inpracticalterms,therealfocusofhispolicylayelsewhere.TheimmediateproblemhadtodowithwhetherthedefenseofEuropewouldrestessentiallyonU.S.power,orwhetherWesternEuropewouldbecome(touse 83 ThedeGaulleProblem6.FordeGaullesthinkinginthisregard,seeentryfor22August1962inAlainPeyreªtte,CétaitdeGaulle,3vols.(Paris:Fayard,1994),Vol.1,pp.158…159.ItwaswidelysuspectedinWestGermanyatthetimethatthiswasdeGaullesgoal.SeeBenediktSchoenborn,Lamésententeapprivoisée:DeGaulleetlesAllemands,1963…1969(Paris:PUF,2007),esp.p.65.7.See,forexample,deGaulle…Lübkemeeting,21July1966,inDDF,1966,Vol.2,p.378;anddeGaulle…Lucetmeeting,25July1966,inDDF,1966,Vol.2,p.415. DwightEisenhowersphrase)athirdgreatpowercomplexintheworld,ŽcapableofbalancingSovietpowerwithoutdirectU.S.support.InthisareaFranceplayakeyrole,anddeGaulleevidentlyverymuchpreferredthatsecondsolution.Hisgoal,hesaid,wastocreateacontinentalWestEuropeanblocthatcouldstandonitsownbothmilitarilyandpolitically,aEuropethatcouldbetrulyindependentoftheUnitedStatesandoftheSovietUnionaswell,aEuropethatcouldchartitsowncourseinworldaffairs.Heoftenspoke,thatis,asthoughheverymuchwantedtocreateaEuropeanEuropeŽinasecondsenseoftheterm:afreestandingcontinentalWestEuropeanbloc.ThisblocwouldbebasednotonaFranco-SovietbutonaFranco-Germanentente:FranceandtheFRGtogetherwouldbetheheartofaEuropecapableofbeingtrulyEuropean,thatis,independent.ŽInitselfthiswasbynomeansanabsurdidea.FranceandWestGermany,withthesmallercountriesinthewesternpartofthecontinentorganizedbehindthem,werecertainlycapableofgeneratingenoughpowertoholdtheirowninEurope.WestGermanleaders,notjustwhenKonradAdenauerwasinchargebutalsoduringthecoalitiongovernmentunderKurtKiesingerandWillyBrandt(1966…1969),werequiteopentotheconcept.TheynaturallyhadnowishtoremaintotallydependentontheUnitedStatesforever,andtheyknewthatafreestandingEuropewasmuchmoreacceptable,bothathomeandabroad,thanafreestandingGermany.AsfortheAmericans,they,too,werequitewillingtogointhisdirection,atleastuntilJanuary1961.CarolyneDavidsonsaysinhercontributiontoGlobalizingdeGaullethatevenduringtheEisenhoweradministrationtheU.S.governmentwasdeterminedtoexercisecontrolinWesternEuropeŽand,inparticular,toretainultimatecontrolovernuclearweapons.ŽButitisquiteclearthatEisenhowerwouldhavebeendelightediftheEuropeanshadcometogetherasablocandtakenchargeoftheirownpoliticalfate„andheunderstoodthattodosotheywouldhavetobuildanuclearforceoftheirown.Hewasbynomeansopposedtothatidea.HewasnotevenagainsttheideaofaWestGermannu 84 Trachtenberg8.SeeMarcTrachtenberg,AConstructedPeace:TheMakingoftheEuropeanSettlement,1945…1963(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1999),p.147n.9.Entryfor21September1963inPeyreªtte,CétaitdeGaulle,Vol.2,p.239.10.CarolyneDavidson,DealingwithdeGaulle:TheUnitedStatesandFrance,ŽinNuenlist,Locher,andMartin,eds.,GlobalizingdeGaulle,pp.112…113.11.SeeTrachtenberg,ConstructedPeace,esp.pp.147…156,205…210.TheEisenhowerpolicywasdroppedwhenJohnF.Kennedytookofªce,andthenewadministrationinitsªrsttwoyearsopposedtheideaofnuclearweaponsunderEuropeancontrol.ButthepolicyshiftedagaininDecember1962,whenKennedytriedtoseewhethersomesortofnucleararrangementcouldbeworkedoutwiththeFrench.Seepp.363…370.Thatattemptfailed,butKennedydidnotloseinterestinthesubject.Hisnationalsecurityadviser,McGeorgeBundy,forexample,wentsofarastotellaFrenchdiplomatinAugust1963thattheUnitedStateswasready,unconditionally,tohelpFrancemanufacturebombs.ŽSeedeLeussetoCouvedeMurville,7August1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.2,p.161. clearforce.HeknewthatthedefenseofEuropewasaburden,andheultimatelywantedtheEuropeansthemselves,nottheUnitedStates,tocarryit.ItwasforthatreasonthathewantedtoreducetheU.S.militarypresenceinEurope,perhapseventuallydowntozero,andtohavetheEuropeansprovidefortheirowndefense.AstheUnitedStatespulledoutitstroops,theNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO),Eisenhowerbelieved,woulddevolveintoanessentiallyEuropeandefenseorganization,andtheNATOcommanderwouldbecomeaEuropean(and,infact,aFrench)general.ButdeGaullewasunreceptivetothatideawhenEisenhowerproposedit,anddespitealltherhetoricaboutaEuropeanEurope,ŽtheFrenchpresidentwasnotinanygreatrushtoseetheAmericansgoandtoreplaceNATOwithapurelyEuropeandefensesystem.ThebasicreasonhadtodowithGermany.DeGaullecameclosesttoacceptingtheideaofafreestandingEurope,notjustinwordsbutinfact,intheearly1960s.Atthattimehethoughtthat,likeitornot,aWestGermannuclearforcemightwellbeunavoidable,andforawhileheseemedinclinedtobuildhispolicyonthatassumption„toacceptthefactthattheFRG,likeFrance,wouldatacertainpointbecomeanuclearpower,andthatanuclear-armedFranceandanuclear-armedWestGermanycouldbethetwogreatpillarsonwhichatrulyindependentEuropecouldbebuilt.Butevenduringthatperiod,hehadrealmisgivingsabouttheideaofaGermannuclearcapability.GiventhewaytheGermanshadbe-havedintheªrsthalfofthecentury,couldtheyreallybetrustedwithnu-clearweapons?Ontheotherhand,ifyoutooktheideaofanindependentWesternEuropeatallseriously,itwashardtoruleoutthepossibilityofanuclearWestGermany.ForhowcouldEuropedefenditself„howcouldyouhaveaEuropethatwasnotjustanAmericanprotectorate„ifoneofitsmost 85 ThedeGaulleProblem12.Trachtenberg,ConstructedPeace,pp.209…210.13.Ibid.,pp.213…215,224…226.14.SomecommentshemadeatameetingwithAdenauerin1960areofparticularinterestinthiscontext.Francewasbuildingnuclearweapons,hesaid,becauseFrancecouldnolongerremaininastateofdependenceŽanditwasmorethanprobableŽthatthedaywouldcomewhenGermanywouldalsowanttobuildanuclearforceofitsown.ThedefenseofEuropecouldnotdependonthevagariesofAmericanpoliticallife,andthismeantthatFranceandWestGermanyhadtobeabletodefendthemselvesbycomingtogetheranddevelopinganuclearcapability:CettesituationimpliqueincontestablementuneunionentrelaFranceetlAllemagneetimpliquerasansdoutequàpartirduncertainmoment,celle-cinerestepas,nonplus,dépourvudarmesnucléaires....Ilestintolérablepournosdeuxpeuples,quiassumentdegrandesresponsabilitésetontdegrandescapacités,dadmettrequecenestpasàeuxdesedéfendrepareux-mêmes,lecaséchéant,etquelesAméricainsensontresponsablesàleurplace.ŽSeedeGaulle…Adenauermeeting,29July1960,inDDF,1960,Vol.2,pp.165…166.Thesepassageswereªrstquoted(inGermantranslation)inGeorges-HenriSoutou,DeGaulle,AdenauerunddiegemeinsameFrontgegendieamerikanischeNuklearstrategie,ŽinE.W.Hansen,G.Schreiber,andB.Wegner,eds.,PolitischerWandel,organisierteGewaltundnationaleSicherheit(Munich:Oldenbourg,1995),pp.498…499.Theaccountofthismeeting,basedonGermansources,inHans-PeterSchwarz,Adenauer:DerStaatsmann,1952…1967(Stuttgart:DeutscheVerlags-Anstalt,1991),p.566,isalsoquiterevealing. important,andmostexposed,memberstateswastobekeptnon-nuclear?AndifyoudidtrytopreventtheWestGermansfromgoingnuclear,whatkindofmessagewouldyoubegivingthem?WouldntyoubesayingthatnomatterhowdemocraticandEuropeanŽtheWestGermanshadbecome,theywerestillmistrusted„thatalthoughitwasacceptableforothercountries,likeCommunistChina,tobuildanuclearforcebecausethatmadeforamoremultipolarworld,thesameprinciplesimplydidnotapplytotheFederalReIftheFrenchreallyfeltthatway,whatkindofpartnershipcouldtheyhavewiththeWestGermans?WhatsortofEuropecouldbebuiltonthatTheseproblemswereclearenough,andinthe1960…1963perioddeGaullewasnotsurewhichwayhewantedtogo.AsLouisJoxe,oneofhisclosestcollaborators,toldaU.S.diplomatinearly1963,deGaullewasmoreuncertainastotheGermanproblemthananyotherin[the]Europeanpicture.ŽButby1964theFrenchpresidenthadmadeuphismind.TheideaoftreatingtheFRGasanequal,theideaofanuclearGermanyandanuclearFrancecomingtogetherastheheartofatrulyindependentEurope,wasessen-tiallyabandoned.Thevague(andsomewhatdisingenuous)overturethatyeartoKarlCarstensaboutsomesortofWestGermanparticipationintheFrenchnuclearforce,whichCarineGermondalludestoinherarticleinGlobalizingdeGaulle,wasperhapsthelastvestigeofthatapproach.AndinfactitwasaroundthattimethatdeGaulleturnedverysharplyagainsttheideaofaWestGermannuclearcapabilityandanythingthatevenseemedtopointinthatdi-rection.FrancewasnowdeadsetagainsttheU.S.planforamultilateralforce(MLF),eventhoughthatplan(astheFrenchrealized)wassomethingofafraud„thatis,itwouldnothavegiventheEuropeansanyrealcontrolovernuclearweapons.TheFrenchevenopposedtheplantheUnitedStatescameupwithasakindofsubstitutefortheMLF:U.S.SecretaryofDefenseRobertMcNamaras1965proposalforagreaterdegreeofallied,andespeciallyWestGerman,participationinNATOnuclearplanning.Thatproposal,whichledtotheestablishmentayearlateroftheNATONuclearPlanningGroup,was 86 Trachtenberg15.FordeGaullesreactiontotheexplosionofaChinesebombinOctober1964,seeInstitutCharlesdeGaulle,Laventuredelabombe:DeGaulleetladissuasionnucléaire(Paris:Plon,1985),p.352.16.BohlentoKennedy,23February1963,inStateDepartmentCentralFilesfor1963,POL15-1FR,RecordGroup59,U.S.NationalArchives,CollegePark,MD.17.CarineGermond,ACordialPotentiality?DeGaulleandtheFranco-GermanPartnership,1963…1969,ŽinNuenlist,Locher,andMartin,eds.,GlobalizingdeGaulle,p.46.OntheoverturetoCarstens,seeSchoenborn,Lamésententeapprivoisée,pp.163…165;andAktenzurAuswärtigenPolitikderBundesrepublikDeutschland,1964,Vol.2,pp.766…768,775,890…891n.19(henceforthcitedasAAPDwithyearandvol.no.).18.TheMLFwascommonlyreferredtoatthetimeasthefarcemultilatérale,Žthemultilateralfarce,ŽatermGeneralPierreGalloisclaimedtohavecoined. opposedbytheFrenchmainlybecauseitinvolvedtheFRGtoocloselyindecisionsaboutnuclearuse.DeGaulleclearlythoughtthattheGermansshouldhavenosaywhatsoeverabouthowandwhennuclearweaponswouldbeused,eventhoughtheircountrywouldbemoredeeplyinvolvedthananyotherinaEuropeanwar.DeGaullebythatpointwasnotwillingeventoconsideranysortofEuropeannuclearforce„thatis,anyformofnuclearsharingwiththeFRG:IamnotgoingtogiveourbombstoGermany!YoucanbequitesurethatIwillnotgiveuptheenormousadvantagewehaveovertheªveothermembersoftheCommonMarketbyvirtueofthefactthatwearetheonlyoneswhoarearmedwithnuclearweaponsandarethusinapositiontodefendourselves!ŽPerhaps,atsomepointinthedistantfuture,aftertheEuropeanshadcometogetherpoliticallyandarealEuropeangovernmenthadcomeintobeing,Europewouldhaveitsownnuclearforce.ButuntilthentheGermansweretohavenosayoverhowtheFrenchforcewouldbeused.TheproblemwasthatwithnowayofprovidingfortheFRGsowndefense„norealcontroloverwhattheUnitedStateswoulddo,andnochanceofcreatingaEuropeanforcethatBonnwouldhavesomecontrolover„theWestGermansweretotallydependentontheUnitedStatesstrate-gicallyandthereforepolitically.Thiswasnotasituationtheyhadchosenforthemselves,andbothChancellorKiesingerandForeignMinisterBrandtwouldhavelikedtofollowamoreGaullistŽpath.ButdeGaulleassumedthattheWestGermansmadeachoice„thattheyhaddecidednottobegoodEuropeans,thattheyhaddecidedinfacttobeAmericasvassals. 87 ThedeGaulleProblem19.Seeesp.deGaullesextraordinarycommentsinameetingwithU.S.UndersecretaryofStateGeorgeBall,31August1965,inDDF,1965,Vol.2,pp.280…281.AfterreadingwhatdeGaullesayshere,youhavetowonderwhetherhethoughtthatarealpartnershipbetweenFranceandGermany„inthelongrun,theonlypossiblebasisforatrulyindependentEurope„wasarealisticgoal.RegardingFrenchpolicyonthequestionofGermanparticipationinNATOnuclearplanning,seealso,FrédéricBozo,DeuxstratégiespourlEurope:DeGaulle,lesEtats-Unisetlallianceatlantique,1958…1969(Paris:Plon,1996),pp.146…147.20.Entryfor25November1964inPeyreªtte,CétaitdeGaulle,Vol.2,p.63.21.DeGaulle…Erhardmeeting,4July1964,in1964,Vol.2,p.775;anddeGaulle…Adenauermeeting,9November1964,in1964,Vol.2,pp.1260…1261.22.See,forexample,deGaulle…Kiesingermeeting,13January1967,inDDF,1967,Vol.1,p.71;deGaulle…Kiesingermeeting,14January1967,inDDF,1967,Vol.1,p.86;deGaulle…Kiesingermeeting,12July1967,inDDF,1967,Vol.2,p.67;deGaulle…Kiesingermeeting,15February1968,DDF,1968,Vol.1,pp.317…318;anddeGaulle…Kiesingermeeting,13March1969,Vol.1,pp.368,372…373.WillyBrandt,thenforeignminister,alsorejectedtheideathatWestGermanycouldbeanAmericansatellite.ŽSeeMauriceVaïsse,DeGaulleetWillyBrandt:Deuxnonconformistesaupouvoir,ŽinHorstMöllerandMauriceVaïsse,eds.,WillyBrandtundFrankreich(Munich:Oldenbourg,2005),p.104.23.See,forexample,deGaulle…Kiesingermeeting,27September1968,in1968,Vol.2,pp.1200…1209,esp.1208.ThepreviousyearhehadtoldKiesingerdirectlythatalthoughtheFederalRepublicwantedgoodrelationswithFrance,theWestGermanshinderedthisbyslavishlyfollowing strucktheWestGermansasdeeplyunfair,especiallybecausedeGaullesownpolicyhadnotbeendesignedtoenabletheFRGtofreeitselffromdependenceontheUnitedStates„aboveallbyallowingittotakepartinaneffectiveEuropeandefensesystem.Andindeedwhenyoulookatthiswholestory,youreallyhavetowonderhowseriousdeGaullewasaboutbuildingasolidrelationshipwithGermany,andthusaboutcreatingatrulyEuropeanEurope.ŽSoyoucomeawayfromallthiswiththesensethattherewasanenormousgapbetweenrhetoricandreality.Theofªciallinewasclear.DeGaullesbasicideawasthatyouhadtomoveawayfromtheYaltaŽsystem„thesysteminwhichthetwosuperpowershaddividedEuropebetweenthem,thesystemthatkepttheEuropeansdownandkeptthemfromcreatingamoreunitedandmorepeacefulcontinent.HetookitforgrantedthatSovietleaderswerenottheonlyonesresponsibleforthissituation.TheAmericanswerealsotoblame.U.S.hegemonywassuffocatingŽtheEuropeans,preventingthemfrombeingthemselvesandreachinganunderstandingwiththeEast.ŽThatwaswhyintheorytheFrenchandtheWestGermanshadtocometo-getherandstanduptotheUnitedStates.ThatwaswhyatrulyindependentEurope„aEuropethatultimatelycouldstandonitsownmilitarily„hadtobebroughtintobeing.Andyettherealitywasverydifferent.DeGaullecertainlybelievedthatFrancehadtobeindependent,andthismeant,tohismind,thatFrenchforcescouldnotbeintegratedŽintotheNATOsystemandthatFranceneededanuclearforceofitsown.ButthisGaullistdoctrinewasnotintendedasanar-ticleforexport„nottoGermany,atanyrate.Tobesure,deGaullesome-timessuggestedtotheWestGermansthattheytoo,soonerorlater,wouldfollowinFrancesfootsteps„thateventuallytheircountrywouldagainbefullysovereign,thatcountrieslikeFranceandGermanywouldinsistontakingcontroloftheirownfate.Butthosewordscannotbetakenatfacevalue,certainlynotafter1963.SovereigntytodeGaullemeantanuclearcapability,andbythemid-1960shewasdead-setagainsttheideaoftheWestGermansgettinganycontrolovernuclearweapons,andwasevenquitereluctanttomove 88 TrachtenbergtheAmericanlead„inderHörigkeitAmerikaszustehen,ŽintheGermanaccount;êtredanslobédiencedelAmérique,ŽintheFrenchrecord.DeGaulle…Kiesingermeeting,13January1967,in1967,Vol.1,p.68;anddeGaulle…Kiesingermeeting,13January1967,inDDF,1967,Vol.1,p.66.24.DeGaulle…Brandtmeeting,15or16December1966,inDDF,1966,Vol.2,p.1020;anddeGaulle…Brandtmeeting,15or16December1966,in1966,Vol.2,p.1640.25.DeGaulle…Kiesingermeeting,25April1967,in1967,Vol.2,p.645.26.See,forexample,deGaulle…Adenauermeeting,21September1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.2,p.284;deGaulle…Adenauermeeting,10March1966,inDDF,1966,Vol.1,p.423;anddeGaulle…vonKielmannseggmeeting,16March1967,inDDF,1967,Vol.1,p.318. aheadwiththeestablishmentofaEuropeandefensesystem,eventhoughthatideawascloselytiedtothenotionofanindependentEurope.Frenchofªcialsinfactopposedtheideabyarguingthatifanythingofthesortwerecreated,itwouldallowtheUnitedStatestoavoidinvolvementinaEuropeanwar„whichwasnotatallthesortofargumentyouwouldhaveexpectedtheFrenchtomakeiftheyhadtakentheirownrhetoricatfacevalue.TherealityisthatdeGaullewasnotinterestedinseeingU.S.troopsleaveEurope,assomeofthearticlesinGlobalizingdeGaullemakeclear.ButthekeypointtoemphasizehereisthatthereasonhadtodoasmuchwithWestGermanyaswiththeSovietUnion.FranceitselfcouldnotbepartoftheintegratedŽNATOcommandsystem,butitwasagoodthingthattheFRGwas„thatis,thatBundeswehrdivisionswereintegratedintoamilitarysystemunderU.S.command.FranceitselfwouldnotsigntheNuclearNonproliferationTreaty(NPT)becausethetreatywaspartofasystemthatallowedthetwosuperpowerstodominatetheworld.ButtheFrenchmadeitabundantlyclearthattheyexpectedWestGermanytosigntheNPT.Thebasicideaofanon-nuclearWestGermanywenthand-in-handwiththeideaofacontinuingU.S.militarypresenceinthatcountry,andacontinu-ingU.S.presenceintheFRGwasnotsomethingthatdeGaullefoundhardtoaccept.Inprinciple,hewantedtomovebeyondtheYaltaŽsystem,andheblamedtheUnitedStatesandtheblocsystemŽforperpetuatingthedivisionofEurope.Inprinciple,hestoodforamoredynamicŽpolicy,onethataimedatovercomingŽtheColdWarstatusquo.Butinreality,whenyoulookatspeciªcs,itishardtoseehow,eveninthemid-andlate1960s,hispolicydif-feredinanyfundamentalwayfromU.S.policy.Neithercountrywantedtoseeanuclear-armedGermany;bothagreedthatWesternEuropeneededtobedefendedandthattheUnitedStateswouldplayafundamentalroleinthatdefense;bothwereinfavorofmovingbeyondtheColdWarandreducingEast- 89 ThedeGaulleProblem27.Couve-Schrödermeeting,12November1965,in1965,Vol.3,p.1701.28.See,forexample,JamesEllison,Britain,deGaullesNATOPolicies,andAnglo-FrenchRivalry,1963…1967,ŽinNuenlist,Locher,andMartin,eds.,GlobalizingdeGaulle,p.148;andYukoTorikata,TheU.S.EscalationinVietnamanddeGaullesSecretSearchforPeace,1964…1966,ŽinNuenlist,Locher,andMartin,eds.,GlobalizingdeGaulle,p.158.29.Seeesp.thedeGaulle…Churchmeeting,4May1966,inDDF,1966,Vol.1,p.764.NoteaU.S.diplomatssummaryofdeGaullesviewsinearly1969,asrelayedtohimbyFrenchForeignMinisterMichelDebrésdirecteurducabinet:deGaulleregardedthecontinuedpresenceofUSforcesinGermanyŽasaprincipalstabilizingelementŽintheforeseeablefutureinfaceofaself-assertiveGermany.ŽSeeBlaketoSecretaryofState,3April1969,inNSCFiles,Box674,FolderFrance,volI,ŽNixonPresidentialLibrary,YorbaLinda,CA.30.See,forexample,HervéAlphand,Létonnementdêtre:Journal,1939…1973(Paris:Fayard,1977),p.379.31.SeeVaïsse,Lagrandeur,pp.377…379.32.SeeSchoenborn,Lamésententeapprivoisée,p.316;andKlaibertoAuswärtigeAmt,1February1968,in1968,Vol.1,p.147. Westtension;bothwantedtoseegreaterfreedomforEasternEurope;andbothapproved,inprinciple,oftheideaofareuniªedGermanstate.DidthetwocountriesdisagreeonanymajorEuropeanissue?ButwhatabouttheFrenchclaimthatthetwocountriesunderstoodtheconceptofdétentedifferently?WhenU.S.ofªcialstalkedaboutdétente,theargumentran,whattheywerereallyaimingatwasanewYalta.Thesortofdétentethesuperpowerswouldbringintobeingwouldsimplyfreezethestatusquo,whereasFrancesupposedlywantedtobringaboutaverydifferentsortofsystem.Andyet,asMarie-PierreReynotesinheressayinGlobalizingdeGaulle,deGaulleinfactfavoredthefreezingofexistingEuropeanbordersŽ„includingtheborderbetweenthetwoGermanys.HejustdidnotwantaninstitutionalizedarrangementthatwouldprovidefortheformalrecognitionofthetwoGermanstates„aviewtheUnitedStatesshared.InpracticaltermsdeGaullewasmorethanwillingtolivewiththestatusquo,includingthestatusquoofadividedGermany.AshetoldtheSovietambassadorinJuly1963,Francesforeignpolicywasbased,ŽlikeMoscows,onthemaintenanceoftheexistingterritorialorder.ŽThatpointappliedinparticu-lartoGermany.DeGaulleinfactwasnotveryinterestedinGermanreuniªcation,exceptperhapsasaverydistantgoal:wewishthatitwillcomeaboutsomeday,butthatsabitliketheJewswhosaidfor1800yearsnextyearinJerusalem.ŽItmightbeaverylongtimebeforeGermanywasreuni-ªed,anddeGaullewasbynomeansupsetbytheprospectthatreuniªcationwouldgetdelayedindeªnitely. 90 Trachtenberg33.Thus,forexample,PresidentKennedyin1963couldnotseewherethedisagreementŽbetweentheUnitedStatesandFrancelay.Yes,inthepasttheUnitedStateshadopposedtheFrenchnuclearforce,butbythatpointithadcometoacceptFrancesnucleararsenalasareality,andonthecorepoliticalissuesbothcountriestookmuchthesameposition.TheFrenchforeignminister,MauriceCouvedeMurville,agreedthattheinterestsofthetwocountrieswereessentiallythesame,ŽandthatonthegreatquestionofGermanythedifferenceshadtodowithtacticsratherthanwithanythingfundamental.SeeKennedy-Couvemeeting,25May1963,inForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates,1963,Vol.13,pp.771…772(hereinafterreferredtoaswithappropriateyearandvolumenumbers);Kennedy-Couvemeeting,25May1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.2,p.355;Kennedy-Couvemeeting,7October1963,in1961…1963,Vol.13,pp.785…786;andKennedy-Couvemeeting,7October1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.2,p.357.DeGaullehimselfseemedtorecognizethisbasicpoint.NotehiscommentinameetingwithAmbassadorCharlesBohlenin1965:hedidnotthinkourdifferenceswerereallyverymuchamatterofprinciple.ŽBohlentoStateDepartment,4May1965,in1964…1968,Vol.12,p.95.34.See,forexample,CouvetoFrenchambassadors,21January1965,inDDF,1965,Vol.1,p.84;anddeGaulle…Erhardmeeting,12June1965,inDDF,1965,Vol.1,pp.727…728.Seealso,Martin,AGaullistGrandStrategy?,Žp.299.35.Marie-PierreRey,DeGaulle,FrenchDiplomacy,andFranco-SovietRelationsasSeenfromMoscow,ŽinNuenlist,Locher,andMartin,eds.,GlobalizingdeGaulle,p.31.36.DeGaulle…Vinogradovmeeting,12July1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.2,p.93.SeealsodeGaulle…Zorinmeeting,5July1965,inDDF,1965,Vol.2,p.47.37.DeGaulle…Mansªeldmeeting,19November1968,inDDF,1968,Vol.2,p.846.NotealsodeGaulle…deMargeriemeeting,5June1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.1,p.597;anddeGaulle…Scranton AsforthenotionthatdeGaullewantedamoredynamicpolicyaimedatovercomingŽtheColdWardivisionofEurope,thatclaim,too,hastobeassessedinthelightofthefactthathedidnotliketheideaofaGermanycutloosefromtheblocs.TheFrenchwerenothappywhentheGermansthemselvesbegantothinkinthoseterms.AndyetendingthedivisionofEuropemeantendingthedivisionofGermany,andtheSovietUnionobviouslywasnotjustgoingtohandoverEastGermanytoaWestGermanstatethatremainedpartofNATO.TheuniªcationofEurope,theovercomingofYalta,Žimpliedtheendingoftheblocsystem„thedissolutionofthealliances.Butitwasonethingtotalkaboutthiskindofoutcomeinaveryvagueandabstractway,assomethingthatmighthappeninthedistantfuture.Itwasquiteanothertogiveitrealoperationalcontent,whichwaswhatpeoplelikeBrandtandEgonBahrwantedtodo„andtheFrenchwerenotatallpleasedwhenWestGermanthinkingand,afterDecember1966,WestGermanpolicystartedtomoveinthatdirection.Sowhatdoesthisallmean?Themainpoint,perhaps,isthatdeGaullespoliticalprogram,ashelaiditoutbothinpublicandinprivate,isnottobetakenatfacevalue,ifonlybecausethepiecesdonotquiteadduptoaclearandconsistentpolicy.Thatbasicpointhasmajorimplications.Foronething,giventhewayInowunderstanddeGaullespolicy,Iammuchmoresympa-thetictoAndrewMoravcsiksgeneralargumentabouttherolethateconomicconsiderationsplayedinshapingFrancesEuropeanpolicyinthatperiodthanIwaswhenItookpartinaJCWSforumrespondingtohisarticleondeGaulleadecadeago.Foriftherhetoricwasnottheexpressionofapowerful 91 ThedeGaulleProblemmeeting,20September1968,inDDF,1968,Vol.2,p.467.Onthisissue,seeesp.Schoenborn,mésententeapprivoisée,pp.289,315,319.38.SeeSchoenborn,Lamésententeapprivoisée,pp.183,359,371…372.FrenchconcernsaboutwhereGermanymightbegoingwerenotnew.In1963,forexample,theFrenchhadopposedtheKennedyadministrationsdétentepolicywiththeargumentthatitwouldspurtheWestGermanstoengageintheirowndialoguewiththeUSSR,whichmightwellleadtotheneutralizationofGermanyandthustotheneutralizationofallofWesternEurope„apredictionthatwastosomedegreeborneoutbysubsequentevents.SeeDeGaulle…Dixonmeeting,17September1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.2,p.268;deGaulle…Adenauermeeting,21September1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.2,pp.291…292;Rusk-Couvemeeting,7October1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.2,pp.367…368;andRusk-Couvemeeting,8October1963,inDDF,1963,Vol.2,p.381.Couvepointedoutinhis8October1963meetingwithRusk(p.381)thattheWestGermanSocialDemocrats(andtheFreeDemocrats)wereincreasinglyinclinedtodealdirectlywiththeUSSR„somethingCouveobviouslyviewedasquitedangerous.OntheBahrconcept„Brandtsviewsweresomewhatmilder,orperhapsjustlessclear„see,forexample,AlexanderGallus,DieNeutralisten:VerfechtereinesvereintenDeutschlandszwischenOstundWest,1945…1990(Dusseldorf:Droste,2001),pp.296…308,esp.303;andAndreasVogtmeier,EgonBahrunddiedeutscheFrage:ZurEntwicklungdersozialdemokratischenOst-undDeutschlandpolitikvomKriegsendebiszurWiedervereinigung(Bonn:Dietz,1996),esp.pp.84…85,170n.ForFrenchviewsofBrandtevenintheperiodbeforeheenteredthegovernmentand,inparticular,FrenchconcernsabouttheneutralistŽtendencieshewastoacertainextentassociatedwith,seeCyrilBuffet,Rapportsurlhommeaupassécomplexe:WillyBrandtetlaFrance(1948…1966),ŽinMöllerandVaïsse,eds.,WillyBrandtundFrankreich,esp.p.66.39.SeeMarcTrachtenberg,DeGaulle,Moravcsik,andEurope,ŽJournalofColdWarStudies,Vol.2, andcoherentgeopoliticalconcept,especiallyafter1963,thenonecouldcertainlyarguethatitistobeunderstoodmainlyininstrumentalterms,andthatinparticularadesiretobeneªteconomicallyfromWestGermanyscommitmenttotheEuropeanidea,ŽmostnotablyviatheCommonAgriculturalPolicy,wasoneofthemainconsiderationsthatcameintoplay.Butthatisessentiallyarationalistview,anditisonlyfairtopointoutthatIalsocameawayfromtheanalysiswithasensethatdeGaullespolicyisnottobeunderstoodinentirelyrationalterms„indeed,withthesensethatdeGaullewasincreasinglyoutoftouchwithpoliticalreality.Therhetoricseemedtotakeonalifeofitsown,andinthelastyearsofdeGaullespresidencyhislanguagebecamealittlewild.Hemadewhatwerewidelyviewedasanti-SemiticcommentsaftertheSix-DayMideastWarin1967.HewenttoMontrealthatsameyearandcalledforindependenceforQuebec.(IfIgo,Žhehadsaid,Iexpectitwillonlybetolightthepowderbarrel.Ž)early1968hesaidthatonlythreepeoples[were]underforeignoppressiontoday„theFrenchinCanada,theArabsinIsrael,andtheTibetansinChina.ŽTheQuebecoisweremoreoppressedthan,say,thePolesortheEsto-nians?Bohlen,theU.S.ambassadorinParis,wasappalledwhenheheardaboutdeGaullescomment:Really,theoldboyisgoingoffhisrocker.ŽAndindeedsomeofthethingshewassayingduringthatperiod„hisremark,forexample,thattheFRGwouldprobablyattacktheSovietUnionifthatcountrywenttowarwithChina„docomeacrossasalittlebizarre.Andyetitishardjusttoleaveitatthat.Despiteeverything,despiteallhisºawsandeccentricities„hisdadas,Žashisclosestcollaboratorscalledthem„whenyoustudydeGaulleyoucannothelpbutfeelthattherewassomethingquiteextraordinaryhere,anintellectualélannotfoundinmanystatesmen.DeGaullewasagiant.Nooneshoulddisputethat.Butsometimesevengiantshavefeetofclay. 92 TrachtenbergNo.3(Fall2000),pp.101…116.ThiswasacommentonAndrewMoravcsik,DeGaullebetweenGrainandGrandeur:ThePoliticalEconomyofFrenchECPolicy,1958…1970(Part1),ŽJournalofColdWarStudies,Vol.2,No.2(Spring2000),pp.3…43;andAndrewMoravcsik,DeGaullebetweenGrainandGrandeur:ThePoliticalEconomyofFrenchECPolicy,1958…1970(Part2),ŽJournalofColdWarStudies,Vol.2,No.3(Fall2000),pp.4…68.40.QuotedinBernardLedwidge,DeGaulle(London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1982),p.335.41.Diaryentryfor23January1968,inC.L.Sulzberger,AnAgeofMediocrity:MemoirsandDiaries,(NewYork:Macmillan,1973),p.404.SeealsoBohlentoStateDepartment,12July1967,in1964…1968,Vol.12,p.143;andBohlentoStateDepartment,27July1967,in1964…1968,Vol.12,p.145.42.SeealsohisremarkthattheFRGwouldprobablyattacktheSovietUnionifthatcountrywenttowarwithChina.DeGaulle…Scrantonmeeting,20September1968,inDDF,1968,Vol.2,p.463.