To understand why a phenomenon occurs is to grasp a correct explanation of the phenomenon To understand a scienti57501c theory is to be able to construct or at least to grasp a range of potential explanations in which that theory accounts for other ID: 6045 Download Pdf
Understanding the methods for the lifecycle prediction for a product enables the customer to consider the tangible value of the product beyond setfeatures before purchasing it MTBF MTTR MTTF and FIT are reliability terms based on methods and procedu
. Mapping . Strand – reflecting on professional practice. John Wardle, Centre for Science Education, Sheffield Hallam University. Mapping strand. Purpose. Produce a framework to encourage teachers to review and classify practical tasks. Enable:.
Why we have made changes to the Key Stage 1 and 2 curriculum. What the changes are including an overview of English and Maths. How we have organised the curriculum into a new two year rolling programme.
A brief description about the politics of history, and where you may fit into the grand narrative of history. Let’s discuss history…. A form of story telling created by humans. Reflects cultural, social, economic conditions.
What is history?. Explaining the past. Understanding the past. Historians devote considerable energy to establishing what happened and then to . why. We know WWI happened but what were the main reasons.
scientia. ," meaning knowledge. . Scientific Theories are not "tentative ideas" or "hunches". . The word "theory" is often used this way in everyday conversation, . but a theory in science refers to a highly probable, well-tested comprehensive explanation, usually for a large collection of observations. .
of . Biology. 1.2 Science in . Context----Outline. Exploration and Discovery: Where Ideas Come From. What . scientific attitudes help generate new ideas?. 1) Scientific Attitudes. 2) Practical Problems.
Michael Lacewing. enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk. (c) Michael Lacewing. Life. Isn’t life amazing?. Organs serve a purpose – heart – pump blood, eye – seeing. We understand parts of an organ in relation to serving this purpose.
research in library/information science. . David . Bawden. Department of Library and Information Science. City University London. To measure is to know.. If you can not measure it. you can not improve it.
We’ve expanded. We can give ‘Merit and Potential’ offers. New for 2017-18: Greater freedom of module choice for students. Lots of joint-honours options. We are a gender balanced department. Diversity and Inclusion Group (DIG).
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To understand why a phenomenon occurs is to grasp a correct explanation of the phenomenon To understand a scienti57501c theory is to be able to construct or at least to grasp a range of potential explanations in which that theory accounts for other
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doeshavetheimplicationpromisedinthetitle,thatexplanationisessentiallyinvolvedinscienticunderstanding,andthatthenormsofcorrectscienticexplanationlogicallyprecedeandparticipateindeterminingthenatureandnormsofunderstanding.Doesthesimpleviewneedadefense?Somethinglikeitcanbefoundinmanydierentphilosophicalworksonunderstanding(deRegtandDieksóþþ¢;Grimmóþþä;KhalifaóþÕó),althoughsomeofthesewriterswouldliketocomplicatetherecipewithadditionalingredients(seesection¦).YetIdonotthinkthatthefundamentalpiecesoftheviewhavebeenlaidoutinsucientdetailÐbesideswhich,ifthetitleofthiscollection,ªUnderstandingwithoutExplanationºisanyguide,thesimpleviewishardlyoutofdanger.AlthoughIadvocatethesimpleview,Iwillarguethatitoughttoberegardedasonepartofabiggerpicture.ebiggerpicturewillbuildonthecentralideaofthesimpleview,thatscienticunderstandingisamatterofhavingtherightepistemicrelationtoanexplanationorexplanationsÐandsothatinscience,thereisnounderstandingwithoutexplanation.Õ.ExplanationGraspingacorrectexplanation.Whatisanexplanation,suchthatitcanbegrasped?Itcanbeassumed,Ithinkwithoutanylossofgenerality,thatanexplana-tionisasetofpropositionswithacertainstructure.Suchacharacterizationiswellsuited,ofcourse,tocaptureHempel'sdeductive-nomologicalandinductive-statisticalaccountsofexplanation(HempelandOppenheimÕɦ;HempelÕÉä¢),alongwithotheraccountsaccordingtowhichexplanationshavetheformofarguments,whethertheargumentsareexplanatoryendsinthemselvesorwhethertheyrepresentstructuralelementsofreality,suchastheinstantiationofunifyingpatterns(KitcherÕÉÕ)orcausalprocesses(Strevensóþþ).Butalmostanyviewofexplanationcanbeputintheseterms.OnSalmon's(ÕÉßþ)statisticalrelevanceview,forexample,anexplanationisatableofó fromªunderstandingthatº:youmightbeexquisitely,incandescentlyawareofthecat'sbeingonthematwithouthavingtheslightestcluehowitgotthere.íesimpleviewisananalysisofunderstandingwhy,aviewthatiscouchedintermsofgraspingpropositions,whichisamatterofunderstandingthat.Ihavenoaccountofunderstandingthat,buttovoidthechargeofcircularity,itisenoughtoobservethatitisentirelydistinctfromunderstandingwhy.Letmetrytosayalittlemore,however,aboutthisunderstandingthat,thisgrasping.Isgraspingthatastateofaairsholdsthesamethingasknowingthatitholds?erearevariousdimensionsalongwhichthisquestionmightbeexplored.Youmight,forexample,askwhethertograspthatastateofaairsholdsyoumustbejustiedinbelievingthatitholds,andifso,whetherthisjusticationcanbeªGettier-izedº.Iwillnotattemptaninvestigationofsuchquestions;letmerathergiveonereasonthatgraspingmustbesomethingoverandaboveknowledge(therebydissentingfromtheviewofKhalifa(óþÕó),whootherwisepresentssomethingmuchlikethesimpleview).Someonewithrelativelylittleunderstandingofchemistrycan,Ithink,knowthatwaterismadeupofHóO,orthatmercuryisametal.Buttheydonottherebygraspthatthesestatesofaairsholdinthesenserequiredforunderstandingthechemicalpropertiesofwaterormercury.Inthesamewaythatunderstandingthatthecatisonthematrequiresanappreciationofthe ì.Bestnottotreatthewordªwhyºinªunderstandingwhyºasanimplicitrestriction:somekindsofunderstandingwhywouldbemoreidiomaticallyexpressedasunderstandinghow(Khalifainpress).Forexample,itisperhapsmorenaturaltospeakofunderstandinghowthedinosaurswentextinctthanunderstandingwhytheywentextinct,thoughthereisnointerestingdierencebetweenthetwo:eitherway,whatisrequiredisacorrectexplanationoftheextinction.¦.CompareHempel's(ÕÉä¢,§¦.Õ)discussionofvarioussensesofthetermexplanation.Kvanvig(óþþì)makesabroadlysimilar,thoughnotidentical,distinctionbetweenªobjectualunderstandingºandªpropositionalunderstandingº.Hisªexplanatoryunderstandingº,aspeciesofobjectualunderstanding,ismoreorlessmyunderstandingwhy.¢.ForadiscussionofthegrowingliteratureonthistopicfromGrimm,Kvanvig,andothers,seeMorris(inpress).¦ nameforthisdirectapprehension.ØWhatisgrasping,orunderstandingthat,ordirectapprehension,then?Itisthefundamentalrelationbetweenmindandworld,invirtueofwhichthemindhaswhateverfamiliarityitdoeswiththewaytheworldis.equestionofthenatureofthisrelationisperhapsthedeepestinallphilosophy;Iwillnottrytomakeanyprogressonitinthispaper.atmeans,ofcourse,thatthispaperwillnotpretendtogiveacompleteaccountofunderstandingwhy;itsaimisrathertoshowhowsuchanaccountshoulddependonindependentaccountsofgraspingandofexplanation(thelatterofwhichwearemuchclosertohaving,Ithink,thantheformer).Letmegiveanswerstotwoshortquestionsaboutgrasping,however.First:isgraspingfactive?Mustthecatbeonthemat,ifyouaretograspthatthecatisonthemat?Factivityseemstobeimpliedbytheªgraspingthatºlocution;nevertheless,afriendofthesimpleviewmight,Isuppose,ndthisimplicationunwelcome.Letmethereforebrieydevelopanon-factivenotiontoparallelªgraspingthatº.Supposethatgraspinghastwocomponents:apurelypsychological(orªnarrowº)component,andtheobtainingofthegraspedstateofaairs.Whatiswantedisthepurelypsychologicalstate,thestatethatwouldpersistinyourmindifanevildemon,atthemomentofyourgraspingthatthecatisonthemat,destroyedthecatwhilemaintaininginyourmindtheappearanceofanenmattedcat.Callthisstategrasping*.enthesimpleviewmightbereformulatedasfollows:Anindividualhasscienticunderstandingofaphenomenonjustincasetheygrasp*acorrectscienticexplanationofthatphenomenon.Inmyview,anexplanationiscorrectonlyifitsconstitutivepropositionsaretrue,sothisreformulationisadierencethatmakesnodierence,butthenotionofgrasping*willndaphilosophicaluseinwhatfollows. ä.WhatIhavesaidintheseparagraphsiscompatible,note,withtheviewthatunderstand-ingthatisaspecialkindofknowledge(Grimmóþþä),hencethatknowledgeisnecessarybutnotsucientforunderstandingthat.ä necessaryconditionforscienticunderstanding.Andyet...considerthreereasonsforthinkingthatamorenuancedatti-tudetoexplanatorycorrectnessisrequired.First,manyexplanatorymodelsinsciencecontainidealizations;inter-pretedliterally,thesemodelsarefalse.Scientistsgainunderstanding,never-theless,bygraspingidealizedmodels.Areasontoabandonthesimpleview'srequirementofexplanatorycorrectness(Elginóþþß)?No;atmostareasontousethetermcorrectratherthan,say,trueÐasthesimpleviewalreadydoes.Why?eapparentfalsehoodofsomemodelsdoesnotstandinthewayofexplanation,butthatofothersÐastheyoungearthcreationistcaseshowsÐmostcertainlydoes.eformerclassofmodelsareªcorrectºinasensethatthelatterclassarenot.eircorrectnesscannot,ofcourse,consistintheirliteraltruth.Butifidealizingexplanationisgovernedbyanystandardatall,thereisatranslationmanualthat,foranyidealizedmodelandcontextof(re)production,picksoutasetofpropositionsthatstatethefactsabouttheworldthatmustobtainifthemodelistobeexplanatory,andinvirtueofwhichthemodelisexplanatory,iftheydoobtain.Calltheseputativefactstheexplanatorycontentofthemodel.Inthesimplestkindofidealizedmodel,ªAllFsareGºmighttranslateto,thushavetheexplanatorycontent,ªAlmostallFsareGº.OritmighthavetheexplanatorycontentªInconditionsC,allFsareGº,wheretheconditionsCaredeterminedbythecontextofproductionÐtheintentionsoftheexplainer,forexample.Myownviewofthenatureofthetranslationmanualismorecomplex(Strevensóþþ,chap.).IholdthatidealizationsthatappeartomakesomefalseassumptionabouttheworldÐforexample,theassumptionthattherearenolong-rangeintermolecularforces(intheidealgasmodel),thatbiologicalpopulationsareinnite(insomeevolutionarymodels),thathumanshaveperfectinstrumentalrationality(ineconomicmodels)Ðinfactmaketrueclaimsaboutdierence-making. SofarIhaveputthebroadandnarrowsensesofunderstandingwhyonapar.Letmenowdiscriminate:Ithinkthatoureverydayattributionsofunderstandingarealmostalwaysbroad.Forexample,Icannotthinkofanyconversationalcontextinwhichitiscorrecttosay,withoutfrantichedging,thattheyoungearthcreationistsunderstandtheformationoftheGrandCanyon,orthatthephlogistontheoristsunderstoodcombustion.(Perhapsyoucansaythatthephlogistontheoristshadawayofunderstandingcom-bustion,butthatitwasanincorrectway,andsotheydidnotachievetheunderstandingthattheysought.)Further,Idonotthinkthathavingnarrowunderstandingisthatmuchcloserthanhavingbroadunderstandingtothepurelyphenomenalªsenseofunderstandingº.Eveniftheyoungearthcreationists'explanationweretoviolatetheinternalstandardsforexplanatoriness,theymightexperienceasenseofunderstanding,apsychologicalorbrainstateÐtheringofU-bers?Ðwhichpresumablycaninpathologicalcasesbecomeuncoupledfromanyexplanatorynorm(Troutóþþß).ethirdreasontothinkthatthecorrectnessofanexplanationis(atleastsometimes)toohighastandardforunderstandingarisesinsomecaseswhenitisatheory,ratherthanaphenomenonorstateofaairs,thatisthesubjectoftheunderstandingclaim:sometimeswetalkaboutunderstandingfalsetheories.HighschoolgraduatesareexpectedtounderstandNewtonianphysics;historiansofchemistryaresupposedtounderstandphlogistontheory;andmanycosmologistsfeelthattheyunderstandtheinationmodeloftheearlyuniverseinasensethatisindependentofwhetheritultimatelyturnsouttobecorrect.isrepresents,Isuggest,athirdsenseofªunderstandingºthatmightbecalledunderstandingwith;theobjectofthisunderstandingis,asIhavesaid,atheoryratherthanaphenomenonorstateofaairs.Likeunderstandingwhy,andunlikeunderstandingthat,understandingwithinvolvesmasteringascienticexplanation:tounderstandatheoryinthisnewsenseistobeÕÕ intheªwhyºsenseistograspacorrectexplanationofthatthing.Itfollowsthatwhateverhasnoexplanation,cannotbeunderstood.Counterexample:Asfarasweknow,generalrelativityisafundamentaltheory(putasideitsdicultrelationshipwithquantummechanics).Assuch,ithasnoscienticexplanation;wecanuserelativitytoexplainmanythings,butwecannotexplainrelativityitselfusingfurtherlawsofnature,orelsethoselaws,notrelativity,wouldbewhatisfundamental.esimpleviewimplies,then,thatgeneralrelativitycannotbeunderstoodÐaconclusionatoddswithourattributionsofunderstandingtocompetentphysicists.eresponsetotheobjectionis,ofcourse,todistinguishunderstandingwithandunderstandingwhy.Physicistsunderstandwithrelativity,andthatiswhatwemeanwhenwesaythattheyunderstandgeneralrelativity.ButtheydonotunderstandwhythetheoryofrelativityistrueÐwhy,forexample,massinteractswithspace-timeinthewaythatthetheorystipulates.Nooneunderstandsthat;perhapsnooneeverwill.¦.BriefObjectionsandRepliesObjection:Understandingisapreconditionfor,notaproductof,correctexpla-nation.Reply:Trueinmanyways.ªUnderstandingthatºandªunderstandingwithºarepreconditionsforeveryexplanation.Butunderstandingwhyaphenomenonobtainsisnotapreconditionforconstructinganexplanationofthatphe-nomenon;thetwoarriveastwins,likeproofandknowledgeinmathematics.Objection:ªUnderstandingwhyºcomesindegrees;correctlyexplainingisanallornothingmatter.Reply:First,distinctionscanbemadebetweencorrectexplanationsofthe .HereIassumethatalawcanbeexplainedonlyintermsofmorefundamentallaws.isisasubstantivepremise,butIknownoaccountofexplanationthatrejectsit.Õì Objection:Understandingisactive;itinvolvesnotonlythecomprehensionofatheorybuttheabilitytoputthetheorytouse(Grimmóþþä;deRegtóþþÉ).Sounderstandingcannotbeamatterofmerelygraspingpropositions.Reply:Someunderstandingisarguablyactive,namely,understandingwith,ifitisinterpretedasinvolvinganabilitytoconstructexplanations.Insofarasunderstandingisamatterofªmerelyºgraspingpropositions,however,itisunderstandingwhy.usitispossibletohaveitbothways:acertainkindofunderstandingismatterofgraspingpropositions,andacertainkindofunderstandingisamatterofhavingaparticularability,buttheyarenotthesamekind.Whynotaddanactivecomponenttounderstandingwhy?Whynotinsist,forexample,thattounderstandaphenomenon,youmustnotonlygraspacorrectexplanationofthephenomenon,butbecapableofconstructingthatexplanationfromitsparts(deRegtandDieksóþþ¢;deRegtóþþÉ)?Sucharequirementisfartoostrongtocaptureordinaryunderstandingtalk,Ithink:wemayunderstandtidalphenomena,say,withouthavingtheabilityÐforlackofphysicalimagination,mathematicalcreativity,orwhateverÐtoputtogetheranexplanationofthetidesfromgravitationalphysics.Tohavesuchanabilityisnodoubtstrongevidenceforunderstanding,butitisnotapreconditionforunderstanding.Perhapssomethingweakercouldbeaddedinstead;say,thattounderstandaphenomenonistohavetheabilitytoseehowitsoccurrencetsacorrectexplanatorymodel?atabilityisalreadyrequiredbythesimpleview:tograspwhatIcalledinthepreviousreplyanexplanation'sstateofinterrelationistoseehowtheexplanandumfollowsfromthemodel.Objection:Lipton(óþþÉ)givesgoodreasonstothinkthatunderstandingcancomebygraspingfactsthatarenotexplanatory.Reply:IconsidertwoofLipton'sexampleshere;suceittosaythattheydonotexhaustthecontentofthissubtlepaper(anotheraspectofwhichIÕ¢ Casetwo.Inamatchbetweentwoboxers,MalloyandWilson,itisagreedthatMalloywilltakeafallinthetenthround,althoughheisthefarsuperiorboxer.Asithappens,WilsonfellsMalloyinthehroundwithaªluckyuppercutº.LiptonarguesthatsomeonewhoknowsonlythattheghtisxedinWilson'sfavorcanunderstandwhyWilsonwins,eventhoughtheexplanationofthewindependsentirelyonthefortuitouspunch,astateofaairsindependentofthematch-xing.Itseemstomequitetendentious,however,thatthereisgenuineunder-standinginthiscase.Lipton'sspectatormaythinkthattheyunderstandwhyWilsonwon,buttheydonot,becausetheygraspthewrongexplanationforthematch'sresult.(Ishouldalsoaddthatanumberofwritershavearguedthatªbackupcausesºsuchasthematch-xingarrangementdofeatureincorrectscienticexplanationsÐseeforexampleRailton(ÕÉÕ)ontheimportanceoftherobustnessofcausalprocessesinstatisticalmechanics,JacksonandPettit(ÕÉÉó)andWoodward(óþþì)ÐalthoughIdonotmyselfthinkthatthisisquitecorrect.)Objection:WhatabouttheVerstehentraditioninthesocialsciences?Reply:esubjectofthispaperisakindofunderstandingthatisfoundacrossthesciences,inphysicsandbiologyaswellasinanthropologyandsociology.equestionwhetherthereisaspecialkindofunderstandingpropertothelatterdisciplineswouldrequireanintensiveexaminationofthedierencesbetweenthenaturalandhumansciences,somethingthatiswellbeyondthescopeofthispaper.¢.Conclusionerearethreesensesinwhichitcanbesaidthatyouun-derstandastateofaairs:youmightunderstandthatitobtains,youmightunderstandwhyitobtains,andifitisatheoryoratheorypart,youmightunderstandhowtouseittoexplainotherstatesofaairs.eseareunder- fascinatingquestionthatcannotpossiblybeadequatelytreatedhere.Õß ReferencesdeRegt,H.W.(óþþÉ).eepistemicvalueofunderstanding.PhilosophyofScienceßä:¢¢±¢Éß.deRegt,H.W.andD.Dieks.(óþþ¢).Acontextualapproachtoscienticunderstanding.SyntheseÕ¦¦:Õìß±Õßþ.Elgin,C.(ÕÉÉÉ).Educationandtheadvancementofunderstanding.IneProceedingsoftheTwentiethWorldCongressofPhilosophy,volumeì,pp.ÕìÕ±Õ¦þ.ÐÐÐ.(óþþß).Understandingandthefacts.PhilosophicalStudiesÕìó:ì챦ó.Grimm,S.R.(óþþä).Isunderstandingaspeciesofknowledge?BritishJournalforthePhilosophyofScience¢ß:¢Õ¢±¢ì¢.Hempel,C.G.(ÕÉä¢).Aspectsofscienticexplanation.InAspectsofScienticExplanation,chap.Õó,pp.ììÕ±¦Éä.FreePress,NewYork.Hempel,C.G.andP.Oppenheim.(Õɦ).Studiesinthelogicofexplanation.PhilosophyofScienceÕ¢:Õ좱Õߢ.Jackson,F.andP.Pettit.(ÕÉÉó).Indefenseofexplanatoryecumenism.Eco-nomicsandPhilosophy:Õ±óÕ.Khalifa,K.(óþÕó).Inauguratingunderstandingorrepackagingexplanation?PhilosophyofScienceßÉ:Õ¢±ìß.ÐÐÐ.(Inpress).Isunderstandingexplanatoryorobjectual?Synthese.Kitcher,P.(ÕÉÕ).Explanatoryunication.PhilosophyofScience¦:¢þß±¢ìÕ.Kvanvig,J.L.(óþþì).eValueofKnowledgeandthePursuitofUnderstanding.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge.ÕÉ
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