To understand why a phenomenon occurs is to grasp a correct explanation of the phenomenon To understand a scienti57501c theory is to be able to construct or at least to grasp a range of potential explanations in which that theory accounts for other ID: 6045
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doeshavetheimplicationpromisedinthetitle,thatexplanationisessentiallyinvolvedinscienticunderstanding,andthatthenormsofcorrectscienticexplanationlogicallyprecedeandparticipateindeterminingthenatureandnormsofunderstanding.Doesthesimpleviewneedadefense?Somethinglikeitcanbefoundinmanydierentphilosophicalworksonunderstanding(deRegtandDieksóþþ¢;Grimmóþþä;KhalifaóþÕó),althoughsomeofthesewriterswouldliketocomplicatetherecipewithadditionalingredients(seesection¦).YetIdonotthinkthatthefundamentalpiecesoftheviewhavebeenlaidoutinsucientdetailÐbesideswhich,ifthetitleofthiscollection,ªUnderstandingwithoutExplanationºisanyguide,thesimpleviewishardlyoutofdanger.AlthoughIadvocatethesimpleview,Iwillarguethatitoughttoberegardedasonepartofabiggerpicture.ebiggerpicturewillbuildonthecentralideaofthesimpleview,thatscienticunderstandingisamatterofhavingtherightepistemicrelationtoanexplanationorexplanationsÐandsothatinscience,thereisnounderstandingwithoutexplanation.Õ.ExplanationGraspingacorrectexplanation.Whatisanexplanation,suchthatitcanbegrasped?Itcanbeassumed,Ithinkwithoutanylossofgenerality,thatanexplana-tionisasetofpropositionswithacertainstructure.Suchacharacterizationiswellsuited,ofcourse,tocaptureHempel'sdeductive-nomologicalandinductive-statisticalaccountsofexplanation(HempelandOppenheimÕɦ;HempelÕÉä¢),alongwithotheraccountsaccordingtowhichexplanationshavetheformofarguments,whethertheargumentsareexplanatoryendsinthemselvesorwhethertheyrepresentstructuralelementsofreality,suchastheinstantiationofunifyingpatterns(KitcherÕÉÕ)orcausalprocesses(Strevensóþþ).Butalmostanyviewofexplanationcanbeputintheseterms.OnSalmon's(ÕÉßþ)statisticalrelevanceview,forexample,anexplanationisatableofó fromªunderstandingthatº:youmightbeexquisitely,incandescentlyawareofthecat'sbeingonthematwithouthavingtheslightestcluehowitgotthere.íesimpleviewisananalysisofunderstandingwhy,aviewthatiscouchedintermsofgraspingpropositions,whichisamatterofunderstandingthat.Ihavenoaccountofunderstandingthat,buttovoidthechargeofcircularity,itisenoughtoobservethatitisentirelydistinctfromunderstandingwhy.Letmetrytosayalittlemore,however,aboutthisunderstandingthat,thisgrasping.Isgraspingthatastateofaairsholdsthesamethingasknowingthatitholds?erearevariousdimensionsalongwhichthisquestionmightbeexplored.Youmight,forexample,askwhethertograspthatastateofaairsholdsyoumustbejustiedinbelievingthatitholds,andifso,whetherthisjusticationcanbeªGettier-izedº.Iwillnotattemptaninvestigationofsuchquestions;letmerathergiveonereasonthatgraspingmustbesomethingoverandaboveknowledge(therebydissentingfromtheviewofKhalifa(óþÕó),whootherwisepresentssomethingmuchlikethesimpleview).Someonewithrelativelylittleunderstandingofchemistrycan,Ithink,knowthatwaterismadeupofHóO,orthatmercuryisametal.Buttheydonottherebygraspthatthesestatesofaairsholdinthesenserequiredforunderstandingthechemicalpropertiesofwaterormercury.Inthesamewaythatunderstandingthatthecatisonthematrequiresanappreciationofthe ì.Bestnottotreatthewordªwhyºinªunderstandingwhyºasanimplicitrestriction:somekindsofunderstandingwhywouldbemoreidiomaticallyexpressedasunderstandinghow(Khalifainpress).Forexample,itisperhapsmorenaturaltospeakofunderstandinghowthedinosaurswentextinctthanunderstandingwhytheywentextinct,thoughthereisnointerestingdierencebetweenthetwo:eitherway,whatisrequiredisacorrectexplanationoftheextinction.¦.CompareHempel's(ÕÉä¢,§¦.Õ)discussionofvarioussensesofthetermexplanation.Kvanvig(óþþì)makesabroadlysimilar,thoughnotidentical,distinctionbetweenªobjectualunderstandingºandªpropositionalunderstandingº.Hisªexplanatoryunderstandingº,aspeciesofobjectualunderstanding,ismoreorlessmyunderstandingwhy.¢.ForadiscussionofthegrowingliteratureonthistopicfromGrimm,Kvanvig,andothers,seeMorris(inpress).¦ nameforthisdirectapprehension.ØWhatisgrasping,orunderstandingthat,ordirectapprehension,then?Itisthefundamentalrelationbetweenmindandworld,invirtueofwhichthemindhaswhateverfamiliarityitdoeswiththewaytheworldis.equestionofthenatureofthisrelationisperhapsthedeepestinallphilosophy;Iwillnottrytomakeanyprogressonitinthispaper.atmeans,ofcourse,thatthispaperwillnotpretendtogiveacompleteaccountofunderstandingwhy;itsaimisrathertoshowhowsuchanaccountshoulddependonindependentaccountsofgraspingandofexplanation(thelatterofwhichwearemuchclosertohaving,Ithink,thantheformer).Letmegiveanswerstotwoshortquestionsaboutgrasping,however.First:isgraspingfactive?Mustthecatbeonthemat,ifyouaretograspthatthecatisonthemat?Factivityseemstobeimpliedbytheªgraspingthatºlocution;nevertheless,afriendofthesimpleviewmight,Isuppose,ndthisimplicationunwelcome.Letmethereforebrieydevelopanon-factivenotiontoparallelªgraspingthatº.Supposethatgraspinghastwocomponents:apurelypsychological(orªnarrowº)component,andtheobtainingofthegraspedstateofaairs.Whatiswantedisthepurelypsychologicalstate,thestatethatwouldpersistinyourmindifanevildemon,atthemomentofyourgraspingthatthecatisonthemat,destroyedthecatwhilemaintaininginyourmindtheappearanceofanenmattedcat.Callthisstategrasping*.enthesimpleviewmightbereformulatedasfollows:Anindividualhasscienticunderstandingofaphenomenonjustincasetheygrasp*acorrectscienticexplanationofthatphenomenon.Inmyview,anexplanationiscorrectonlyifitsconstitutivepropositionsaretrue,sothisreformulationisadierencethatmakesnodierence,butthenotionofgrasping*willndaphilosophicaluseinwhatfollows. ä.WhatIhavesaidintheseparagraphsiscompatible,note,withtheviewthatunderstand-ingthatisaspecialkindofknowledge(Grimmóþþä),hencethatknowledgeisnecessarybutnotsucientforunderstandingthat.ä necessaryconditionforscienticunderstanding.Andyet...considerthreereasonsforthinkingthatamorenuancedatti-tudetoexplanatorycorrectnessisrequired.First,manyexplanatorymodelsinsciencecontainidealizations;inter-pretedliterally,thesemodelsarefalse.Scientistsgainunderstanding,never-theless,bygraspingidealizedmodels.Areasontoabandonthesimpleview'srequirementofexplanatorycorrectness(Elginóþþß)?No;atmostareasontousethetermcorrectratherthan,say,trueÐasthesimpleviewalreadydoes.Why?eapparentfalsehoodofsomemodelsdoesnotstandinthewayofexplanation,butthatofothersÐastheyoungearthcreationistcaseshowsÐmostcertainlydoes.eformerclassofmodelsareªcorrectºinasensethatthelatterclassarenot.eircorrectnesscannot,ofcourse,consistintheirliteraltruth.Butifidealizingexplanationisgovernedbyanystandardatall,thereisatranslationmanualthat,foranyidealizedmodelandcontextof(re)production,picksoutasetofpropositionsthatstatethefactsabouttheworldthatmustobtainifthemodelistobeexplanatory,andinvirtueofwhichthemodelisexplanatory,iftheydoobtain.Calltheseputativefactstheexplanatorycontentofthemodel.Inthesimplestkindofidealizedmodel,ªAllFsareGºmighttranslateto,thushavetheexplanatorycontent,ªAlmostallFsareGº.OritmighthavetheexplanatorycontentªInconditionsC,allFsareGº,wheretheconditionsCaredeterminedbythecontextofproductionÐtheintentionsoftheexplainer,forexample.Myownviewofthenatureofthetranslationmanualismorecomplex(Strevensóþþ,chap.).IholdthatidealizationsthatappeartomakesomefalseassumptionabouttheworldÐforexample,theassumptionthattherearenolong-rangeintermolecularforces(intheidealgasmodel),thatbiologicalpopulationsareinnite(insomeevolutionarymodels),thathumanshaveperfectinstrumentalrationality(ineconomicmodels)Ðinfactmaketrueclaimsaboutdierence-making. SofarIhaveputthebroadandnarrowsensesofunderstandingwhyonapar.Letmenowdiscriminate:Ithinkthatoureverydayattributionsofunderstandingarealmostalwaysbroad.Forexample,Icannotthinkofanyconversationalcontextinwhichitiscorrecttosay,withoutfrantichedging,thattheyoungearthcreationistsunderstandtheformationoftheGrandCanyon,orthatthephlogistontheoristsunderstoodcombustion.(Perhapsyoucansaythatthephlogistontheoristshadawayofunderstandingcom-bustion,butthatitwasanincorrectway,andsotheydidnotachievetheunderstandingthattheysought.)Further,Idonotthinkthathavingnarrowunderstandingisthatmuchcloserthanhavingbroadunderstandingtothepurelyphenomenalªsenseofunderstandingº.Eveniftheyoungearthcreationists'explanationweretoviolatetheinternalstandardsforexplanatoriness,theymightexperienceasenseofunderstanding,apsychologicalorbrainstateÐtheringofU-bers?Ðwhichpresumablycaninpathologicalcasesbecomeuncoupledfromanyexplanatorynorm(Troutóþþß).ethirdreasontothinkthatthecorrectnessofanexplanationis(atleastsometimes)toohighastandardforunderstandingarisesinsomecaseswhenitisatheory,ratherthanaphenomenonorstateofaairs,thatisthesubjectoftheunderstandingclaim:sometimeswetalkaboutunderstandingfalsetheories.HighschoolgraduatesareexpectedtounderstandNewtonianphysics;historiansofchemistryaresupposedtounderstandphlogistontheory;andmanycosmologistsfeelthattheyunderstandtheinationmodeloftheearlyuniverseinasensethatisindependentofwhetheritultimatelyturnsouttobecorrect.isrepresents,Isuggest,athirdsenseofªunderstandingºthatmightbecalledunderstandingwith;theobjectofthisunderstandingis,asIhavesaid,atheoryratherthanaphenomenonorstateofaairs.Likeunderstandingwhy,andunlikeunderstandingthat,understandingwithinvolvesmasteringascienticexplanation:tounderstandatheoryinthisnewsenseistobeÕÕ intheªwhyºsenseistograspacorrectexplanationofthatthing.Itfollowsthatwhateverhasnoexplanation,cannotbeunderstood.Counterexample:Asfarasweknow,generalrelativityisafundamentaltheory(putasideitsdicultrelationshipwithquantummechanics).Assuch,ithasnoscienticexplanation;wecanuserelativitytoexplainmanythings,butwecannotexplainrelativityitselfusingfurtherlawsofnature,orelsethoselaws,notrelativity,wouldbewhatisfundamental.esimpleviewimplies,then,thatgeneralrelativitycannotbeunderstoodÐaconclusionatoddswithourattributionsofunderstandingtocompetentphysicists.eresponsetotheobjectionis,ofcourse,todistinguishunderstandingwithandunderstandingwhy.Physicistsunderstandwithrelativity,andthatiswhatwemeanwhenwesaythattheyunderstandgeneralrelativity.ButtheydonotunderstandwhythetheoryofrelativityistrueÐwhy,forexample,massinteractswithspace-timeinthewaythatthetheorystipulates.Nooneunderstandsthat;perhapsnooneeverwill.¦.BriefObjectionsandRepliesObjection:Understandingisapreconditionfor,notaproductof,correctexpla-nation.Reply:Trueinmanyways.ªUnderstandingthatºandªunderstandingwithºarepreconditionsforeveryexplanation.Butunderstandingwhyaphenomenonobtainsisnotapreconditionforconstructinganexplanationofthatphe-nomenon;thetwoarriveastwins,likeproofandknowledgeinmathematics.Objection:ªUnderstandingwhyºcomesindegrees;correctlyexplainingisanallornothingmatter.Reply:First,distinctionscanbemadebetweencorrectexplanationsofthe .HereIassumethatalawcanbeexplainedonlyintermsofmorefundamentallaws.isisasubstantivepremise,butIknownoaccountofexplanationthatrejectsit.Õì Objection:Understandingisactive;itinvolvesnotonlythecomprehensionofatheorybuttheabilitytoputthetheorytouse(Grimmóþþä;deRegtóþþÉ).Sounderstandingcannotbeamatterofmerelygraspingpropositions.Reply:Someunderstandingisarguablyactive,namely,understandingwith,ifitisinterpretedasinvolvinganabilitytoconstructexplanations.Insofarasunderstandingisamatterofªmerelyºgraspingpropositions,however,itisunderstandingwhy.usitispossibletohaveitbothways:acertainkindofunderstandingismatterofgraspingpropositions,andacertainkindofunderstandingisamatterofhavingaparticularability,buttheyarenotthesamekind.Whynotaddanactivecomponenttounderstandingwhy?Whynotinsist,forexample,thattounderstandaphenomenon,youmustnotonlygraspacorrectexplanationofthephenomenon,butbecapableofconstructingthatexplanationfromitsparts(deRegtandDieksóþþ¢;deRegtóþþÉ)?Sucharequirementisfartoostrongtocaptureordinaryunderstandingtalk,Ithink:wemayunderstandtidalphenomena,say,withouthavingtheabilityÐforlackofphysicalimagination,mathematicalcreativity,orwhateverÐtoputtogetheranexplanationofthetidesfromgravitationalphysics.Tohavesuchanabilityisnodoubtstrongevidenceforunderstanding,butitisnotapreconditionforunderstanding.Perhapssomethingweakercouldbeaddedinstead;say,thattounderstandaphenomenonistohavetheabilitytoseehowitsoccurrencetsacorrectexplanatorymodel?atabilityisalreadyrequiredbythesimpleview:tograspwhatIcalledinthepreviousreplyanexplanation'sstateofinterrelationistoseehowtheexplanandumfollowsfromthemodel.Objection:Lipton(óþþÉ)givesgoodreasonstothinkthatunderstandingcancomebygraspingfactsthatarenotexplanatory.Reply:IconsidertwoofLipton'sexampleshere;suceittosaythattheydonotexhaustthecontentofthissubtlepaper(anotheraspectofwhichIÕ¢ Casetwo.Inamatchbetweentwoboxers,MalloyandWilson,itisagreedthatMalloywilltakeafallinthetenthround,althoughheisthefarsuperiorboxer.Asithappens,WilsonfellsMalloyinthehroundwithaªluckyuppercutº.LiptonarguesthatsomeonewhoknowsonlythattheghtisxedinWilson'sfavorcanunderstandwhyWilsonwins,eventhoughtheexplanationofthewindependsentirelyonthefortuitouspunch,astateofaairsindependentofthematch-xing.Itseemstomequitetendentious,however,thatthereisgenuineunder-standinginthiscase.Lipton'sspectatormaythinkthattheyunderstandwhyWilsonwon,buttheydonot,becausetheygraspthewrongexplanationforthematch'sresult.(Ishouldalsoaddthatanumberofwritershavearguedthatªbackupcausesºsuchasthematch-xingarrangementdofeatureincorrectscienticexplanationsÐseeforexampleRailton(ÕÉÕ)ontheimportanceoftherobustnessofcausalprocessesinstatisticalmechanics,JacksonandPettit(ÕÉÉó)andWoodward(óþþì)ÐalthoughIdonotmyselfthinkthatthisisquitecorrect.)Objection:WhatabouttheVerstehentraditioninthesocialsciences?Reply:esubjectofthispaperisakindofunderstandingthatisfoundacrossthesciences,inphysicsandbiologyaswellasinanthropologyandsociology.equestionwhetherthereisaspecialkindofunderstandingpropertothelatterdisciplineswouldrequireanintensiveexaminationofthedierencesbetweenthenaturalandhumansciences,somethingthatiswellbeyondthescopeofthispaper.¢.Conclusionerearethreesensesinwhichitcanbesaidthatyouun-derstandastateofaairs:youmightunderstandthatitobtains,youmightunderstandwhyitobtains,andifitisatheoryoratheorypart,youmightunderstandhowtouseittoexplainotherstatesofaairs.eseareunder- fascinatingquestionthatcannotpossiblybeadequatelytreatedhere.Õß 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