Advisor Professor Frank YS Lin Present by Hubert JW Wang Outline Introduction Motivation Problem Description 2010107 2 NTU OPLab Introduction Background The rapid advancement of wireless technologies has enabled a broad class of new applications ID: 323908
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Slide1
Research Direction Introduction
Advisor: Professor Frank Y.S. Lin
Present by Hubert J.W. WangSlide2
OutlineIntroduction
Motivation
Problem Description
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NTU OPLabSlide3
IntroductionSlide4
BackgroundThe rapid advancement of wireless technologies has enabled a broad class of new applications.
Some of the applications are safety-critical or life-critical such as:
Patient tracking
Traffic monitoring
Emergency rescue and recovery
Etc.
Availability has became a critical issue in wireless
network.
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NTU OPLabSlide5
Jamming attackDefinitions
Jamming
is any attack to deny
service
to legitimate users by generating noise or fake
protocol packets or legitimate packets but with spurious timing.[1]
Jamming refers to blocking of a communication channel with the intent of preventing the flow of any information.[2]
Jamming
attacks exploit
the shared
nature of the wireless medium in order to
prevent devices
from communicating or receiving
.[4]
….
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NTU OPLabSlide6
Jamming attack(cont’)
Nature of wireless networks.
Countermeasures
Mitigation
Prevention
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NTU OPLabSlide7
Wireless Mesh NetworkA WMN is dynamically
self-organized
and
self-configured
, with the nodes in the network automatically establishing and maintaining mesh connectivity among themselves.
Wireless
Mesh Networks(WMNs) consist of :
Mesh routers
Mesh clients
The integration of WMNs with other networks can be accomplished through the gateway and bridging functions in the mesh router.
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NTU OPLabSlide8
Wireless Mesh Network(cont’)
Architectures
Infrastructure/Backbone WMNs
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Wireless Mesh Network(cont’)
Architectures
Client WMNs
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Wireless Mesh Network(cont’)
Architectures
Hybrid WMNs
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NTU OPLabSlide11
Wireless Mesh Network(cont’)
Characteristics
Multi-hop wireless
network
Extend the overage range with out sacrificing the channel capacity
Provide non-line-of-sight(NLOS) connectivity among the users with out direct line-of-sight links.
Multiple
radios
Integration
Mobility
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NTU OPLabSlide12
MotivationSlide13
Literature Survey – Jamming Attack[4]Jamming sensor networks: attack and defense strategies
W.
Xu
, et al.,
Network
, IEEE,
vol. 20, pp. 41-47,
2006
Models of jammers:
Constant jammer
Deceptive jammer
Random jammer
Reactive jammer
Detection Strategies:
PDR
Carrier sensing time
Signal strength
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NTU OPLabSlide14
Literature Survey – Countermeasures[2]Using
honeynodes
for defense against jamming attacks in wireless infrastructure-based
networks
S.
Misra
, et
al.,
Computers & Electrical Engineering,
vol. 36, pp. 367-382,
2010
Mitigation techniques
Channel
Surfing
Spatial
Retreats
Using
WormholesMapping
jammed regions
Spread
Spectrum Techniques
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NTU OPLabSlide15
Literature Survey – Countermeasures(cont’)
The general approaches used for tackling jamming attacks consist of the following steps:
Attack detection
Attack mitigation
Attack prevention
Using
honeynodes
to prevent jamming attack from affecting the communication channel:
Sending fake traffic on a nearby channel
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NTU OPLabSlide16
Literature Survey – Countermeasures(cont’)
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NTU OPLab
2405MHz
Base Station
2400 MHz
Honeynode
Jammer 1
2430 MHz
Base Station
Hop
Run
Jamming
Jammer 2Slide17
Literature Survey – Countermeasures(cont’)
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NTU OPLab
2405 MHz
Base Station
2400 MHz
Honeynode
Jammer
Jamming
2425 MHz
Base Station
2420 MHz
Honeynode
Jammer
Jamming
Random
ScanSlide18
Literature Survey – Jammer localization
Three challenges of jammer localization
Jammers will not comply with localization protocols.[6]
Require special infrastructure(e.g. ultrasound, infrared or laser infrastructures).[5-7]
Jamming has disturbed network communication.[6]
Unable to transmit the localization info out or the jamming area.
Should not require extensive communication among network nodes.
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NTU OPLabSlide19
Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
[5]Lightweight
Jammer Localization in Wireless Networks: System Design and
Implementation
K.
Pelechrinis
, et al
.,
Global Telecommunications Conference, 2009. GLOBECOM 2009. IEEE
, 2009, pp. 1-6
.
Simple localization method which
relies on PDR
Distributed
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Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
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NTU OPLabSlide21
Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
[6]Localizing
jammers in wireless
networks
H. Liu
, et al
.
,
IEEE
International Conference on
, 2009, pp.
1-6
Existing range-free techniques
Centroid Localization(CL)
Weighted Centroid Localization(WCL)
The accuracy of those method is extremely sensitive to node densities.
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NTU OPLabSlide22
Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
Virtual Force Iterative Localization(VFIF)
Use CL to perform initial position
Re-estimate the location until the estimated jammer’s position is closed to the real location
Termination
When the jammed region contains all the jammed nodes and
all boundary nodes falls out of the region.
Iteration
The jammed nodes will
pull
the jammed region toward themselves,
while the boundary nodes will
push
the jammed region away from them
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NTU OPLabSlide23
Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
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Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
Pull and Push function
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Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
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Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
[7]Wireless
Jamming Localization by Exploiting Nodes’ Hearing
Ranges
Z. Liu
, et al
.
,
Distributed
Computing in Sensor Systems
. vol.
6131,2010
, pp.
348-361
Hearing-range-based localization scheme
A jammer may reduce the size of a node’s hearing range
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NTU OPLabSlide27
Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
The effect of Jamming on the Communication Range
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NTU OPLabSlide28
Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
The effect of Jamming on Network Topology
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NTU OPLabSlide29
Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
Jammer Localization Algorithm
where
is
the hearing
range of node A
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NTU OPLabSlide30
Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
Estimating the hearing range
Average of:
The location of the
furthest
remaining neighbor(lower bound)
The location of
the
nearest lost
neighbor(upper bound)
Estimation error between:
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NTU OPLabSlide31
Literature Survey – Jammer localization(cont’)
The nodes that can contribute to the jamming localization have to satisfy the following requirements:
They have a reduced hearing range.
The new hearing range under jamming attack can be estimated.
They are able to transmit the new hearing range out of the jammed range.
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NTU OPLabSlide32
Problem DescriptionSlide33
Problem DescriptionProblem
Jamming attack
Environment
Infrastructure/Backbone
WMNs
Role
Attacker
Defender
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NTU OPLabSlide34
DefenderAttributes
Nodes
Base
Station
Mesh
router(with 2
NICs)
Mesh client
Honeynode
(with 3 NICs)
Guard Node
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Defender(cont’)
Attributes
Budget
Planning
phase
Non-deception based
Deception
based
Defending
phase
Localization
Approximate
Precise
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Defender(cont’)
Strategies
Preventing the attacker from obtaining topology information.
Distracting the attacker
Real-time reaction
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AttackerAttributes
Budget
Preparing
phase
Mainly
small-scale jammers
Mainly
large-scale jammers
Attacking
phase
Compromising
mesh
router
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NTU OPLabSlide38
Attacker(cont’)
Strategies
Preparing phase
Node compromising
Defense resources oriented
Easiest to
find
Jamming
Range
oriented
User
number oriented
Traffic
oriented
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Scenario2010/10/7
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Base Station
Mesh router
Honeynode
Compromised mesh router
Jammed mesh router
Jammer
AttackerSlide40
Scenario – Defender Strategy
1(Preventing)
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Base Station
Mesh router
Which mesh router is important?Slide41
Scenario – Defender Strategy
1
(Preventing
)(
cont
’)
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Near Base Station
?
Base Station
Mesh routerSlide42
Scenario – Defender Strategy 1(Preventing)(
cont
’)
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NTU OPLab
The one with the most users
?
Base Station
Mesh routerSlide43
Scenario – Defender Strategy
1(Preventing)
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the one with the highest connectivity?
Base Station
Mesh routerSlide44
Scenario – Defender Strategy 1(Preventing)(
cont
’)
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NTU OPLab
Or the one with the most traffic
?
Base Station
Mesh routerSlide45
Scenario – Defender
Strategy 2(Distracting)
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NTU OPLab
Where to distract the jammer?
Base Station
Mesh routerSlide46
Scenario – Defender Strategy 2(Distracting)(cont
’)
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NTU OPLab
Base Station
Mesh router
Honeynode
The
region
with the most users
?Slide47
Scenario – Defender Strategy 2(Distracting)(cont’)
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Or the
region
with the most traffic
?
Base Station
Mesh router
HoneynodeSlide48
Scenario – Defender Strategy
3(Real-time reaction)
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NTU OPLab
How to localize a jammer?
Base Station
Mesh router
Jammed mesh router
JammerSlide49
Scenario – Defender Strategy
3(Real-time reaction
) (
cont
’)
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Approximate the jammer’s location by the change of the range of boundary nodes.
Base Station
Mesh router
Jammed mesh router
JammerSlide50
Scenario – Defender Strategy
3(Real-time reaction
) (
cont
’)
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Send out a guard node to discover the precise hearing range of boundary nodes
Base Station
Mesh router
Jammed mesh router
Jammer
Gotcha!Slide51
Scenario – Attacker Strategy2010/10/7
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NTU OPLab
Which mesh router should I compromise?
Base Station
Mesh router
Compromised mesh router
AttackerSlide52
Scenario – Attacker Strategy 1(Defense resource oriented)2010/10/7
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Well, must not those who looks strong.
Base Station
Mesh router
Compromised mesh router
AttackerSlide53
Scenario – Attacker Strategy 2(Easiest to find)
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Maybe the one with the strongest signal power is a good choice
Base Station
Mesh router
Compromised mesh router
AttackerSlide54
Scenario – Attacker Strategy(Jamming)2010/10/7
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NTU OPLab
Which mesh router should I jam?
Base Station
Mesh router
Compromised mesh router
AttackerSlide55
Scenario – Attacker Strategy 3(Range oriented)
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The more the better.
Base Station
Mesh router
Compromised mesh router
Attacker
Jammed mesh routerSlide56
Scenario – Attacker Strategy 4(User number oriented)
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NTU OPLab
Base Station
Mesh router
Compromised mesh router
Attacker
Jammed mesh router
Ready to meet customers’ complaints?Slide57
Scenario – Attacker Strategy 5(Traffic oriented)
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Base Station
Mesh router
Compromised mesh router
Attacker
Jammed mesh routerSlide58
Scenario – Effect of jamming range2010/10/7
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Okay, there are still some boundary nodes.
Base Station
Mesh router
Compromised mesh router
Attacker
Jammed mesh routerSlide59
Scenario – Effect of jamming range2010/10/7
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Approximation is impossible. There is no boundary nodes.
Base Station
Mesh router
Compromised mesh router
Attacker
Jammed mesh routerSlide60
The EndThanks for your attention.2010/10/7
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NTU OPLabSlide61
ReferencesSlide62
References[1] D. J. Thuente and M. Acharya
, "Intelligent Jamming in Wireless Networks
with Applications
to 802.11b and Other Networks " in
Proc. of IEEE MILCOM, 2006.
[2] S. Misra, et al., "Using
honeynodes
for defense against jamming attacks in
wireless infrastructure-based
networks,"
Computers & Electrical Engineering, vol. 36, pp. 367-382, 2010.
[3] I. F. Akyildiz, et al., "Wireless mesh networks: a survey,"
Computer Networks, vol. 47, pp. 445-487, 2005.
[4] W.
Xu
, et al., "Jamming sensor networks: attack and defense strategies,"
Network, IEEE, vol. 20, pp. 41-47, 2006.
[5] K. Pelechrinis, et al., "Lightweight Jammer Localization in Wireless
Networks
: System Design and Implementation," in
Global
Telecommunications
Conference, 2009. GLOBECOM 2009. IEEE
, 2009, pp. 1-6.
[6] H. Liu
, et al.
, "Localizing jammers in wireless networks," in
Pervasive Computing
and
Communications, 2009.
PerCom
2009. IEEE International Conference on
,
2009
, pp. 1-6.
[7] Z. Liu
, et al.
, "Wireless Jamming Localization by Exploiting Nodes’ Hearing Ranges,"
in
Distributed Computing in Sensor Systems
. vol. 6131, R.
Rajaraman
, et al.
, Eds.,
ed
: Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 348-361.
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