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On believing that the scriptures are divinely inspired On believing that the scriptures are divinely inspired

On believing that the scriptures are divinely inspired - PDF document

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On believing that the scriptures are divinely inspired - PPT Presentation

wheretheideahereisthatonestartswithanevidencebasethatintelligentreasonablywelleducatedpeoplewouldthinkofasepistemicallyaboveboard132asetofpropositionsthatintelligentreasonablywelleducatedpeople ID: 340080

wheretheideahereisthatonestartswithanevidencebasethatintelligent reasonablywell-educatedpeoplewouldthinkofasepistemicallyaboveboard„asetofpropositionsthatintelligent reasonablywell-educatedpeople

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epistemicallyproper,properfromtheintellectualpointofview.Giventhehistoryofrecentepistemology,ofcourse,thisisnttosayanythingveryinformative:disagreementrunsriotincontemporaryepistemologyaboutwhatexactlyepistemicjusticationis,whetheronepropertydeservesthelabelepistemicjusticationormany,andmuchmorebesides.Ihavemyownviewaboutwhatdeservesthelabelbutwontbeabletoargueforithere.IshallsimplypresupposethatabeliefBisepistemicallyjustiedforahumanbeingSiBisproperlybasicforSorproperlybasedforS,wherethekeytermsherearetobeunderstoodasfollows:BisproperlybasicforahumanbeingSiBistheoutputofaproperlyfunctioning,truthaimed,beliefindependentbeliefformingprocessinS.BisproperlybasedforahumanbeingSiBistheoutputofaproperlyfunctioning,truthaimed,beliefdependentbeliefformingprocessinSwhoseinputsareeitherproperlybasicforSorproperlybasedforS.Soforthosewhofollowthesethings,ImplumpingforaPlantinga-styleproperfunctionalistapproachtojustiAbelief-formingpro-cessisanycognitiveprocesswhoseoutputisbelief.Abelief-formingprocessitfunctions,well,thewayitsto,thewayGoddesignedittofunction.Abelief-dependentprocessisabelief-formingprocesswhoseinputsareinteraliaotherbeliefs.Abelief-independentprocessisabelief-formingprocessthatisntbelief-dependent.Finally,abelief-formingprocessistruth-aimeditsfunctionistoproducetruebelief(asopposedto,say,beliefthatconducestosurvivaloremotionalwell-being).Muchmorecouldsaid,ofcourse,tollthisin,butweveenoughonboard,Ithink,toproceed.Secondly,astowhatIshallmeanbytheclaimthattheBibleisdivinelyinspired:IassumethattosayoftheBiblethatitisdivinelyinspiredistosay,amongotherthings,thatithasbeenbyGodandthat,bywayofitssentences,Godassertsvariouspropositions.(Theresmoretoit,ofcourse.Heassertspropositionsbywayofitssentences,trueenough,buthealsohealsourections,warnsusagainstsin,encouragesus,directsus,comfortsus,andmore.IassumethoughthatinspirationofthescripturesisatleastamatterofGodscommunicatingvariouspropositionsbywayofitssentences.)Thisraisesmanyquestions.InwhatwastheBibleauthoredbyGod?CanwereallymakesenseoftheideathatGodassertspropositionsbywayoftheSeee.g.Plantinga1993a,1993b,2000.ForaclosecousinoftheapproachtojustiIfavor,seeBergmann2006.MyapproachisalsoindebtedtoGoldman1979.Formoreonwhatsinvolvedinabeliefformingprocesssbeingtruthaimed,seePlantinga:ch.2.ThankstoAlPlantingaforhelpfulfeedbackhere.ThomasM.Crisp wheretheideahereisthatonestartswithanevidencebasethatintelligent,reasonablywell-educatedpeoplewouldthinkofasepistemicallyaboveboard„asetofpropositionsthatintelligent,reasonablywell-educatedpeoplewouldthinkofasknown„andtriestoshowthatthelikelihoodorprobabilitythatthescripturesaredivinelyinspiredishighorreasonablyhighontherelevantevidencebase.Secondly,theresthesuggestionthatjusticationforbeliefthatthescrip-turesaredivinelyinspiredcomesbywayoftestimony.Muchthatwejustibelieveisbelievedonthebasisoftestimony„thesay-soofothers.SotoowithbeliefthattheBibleisdivinelyinspired.TheChurchteachesthatitis,andwhenweaccepttheChurchstestimony,wegetjustiedbelief,justasIgotjustibeliefwhenIacceptedtestimony,forexample,thatthereisaplacecalledChina,thatmynameisThomasCrisp,andthatCaesarcrossedtheRubicon.Thirdly,theresthesuggestionmootedbytheBelgicConfession,oneofthecentralconfessionsoftheReformedbranchofProtestantism:...webelievewithoutadoubtallthingscontainedin[theBible]notsomuchbecausethechurchreceivesthemandapprovesthemassuch,butaboveallbecausetheHolySpirittestiesinourheartsthattheyarefromGod,andalsobecausetheyprovethemselvestobefromGod.(BelgicConfession,Article5)TheideahereisthatsomethinglikePlantingasinternalinstigationoftheHolySpirit(Plantinga2000)operatesinthemindsandheartsofbelievers,producinginthemeitherbeliefthattheBibleisdivinelyinspiredorsome-thinginthenearneighborhood.Since,youmightthink,beliefsoproducedisepistemicallyjustied,wegetananswerheretotheMainQuestion.Thereareproblemswitheachofthesesuggestions,problemsInowturnto.NATURALTHEOLOGYANDDWINDLINGPROBABILITIESPlantingahasarguedthatattemptstoargueforthegreatthingsofthegospel(i.e.incarnation,atonement,Jesussresurrection)onthebasisofnaturaltheologyandhistoricalargumentsuerfromaproblemhedubsthePrin-cipleofDwindlingProbabilities.ThePrincipleofDwindlingProbabilitiesaictsargumentswithacertainstructure.SupposeyouwanttoshowsomepropositionPprobableonourSeePlantinga2000:27080.Forresponseandcounterresponse,seeSwinburne2004;McGrew2004;Plantinga2006;McGrew2006.ThomasM.Crisp backgroundknowledgeK.YoumightdothatbyproducingsomeotherpropositionA,showingthatP(A/K)andP(P/A&K)arehigh,andconcludingthat,bytheprobabilitycalculus,itfollowsthatP(P/K)ishigh.Youmight,however,trytoshowthatP(P/K)ishighbyiteratingtheaboveprocedure,arguingthatsomepropositionAisprobableonK,thatsomeotherpropositionBisprobableonA&K,andthatPisprobableonA&B&K,concludingthat,therefore,PisprobableonK.ButsuchanargumentissubjecttoPlantingasPrinciple.IfallyouvesaidisthatP(A/K),P(B/A&K),andP(P/A&B&K)arehigh,sayaround.8each,then,sofar,allthatfollowsfromtheprobabilitycalculusisthatP(P/K)isgreaterthanorequalto.8.8,atadhigherthan.5.ThoughtheconditionalprobabilitiesP(A/K),P(B/A&K),andP(P/A&B&K)areeachhigh,theprobabilitiesdwindlewhenyoumultiplythemthrough.ThisPrincipleofDwindlingProbabilities(PDP),then,makestroubleforargumentswiththeforegoingiterativestructure,argumentsthatattempttomotivatetheclaimthatP(P/K)ishighforsomePbyarguing,forsome,that,andarehigh.PlantingasPDP,notice,willaictjustthoseargumentswiththerelevantiterativestructure.TheresaproblemcloselyconnectedtoPDPthoughthatcanariseforhistoricalornaturaltheologicalargument,whetheritdisplaysthatstructureornot.IshallnowarguethatthisclosecousinofPDPwillaictanyattempttoargueforthedivineinspirationoftheBibleonhistoricalornaturaltheologicalgroundsandthat,therefore,weneedtolookelsewhereforananswertotheMainQuestion.Thepointofanyhistoricalornaturaltheologicalargument,Itakeit,istoshowofsomeconclusionCthatitisprobable„ormoreexactly,thatitisprobablewithrespecttowhatweknowortakeforgranted(K)„byputtingforwardcertainpremises,andurging,roughly,that(areprobablegivenK,and(makeitprobable,givenK,thatC.Letuslookintothismorecarefully.SupposeyouproposetoarguefrompremisesthatP(C/K)ishigh.Whatyoullneedtodo,then,roughly,isshowthatareprobablegivenKandthatmakeitprobable(givenK)thatC.Lessroughly,whatyoullneedtodomaybeseenbyectingonthelatticediagramshowninFigure9.1.ThefourpathwaysfromKtoCcorrespondtofourjointlyexhaustiveandmutuallyexclusivewaysforCtobetruegivenK.TheprobabilityofCgivenKisequaltothesumoftheprobabilities(onK)oftheconjunctionsofCandthepropositionsalongeachpath,thatis:IborrowthiswayofrepresentingprobabilisticargumentsfromMcGrew2004.BelievingtheScripturesDivinelyInspired Secondly,Icouldshowthatthesumoftheprobabilitiesalongtheleftmostthreepathwaysis,toborrowPlantingaslanguage,inscrutable„suchthatonecanttellwhatitis.Andthirdly,Icouldshowthatthesumoftheprobabilitiesalongtheleftmostthreepathwaysliesinanintervalwithalowlowerboundandinscrutableupperbound.Thatdbetoshowthatthesumoftheprobabilitiesalongtheleftmostthreepathwaysisgreaterthanorequaltosomesmallishnumberbutthatwedontknowhowgreater(ifitsgreater).TherestroubleforyourargumentifIcanshowanyofthese.Eachconsti-tutesreasontoeitherwithholdordenythepropositionthatthesumoftheprobabilitiesalongtheleftmostthreepathwaysoftheabovelatticeishigh.AndreasontowithholdordenythatpropositionisreasonforthinkingyourargumentfromtoCnogood.Aswemightputit,itunderminestheevidentialvalueofyourpremisesvis-a-visyourconclusion.LetussaythatobjectingtoyourargumentfromtoCbygivingoneoftheabovereasonsforwithholdingordenyingthepropositionthatthesumoftheprobabilitiesalongtheleftmostthreepathwaysoftheabovelatticeishighistoputagainstyourargumentanunderminingBelowIshallsuggestthatthestrongestargumentfromhistoryandnaturaltheologytoIBiscompromisedbyanunderminingobjection.Ishallthereneedanotionofunderminingobjectionthatismoregeneralthantheonedescribedinthepreviousparagraph,whichappliesjusttotwo-premisearguments.Afewremarks,then,abouthowtomakethatnotionmoregeneral:Notethatthethreeleftmostpathwaysthroughtheabovelatticearepathwaysinwhichoneormoreof,thepremisesoftheargument,aretrue.Wemightsaythatthosepathwaysarefavorablewithrespectto,whereapathwaythroughthelatticeisfavorablewithrespecttooneormoreofaretrueinthatpathway.Now,correspondingtoanyargumentAfrompremisesfortheclaimthatP(C/K)ishigh,forsomepropositionCandbodyofbackgroundbeliefK,willbevariouslatticeslikethatconsideredabove.YouhaveanunderminingobjectiontoA,letussay,iforatleastoneoftheselatticesL,youhavereasontowithholdordenythepropositionthatthesumoftheprobabilitiesalongthepathwaysthroughLfavorabletoishigh.Thisgeneralizednotionofanunderminingobjectioninhand,letusreturntonaturaltheologyandtheMainQuestion.IsuggestedabovethataclosecousinofPDPwillaictanyattempttoargueforthedivineinspirationoftheBibleonhistoricalornaturaltheologicalgroundsandthat,therefore,weneedHereIhaveinmindJohnPollockswellknowndistinctionbetweenrebuttingandunderminingdefeaters(Pollock1986).BelievingtheScripturesDivinelyInspired tolookelsewhereforanexplanationhowbeliefthatIB(whereIB,again,denotesthepropositionthattheBibleisdivinelyinspired)comesbywayofcation.Icannowspellthatsuggestionoutinmoredetail.ToargueforthedivineinspirationoftheBibleonhistoricalornaturaltheologicalgrounds,Itakeit,istoarguethatitisprobablethattheBibleisdivinelyinspiredgivensomebodyofbackgroundknowledgeKcomprisingpropositionsfromhistoryand/orthedataofnaturaltheology,propositionsthatallormostofuswouldthinkofasknown.Ithinkanysuchargumentwillbesubjecttoanunderminingobjection.ThisisbecauseIsuspectthestrongestcasefromthedeliverancesofhistoryandnaturaltheologyfortheclaimthatP(IB/K)ishighwillrely,ifnotontheseprecisepremises,thenonpremisesinthenearvicinityofthese:T:Godexists.A:GodintervenesinhistorytoprovideapropositionalrevelationaboutB:Jesussteachingsweresuchthattheycouldbeplausiblyinterpretedasimplyingthatheintendedtofoundachurchthatwouldfunctionforalongperiodtimeasanauthoritativesourceofinformationabouthim.C:Jesusrosefromthedead.D:InraisingJesusfromthedead,GoddeclaredhisapprovalofJesussE:TheChurchthat,bythestartofthefthcentury,hadpronouncedonwhichbooksweredivinelyinspired,isalegitimatesuccessor„theclos-estcontinuer„ofthechurchfoundedbyJesus.Ifso,thenthestrongestcaseforIBwillbecompromisedbyanunderminingobjection.Letmetrytoindicatewhy.Theprobabilitylatticesfromthesepremisesareintricate,butwegetafeelforwhetheranargumentofthissortiscompromisedbyanunderminingobjectionbyconsideringapartiallatticefortheargument,onethatomitspathwaysrunningthroughTandAsince,plausibly,theprobabilitiesalongthosepathwayswillbe0:seeFigure9.2.Otherpathwaysthroughthelatticethatzeroout,arguably,arethoserunningthroughC.TheresurrectioniscentraltothemessageoftheChristianscriptures;ifitdidntoccur,then,onethinks,theprobabilitythatthosescripturesaredivinelyinspiredissmallindeed.ThiswayofthinkingaboutarguingtoIBisinspiredbySwinburnes(1992)argumentforthecentralclaimsofChristianity.Plantinga(2000)arguedthatSwinburnesargumentiscompromisedbyPDP.SwinburnethendeniedthisongroundsthathisargumentlackstheiterativestructurerelevanttoPDP(2004).Iamnotattemptingtoadjudicatetheirdisputehere.IammerelyarguingthatanyattempttoargueforIBontheaboveSwinburneinspiredpremiseswillbesubjecttowhatIamcallinganunderminingobjection,anobjectionthatiscloselyrelatedtobutnotidenticalwithPlantingasPDP.ThomasM.Crisp Otherpathways,whilenotobviouslysuchastozeroout,aresuchthat,soitseemstome,wedontknowwhattheirprobabilitiesare.ThepathwaysrunningthroughBarelikethis.SoconsidertheK&T&A&pathway.TheprobabilityalongitisequaltoConsidertheleftmultiplicand,theprobabilityofIBgiventhatGodexists,heintervenesinhistorytoprovideusapropositionalrevelationabouthimself,Jesussmessagecouldntbeinterpretedasimplyingthatheintendedtofoundachurchthatwouldbeanauthoritativesourceofinformationabouthim,herosefromthedead,andsoforth.Whatisthisprobability?Hardtosay.IfGodexists,providesapropositionalrevelationabouthimself,andraisedJesusfromthedeadtherebyendorsinghisteachings,thenitseemslikelyhedprovideuswithpropositionalrevelationaboutJesusandhisteachings.ButwhatstheprobabilitythatrevelationwouldbetheoneidentiedbytheChurchoftherstfewcenturies,theonespeciedbyIB,giventhatJesusneverclaimedtobefoundingagroupthatwouldfunctionasanauthoritativesourceofinformationabouthim?PerhapstheChurchgotitwrong:perhapsGodleftusapropositionalrevelationaboutJesus,alright,butitsmuchsmallerthanwesuppose,comprisingforexample,justthegospelofLuke,orjustthebookofRomans.Whatstheprobability(again,givenB)thattheChurchgotitrighthere?Ithinkwevenowayofsaying;wecanttell.Theprobabilityalongthispathway,soitseemstome,isinscrutable.IB E ~E E ~E E ~E E ~E E ~E E ~E E ~E E ~E D ~D D ~D D ~D D ~D C ~C C ~C B ~B Figure9.2HereIamindebtedtoPlantinga2006:1012.BelievingtheScripturesDivinelyInspired TheobviouswaysofdeployingtheIIHSmodelfacethisdiculty:eitheritsnotclearonthemhowitcouldbethatmostChristiansarejustiedinbeliefthatIBorwegetdiverseexplanationsofsimilarphenomenaandconsequenttheoreticalcost.Inthenextsection,IllsketchamodelforthinkingabouttheepistemologyofbeliefthatIBnotsubjecttothisdiculty,amodelthat,soIllclaim,ismoresatisfyingthantheoptionssofarconsidered.MOREONAUTHORITYIarguedabovethatifjusticationforbeliefthatIBcomesbywayofordinarytestimony,wegetadefeaterforbeliefthatIBwhenwerunacrosstestimonyIBandlackgoodreasonforpreferringonesourceoftestimonytotheother.IsaidthismakestroublefortheideathatjusticationforbeliefthatIBarisesbywayofordinarytestimonysincemostofushaverunacrossplentyoftestimonythatIB.Iwanttoproposenowamodelthatgetsroundthisworry,amodelonwhichjusticationforbeliefthatIBcomebywayoftestimony,butnotbywayofordinarytestimony.PeterVanInwagenspointhereissurelycorrect:Eachofusacceptscertainauthoritiesandcertaintraditions.Youmaythinkthatyouareanepistemicenginethattakessensoryinput(thatfancifullyfancilessmediumofunvarnishednews)andgeneratesassignmentsofprobabilitiestopropositionsbymeansofasetofrulesthatyieldsthemostuseful(usefulfordealingwiththefuturestreamofsensoryinput)probabilityassignmentsinmostpossibleworlds.Infact,however,youtrustalotofpeopleandgroupsofpeopleandwithinverybroadlimitsbelievewhattheytellyou.Andthisisnotbecausetheepistemicenginethatisyourselfhasprocessedalotofsensorydataand,inconsequence,assignedhighprobabilitiestopropositionslikeDixyLeeRayisareliablesourceofinformationonecologicalmattersorMostthingsthattheBostonGlobesaysaboutthehomelessaretrue.Youmayhavedonesomeofthat,butyouhaventhadtimetodoverymuchofit.(1994:48)Thecentralsuggestion:weacceptthetestimonyofcertainauthorities,often-timeswithoutmuchbywayofargumentthatweshould.Typicallythisisamatterofacceptingthetestimonyofthosedeemedauthoritativeorexpertbyoursocialgroup.WhenIwasyoung,mysocialgroupwasmyfamilyandtheexpertsweremyparents.Iacceptedmuchthattheytoldme,usuallyinthebasicway(wheretoacceptabeliefinthebasicwayhere,istoacceptitwithouthavinginferreditfromargumentorevidence„itstoholdthebelief).Nowadays,mysocialgroupismuchwideranditsexpertsmorediverse.Iacceptquiteabitoftestimonyfrom,forexample,physics,BelievingtheScripturesDivinelyInspired ofteninthebasicway:itsnotasifIvemuchbywayofdecent,non-circularargumentthatthemethodsofphysicsaretruth-conducive.Notethatwelloftenacceptthetestimonyofthosedeemedexpertbyoursocialgroupinthefaceofconictingtestimony.SowhenIwasyoung,Idoccasionallyrunacrosstestimonythatconictedwiththatofmyparentsbutwouldgoonbelievingmyparentsnonetheless.(IrememberhearingmuchtestimonyontheplaygroundtotheeectthattherewasnoSantaClaus;Ididntbelieveitforaminute.)NotthatIhadmuchbywayofargumentforthinkingmyparentsshouldbetrustedovertheseothersources.Ididnt.Butconfrontedwithconictingtestimony,withoutmuchbywayofargumentthatmyparentsshouldbetrustedoverconictingsourcesofinformation,Idgoonbelievingmyparents.Istilldothissortofthing.So,forexample,scienceassuresusthereisoverwhelmingevidencefortheclaimthatthecosmosisconsiderablyolderthan10,000years.Ibelievethereis.Iknowofpeople,though,whoclaimthereisnt.Theythinktheideathatthereispowerfulevidenceforthisclaimisbasedonenormousconfusioninthescienticcommunity.Ithinktheyremistaken,butpressedforargumentwhyweshouldtrustthedeliverancesofmainstreamsciencehereandnotthesepeople,Imnotsurewhattosay.Iveonlyahaltinggripontherelevantscience.OfcourseImnotalonehere.Wealldothissortofthing.Wetrustthosedeemedexpertbyoursocialgroups,ofteninthefaceofconictingtestimony,oftenwithoutmuchbywayofargumentforpreferringtheexpertstothenon-experts.AsIllputit,wetothosedeemedexpertbyoursocialgroup,where,letussay,youdefertoanexpertinyoursocialgroupi)youaccepthertestimonyinthebasicway,and()youdcontinuetodosoifapprisedofictingtestimonybythoseyourcommunitydeemsnon-expert,whetherornotyouhadgoodargumentforpreferringtheexpertstestimonytothenon-experts.Wedothissortofthing,butwhy?Whydoweengageinthisdoxasticpractice?Iconjecturethatitshard-wiredintous.Deferringtoexpertsis,Iconjecture,amatterofpropercognitivefunction.More,IconjecturethatGodsintentioninhard-wiringthepracticeintoushadtodowithhisdesireWhereadoxasticpractice,forpresentpurposes,isawayofformingbelief,amodeofbeliefformation;e.g.,formingbeliefonthebasisoftestimony,formingbeliefonthebasisofperceptualexperience,formingbeliefonthebasisofdeductivereasoningallarewaysofformingbeliefanddoxasticpracticesinmysense.IborrowtheexpressiondoxasticpracticefromAlston(seee.g.Alston1989).Hedevelopsasophisticatedepistemologyaroundthenotionofadoxasticpracticehissocalleddoxasticpracticeapproachtoepistemology(seee.g.Alston1989).Iamborrowinghisexpression,butnothisepistemology,whichdiersinimportantwaysfromtheproperfunctionalistapproachtoepistemologyIassumeatthechaptersoutset.ThomasM.Crisp and,soIsuspect,beliefintheinspirationofthescripturesacrossthemajorbranchesofChristendomis,byandlarge,prettysimilar.Whostosay,though,whetherthefathersbeliefsonIBwererelevantlysimilartoours?Perhapstheywerent;perhapstheywereaccompaniedbypowerfulreligiousexperiences,signsandwonders,orsomesuchthing.Idontknow.NothingIsayabovesuggestsonewayoranotheraboutit.SonothingIsayabovecastsdoubtonthesuggestionthatsomeofthefathersbeliefsthatIBwereproductsofIIHS.Secondly,theobjectionassumesthatbeliefthatPheldonthebasisofachainoftestimonytracingbacktosomeoneyoursocialgroupdeemsexpertisedonlyiftheexpertinquestionwasjustiedinbelievingthatP.Idenythat.Supposeanunscrupuloushighschoolphysicsteacherknowinglyfoistsvarioussubtlyfalseclaimsaboutphysicsonhisstudents.Providedhissoph-istryissucientlysubtleandthathisstudentshadnoreasonforsuspicion,wouldnttheybejustiedinacceptinghistestimony?Ithinkso.Tobesure,theresepistemictroubleformytestimonialbeliefBifIcometothinkthattheinitiallinkinthetestimonialchainsubtendingBisntlikelytobetrue.ButinthecaseofbeliefthatIB,fewChristianswouldthinkthat.Mostofus,Isuspect,thinkthatGodprovidentlyguidedthedevelopmentoftheChurchfathersbeliefsonIBinsuchawayastoprotectthemfromerror.Perhapstheirbeliefswerealsojustied,maybeviaIIHS.Notmuchhangsonit.IflikemostChristians,youthinkthebeliefsofthefathersonIBaproductofprovidentguidanceandprotectionfromerror,thejusticatorystatusofthosebeliefsisntveryrelevanttothejusticatorystatusofyourbeliefthatIB.Cf.Plantinga1993:828.Cf.Lackey1999:4801.Forarecent,fulllengthtreatmentofrelatedissues,seeLackeyWhereprovidentguidance,asImthinkingofithere,mayormaynotinvolvethesortofdirectproductionofbeliefbytheHolySpiritpostulatedbytheIIHSmodel.Godcouldprovidentlyarrangeforsomeonetoholdacertainbeliefbydirectlycausingitinher,butIassumehecoulddoitinlessdirectwaystoo.Objection:SurelythejusticatorystatusofthefathersbeliefsonIBrelevanttothecatorystatusofpresentdaybeliefthatIB.ForiftheFatherswerentjustiedinbeliefthatIB,weshouldntdeemthemexpertsonIB.AndifweshouldntdeemthemexpertsonIB,weshouldntthinkpresentdaybeliefthatIBadeliveranceofexperttestimony.AndifweshouldntthinkbeliefthatIBadeliveranceofexperttestimony,thengivenyourearlierarguments,itseemsweshouldntthinkpresentdaybeliefthatIBjustiedatall.Bywayofreply,whythinkthefathersstatusasexpertsonIBthusdependentonwhethertheywereepistemicallyjustiedinbeliefthatIB?SolongastheirbeliefsregardingIBresultedfromdivineguidanceandprotectionfromerror,Ishouldthinkthemexpertsintherelevantsense,eveniftheylackedwhatwewouldthinkofasjustiedbeliefthatIB(andasIsayabove,Idontseeanyreasonforthinkingtheydid).ThankstoMikeReaforhelpfulfeedbackhere.ThankstoNathanBallantyne,DanielHowardSnyder,AlvinPlantinga,TedPoston,MichaelRea,DonaldSmith,andGreggTenElshofforhelpfulcommentsandconversation.ThomasM.Crisp Alston,WilliamP.(1989)ADoxasticPracticeApproachtoEpistemology,inMarjorieClayandKeithLehrer(eds.),KnowledgeandSkepticism,pp.129.Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress.Bergmann,Michael(2006)JusticationWithoutAwareness:ADefenseofEpistemicExternalism.Oxford:OUP.Craig,WilliamLane(1989)AssessingtheNewTestamentEvidencefortheHistoricityoftheResurrectionofJesus.EdwinMellonPress.Davis,StephenT.(1993)RisenIndeed:MakingSenseoftheResurrection.GrandRapids,Mich.:Eerdmans.Goldman,AlvinI.(1979)WhatisJustiedBelief?,inG.S.Pappas(ed.),JustiandKnowledge,pp.123.Dordrecht:D.Reidel.Habermas,Gary,andAntonyFlew(1987)DidJesusRisefromtheDead?TheResurrectionDebate,ed.TerryL.Miethe.SanFrancisco:Harper&Row.Lackey,Jennifer(1999)TestimonialKnowledgeandTransmission,Quarterly,49:47190.LearningfromWords:TestimonyasaSourceofKnowledge.Oxford:OUP.McGrew,Timothy(2004)HasPlantingaRefutedtheHistoricalArgument?,phiaChristi,6:726.andLydiaMcGrew(2006)OntheHistoricalArgument:ARejoindertoPlantinga,PhilosophiaChristi,8:2338.Plantinga,Alvin(1993Warrant:TheCurrentDebate.Oxford:OUP.WarrantandProperFunction.Oxford:OUP.WarrantedChristianBelief.Oxford:OUP.(2006)HistoricalArgumentsandDwindlingProbabilities:AResponsetoTimothyMcGrew,PhilosophiaChristi,8:1221.Pollock,John(1986)ContemporaryTheoriesofKnowledge.Totowa,NJ:Rowman&Swinburne,Richard(1992)Revelation:FromMetaphortoAnalogy.Oxford:OUP.TheResurrectionofGodIncarnate.Oxford:OUP.(2004)NaturalTheology,itsDwindlingProbabilitiesandLackofRapport,FaithandPhilosophy,21:53346.VanInwagen,Peter(1994)QuamDilecta,inThomasV.Morris(ed.),GodandthePhilosophers:TheReconciliationofFaithandReason,pp.3160.Oxford:OUP.Wright,N.T.(2003)TheResurrectionoftheSonofGod:ChristianOriginsandtheQuestionofGod,iii.Minneapolis:FortressPress.BelievingtheScripturesDivinelyInspired