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Advanced Network Based IPS Evasion Techniques Advanced Network Based IPS Evasion Techniques

Advanced Network Based IPS Evasion Techniques - PowerPoint Presentation

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Advanced Network Based IPS Evasion Techniques - PPT Presentation

Antti Levomäki Christian Jalio Olli Pekka Niemi 28 October 2009 Intrusion Prevention Systems should protect vulnerable hosts from remote exploits Exploits can apply multiple evasion method to bypass the detection of Intrusion Prevention Systems and break into the remote sy ID: 276861

smb evasion random tcp evasion smb tcp random msrpc write byte fragment context payload fragmentation fragments object time urgent

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Slide1

Advanced Network Based IPS Evasion Techniques

Antti Levomäki, Christian Jalio, Olli-Pekka Niemi

28 October 2009Slide2

Intrusion Prevention Systems should protect vulnerable hosts from remote exploits

Exploits can apply multiple evasion method to bypass the detection of Intrusion Prevention Systems and break into the remote system Hack.Lu 2009

IntroductionSlide3

There

are hacking tools which apply multiple evasion techniques However, these tools are more exploit oriented and not evasion orientedSlide4

IP Fragmentation with manipulated fragment size and order

TCP segmentation with manipulated segment size and orderSMB Fragmentation SMB Transaction Write Method MSRPC Multibind (bind to multiple ”unnecessary or non-existent” context + the vulnerable contextMSRPC fragmentation

MSRPC

encryption

Known Evasions Implemented various testing tools…Slide5

IP Random Options

TCP Time WaitTCP Urgent PointerSMB Write/Read PaddingSMB Transaction Method fragmentation SMB Session MixingMSRPC Alter Context MSRPC Object ReferenceMSRPC Endian

Manipulation

Not So Known Evasions, Implemented in ???Slide6

IPS signatures can be evaded completely if the protocol stacks do not understand the evasions and normalize the traffic

Example: SMB and MSRPC signatures should not worry about fragmentation, padding , extra methods or other randomizationsThe Power of Evasion MethodsSlide7

Fill IP Packet with random Options

If the target host and the IPS device disagree about the validity of the packet, the target host may see different data than the IPSIPRandom OptionsSlide8

Open and close a TCP connection. Open a new TCP-connection to the same service using the same TCP-source port.

According the TCP RFC, the TCP client MUST wait ”TIME-Wait Delay” amount of seconds before reusing a port.If the attacker uses his own TCP/IP Stack, he can open and close a TCP-connection and immediately open a new TCP connection using the same source port.The IPS stack should handle new connections as new connections regardless of the TIME-Wait-Delay

TCP Evasion

TCP Time WaitSlide9

I

nsert one byte into a TCP-stream. TCP-Server chooses whether to use or discard the added byte.An IPS device inspection can be evaded by clever use of the urgent pointer. ExampleTCP Stream: GETP / (P is urgent data)IPS sees: GETP /Apache sees: GET /

TCP

Evasion

TCP

Urgent

PointerSlide10

It is possible to use multiple resources over the same SMB-session within the single TCP-connection at same time.

Simultaneously read and write into multiple files SMB EvasionSMB

Session

MixingSlide11

The write and read commands have an offset pointer that can be used for padding.

All data after the SMB header till the pointed byte should be discarded.SMB Evasion

SMB Write/Read PaddingSlide12

SMB Trans Act Write Method

The SMB Protocol allows the fragmentation of Transaction messages by using ”Transaction secondary” messages. SMB Evasion

SMB

Transaction

MethodSlide13

MSRPC Object Reference

Adding an Object Reference (UUID) to an MSRPC Request Header enlarges the header by 16 bytes, and thus moves the MSRPC payload 16 bytes forward. MSRPC Evasion

MSRPC Object Reference Slide14

The client may change the current context using the Alter Context Method. All subsequent request

s then go to the new contextExample: The client binds to non vulnerable context and then changes into a vulnerable context and sends the exploit.

MSRPC

Evasion

Alter

ContextSlide15

MSRPC protocol allows both big- and little-

endian encodingWindows hosts normally use the little-endian encodingHackers should use big endian for obvious reasons…MSRPC EndiannessSlide16

Introducing Predator

Evasion Fuzzer Use multiple random evasion techniques simultaneously in multiple layersTransmit the

same payload

until

successfulSlide17

Evasions in Predator

Evasions for attack "CVE-2008-4250 “IP fragmentation, --ip_frag: 8byte: Fragment IP payload into 8 byte fragments

16byte: Fragment IP payload into 16 byte fragments

24byte

Fragment IP payload into 24 byte fragments

256byte

Fragment IP payload into 256 byte fragments

random_order

: Send fragments in a random order

out_of_order

: Send one fragment out of order

fwd_overwrite

Perform forward overwriting with fragments

last_first

Send last fragment first

one_duplicate

Send one duplicate fragment

IP

evasion, --

ip_evasion

:

random_options

: Send

random IP options Slide18

TCP fragmentation, --

tcp_frag: 1byte Fragment TCP payload into 1 byte segments

TCP

evasion, --

tcp_evasion

:

time_wait

Open a decoy connection and attack from same

ip:port

while in time-wait

urgent_ptr

Insert meaningless data into 1 byte urgent segments Slide19

SMB fragmentation,

--smb_frag: 16byte Fragment SMB payload into 16 byte fragments 256byte

Fragment SMB payload into 256 byte fragments

SMB

evasion,

--

smb_evasion

:

andx_connect

Negotiate SMB session and connect to a tree connect an

AndX

message

decoy_trees

Open decoy SMB tree connects in the same TCP stream as the attack

read_offset

Use random offsets in SMB read operations

pad_write_random

Pad SMB write commands with a random sized block of random data

pad_write_static

Pad SMB write commands with a static sized block of random data

random_write_method

Use a random SMB write method ( TRANSACT / WRITE )

write_offset

Use random offsets in SMB write operationSlide20

MSRPC fragmentation, --

msrpc_frag: 16byte Fragment MSRPC payload into 16 byte fragments 256byte Fragment MSRPC payload into 256 byte fragments

MSRPC evasion, --

msrpc_evasion

:

big_endian

Communicate in big

endian

format

random_object

:

Add a random object reference to MSRPC requests

alter_context

:

Bind to a random context and then alter to the correctSlide21

Hunting High and Low

Initializing IPForge based on the configuration..Started at IP 10.0.215.32, MAC de:ad:01:00:01:02. Attacking against 10.0.215.101

Exploit run 1: TCP

fragstyle

: 1byte, TCP evasion:

urgent_ptr

, SMB

fragstyle

: 16byte, MSRPC evasion:

random_object

}

Exploit run 2: SMB evasion:

read_offset

, MSRPC evasion:

big_endian,random_object,alter_context

}

Exploit run 3: SMB evasion:

decoy_trees,pad_write_static

, MSRPC evasion:

random_object,alter_context

}

Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]

(C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp.

C:\WINDOWS\system32>Slide22

Hunting High and Low

Initializing IPForge based on the configuration..Started at IP 10.0.215.32, MAC de:ad:01:00:01:02. Attacking against 10.0.215.101Exploit run 1: TCP

fragstyle

: 1byte, TCP evasion:

urgent_ptr

, SMB evasion:andx_connect,pad_write_static,random_write_method,write_offset, MSRPC evasion:

alter_context

}

Exploit run 2: TCP evasion:

time_wait

, SMB evasion:

decoy_trees,read_offset,pad_write_static

Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]

(C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp.

C:\WINDOWS\system32>Slide23

DEMOSlide24