Contents Writing Argument from Materialism A J Ayer Nahmias Harris Fate and Moral Responsibility Ciceros Argument Against Gods Foreknowledge If God knows how our lives will unfold then we have no free will ID: 524001
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Slide1
Free WillSlide2
Contents
Writing
Argument from Materialism
A. J.
Ayer
Nahmias
HarrisSlide3
Fate and Moral Responsibility
Cicero’s Argument Against God’s Foreknowledge
If God knows how our lives will unfold, then we have no free will.
If we have no free will, then we are not morally responsible.
This could be used as an argument against moral responsibility, but…Slide4
Fate and Moral Responsibility
Cicero’s Argument Against God’s Foreknowledge
If God knows how our lives will unfold, then we have no free will.
If we have no free will, then we are not morally responsible.
But we are morally responsible!
So, even God does not have complete foreknowledge.Slide5
Fate and Moral Responsibility
Cicero’s Argument assumes that if we could not have acted otherwise, then we cannot be held morally responsible for than action.
In other words, necessity and free will appear to be incompatible.Slide6
Materialism and Moral ResponsibilitySlide7
Materialism and Moral Responsibility
What’s wrong with the following line of reasoning?
Or, if nothings wrong with it, what are we justified in concluding?
The argument purports to show that if we are entirely material, then we don’t deserve punishment for any of our actions no matter how terrible. Note that this is logically equivalent to saying that if we
do
deserve punishment for at least some bad action, then we are not entirely material.Because the argument is complex, it purports to show that other assumptions preclude deserving punishment as well.Slide8
Materialism and Moral Responsibility
We are entirely material beings.
If we are entirely material beings, then we are governed by the laws of physics.
If we are governed by the laws of physics, then our actions are determined (made necessary) by previous causes out of our control.
If our actions are determined by determined by previous causes out of our control, then we aren’t morally responsible for them.
If we aren’t morally responsible for our actions, then we don’t deserve punishment (or praise) for them.Thus, we do not deserve punishment (or praise) for any of our actions.Slide9
Materialism and Moral Responsibility
If we are governed by the laws of physics, then our actions are determined (made necessary) by previous causes out of our control.
Causal Determinism: Every event is causally determined to happen by some other event. (In other words, the cause, C, could not have happened without being followed by the effect, E. Or, given that C occurred, E was necessary.)Slide10
Materialism and Moral Responsibility
If our actions are determined by determined by previous causes out of our control, then we aren’t morally responsible for them.
Principle of Alternate Possibilities: You
can’t be morally responsible for an action unless
you
could have done otherwise.Slide11
Materialism and Moral Responsibility
You can’t be morally responsible for an action unless you could have done otherwise
.
Mother Teresa could have stayed home and watched football.
Slide12
Materialism and Moral Responsibility
You
can’t be morally responsible for an action unless you could have done otherwise.
Leopold and Loeb could have refrained from killing Bobby Franks. Slide13
Materialism and Moral Responsibility
You
can’t be morally responsible for an action unless you could have done otherwise.
Wikus
Van de Merwe presents an unequivocal case of someone who could not have done otherwise.Slide14
Materialism and Moral Responsibility
We are entirely material beings.
If we are entirely material beings, then we are governed by the laws of physics.
If we are governed by the laws of physics, then our actions are determined (made necessary) by previous causes out of our control.
If our actions are determined by determined by previous causes out of our control, then we aren’t morally responsible for them.
If we aren’t morally responsible for our actions, then we don’t deserve punishment (or praise) for them.Thus, we do not deserve punishment (or praise) for any of our actions.Slide15
A. J. Ayer on Freedom and NecessitySlide16
A. J. Ayer on Freedom and Necessity
Principle of Alternate Possibilities: If you could not have done otherwise when you did something, then you are not morally responsible for it.
Causal Determinism: Every event is causally determined to happen by some other event.
Together, these principles seem to imply that you are not morally responsible for anything
.Slide17
A. J. Ayer on Freedom and Necessity
The Problem of Free Will
Two assumptions are in apparent conflict:
Freedom: We are capable of acting freely enough to be morally responsible.
Necessity: Human behavior is governed by causal laws.
Either reject at least one assumption, or show that the conflict is only apparent.The Determinist rejects Freedom.The “Moralist” rejects Necessity.Slide18
A. J. Ayer on Freedom and Necessity
The Problem of Free Will
Two assumptions are in apparent conflict:
Freedom: We are capable of acting freely enough to be morally responsible.
Necessity: Human behavior is governed by causal laws.
Either reject at least one assumption, or show that the conflict is only apparent.The Determinist rejects Freedom.The “Moralist” rejects Necessity.Ayer tries to show that the conflict is only apparent.Slide19
A. J. Ayer on Freedom and Necessity
Ayers will try to show that freedom and necessity can coexist.
The conflict between them is only apparent.
Once we have a better understanding of freedom, we will see that it is compatible with the idea that all our actions are causally determined.Slide20
A. J. Ayer on Freedom and Necessity
Ayers
I could have acted otherwise if and only if
I should have acted otherwise if I had so chosen
My deliberation has not ceased to be a causal factor in my behavior, and
Nobody compelled me to do as I did.Slide21
A. J. Ayer on Freedom and Necessity
Ayers
Wikus
is thus not acting freely.
The man with the cattle prod, however, may be acting freely when he force
Wikus to pull the trigger.Slide22
A. J. Ayer on Freedom and Necessity
Ayers
I could have acted otherwise if and only if
I should have acted otherwise if I had so chosen
My deliberation has not ceased to be a causal factor in my behavior, and
Nobody compelled me to do as I did.But why do we choose what we choose?How do we deliberate?Aren’t these processes themselves subject to causal law?Slide23
A. J. Ayer on Freedom and Necessity
Granted, there is a significant distinction between the kleptomaniac and the thief, but what is it? And does it justify holding some people morally responsible?
The typical thief steels because he or she wants to steel.
Leopold and Loeb murdered Franks because, similarly, they wanted to do it.
But isn’t that also the general form of Mother Teresa’s deliberation?
Can we justifiably blame thieves and murders for doing what they want to do while praising Mother Teresa, when whatever it is that they want is part of who they are in the first place?Slide24
Free Will
Compatibilism
: Free will is compatible with determinism.
Incompatibilism
: Free will is incompatible with determinism.Slide25
NahmiasSlide26
Nahmias
Nahmias
: Science only appears to refute free will if we “define free will out of existence”.
Libet
ExperimentsDefinitions of Free WillHarris: Accepting determinism does not entail moral collapse; in fact, it may promote a more compassionate, equitable, and sane society.”
Bad Objection to Determinism: The Change of Subject
Bear ExampleSlide27
Nahmias
Libet
Experiments
Benjamin
Libet
(1983) showed that our EEG brain scans indicate that we are about to press a button before we can report our awareness of our attention to do so.Some people say this shows that the brain initiates action, not the conscious self.Slide28
Nahmias
Libet
Experiments
Nahmias
argues that the
Libet experiments do not rule out cases in which we deliberate and exercise self-control.Furthermore, some neural activity before you become aware of your “urge” to press the button is to be expected.Slide29
Nahmias
Two Definitions of Free Will
Nahmias
accuses some scientists of “defining free will out of existence.” They think of free will as requiring
by definition
an immaterial self independent of the laws of physics. Incompatibilist Free Will: The capacity to make choices with a self which is somehow unconstrained by the laws of nature.Compatibilist Free Will: The capacity to consciously entertain alternative courses of action, to deliberate about one’s reasons for choosing them, and to plan one’s actions accordingly carrying them despite competing desires.Slide30
Nahmias
Two Definitions of Free Will
Nahmias
argues that although
incompatibilist
free will is not supported by science, this doesn’t mean we have no free will. Instead, science shows us that free will does not conform to the incompatibilist definition. Indeed, when we learn about the brain, we discover how and in what ways we can exercise free will as defined by Nahmias
and other compatibilists.Slide31
Nahmias
Two Definitions of Free Will
Harris uses the
incompatibilist
definition, arguing that what we know about the brain tells us that no such free will exists.
So, while Nahmias and Harris appear to disagree about whether free will exists, they employ very different definitions.The free will Harris rejects is not the free will Nahmias defends.
And the capacities of deliberation and action that
Nahmias
believes are further revealed by neuroscience are not denied by Harris.
So do they disagree about anything?Slide32
HarrisSlide33
Harris
Bad Objection: A Change of Subject
Harris points out that some people argue that if we believe there is no free will, then we will be inclined to behave very badly.
But even if this is true, it doesn’t show that free will exists. In fact, the consequences of believing P don’t normally constitute evidence for P.
Such an objection changes the subject from
Do we have free will? to How would we act if we thought we had no free will?Slide34
Harris
Bear Example
Imagine you awake to find a mad bear charging at you, clearly intent on attacking.
You manage to escape.
Human Attacker
Imagine you awake to find a man with a butcher knife charging you, clearly intent on attacking.You manage to escape.Slide35
Harris
Bear Example
Imagine you awake to find a mad bear charging at you, clearly intent on attacking.
You manage to escape.
How would you feel later, upon seeing the bear safe in the zoo?
Human AttackerImagine you awake to find a man with a butcher knife charging you, clearly intent on attacking.
You manage to escape.
How would you feel later, upon seeing the man in court?Slide36
Harris
Bear Example
Harris holds that once we come to see the actions of others as determined by causes beyond our control, the impulse to hate is greatly diminished.
From a societal standpoint, we can “forget about retribution and concentrate entirely on mitigating harm”.
Rejecting the “traditional notion of free will” may result in a more compassionate, equitable, and sane society.”Slide37
End