Ahmad Alqasim 1 Agenda Problem Statement Power system vs smart grid Background Information Focus Point Privacy Attack Privacy Attack Countermeasures Jamming attack Jamming Attack Countermeasures ID: 596319
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Slide1
Smart Grid Security Challenges
Ahmad Alqasim
1Slide2
Agenda
Problem StatementPower system vs. smart grid
Background Information
Focus Point
Privacy AttackPrivacy Attack CountermeasuresJamming attackJamming Attack CountermeasuresConclusionDiscussion Time
2Slide3
Problem Statement
Analyze smart grid security challenges
Focus on:
Privacy
attack: Aims to illegally reach to the customer’s load profile (CLP)Jamming attack: Aims to cause a denial of service to the wireless system in home area network (HAN)
3Slide4
Traditional System vs. Smart Grid
Traditional Power system
One-way Interaction
Unable to meet the new energy demand
Customers only have a physical access to their electrical devicesDepends on complex distribution scheme and manual switchingSmart Grid System
Two-way Dialogue
More Efficient, Reliable, Secure and Greener
Allow customers to manage electricity usage and bill over the web
Automatically rerouting and restoring power delivery
4Slide5
IT Systems and Power Systems Integration
IT Systems
Power Systems
Smart Grid System
5
IntegrationSlide6
IT Systems and Power Systems Integration
IT Systems
Power Systems
Smart Grid
Operating Systems
WAN
TCP/IP
ICCP
/DNP3
EMS
SCADA
SCADA
EMS
WAN
Operating Systems
TCP/IP
ICCP
/DNP3
6Slide7
Conceptual Model
Market
Operations
Service
Provider
Customer
Distribution
Transmission
Bulk Generator
Electrical Flow
Secure Communication Flow
Domain
7Slide8
Focus Point
8
HAN
Distribution
Service Provider
Smart
Meter
Jamming Attack
Privacy AttackSlide9
Home Area Network (HAN)
9
ZigBee WirelessSlide10
Privacy Attack
Customer’s Load Profile (CLP
) stored in the smart meter
Represent the reading figures by different appliances during different periods of time
The service provider use the CLP to calculate the electricity priceA behavioral information about customer can be extracted from the CLPFor example: waking up or sleeping timeThe motivation to use these information can be: spying, burglary or business benefits
10Slide11
Privacy Attack
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Wake up time – 8:00 am
Evening Activities– 7 pm-10 pm
Reference : [Molina-Markham et al., 2010]
Customer’s Load Profile GraphSlide12
Privacy Countermeasures
Trusted Third Party (TTP)
High Frequency Encryption
De-Pseudonymization
Non-Intrusive load Levelling (NILL)12Slide13
Trusted Third Party (TTP)
The TTP Will not access to the smart meter. Rather, it will receive the reading figures and send them to the service provider
13
Smart Meter
Service Provider
Trusted Third Party (TTP)Slide14
High Frequency Encryption
The service provider can access to the LF in order to calculate the electrical bill
14
Unencrypted LF
Encrypted HF
Service ProviderSlide15
De-Pseudonymization
Aims to store customer personal information and load information in two different
databases
15
Address, name and phone
television, electrical consumptionSlide16
Non-Intrusive load Levelling (NILL)
Aims to mask the actual load profile without affecting the actual data
16
Actual CLP
Mask CLP
Masked CLP
1
2
BatterySlide17
Jamming Attack
Performed against ZigBee wireless in HAN
Hacker usually aims to prevent the smart meter from communicating with different appliances
In smart grid, the priority for
availability, then integrity and confidentialityJamming attack affects the availability of data17Slide18
Jamming Techniques and Types
Techniques
Spot Jamming
Sweep Jamming
Barrage JammingDeceptive JammingTypes
Constant Jammer
Deceptive Jammer
Random Jammer
Reactive Jammer
18Slide19
pseudorandom Sequence
Pseudorandom sequence is a key that only known by the sender and receiver
And aims to hide the SFD
19
Start of Delimiter Frame (SFD)
pseudorandom
Sequence
Packet
Mask the SFDSlide20
Frequency Hopping
The packet jumps between different frequencies. So, the jammer does not know exactly which frequency to jam
20
Washing
MachineSlide21
Wormhole-based Anti-jamming
21
Jammed Area
The wire cable is used in case the wireless range is jammed
Node 2
Node 2
Wireless Range
Wire Cable
Node 1Slide22
Conclusions
Smart grid provide more reliable, efficient and greener energy than power system
Privacy attack aims to develop a behavioral pattern about customers in order to perform a future action
Jamming attack aims to affect the availability of data and wireless communication in HAN
Current security tools are not completely suitable for smart grid. So, new tools have to be developedAnd, the cost of security system has to be justified to fit with the business requirement22Slide23
Discussion Time
23
Questions and Answers