/
ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION Clever Hands Uncontrolled Intelligence in Facilitated Communication ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION Clever Hands Uncontrolled Intelligence in Facilitated Communication

ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION Clever Hands Uncontrolled Intelligence in Facilitated Communication - PDF document

lois-ondreau
lois-ondreau . @lois-ondreau
Follow
489 views
Uploaded On 2014-11-16

ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION Clever Hands Uncontrolled Intelligence in Facilitated Communication - PPT Presentation

Wegner Harvard University Valerie A Fuller University of Virginia Betsy Sparrow Harvard University Five studies examined how people who are answering questions on behalf of another person may use their own knowledge to answer correctly while attribu ID: 13209

Wegner Harvard University Valerie

Share:

Link:

Embed:

Download Presentation from below link

Download Pdf The PPT/PDF document "ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION Clever Ha..." is the property of its rightful owner. Permission is granted to download and print the materials on this web site for personal, non-commercial use only, and to display it on your personal computer provided you do not modify the materials and that you retain all copyright notices contained in the materials. By downloading content from our website, you accept the terms of this agreement.


Presentation Transcript

ATTITUDESANDSOCIALCOGNITION CleverHands:UncontrolledIntelligenceinFacilitatedCommunicationDanielM.WegnerHarvardUniversityValerieA.FullerUniversityofVirginiaBetsySparrowHarvardUniversityFivestudiesexaminedhowpeoplewhoareansweringquestionsonbehalfofanotherpersonmayusetheirownknowledgetoanswercorrectlywhileattributingauthorshipoftheiranswerstotheother. DanielM.WegnerandBetsySparrow,DepartmentofPsychology,HarvardUniversity;ValerieA.Fuller,DepartmentofPsychology,Univer-sityofVirginia.ThisresearchwassupportedinpartbyNationalInstituteofMentalHealthGrantMH49127.Forhelpingeneratingresearchideas,wethank Thingsthatpeopledocanbeinformedbywhattheyknow,then,evenwithouttheirconsciousrealizationthatwhattheyknowisbeingappliedtotheiraction.FacilitatorsinFCmaybeinfluencedbyjustsuchuncontrolledintelligence,theproductionofintelligentactionsthatoccurswithoutconsciousintention,oreveninoppo-sitiontosuchintention.Thetypicalfacilitatordoubtlesshasathandinformationabouttheclientsactivitiesandcircumstances,afterall,andisalsolikelytohaveexpectationsforwhattheclientwants,orwhatmightarousetheclientsinterestoremotions.Suchknowledgecouldprimethefacilitatortoinfluencetheactionsthatthefacilitatorandclientmaketogetheratthekeyboard,percolatingsubtlyintothechoicesoflettersandwordsevenwhilethefacili-tatormaybeattemptingtocounteractsuchinfluences.Thefacil-itatoristhusintrinsicallyprimedbyhisorherownpriorknowl-edge.Thefacilitatorsknowledgecaninformhisorherjudgmentsevenwhenheorsheisattemptingtorespondinawaythatdoesnotdependonthisknowledge.Afirstgoalofthepresentresearch,then,wastoseeifpriorknowledgecaninfluenceactionagainstasintentioninthisway.ThetypicalinstructionstothefacilitatorinFCemphasizetheimportanceofsensitivittothecommunicatorandofnotinfluenc-ingthecommunication.Onbeingaskedtoremainfullyopentoanysignofinfluencefromthecommunicator,thefacilitatorisbeingaskednottocontributemeaningfulresponses.Ourstrategyforstudyingtheprocessofintelligentactionproductionwastotesttheinfluenceofanindirectformofthisinstruction.Ratherthanaskingpeoplenottocontributemeaningfulresponses,wesimplyaskedthemtorespondrandomly.Experiments1and2weredesignedtoseeifknowledgeinformsactionwhenparticipantsarenotconsciouslytryingtoexpressknowledge,andinsteadaretryingtoanswerquestionsrandomly.ActionProjectionHowdofacilitatorscometobelievethattheyarenotauthorsandthattheclientisthesource?Normally,wecanidentifyactionsasourown,inpart,becausethephysicalseparationofselfandotherallowsustogetvisualinformationaboutwhodidwhat.ThereisinsufficientseparationofselfandotherintheFCsetting,however,toprovidethisinformation.Anothercluetoauthorshipistheproprioceptivefeedbackwegetfromourmuscles,skin,andjointsthatwedonotreceivefromthesepartsofotherpeople.Facilitatorsoughttobeabletotellwhattheywerecontributing,perhaps,byfeelingthemovementoftheirownfingers.However,suchpropri-oceptivefeedbackisoftenremarkablyweak,sofaintthatitiseasilyoverriddenbyvisualorverbalfeedback(Fourneret&Jean-nerod,1998;Pavani,Spence,&Driver,2000).Athirdcluetoauthorshipiswhatwearethinking.Authorshipinferencesmayoftenbebasedonthefactthatwehavethoughtsthatseemtocausewhatwedo,andsowecanidentifyactionsthathaveoccurredasourowntotheextentthatweknewweweregoingtodothemandfeltthatweconsciouslywilledtheiroccurrence(Wegner,2002,inpress;Wegner&Wheatley,1999).ActionprojectionmayhappeninFCbecausefacilitatorsdonotperceivetheirownthoughtsasexclusivecausesofthecommuni-cativeactions.Thesimplefactthatoneshandmovementscoin-cidewiththemovementsofanotherpossibleagentoftheactionisenoughtoyieldareducedsenseofconsciouswillfortheactionandanaccompanyinginferencethattheclientistheauthor.Oncecommunicativeactionshavebeenproduced,inotherwords,thematterofwhodidthemisdeterminedbythefacilitatorsbeliefsaboutwhocouldhavedonethem.Tothedegreethattheclientisbelievedtobeaplausibleagentoftheaction,theselfsauthorshipwillbeunderestimatedtheactionwillbeprojectedtotheothereveninthepresenceofconsciousthoughtsthatareconsistentwiththeactionsandoccurappropriatelypriortothem(Wegner,2002).Experiments35weredesignedtotestthisaccountofactionprojection.Participantswereaskedinthesestudiestofacilitatecommunicationbyansweringquestionsforanotherpersontensiblyanotherparticipantwhohadbeeninstructednottore-spond.InExperiments3and4,thenovicefacilitatorswereinvitedreadtheunconsciousmusclemovementsofthepersonfingersatakeyboardduringquestioning.InExperiment5,thenovicefacilitatorswereaskedmerelytoempathizewithapersontodiscernthepersonsanswers.However,inallcasesthepersonplayingthewasaconfederatewhoheardnoquestionsandsoproducednorelevantmovements.Theaccuracyofanswersthatfacilitatorsgaveonbehalfofcommunicatorsservedasameasureofactionproduction.Thedegreetowhichfacilitatorsattributedtheanswerstothisinertcommunicatorservedasameasureofactionprojection.ThesestudiesweredesignedtobreakdowntheprocessofFCbylookingattheactionproductionandactionprojectioncomponents.UnlikepriorresearchthathaslookedatactualFCinteractionsorcloseanalogs,thesestudiesabstractedtheelementsoftheFCsituationforexamination.TheusualpracticeofFCwasabridgedsuchthatparticipantswereaskedtoansweryes/noquestionsratherthantotypeanswersinfull.Experiments1and2exploredtheactionproductioncomponentbyinvestigatingtheproductionofintelligentactionsoutsideacommunicationsettingwhenpartic-ipantsworkingbythemselveswereaskedtogiverandomanswerstoquestions.Theinstructiontoanswerrandomlywasusedbe-cause,liketheinstructionnottoinfluencethecommunicatorthatisgiveninFC,itimpliesthatthefacilitatorshouldnotapplyhisorherownknowledgeinanswering.Experiments35thenfocusedonbothactionproductionandactionprojectioninasettingonestepclosertotheFCsituation.Fortheselatterexperiments,par-ticipantsattemptedtodiscerntheanswerstoquestionsmadebyanotherpersonwhoinrealitycouldnotmakeinformedresponses.Experiment1:IntelligenceinRandomAnswersFreud(1901/1965)maintainedthatnoactionistrulyrandom:Onecannotmakeanumberoccurtooneatonesownfreechoiceanymorethananame(p.240).Participantsinthisstudywerenonethelesschallengedwithexactlythistasktomakefreelychosen,randomanswerstoquestions.Itwasexpectedthatwhenparticipantswereaskedtogiverandomanswerstoeasyyes-or-noquestions,theirknowledgeofthecorrectanswerswouldinfluencetheirresponses,leadingthemtoanswermoreitemscorrectlythanwouldbeexpectedbychance.IncontrastwithFreudsassumptionthatdisturbingunconsciousthoughtswouldinfluencethedirectionofintentionallyrandomresponses,however,weassumedmerelythattheparticipantsknowledgewouldhavesuchinfluence.Justaspeoplepresentedwith2plus2equals___maynotbeabletoCLEVERHANDS toaccountfortheapparentinflationandunderestimationoftheeffectinthissampleandsetting,butthekeypointhereissimplythattheinfluenceofknowledgeintherandomanswerparadigmisnotuniquetocollegestudents.Experiment2:UncontrolledIntelligenceCanpeopleovercometheinfluenceoftheirknowledgewhentheyaretryingtoanswerquestionsrandomly?Andifso,doesthisabilitystemfromresource-dependentcognitiveprocesses?Thesearedifficultquestionstoposeempiricallybecausetheanswerinbothcasesmightbenull.Itishardtoestablishthatapsychologicalprocessisuncontrollableandindependentofmentalresourcesbecausethesecharacteristicsimplytheabsenceofanysignificantabilitytocontroltheprocess.Thebestwecandototestthecontrollabilityofcorrectnessinrandomansweringistoseewhetherconditionsthatoftenexertinfluenceoverothercontrol-lableprocessesalsoexertsuchinfluenceinthiscase.Thisstudyexaminedwhethertheproportionofcorrectresponsesgivenintherandomansweringtaskwouldbeinfluencedby(a)monetaryincentivestoberandomand(b)pressuretoanswerquestionsIfcorrectanswersareproducedbyacontrolledprocess,incen-tivestoanswerrandomlyshoulddecreasecorrectresponses.Peo-plearesometimesabletoinfluencetheirowncognitiveprocesses,andthereisevidencethatbiasescanbereducedinsomedomainswhenpeoplearegivenfinancialincentivestodoso(e.g.,Camerer&Hogarth,1999).Onestandardfinancialincentiveinstudiesofcontrolovercognitivebiasesistheofferofaprizeforperfor-mance,soweofferedpeopleaprizeof$50formakingresponsesthatweremostrandom.ResponsetosuchanincentivewouldbeoneindicationthattheprocesswasunderthecontroloftheAnothertestofthecontrollabilityofintelligenceintherandomanswertaskistheroleoftimepressureonperformance.Controlledcognitiveprocessesareoftenidentifiedbythedetrimentaleffectthattimepressurehasontheiroperation(Bargh&Thein,1985;Wegner&Bargh,1998),andaskingpeopletoanswerquestionsinunder2seachisastandardmanipulationofsuchpressure.Ifcorrectnessisreducedintherandomanswertaskwhenparticipantsaregivenampleresponsetime,ascomparedwithwhentheirresponsesarespeeded,itcouldbeinferredthatthecognitiveprocessespromotingcorrectnessarecontrolledratherthanStudentsfromHarvardUniversityparticipatedforpay.Becauseofaprogrammingerror,datafrom8participantswerelost,andthefinalsampleconsistedof60(39womenand21men).TheprocedureofExperiment1wasadaptedforcomputerpresentationofquestionsandresponse-timemeasurement(using;Jarvis,2000).Participantssaweachques-tiononthescreenalongwithwords,andheardthequestionaloud.TheinstructionstoanswerrandomlyweregivenasinExperiment1,thistimebothverballybytheexperimenterandonthecomputerscreen.Responsetimewasmeasuredfromtheoffsetoftheaudiofiledeliveringeachquestion.Participantsrespondedto56questions.Thefirst28(20easyand8hard)weredeliveredasinExperiment1,withoutanymentionofresponsetime.Timepressurewasthenincreasedforthesecond28questions(again20easy,8hard),whichwerepresentedafteraninstructionscreeninformingparticipantsthattheynowneededtorespondwithin2safterhearingeachquestion.Theorderofconditionswasnotcounterbalancedontheassump-tionthatparticipantswhohadinitiallyrespondedundertimepressurewouldhavedifficultyrelaxingforanonpressureditemset.ThecorrectanswerforhalfthequestionswasandhalfwasForthemanipulationoffinancialincentive(cf.Camerer&Hogarth,1999),onegroup(27)wastoldbeforehandthatthosemostsuccessfulinansweringrandomlywouldbeeligibletowin$50.Theremainingparticipants(33)werenotalertedtosuchanincentive.Attheconclusionoftheexperiment,participantsweredebriefedandpaid,andwereenteredintoadrawingregardlessoftheirperformance.Oneluckyparticipantwasawardedtheprize.ResultsandDiscussionTheproportionofcorrectanswerswasexaminedina2(incen-tivevs.noincentive)2(easyvs.hardquestions)2(timepressurevs.nopressure)analysisofvariance(ANOVA)withrepeatedmeasuresonthelattertwovariables.Asignificantmaineffectwasfoundforquestiontype,(1,58).19,withahighermeanproportionansweredcorrectlyforeasyquestions(.65)thanforhardquestions(.54).Asinthepriorstudy,then,participantswereinfluencedbytheirknowl-edgeofthecorrectanswerstotheeasyquestionsevenwheninstructedtoproviderandomanswerstoallquestions.Anexam-inationofthedistributionofcorrectnessfortheeasyitemsshowedagainthatthemajorityofparticipants(75%)answeredameanproportionof.50ormorecorrectlyontheeasyitems.Thepro-portionofcorrectanswerswassomewhatlowerinthisstudythaninthelast,perhapsbecauseofthecomputerpresentation.Therewerenosignificantmainorinteractiveeffectsforincen-tive;theoverallmeanproportioncorrectforincentiveparticipants.60)wasmuchlikethatforno-incentiveparticipants(.59).Similarly,therewerenosignificantmainorinteractiveeffectsfortimepressure;theoverallmeanproportioncorrectfortimepressuretrials(.58)wasnotsignificantlydifferentfromthatforno-pressuretrials(.61).Thesefindingssuggestthatcorrectrespondingwasnotcontrollableinthissetting.Althoughthisconclusioncannotbedrawndirectlyfromsuchnullfindings,thereareassociatedfindingssuggestingatleastthattheseinflu-encesoncontrollabilitywereeffectivelymanipulated.Theeffectivenessoftheincentivemanipulationcanbeinferredfromitsinfluenceonparticipantspostexperimentalestimatesoftheircorrectness.A2(incentivevs.noincentive)2(estimatedvs.actualtotalcorrect)ANOVArevealedthat,asinthepriorstudy,participantsunderestimatedthecorrectnessoftheiranswers,(1,57).21,estimating.55correctwhileansweringcorrectlyameanproportionof.62(foreasyandhardquestionscombined).Thisunderestimatewasonlysignificant,however,underhigh-incentiveconditions.Therewasasignificantinteractionofincentivewithestimatedversusactualtotalcorrect,(1,57).08,andsimplemaineffectsanalysisindicateditwasonlyintheincentiveconditionthattheestimatedproportioncorrect(.52)waslessthantheactualtotalcorrect((1,57).01.Withouttheincentive,theestimate(.57)wasnotsignificantlybelowtheactualcorrect(.60).Thispatternsuggeststhattheincentiveledparticipantstoestimatethattheyhadsuccessfullyovercomethetendencytoanswercorrectlyintheirpursuitofrandoman-CLEVERHANDS (16mininduration)waseditedtosuggestthatFCwasawidelyacceptedinnovation.Thetape(19min)waseditedtoprovideathoroughdebunkingofFCandincludeddescriptionsofstudiesthatdisproveditsvalidity.Afterparticipantssawatape,theyweretoldthatresearchwastodofurthertestingofFCusingavariationoftheusualtechnique.Itwasexplainedthatthestudywasonwhetherreadingmusclemovementscanworkwithpeoplewhodonothavedisabilities.Forparticipantsviewingthedisbelieftape,thisinstructionleftopenthepossibilitythatFCmightworkintheexperiment.Theexperimentersaid,Asyouhaveseenonthetape,FCdoesnotworkwithpeoplewithprofounddevelopmentaldisabilities.Wesuspect,however,thatitmayworkonpeoplethatdonothavedisabilities.Therefore,wearedoingtestingonthetechniquewithcollegestudents.Forparticipantsinthenormalpresentationcondition,theprocedurewasasinthepriorstudy.Forthoseinthesubliminalpresentationcondition,theproceduredepartedfromthis,beginningwhentherolesoffacilitatorandcommunicatorwerechosen.Theexperimentersaid,weareinterestedinfindingoutifpeoplecanhelpanotherpersonanswerquestionsevenifthosequestionsareadministeredsublimi-nally.Now,Iimagineyouarebothatleastsomewhatfamiliarwithwhatsubliminalmessagesare,butIllexplainbriefly:Subliminalmessagesarestimulithatarepresentedbelowconsciousawareness.Inthisexperiment,thecommunicatorwillbelisteningtoatapeonwhichquestionsarepresentedsubliminally;theyarerecordedbelowthehumanauditorythreshold.Andthefacilitatorwillattempttoanswerthosequestionsbysensingthecommunicatorsmusclemovements.Aftertheroleassignment,theinstructionscontinued:Now,theinter-estingpartofthisexperimentisthatthecommunicatorisgoingtoreceivethequestionssubliminallyinher(his)headphones.Thecommunicatorwastoldthefollowing:tapewillsoundasifithasnoquestionsonit;onaconsciouslevel,youwillheartheannouncersayQuestion1,thenyoullhearapause,andthenyoullhearAnswer,please,andsoon.Inreality,therewillbesubliminallyrecordedquestionsonyourtape.Asyoulistentothetape,clearlyformananswer,yesorno,tothatquestioninyourmind,butmakenoattempttopressthekeysphysically.Itisthefacilitatorsjobtosensewhichkeyyouwanttopress.Eventhoughyoumaynotthinkyouhaveheardaquestion,alwaysformananswerinyourhead.Thesubliminalandnormaltapesheardbytheconfederatewere,ofcourse,identicaltoeachotherandwithoutcontentasinthepriorstudy.Whentestingwasover,participantsrespondedtotheperceivedcommu-nicatorinfluencequestion,andquestionswerepresentedwith9-pointscales(1and9)tocheckthemanipulations,toassessperceptionsofanswercontrolduringfacilitation,andtoseeiffacilitatorsthoughttheycouldfeelthecommunicatorsmovements.ResultsandDiscussionManipulationeffectiveness.Agreementwiththeitemtatedcommunicationworkswasacheckontheeffectivenessofthebeliefmanipulation.A2(beliefvs.disbelief)2(normalvs.subliminal)ANOVAshowedthatparticipantsinthebeliefcondi-tionweremorelikelytoendorsethisstatement(4.25)thanparticipantsinthedisbeliefcondition(.29.Therewerenoothersignificanteffectsforthisitem,sobeliefinFCwasinfluencedonlybythevideotapemanipulation.TheitemIassumedthecommunicatorknewtheanswerstotheeasyquestionscheckedthemanipulationofnormalversussub-liminalquestionformat.Peopleinthesubliminalconditionwerelesslikelytoendorsethisstatement(5.73)thanpeopleinthenormalcondition((1,62)andothereffectswerenotsignificant.Thus,thefacilitatorsinthesubliminalconditionwereindeedlesslikelytothinkthatthecommunicatorwasawareoftheanswerstothequestions.Proportioncorrect.2ANOVAontheproportionofcorrectanswersrevealedonlyasignificantmaineffectofeasyversushardquestion,(1,62)Participantswerefarmorelikelytoanswereasyquestionscor-rectly(.82)thanhardquestionscorrectly(.51).Easyquestionswerealsoansweredmorecorrectlythanwouldbeex-pectedbychance(Therewerenoothermainorinteractiveeffectsinthisanalysis.Thus,theactionproductionprocesswasnotinfluencedbypartic-beliefintheeffectivenessofFCoverall,anditwasalsounchangedwhenparticipantswereledtobelievethatthecommu-nicatorwasnotevenconsciousofthequestions.Apparently,theproductionofcorrectanswersinthisparadigm,liketheproductionofcorrectanswersintherandomansweringparadigm,isrelativelyimpervioustocontextualfactors.Perceivedcommunicatorinfluence.Participantsacrosscondi-tionsfeltthatthecommunicatorhadinfluencedtheanswersthatwereprovided(32.30)morethantheactuallevelofzero.001).Therangeofresponseswas86,withonly2participantsreportingzerocommunicatorin-fluence.Overall,13of79participantsreportedthatthecommu-nicatorhadgreaterinfluencethantheydid(over50%).ParticipantsattributedagreaterpercentageofinfluencetothecommunicatoriftheywereledtobelievethatFCworks(41.44),however,thaniftheywereledtobelieveitdoesnotwork(.17.Thisfindingindicatesthatactionprojectionisinfluencedbybeliefsaboutthelikelyagencyofthecommunicator.Thisresultalsoispertinenttothequestion,how-ever,ofwhetherFCisentirelyeradicableunderthepropercon-ditionsofskepticism.Asitturnedout,apersuasiveappealagainsttheeffectivenessofFCdidsignificantlyreduceperceivedcom-municatorinfluence,butthisdebunkingdidnoteliminatepercep-tionsofcommunicatorinfluenceentirely.Estimatedpercentofcommunicatorinfluenceinthedisbeliefcondition(wasstillsignificantlyabovezero(.001).Admittedly,areportofzeroinfluenceisastringentcriteriontoapplywhenthisistheendpointofaratingscale.However,zeroinfluencebythecommunicatorwasindeedtheprearrangednor-mativestandardinthissituation,anditisinformativethatpartic-ipantswerenotabletodiscernthisstandard.Themanipulationofnormalversussubliminalquestionformathadnoeffectonperceivedcommunicatorinfluence,norwastheinteractionsignificant.Apparently,actionprojectiondidnotde-pendonparticipantsbeliefthatthecommunicatorwasconsciousofthequestionsandanswers.Thetendencytoattributeanswerstothecommunicatorwaspresentevenwhenparticipantsbelievedthecommunicatorwasnotconsciousofthequestions.Perceptionsofthecommunication.ResponsestootherratingitemsshowedperceptionswerestronglyinfluencedbybeliefinFC.ParticipantsledtobelieveinFC,ascomparedwiththosegiventhedebunkingvideo,weremoreinclinedtoagreethatIwasableCLEVERHANDS .001),theirfeelingthatthecommunicatorwascontributingtendedtobeunderminedwhenthemanualcontactwasdiscontinued.Asinthepriorstudies,thecorrelationbetweencorrectansweringofeasyquestionsandperceivedcommunicatorinfluencewasnegligible,Theresultssuggestthreeconclusions.First,itappearsthatevenwhenfacilitatorsdonottouchthecommunicatorandbasetheiractionsmerelyonempathywiththecommunicator,theycontinuetoproduceanswersthatarelargelycorrect.Itseemsthattheprocessesyieldingcorrectanswersarenotdependentonphysicalcontactbetweenfacilitatorandcommunicator.Thesecondconclu-sionsuggestedbytheseresultsisthatthefurtherstepofactionthinkingthatthecorrectanswersareindeedproducedbythecommunicatormaybemoredependentonphysicalcon-tact.Withouttouch,thedegreeofinfluenceattributedtothecommunicatordroppedtosomedegree.Physicalcontactbetweenfacilitatorandcommunicatormayobscurethefacilitatorsappre-ciationofselfasthesourceoftheactionandmakeitmorereasonabletoprojectthisactiontothecommunicator.Finally,theseresultsreinforcethefindingsofExperiment4toindicatethatself-presentationtothecommunicatorisnotinfluentialinproduc-ingcorrectresponses.Participantsintheno-touchingconditionansweredtheitemswithoutthecommunicatorobservingtheiranswersatall,eliminatingconcernaboutsuchobservationasapossiblemotiveforcorrectanswering.GeneralDiscussionTheseexperimentsintroducedtwoparadigmsthatcontainele-mentsofthestandardFCsituationoneexaminingresponseproductionandanotherexaminingcommunication.IntheparadigmofExperiments1and2,participantswereinstructedtoansweryes/noquestionsrandomly,givingthemostfreeandrandomchoiceyoupossiblycanaftereachone.Suchrandomanswersweremorecorrectforeasythanforhardques-tions,suggestingthatansweringwasinfluencedbyknowledgeofthecorrectanswer.ThiseffectmayunderlietheprocessesofactionproductioninFCwherebyfacilitatorsproducecommunicationsforclientsevenwhilenottryingtodoso.InthemusclereadingparadigmofExperiments3and4,then,participantswereaskedtoansweryes/noquestionsbysensingthekeyboardfingermovementsofanotherpersonwhohadbeenadmonishednottoanswer,andwhowasinfactaconfederateandwasnotevengiventhequestions.Theanswersthatparticipantsofferedweremorecorrectforeasythanforhardquestions,againshowingtheinfluenceofparticipantsknowledge.Inthispara-digm,theanswerswereoftenattributedtotheother.ApersuasivemessagethatincreasedbeliefintheeffectivenessofFCwasfoundtoenhancesuchactionprojectioninExperiment4,suggestingthattheplausibilityoftheclientsauthorshipoftheactionamplifiesthesperceptionthattheactionsproducedbytheselfhavebeengeneratedbytheother.AndinExperiment5,participantsattemptingtoanswerempathicallyfortheclientwithoutbenefitofphysicalcontactalsoexhibitedtendenciestooffercorrectanswersandattributethemtotheclient.TheProductionofIntelligentActionsIntheseexperiments,participantsshowedamarkedtendencytoansweryes/noquestionscorrectlywhentheyknewtheanswer.Thishappenedwhenparticipantswereaskedtoanswerrandomly(Experiments1and2),evenwithinstructionsonrandomness(Experiment1follow-up)andfinancialincentivetoberandom(Experiment2),andregardlessofwhethertheywerepromptedtoanswerquicklyorallowedtotaketheirtime(Experiment2).Correctanswersinresponsetotheinstructiontoanswerrandomlyalsowerefoundinacommunitysample(Experiment1follow-up).Correctnesswasobservedwhenparticipantswereaskedtoanswerbysensingthe(random)musclemovementsofanotherperson(Experiments3and4),andoccurredatsimilarlyinflatedlevelswhenparticipantswereledtobelievethatthispersoncouldnotcommunicatewiththem(Experiment4),whentheywerein-structedthatthispersonwasnotconsciousofthequestionsthatwerebeingposed(Experiment4),andwhentheydidnottouchthepersonandwereonlyaskedtoempathize(Experiment5).Theonlysignificantinfluenceobservedforsuchcorrectnesswasthecorrelation(inExperiments3and4)betweenproportioncorrectandparticipantsreportsthatthecommunicatorwaslikelytoknowtheanswerstotheeasyquestions.Thisresultledustoexamineself-presentationtothecommunicatorexplicitlyinEx-periment4.Inthatstudy,leadingfacilitatorstobelievethatcom-municatorswerenotconsciousofthequestionsreducedreportsthatthecommunicatorwaslikelytoknowtheanswers,butdidnothaveasignificantimpactonpercentcorrect.PercentcorrectwasalsonotaffectedinExperiment5whenparticipantswereaskedtorespond(withouttouching)foracommunicatorwhowasnotawareoftheirresponses.Concernaboutansweringquestionsin-correctlyinfrontofthecommunicatorthuswasnotastronginfluenceonproductionofcorrectanswersinthemusclereadingTakentogether,thesefindingssuggesttwopossibleconclusionsaboutactionproduction.Onepossibilityisthatparticipantsinthesestudieswereremarkablyunawareoftheinfluenceofcor-rectnessontheiranswersandwereunabletocontrolthiseffectevenwhengivenavarietyofinducementsandfavorablecircum-stances.Theotherpossibleconclusionisthattheseexperimentsdidaremarkablypoorjobofprovidingsuchinducementsandcircumstances.Thepresentresultsdonothelptoarbitratewhichsortofremarkablenessispresenthere.Asnotedearlier,nulleffectsalwaysproducethisquandaryofinterpretation,andthisfeatureofthepresentresultsmustbeunderstoodinthislight.Thetendencytoanswercorrectlyundertheinstructiontoanswerrandomlyorforsomeoneelse(whoprovidesonlyrandominformation)wasrobustinthesestudiesandsoappearsuncontrolledanduncontrollable.Theempiricalobservationoftheeffectivecontrolofcorrectnessinthesecircumstancesawaitsfurtherinquiry.Furtherresearchisalsowarrantedonhowtheseeffectsoc-curred.Althoughseveraldemonstrationsexistofbehaviorproduc-tionprocessesthatareinformedandinfluencedwithouttheper-sconsciousparticipation(e.g.,Dijksterhuis&Bargh,2001),thestudyofthisinfluenceisonlybeginning.Whatseemstobeclearatthispointisthatactionscanbeperformedevenwhilepeoplehaveonlyalimitedappreciationoftheirorigins.Theparticipantsinthepresentstudiesmayhavebeenquiteawarethattheyweretryingtoberandom,forinstance,orthattheyweretryingtosensetheothersmusclemovementsandperhapsalsothattheyweretryingnottobecorrectortryinginothercasesevenbecorrect.However,thisarrayofconsciousunderstandingsofwhatwasbeingdonewasnotsufficientlycoherentandinsistenttoCLEVERHANDS indeterminate.Thepresentfindingsweighagainstthisone-processaccount,indicatinginsteadthatproductionandprojectionarefullyTheresultsofExperiments35suggestthattheproductionofcorrectresponsesisindependentoftheprojectionofthesere-sponsestotheother.Measuresofactionproductionandactionprojectionwereuncorrelatedinthesestudies.ActionprojectionrespondedtothebeliefmanipulationinExperiment4whereasactionproductiondidnot.Patternsofcorrelationswerefoundtodifferbetweenthesevariables,withactionprojectionlinkedtoageneraltendencytoperceiveFCasworking,butactionproductionlinkedonlytothetendencytothinkthatthecommunicatormightknowanswerstotheeasyquestions.TheseparationoftheproductionandprojectionprocessesinthisparadigmmayhavebeenfosteredbythewayinwhichthesituationdepartedfromstandardFC.FacilitatorsinFCoutsidethelabareregularlyconfrontedwiththeresultsoftheirwork.Theyseethewordsappearingonthescreen,andthisfeedbackislikelytofurthertheirbeliefinFCandpromptesca-latingprojection.Participantsinthemusclereadingparadigmwerenotmadeawareoftheoftheiractionproductionsinthisway.TheactionsthatwecountedasevidenceoftheFCphenom-enonwerecorrectresponsestotheeasyquestions.However,themeasureofactionprojectionreferredgloballytoallresponsestothequestions.Thus,participantsprojectionofanswersherewasnotpredicatedonthecorrectnessoftheanswers.Participantsreceivednofeedbackabouttheircorrectness,yetprojectedsomeresponsibilityfortheanswers.Thedegreeofactionprojectionobservedinthepresentresearchmighthavebeenevenlargerwiththeprovisionofsuchafeedbackprocess.IfactionproductionandprojectionarelinkedinFC,theymaybeconnectedbyvirtueofaself-perceptionprocess.Inthelab,theprojectionoftheactiontotheotherdoesnotseemtobeessentialfortheproductionoftheintelligentactions,nordoestheproductionoftheintelligentactionsseemessentialfortheoccur-renceofprojection.Facilitatorsfundamentallackofinsightintotheactionproductionprocessthusmerelyprovidesacontextwithinwhichtheprojectionoftheactionstothecommunicatorcanmakesense.AuthorshipConfusioninEverydayLifeThecasesofFCandCleverHansillustrateauthorshipconfusionbecausetheyfeaturetheprojectionofintelligentactiontoagentsthatareunlikelytobecapableofsuchaction.Ourexperimentsrenderauthorshipconfusionevenmorestarkly,astheyshowprojectionofactiontoothersunderconditionswhentheotherisentirelyinert.Ineverydaysocialsettings,theprocessesatworkheremightcontinuetoapply,however,wheneverapersonbe-lievesthatsomeotheragentcouldconceivablybethesourceofanactionthepersonhasperformed.Wegner(2002)hassuggestedthatsuchcircumstancesarisewhenpeopleframetheirowncontribu-tiontoacoactionasinaction,stimulation,reaction,ThebeliefthatoneisinactiveisinherentbothinFCandinvonsinteractionwithCleverHans.Peoplethinktheyaredoingnothing,andthisimpressionmaycreateasettointerprettheirownthoughtsasaccompanimentsratherthancausesoftheaction.Peoplebelievetheyareinactive,too,whentheyattribute(theirown)motiontoastationaryspotoflightintheautokineticeffect(Sherif,1935).Anexpectationofinactionisalsopresentwhen,forinstance,oneplaysagamewithachildandhopestohavethechildwin.Dozensofattemptsnottoplaywellandhavethechildsucceedstillresult,somehowalltoooften,inalltherightmovesandanunwanteddefeatforthechild.Approachingonesactionasstimulatingaresponsefromtheotherpersonmaybeasecondpathtowardactionprojection.ThisiscertainlywhathappensinFCwhenthefacilitatortriestohelpthecommunicatorgetstarted.Anotherexampleariseswhenaparenthelpsayoungchildgetdressed,andcomesawaythinkingthechildputonthemittenssuccessfullyandwillbeabletodoitagain.Nexttime,though,theparentisstruckwiththechildapparentlapseinmemory.Itseemedasthoughthechildwasperfectlycapableofdoingthisindependently,butnowcannotdoit.Perhapsintheprocessofstimulatingthechildsaction,theparentwasprojectingtheactionintheinitialsessionandendedupattributingtothechildwhattheparenthadactuallyaccomplished.Similarexamplesoccurinteacherstudentinteractions,andincloserelationshipswhenonepartnerinfluencestheothertodosomethingandyetassumestheothernotonlywantedtoperformtheaction,butactuallythoughtofitaswell(cf.Weiner,1991).Actionsperceivedasreactingtotheotherpersonarealsolikelytobeprojectedtotheotherperson.Interactionscanbeparsedintosegmentsinmanyways,someofwhichsuggestthatownactioncausedtheothersaction(e.g.,Iavoidedherandshecomplained),andothersofwhichsuggestthattheothersactioncausedoneownaction(e.g.,shecomplainedandIavoidedher).Swann,Pelham,andRoberts(1987)foundthatpeoplesettoperceivetheirownactionsasreactionsoftenrememberedtheinteractioninwaysthatfeaturedtheotherscausalagency.FacilitatorsinFCwhohelpthewordsthatacommunicatorhasexample,mightthenbeinclinedtoattributethewordstotheAuthorshipconfusionmayalsoarisewhenpeopleinterprettheirbehaviorsascollaboratingwiththeother.Peopleworkingingroupsregularlyexperienceaforwhatthegroupdoes,suchthatauthorshipforanyindividualsactionislostinthemeldingofindividualsintothegroup.Individualsmotivatedtomaintainacommunalorientationmayfailtorecordorrecognizeindividualauthorship(Clark,1984),andsobecomesusceptibletotheprojectionoftheirownactionstoothergroupmembers.Iron-ically,then,peopleingroupsmightinfluencethegrouprelent-lessly,allthewhileperceivingtheimpetusforgroupactionascomingfromothermembers.Politicalleadersmaybehavequiteautocratically,forinstance,whilesincerelyperceivingthattheyareslavestothewillofthepeople.ThesestudiesweredirectedtowardunderstandinganunusualsocialsituationtheoddlyframedinteractionthatoccursinFC.Itispossible,however,forothermoretypicalsocialinteractionstoengagesimilarforceswhentheirparticipantsunderstandtheminwaysthatpromoteactionproductionandprojection.Withfurtherresearch,wemaylearnjusthowoftenandwithwhateffectuncontrolledintelligenceleadspeopleindailylifetoplaypuppe-teers.Intherightcircumstances,eachofusmightleadotherstoknowwhatweknowanddowhatwewantevenwhilewefailtorealizethatwearepullingthestrings.CLEVERHANDS Siegel,B.(1995).Assessingallegationsofsexualmolestationmadethroughfacilitatedcommunication.JournalofAutism&DevelopmentalDisorders,25,Simpson,R.L.,&Myles,B.S.(1995).Effectivenessoffacilitatedcom-municationwithchildrenandyouthwithautism.JournalofSpecialEducation,28,Spitz,H.H.(1997).Nonconsciousmovements:Frommysticalmessagestofacilitatedcommunication.Mahwah,NJ:Erlbaum.Swann,W.B.,Pelham,B.W.,&Roberts,D.C.(1987).Causalchunking:Memoryandinferenceinongoinginteraction.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,53,Szempruch,J.,&Jacobson,J.W.(1993).Evaluatingthefacilitatedcom-municationsofpeoplewithdevelopmentaldisabilities.ResearchinDevelopmentalDisabilities,14,Twachtman-Cullen,D.(1998).Apassiontobelieve:Autismandthefacilitatedcommunicationphenomenon.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress.Vallacher,R.R.,&Wegner,D.M.(1985).Atheoryofactionidentifica-Hillsdale,NJ:Erlbaum.Wegner,D.M.(1994).Ironicprocessesofmentalcontrol.Review,101,Wegner,D.M.(2002).Theillusionofconsciouswill.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.Wegner,D.M.(inpress).Whoisthecontrollerofcontrolledprocesses?InR.Hassin,J.S.Uleman,&J.A.Bargh(Eds.),Thenewunconscious.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Wegner,D.M.,Ansfield,M.E.,&Pilloff,D.(1998).Theputtandthependulum:Ironiceffectsofthementalcontrolofaction.Science,9,Wegner,D.M.,&Bargh,J.A.(1998).Controlandautomaticityinsociallife.InD.Gilbert,S.T.Fiske,&G.Lindzey(Eds.),Handbookofsocial(4thed,Vol.1,pp.446496).NewYork:McGraw-Hill.Wegner,D.M.,Coulton,G.,&Wenzlaff,R.(1985).Thetransparencyofdenial:Briefinginthedebriefingparadigm.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,49,Wegner,D.M.,&Wheatley,T.P.(1999).Apparentmentalcausation:Sourcesoftheexperienceofwill.AmericanPsychologist,54,Weiner,B.(1991).Onperceivingtheotherasresponsible.InR.A.Dienstbier(Ed.),Nebraskasymposiumonmotivation(Vol.38,pp.198).Lincoln:UniversityofNebraskaPress.Wheeler,D.L.,Jacobson,J.W.,Paglieri,R.A.,&Schwartz,A.A.(1993).Anexperimentalassessmentoffacilitatedcommunication.MentalRe-tardation,31,Wilson,T.D.,&Capitman,J.A.(1982).Effectsofscriptavailabilityonsocialbehavior.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,8,ReceivedDecember28,2001RevisionreceivedJanuary24,2003AcceptedJanuary27,2003CLEVERHANDS