Realtime Communications SIPNOC 2016 Herndon Virginia Russ Housley My Background Became active in the IRTF and then IETF to work on security for Email and PKI IETF SMIME WG Chair IETF Security Area Director 4 years ID: 561510
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Slide1
Improving Security ofReal-time Communications
SIPNOC 2016
Herndon, Virginia
Russ HousleySlide2
My Background
Became active in the IRTF, and then IETF to work on security for Email and PKI
IETF S/MIME WG Chair
IETF Security Area Director – 4 years
IETF Chair – 6 years
IAB Chair – 2 years
IETF STIR WG ChairSlide3
IntroductionTwo IETF activities that will improve the security of real-time communications:
Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR)
Session initiation Protocol Best-practice Recommendations Against
Network Danger (SIPBRANDY)Slide4
STIR
Three parts to the STIR specification set:
SIP Identity
PASSporT
Certificate ProfileSlide5
SIP IdentityRFC 4474bisCarries signature on the source of the session
Relies on
PASSporT
for signature definitionSlide6
STIR PASSporT
Uses the JOSE JWT format for signature
Three parts:
BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))
BASE64URL(JWS Payload)
BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
Uses only ECDSA with P-256
and SHA-256
Design allows this to be
used in other contexts too
{
"
iat":"1443208345", "otn":"12155551212", "duri":"sip:alice@example.com"}
{
"
typ
":"passport",
"alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://
cert.example.org
/
passport.cer
"
}Slide7
STIR Certificate ProfileGreat deal of flexibility in the PKI
Each Country Code need to set policies regarding trust anchors
Certificate signed with either RSA or ECDSA with P-256
Subject public key is ECDSA with P-256Slide8
Display of Caller IdentityNot being done by the IETF
Vital for consumer confidenceSlide9
SIPBRANDYObjective
: two-party, SIP-signaled SRTP sessions with end-to-end security
That means no sharing of SRTP
keying material
Personal Prediction:
SIPBRANDY will deprecate SDESSlide10
SIPBRANDY ApproachLeverage the caller authentication provided by STIR
SRTP already provides some confidentiality and integrity
Move to end-to-end
Move to compatible key establishmentSlide11
SIPBRANDY OpinionSuccessful deployment will require compatibility with
WebRTC
Need to think about transition to
multi-party, even if it is not initial goalSlide12
ScheduleSTIR
Expect WG Last Call in next few weeks
Expect RFC before end of the year
SIPBRANDY
Not started yet
WG to be chartered in next few weeksSlide13
Questions?