THE ROLE OF THE IPCC IN POST INCIDENT MANAGEMENT PowerPoint Presentation, PPT - DocSlides

THE ROLE OF THE IPCC IN POST INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

Tim Godwin

Operations Team Leader

Objectives

Describe role of IPCC in a police shooting or other critical incident

Current IPCC expectations

from a PIP

Proposals

for the future

The IPCC’s purpose

Helping to increase confidence in the police service by increasing confidence in the police complaints system

Conducting independent scrutiny of death and serious injury incidents and others that meet the referral criteria

Referrals

The IPCC require death or serious injury incidents

to be referred as

mandatory referrals

APP guidance on referral

Incidents which:

Resulted in death or serious injury (DSI) – mandatory referral to the IPCC

Revealed failings in command

Caused danger to officers or the public

Article 2

Where a death occurs at the hands of the state, the burden is on the appropriate authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation for the death

In the absence of such explanation, Article 2 is breached

Article 2 and PIPs

Investigation must be:

Independent

Capable of leading to a determination as to

whether force was justified

Identify those responsible for use of force

Prompt and expeditious

Open to public scrutiny to ensure accountability

Duty to preserve evidence

From the point at which the police become aware of a DSI matter, they have the responsibility to ensure that evidence is not lost or compromised in any way. This may include, but is not limited to, securing any scene, protecting samples of forensic evidence and preventing the overwriting of visual or audio footage

IPCC Initial Response

Initial information provided by PSD/DPS including location of incident, location

of PIP and relevant contact details

Team Structure

4 investigators

1 Operations Team Leader per office

1 Operations Manager per office

Team Structure (out of hours)

2 – 4 investigators per region

1 Operations Team Leader per region

1 Operations Manager for the whole country

Deployment decision made

1-2 investigators to scene

1-2 investigators to PIP

Mode of Investigation

Investigator will either attend PIP:

In assessment mode

As the independent investigating authority (IIA) where independent investigation decision has been made

Assessment Mode

Before a decision has been made as to whether an incident will be investigated independently or not

Investigator will be gathering information and feeding it back to the Operation Manager so a decision can be made

AA has direction and control

Independent investigating authority

Declared independent investigation

IPCC has direction and control

IPCC will attend scene to provide oversight or direction and control. Aim is to ensure independence of evidential recoveryWill consult with police experts and may rely on: CSM and SOCOPOLSACordonsWeapons recoveryTechnical expertise

IPCC Initial Response (Scene)

Initial BriefingPIM basic facts (if available) Location and identity of officersConfirmation non-conferring warning has been given and how officers travelled to PIPWelfare of officers

IPCC Initial Response (PIP)

Key Considerations

Count-back

Pseudonyms

Body Worn Cameras

Clothing

Initial Accounts

Detailed Accounts

Separation

Conferring

1. Count-back

IPCC presence

Which officers should count back?

Which weapons?

Other options

2. Protecting Officers’ IdentitiesAnonymity and Pseudonyms

Anonymity can only be granted by a judge or coroner

Pseudonyms can be given to anyone

APP Armed Policing

Anonymity provided to key police witnesses:

- Officers directly related to the decision to use force (i.e. SFC, TFC,

Tac

Ad, AFO, FIB)

IPCC Policy

PIP - Anyone can use a pseudonym during initial stages

IPCC must be provided with officers’ true identities

Officer(s) who discharged their weapon will automatically keep their pseudonym during investigation

All other officers are subject to different consideration

2. Protecting Officers’ IdentitiesAnonymity and Pseudonyms

Officers who did not discharge weapons

Considerations include:

Risk assessment

Nature of the work they undertake

Prejudice to ongoing investigations

Anonymity applications

Commissioner will consider these and decide on whether pseudonyms will be kept

Final report considerations separate

3. Body Worn Cameras

IPCC expect:

Cameras to remain on to capture non-conferring warning and travel to PIP

Camera to be taken from officer by PIM or nominated officer not involved in incident (DPS)

Officers not to watch footage until permission received by IPCC

Other issues

Officer welfare / privacy

Impact on pseudonyms

4. Clothing

Not automatically needed for investigation

Must be an evidential reason to take clothing. E.G.:

Blood splatter analysis

If necessary can be seized as property by the appropriate authority

Considerations around welfare

5. Initial Accounts

APP Armed Policing

The purpose of the personal initial account is to record the officer’s role, what

they believe to be the essential facts and should, where relevant, outline the

honestly held belief that resulted in their use of force.

IPCC

Need enough information to progress the investigation effectively

6. Detailed Accounts

APP states that these may be taken by the IPCC or written by the officers themselves

IPCC may wish to interview all or some of the officers as this is currently considered to achieve best evidence. IPCC can compel officers to attend interview.

If officers do write their own statements then an IPCC representative may want to be present

6. The Future

Following a consultation process the IPCC has drafted new statutory guidance. It outlines a different process for providing accounts:

Detailed individual factual account (DIFA)

All key policing witnesses will be expected to assist in the investigation into the death or serious injury by providing a full and detailed account at the earliest opportunity

A DIFA will be required from each policing witness before s/he goes off duty

DIFA contains full information about their involvement in the incident

7. Separation

A decision for the PIM based on whether it is necessary to prevent conferring

The decision to separate or a request to separate needs to be documented

IPCC currently in agreement with this guidance

Fatal shooting of Dean Joseph September 2014During post incident procedure where stage 4 accounts were compiled, officers were sat according to their positions or role during the incident (white, black, stick, command). The IPCC were critical of this and recommended: It is recognised that current APP guidance states that separation should only be considered when it is both practicable and necessary to do so, and where there are no implications for the safety of the public of officers. Where officers remain together while writing their statements consideration should be given to sitting the officers in a manner which minimises rather than encourages conferring about their accounts.

7. Separation – case study

7. The Future

New draft statutory guidance outlines a different position on

separation

.

Officers should not communicate about the incident with each other or any other potential witness before or after giving accounts

If conferring is necessary to avert a

real and immediate risk to life

then comprehensive notes must be taken as to:

Extent of communication

Justification for the communication

Content of that communication

Officers should be kept separate as soon as it is operationally safe to do so

8. Conferring – Case Study

Fatal shooting of Dean Joseph September 2014

During post incident procedure where stage 4 accounts were compiled, the Tactical Advisor’s log was put onto a flip chart for all officers to see.

Two examples were:

Male more agitated, female struggling

Considered pre-emptive taser strike but not appropriate due to sitting down, cramped area insufficient target, not suitable for baton gun

The IPCC were informed about everything that officers conferred about and provided with the flip charts after the PIP The IPCC did not find that there was any misconduct relating to the PIP but were critical of some of the conferring and recommended: Evidence about an incident, factual or not, should not be provided to officers during the post incident procedure. Providing such information risks influencing the officers’ recollection of events and contaminating their evidence. This is likely to undermine the integrity of the process, leave officers vulnerable to criticism and reduce public confidence in the investigation.

8. Conferring – Case Study

8. Conferring – Case Study

The PIP came under scrutiny at the inquest for the same reasons and doubt was cast over the credibility of the officers’ accounts

HMC - officers could have been telling the truth but there was doubt cast due to the PIP

She said that the PIP had not served anyone, not the officers, not the family and not the public

Officers were not allowed in court to hear each others evidence

Press –

“‘

Doubt’ over evidence of siege cops as shooting inquest is told how officers later wrote accounts of incident together

” – Islington Tribune

The MPS have said “

There are flaws in the process

...”

Normal PIP may not be appropriate in these circumstancesStill Article 2 obligationsOngoing consultations between the IPCC and NPCCCommunication key

Terrorist Firearms Incident

Any questions?